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2Abstract
The 198 0s were hailed by many as the decade of tax reform. A 
number of different countries were caught by a neo-liberal tax 
reforming wave which saw rates of personal and corporate income 
taxes reduced, tax allowances restricted, tax bases broadened, the 
incidence between direct and indirect taxation shifted and tax 
structures simplified. Policy makers were driven to change tax 
systems for a number of reasons. There is a tendency, however, to 
point to economic factors as the cause, but this presents only part 
of the picture. Moreover, it tells us little about the process. 
How did tax reform come about? Where did the impulse come from? 
How did it emerge on political agendas? Tax reform measures were 
the outcome of positive political decisions to make a policy 
changej. Therefore, it's primarily to the political context we must 
look for an explanation. While considering a broad range of 
competing models of politics, this paper will ultimately show that 
the complex of factors which constitute the tax reform process can 
best be explained by reference to problems, policies, politics and 
open windows in a given institutional setting. This hypothesis 
will be considered in light of the French and British experiences 
in the 1980s.
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CHAPTER ONE
"Tax reform - and in particular lowering income taxes - 
is the vogue in international economics. Governments as 
far apart as Australia and Denmark, New Zealand and 
Belgium have jumped on the bandwagon."
- Financial Times, March 9, 1987
Tax reform has become an all-pervasive feature of the 
industrialized world in the 1980s...Is there a common 
thread?"
- Financial Times, March 13, 1987
- Introduction and Reviewing the Terrain -
The 1980s were hailed by many as the decade of tax reform.1 
During that period, politicians and governments of various 
political colors were considering, advocating and/or pursuing tax 
reform. Australia, Great Britain, the United States, New 
Zealand, Belgium and France were just some of the countries 
which, during the 1980s, succumbed and contributed to this
For the purpose of this thesis, tax reform signifies an attempt to 
alter or 're-form' a given tax system with the aim or aims of enhancing 
the system's equity, efficiency, and/or simplicity. Several books and 
articles have been written about tax reform generally in the 1980s. 
Only a partial list is provided here: B.G. Peters, The Politics of 
Taxation, A Comparative Perspective, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991) ; 
J.A. Pechman, ed., World Tax Reform, A Progress Report, (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1988) ; J.A. Pechman, Tax Reform, the Rich 
and the Poor, 2nd ed., (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1989); 
T. Gandillot, Le Grand Cirque Fiscal, (Paris: Hatier, 1988); C.
Sandford, Successful Tax Reform, Lessons from an Analysis of Tax Reform 
in Six Countries, (Bath: Fiscal Publications, 1993); M. Boskin and C. 
McLure, Jr., eds., World Tax Reform, (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1990); 
J. Plender, "Another Wave of Change Ahead", Financial Times, March 13, 
1987, p.24; J. Owens, "Tax Reform: An International Perspective",
National Westminster Bank Quarterly Review, May 1987; R. Hagemann, OECD 
Department of Economics and Statistics, Working Paper, Tax Reform in 
OECD Countries, (Paris: OECD, August 1987). Several others have
appeared which are generally concerned with tax reform and/or more 
country specific and will be cited throughout the course of this 
thesis.
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phenomenon to some degree. The reforms had a markedly neo­
liberal2 flavor and show a more or less common pattern: reducing 
rates of personal income and corporate taxes, restricting tax 
allowances and broadening tax bases, simplifying rate structures 
and shifting the incidence of taxation between direct and 
indirect.
This interest in tax reform which has characterized the 
fiscal strategies of Western governments in the 1980s has been 
expressed in a range of policies reflecting a distinct mix of 
actors, ideas and institutions. In Britain, in 1979, the new 
Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher initiated the wave
A definition of neo-liberalism has been loosely adapted from the 
McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Modern Economics: a Handbook of Terms and 
Organizations (1983) and the Dictionnaire iconomigue et Sociale (1981). 
Neo-liberalism is the modern adaptation of the laissez-faire doctrine 
of the 1800s. Among its twentieth century proponents are Ludwig von 
Mises, F.A. von Hayek and Milton Friedman. The commonly expressed 
preference is for a minimum of governmental intervention in the economy 
and society and the strengthening of economic competition through the 
free play of market forces. Neo-liberal and new right economists, (not 
always one and the same) advocated lower and simpler taxation as a 
means of realizing neo-liberal principles: less government intervention 
and more decision-making according to market mechanisms. Supply-side 
economics, a reaction and response to the perceived failure of 
Keynesian economics was embraced by some neo-liberal politicians and 
economists in the 1970s and 1980s. Hearkening back to the classical 
tradition of Adam Smith and Jean-Baptiste Say, supply-side economics 
prescribes, among other things, tax cuts, as a way of slowing 
inflation, creating incentives and stimulating production. Some of the 
measures devised by policy makers owed their inspiration to a 
California economist, Arthur Laffer who maintained that marginal tax 
rates, if too high, discourage work, risk and investment. However, if 
taxes were reduced, people would consider work and savings more 
worthwhile than leisure, which consequently would have a buoyant effect 
on government revenues. Laffer's theory has antecedents in the 
thinking of Baron de Montesquieu and Adam Smith. It is interesting to 
note that J. Duberge (Les Francais Face d 1'Impot: essai de psychologie 
fiscale, Paris: LGDJ, 1990) and G. Belanger ("Le Federalisme Fiscal ou 
Comment Concevoir 1'Harmonisation", Revue Francaise de Finances 
Publiques, no.20, 1987) assert that Laffer's theory was not at all
novel. In fact, it has its roots in French public finance thinking, 
"discovered" first by an engineer of the Ponts et Chaussees, Jules 
Dupuit in the 19th century, and developed by Jean-Marcel Jeanneney in 
the 1930s. These two Frenchmen, according to Duberge and Belanger, 
long before Laffer came along, had turned their attention to the links 
between tax rates, incentives and tax revenues.
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of reform by lowering marginal rates of taxation, particularly 
for high income earners, and shifting the incidence of taxation 
from direct to indirect taxes. The election of Ronald Reagan in 
1980, was the impetus for the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 
1981 which lowered income tax rates over a three year period for 
individuals, cut corporate taxes and created new tax expenditures 
or renewed old ones. These two administrations, elected in part 
on their promises to cut taxes and simplify their nations' 
respective tax systems, set the tone for other governments for 
the rest of the decade. Even France, under Francois Mitterrand, 
was soon to acknowledge the efficacy and appeal of tax reform. 
Less than two years following the left's victory in the 1981 
elections, the Mitterrand government was giving serious 
consideration to lowering taxes and a small but symbolically 
significant exploratory effort was realized in the 1985 Budget.
The focus here is on the evolution of tax reform in Britain 
and France. These countries have often pursued different policy 
paths in the face of the economic problems which emerged and 
undermined their economies from the 1970s.3 This divergence was 
also evident in the tax policies pursued by each country; 
although by the mid- to late 1980s, some convergence was evident 
as France moved closer to the British "model”. Despite the 
apparent divergence, a common thread can be detected in attitudes
For an excellent comparison and analysis of French and British economic 
policies in the post-war period see, P. Hall, Governing the Economy: 
The Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France, (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1986).
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and approaches to tax reform in the 1980s. Policy makers were 
driven to change tax systems for a number of reasons. However 
diverse the policies chosen, similar rationales lay behind the 
changes or proposed changes, among which: the need to meet the 
challenges of stagflationary economies, ideology (ie. "neo­
liberalism") , similar changes underway in other countries, and 
the need to maintain and encourage economic competitiveness.
At first glance, it appears tax reform could be explained 
largely in economic terms. In other words, the sort of tax 
measures enacted during the 1980s were, for example, deemed 
necessary to stimulate the economy and to keep capital from 
finding more attractive locations. However, attributing tax 
reform to changes in the economic environment and to economic 
forces is not entirely convincing and, therefore, unsatisfactory. 
We learn little about the process. How did tax reform emerge on 
the political agenda? Where did the idea come from? How did tax 
reform evolve from idea to government policy? These questions as 
well as others arise from consideration of this phenomenon and to 
answer them begs a review of the form and development of tax 
reform and an attempt to explain its emergence as an important 
feature of government policy during the 1980s. One purpose of 
this paper will be to explain the evolution of tax reform in 
Britain and France and thereby illuminate the influence and 
effect of politics on that evolution. The United States will 
intermittently be added to the analysis in order to enhance the 
comparative features of this paper and provide extra leverage
14
over the issues treated therein.
This effort requires a contextual framework which considers 
the factors that influenced this important government policy. 
Given that tax policy is subsumed under the rubric of economic 
policy making, and that taxation has traditionally been seen as a 
tool of economic management, the temptation to see tax policy as 
simply a response to prevailing economic conditions is hard to 
resist. However, an economic explanation on its own terms is not 
entirely convincing. Economic policy, and more particularly, tax 
policy, is made by governments. Governments are made up of 
politicans, among other things. It is therefore reasonable to 
expect that political variables play an integral part in the tax 
policy making process. The impact made by these variables and 
their relative importance is oftentimes difficult to assess. 
Still, this paper maintains that they exist and, furthermore, 
have a decisive impact on the character and direction of tax 
reform. Tax reform and the tax policy making process must 
therefore be seen as a highly political process.
Tax reform measures were the outcome of positive political 
decisions to make a policy change. While economic forces played 
a part in the emergence of tax reform on political agendas in the 
late 1970s/early 1980s, it is to the political context that we 
must look for an explanation of tax reform. Of course, how one 
conceptualizes that political context is very important, and an 
attempt will be made to assess the politics of tax reform in 
light of competing models of politics.
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This thesis will approach this public policy change by 
combining empirical and theoretical material. The focus will be 
on the political dimensions of tax reform. It will show how 
politics, and to a certain extent economics, affected the 
evolution of tax reform from idea to government policy. 
Consequently, this thesis is primarily about the political 
dimensions of tax reform. It contends that political variables 
have been central to the character and direction of tax reform. 
This contention, however, begs certain questions. What sort of 
political variables are involved? How does one conceptualize the 
range of political factors that influenced the tax reform 
process? Several important lines of analysis have been developed 
to explain the policy making process in general, and the tax 
policy making process in particular. The approach here will 
demonstrate how such elements as interest groups, public opinion, 
culture, political parties, policy activists, institutions and 
the international environment influenced the tax (reform) policy 
processes up to the point of setting the government's agenda. We 
will discover how these and other elements were important in 
shaping and defining tax reform in France and Britain.
The first part of this thesis will seek to explain, by 
reference to existing models of politics, the process of tax 
reform. As we have noted, a complex of factors accounts for the 
emergence of this issue on the government's agenda. Our ultimate 
purpose is to illustrate and to identify the complex of factors 
relevant to the political dynamic. In order to do this we must
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understand the policy process with the help of appropriate 
analytical tools. This undertaking will entail a review of the 
existing literature in the field, ranging widely across various 
models, theories, frameworks and approaches whose assumptions 
will be considered in some depth in the first part (Chapter 2) of 
the thesis, and then more briefly later (Chapters 7 and 8) as we 
set some of these assumptions against the facts presented in the 
second part (Chapters 3 through 6). This review will ultimately 
show that the complex of factors which constitute the tax reform 
process in France and Britain can best be explained by reference 
to three process streams - problems, policies and politics - the 
opening of windows and the role of ideas, actors and 
institutions.
The second part is concerned with describing events and 
circumstances leading up to the appearance of tax reform on the 
government's agenda. This account will stick to the facts and 
provide the socio-economic and political contexts in which tax 
reform evolved. Our focus is on France and Britain, which for a 
number of reasons, lend themselves to comparative discussions.4
Among these reasons are: 1) France and Britain are categorized as
unitary states; 2) the geographical proximity of the two countries; 3) 
the inclination of each country to scrutinize political and economic 
developments in the other; 4) their status as "intermediate economies";
5) the centralized control over fiscal policy exercised by the Treasury 
in Britain and the Ministry of Finance in France, and 6) the similar 
trends in taxation exhibited by the mid-1980s. See e.g. : P. Hall, 1986, 
op.cit.; P. Cerny, "State Capitalism in Britain and France and the 
International Economic Order" in P. Cerny and M. Schain, eds. , 
Socialism, the State and Public Policy in France, (London: Frances
Pinter, 1985) ; R. Sturm, "Budgetary Policy-Making Under Institutional 
Restrictions: The Experience of Britain, France, West Germany and the 
United States", Government and Opposition, vol.21, no.4, Autumn 1986; 
N. Lawson, The View From No. 11, Memoirs of a Tory Radical, (London: 
Bantam Press, 1992), pp.272,274; J. Henig, C. Hamnett and H. 
Feigenbaum, "The Politics of Privatization: a Comparative Perspective",
17
However, given limitations of space, and the availability of a 
plethora of material treating British tax reform in the 1980s, 
the Anglo-French comparison will rely on an elaborate study on 
French tax reform and a cursory study on British tax reform.5 
Rather than a detailed account, as has been done with France, the 
case of Britain will be selectively and carefully incorporated 
into the analysis.
The final part (Chapters 7 and 8) of this thesis will 
attempt to synthesize the first two parts and advance an 
appropriate analytical framework for an explanation of the 
processes and activities observed. It is particularly concerned 
with conceptualizing the interaction of ideas, actors and 
institutions. Hopefully this enterprise will offer an 
improvement on existing political explanations of tax reform and
Governance, vol.l, no.4, October 1988; D.E. Ashford, "The British and 
French Social Security Systems: Welfare States by Intent and by
Default" in D.E. Ashford and E.W. Kallet, eds., Nationalizing Social 
Security in Europe and America, (Greenwich: JAI Press, 1986); W.
Coleman, "Policy Convergence in Banking, a Comparative Study", 
Political Studies, vol.42, no.2, June 1994; P. Pierson and M. Smith, 
"Bourgeois Revolution? The Policy Consequences of Resurgent 
Conservatism" and J.S. Keeler, "Opening the Window for Reform: 
Mandates, Crises and Extraordinary Policy-Making", Comparative 
Political Studies, vol.25, no.4, January 1993; P.J. Katzenstein, ed., 
Between Power and Plenty, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1978) .
On British tax reform see: A. Robinson and C. Sandford, Tax Policy- 
Making in the United Kingdom, (London: Heinemann, 1983) ; A. Dilnot and 
J. Kay, "Tax Reform in the United Kingdom: The Recent Experience" in 
M. Boskin and C. McLure, Jr., eds., op.cit.; J. Kay and M. King, The 
British Tax System, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, 1990); S. 
Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy: Swedish, British and American
Approaches to Financing the Modern State, (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1993); C. Sandford, 1993, op.cit., ch.3; B. Sabine, "Life and 
Taxes 1943-1992, Part III 1965-1992: Reform, Rossminster and
Reductions", British Tax Review, no.6#, 1993; J. Leape, "Tax Policies 
in the 1980s and 1990s: the Case of the United Kingdom" in A. Knoester, 
ed., Taxation in the United States and Europe, (London: St. Martin's 
Press, 1993); T. Gandillot, op.cit., ch.3; N. Lawson, op.cit. 
Additional literature pertinent to British tax reform will be cited 
later in this study.
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help us to better understand how and why tax reform emerged on 
the French and British governments' agendas in the 1980s. This 
analysis, furthermore, may prove to be of use beyond the limited 
scope considered here. That will be for the reader to decide. 
Reviewing the Terrain
Despite institutional, political, economic/budgetary and 
other constraints, neo-liberal tax reform found its way onto the 
agendas in Britain and France (some of the principal reforms 
introduced in France and Britain in the 1980s appear in Appendix 
B). Faced with the evidence of tax reform in these two 
countries, how do we explain its appearance? How do we explain 
why and how this issue emerged on the agendas in Britain and 
France in the 1980s? How and why did the French and British 
governments come to consider and adopt tax reform? Such 
questions will be briefly addressed in due course. The questions 
are, however, related to the larger issue of how governments 
choose the policies they do. A range of factors come into play. 
But how should we conceptualize this range of factors? On the 
answer to this question, there is little agreement.
The study of taxation is typically the domain of economists. 
They tend to see taxation policy as a tool of economic management 
that responds to prevailing economic conditions. This is, in 
part, true. But this view provides us with only part of the 
picture. Tax policy is developed, written, and decided by 
governments. Furthermore, it is enacted, implemented and 
evaluated by governments. As tax decisions are among the most
19
political that a government can make, and as governments are 
themselves political creatures, it seems only natural that 
conceptualizing the tax reform process should rely on a model of 
politics. The appropriate model should adequately stress policy 
innovation and account for and explain the interaction of actors, 
ideas, and institutions in a given context. Moreover, these 
interactions need to be studied in the light of the motives, 
methods and opportunities which impel them.6
As the issues of interest here are how and why tax reform 
rose on the governmental agendas in Britain and France rather 
than how authoritative decisions on tax reform were actually made 
and implemented, and rather than assessing the effectiveness of 
that process, the focus will be on the early stages of the policy 
process: problem recognition, agenda setting and to a lesser 
extent, policy formulation. By focusing thusly, we will 
hopefully come to understand not only how and why tax reform 
emerged on the agenda, but also if, how, and why, the agendas in 
these countries did indeed change to accommodate the rise of this 
item.
Political scientists and economists have put forward a 
variety of tools to help us better understand how and why we get 
the policies we do. Appropriately conceptualizing the policy 
process by ascertaining those factors that most influence it is 
no small challenge. Thankfully, there are a number of different
See, S.B. Hansen, The Politics of Taxation, (New York: Praeger, 1983), 
c h . 2 .
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theories and models available which help us identify, organize, 
and understand the range of factors involved in different public 
policy areas and which help us to make predictions. The astute 
student will be wary of any model that claims to be ' the model to 
end all models'. It would be foolhardy to assume that there is 
only one way in which policy can be made. Most political 
scientists couch their models in tentative terms; in other words, 
'if X conditions are present then Y is (highly) (im)probable or 
(un)likely'. When dealing with the vague and imprecise phenomena 
which make up the tax policy making process, it is more fruitful, 
perhaps, to think in probabilistic, rather than absolute, terms.
In uncovering and examining the evidence which describes the 
events and activities germane to tax reform in the 1980s, it is 
important to consider a range of models. The standard theories 
and explanations which we will examine shortly reveal important 
and interesting aspects of the tax policy process in general, and 
the tax reform process in particular. Several competing models 
are available: rational-comprehensive, incremental, public 
choice, cultural, group, elite, state-centric, learning- 
diffusion, institutional and garbage can/process streams.7 We
Immediately I am setting aside theories of inertia and incrementalism, 
although I do devote some attention to the latter. While they are 
generally helpful in explaining parts 'of the policy process, they are 
not appropriate as explanations of agenda change. As Kingdon (1984, 
p.87) points out, agenda change appears quite discontinuous and non- 
incremental (see, J. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public 
Policies, Boston: Little, Brown, 1984). Both theories are
inappropriate for our discussion here because they de-emphasize the 
ability of policy makers to: 1) act decisively, and 2) introduce
measures that depart from the norm and which are likely to have 
important financial, economic, social and/or political consequences. 
Moreover, they largely ignore the role of ideas, policy entrepreneurs 
and institutional change. Why and how tax reform emerged on the French
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will briefly describe these models and test their validity 
against the data below.
Each model calls forth and focuses attention on a variety of 
- and in may cases distinct - elements in the policy process.
But while each may contain some element of truth, none, but one 
or two, takes us very far in trying to understand the range of 
factors that determined tax reform in Britain and France in the 
1980s. By the end of this review of existing theoretical and 
empirical material, it should be apparent that the 'process 
streams and windows' approach developed by John Kingdon (1984), 
in combination with institutional arguments, seems to optimally 
capture and explain the range of factors involved in the early 
stages of the tax reform process. Moreover, the synthesis of 
these two frameworks provides common ground for considering the 
proceesess that took place in Britain and France. Although, as 
with other models it may demonstrate certain limitations, the 
Kingdon approach seems to explain in the most comprehensive, 
systemic and empirical manner, the events and activities 
associated with tax reform in Britain and France in the 1980s.
This approach, however, is no doubt incomplete.
Nevertheless, this study will hopefully prove helpful in 
fostering a greater understanding of the pre-enactment processes
and British governments' agendas cannot be accounted for in terms of 
incrementalism or inertia. However, as constructs for analyzing the 
activities and policies generated by agenda change, incrementalism and 
inertia are not without some validity (see: J. Witte, The Politics and 
Development of the Federal Income Tax, Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1985; R. Rose and T. Karran, Taxation by Political Inertia, 
London: Allen and Unwin, 1987) .
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particular to the politics of tax reform in France and Britain,
as Kingdon's did for the health and transportation policy areas
in the United States. And if the ideas derived from this study
should facilitate or enhance analysis in this or other policy
areas within one country or across countries, then this work will
have exceeded the scope of its limited aims.
The approach undertaken here is influenced by the first two
of Jones's (1977) five systems of action: problem identification
and policy formulation. Both these activities are essential to
the agenda-setting process which is our focus. Jones (1977)
quotes Layne D. Hoppe's definition of agendas,
"'Agenda' [comes] to have meaning in terms of specific 
patterns of action in government - particularly those 
in the early stages of policy development. An analysis 
of agenda-setting processes [becomes] an analysis of
how problems developed, how they were defined, the
courses of action formulated to act on these problems, 
the legitimation of one course of action over another, 
the emergence of policy systems designed to act on such 
problems on a continuing basis. The result [is] that 
it [is] most difficult to isolate an agenda-setting 
process as an identifiable, one-time, discrete 
process."8
Our purpose will be to identify a pattern, or patterns, of action
in the early stages of the policy process, particularly those
stages which led to the setting of the neo-liberal tax reform 
agenda.
Why focus on agenda setting? It is a critical stage in the
Layne D. Hoppe, "Agenda-Setting Strategies: Pollution Policy,"
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Arizona, 1969, p. 2, 
quoted from Charles Jones, An Introduction to the Study of Public 
Policy, (North Scituate: Duxbury Press, 1977), p.39. Brackets are 
Jones' s.
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policy process. As B. Guy Peters writes, "Agenda setting is 
crucial, for if an issue cannot be placed on the agenda, it 
cannot be considered and nothing will happen."9 In order for an 
issue or a proposal to become government policy, it must first 
earn a place on the governmental agenda.10 This is the first 
major hurdle in the policy process. If an issue or proposal is 
receiving serious attention from key decision makers in and 
around government, and it is deemed viable - by which I mean, it 
passes certain criteria which make it viable, i.e. technical and 
budgetary feasibility, no widespread political opposition, etc. - 
then it is very likely that it will become government policy.
Tax reform is a case in point. Several governments, for a 
number of reasons, considered and investigated the issue of tax 
reform in the late 1970s and 1980s out of ideological, political 
and economic concerns. Reacting to perceived problems, 
participants in the governmental and non-governmental policy 
communities proceeded to develop solutions and policies, many of 
which are subsumed under the rubric of neo-liberal tax reform.
B.G. Peters, American Public Policy: Promise and Performance, Third 
edition, (Chatham: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1993), p.41.
John Kingdon (1984) distinguishes between a governmental agenda, which 
represents the array of items which are receiving serious attention by 
a broad range of people both in and around government, and a decision 
agenda, which is a more 'advanced' stage of the governmental agenda, 
when a more selective set of proposals or policies are being reviewed 
with the aim of taking a decision concerning future enactment. This 
stage is generally dominated by an authoritative decision-maker, i.e. 
a member of cabinet or a prime minister or president. The decision 
taken may be positive or negative. Kingdon also refers to a 
specialized agenda, which comprises a narrower set of subjects 
receiving serious attention by a particular interested party, i.e. a 
political party, an interest group, a policy community. I will be 
using Kingdon's conceptions of 'agenda' throughout the course of this 
paper (see, J. Kingdon, 1984, op.cit., pp.3-4, 174).
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In some cases, the policy, was considered, but no action was 
taken. But in other cases, the policy was adopted and prepared 
for enactment.
Neo-liberal tax reform swept onto the agendas in Britain 
from 1979 and in France, from the early 1980s. Given the 
dramatic and sweeping manner in which this issue appeared on 
governmental agendas - and in France in particular where the 
issue rose onto the agenda against many odds - I was led to 
question why. Why did tax reform emerge when it did? What made 
it an idea whose time had come? What forces were at work which 
made actors, both inside and outside government, attend to this 
idea? As already indicated, these questions necessitate 
focussing on the pre-enactment stages of the policy process.
What is being looked at here is not how the issue was 
authoritatively decided by the executive or the legislature, but 
rather how tax reform came to be an issue in the first place.
The inspiration for this study was John Kingdon's work on 
agenda processes embodied in his Agendas, Alternatives and Public 
Policy (1984). His examination of the dynamics of the agenda 
setting processes in the United States spurred me to undertake my 
own examination of the extent to which such dynamics were, or 
were not, present in Britain and France with respect to one of 
the most significant political issues and economic policy 
developments in the 1980s. Pre-enactment - or agenda setting - 
processes, and the politics of tax reform in the 1980s, are both 
relatively under-examined areas in West European politics (as
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opposed to the economics and administration of tax reform); 
moreover, in terms of France, English language literature on the 
subject is practically non-existent. This study will hopefully 
make these waters less unfamiliar.
The activities of the agenda setting process are not clearly 
discernable and identifiable. There are no firm boundaries. As 
Kingdon (1984) notes, "In contrast to many areas of study in the 
social sciences, this one is particularly untidy."11 Many 
problems, ideas, proposals, actors and institutions are involved 
in often times hard to predict and haphazard ways. There is 
rarely a neat and orderly sequence of events. Various models 
attempt to make the process less untidy and more comprehensible. 
Indeed, there are a number of theoretical approaches to the study 
of public policy which focus on the process in a fairly precise 
and orderly way. Apart from the models referred to above, other 
public policy models focus on the policy itself. In such studies 
the output and how it is arrived at are of primary concern. 
Rational and incremental decision making theories and inertia 
theories are important here. However, I intend to concentrate on 
the process rather than the output. The thrust therefore is 
descriptive rather than prescriptive, process-oriented rather 
than output-oriented. In the next chapter, we will briefly 
examine and assess the theoretical landscape and try to determine 
to what extent it is capable of explaining tax reform in Britain 
and France in the 1980s.
ii J. Kingdon, 1984, op.cit., p.2.
CHAPTER TWO
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CHAPTER TWO
- Explaining Tax Reforms the Models -
Introduction
During the 1980s neo-liberal tax reform found its way onto 
the governmental agendas in Britain and France. In Britain, tax 
reform was ushered in under the Conservative governments led by 
Margaret Thatcher from 1979. In France, tax reform became 
government policy first under a Socialist government, then a 
conservative one whose ideological predisposition, heightened the 
priority given to the issue. The emergence of tax reform in 
Britain and France, as well as other countries, and the 
variations in approach, have provoked a reconsideration of 
conventional models of tax politics and policy making. While I 
will not endeavor to elucidate all the theories proffered as 
explanations of the tax policy making process some of the more 
important lines of analysis will be treated here.
The tax reform process has something to tempt every 
theoretical taste and it would be misleading to assert that tax 
reform came to the governmental agendas in Britain and France in 
only one way. The data is, of course, open to differing 
interpretations. Other models may lead to different conclusions. 
There are, however, some common patterns discernible. I will 
strive to show how the emergence of the tax reform issue and its 
translation into policy was an interactive process of politics 
and economics, ultimately shaped by institutional factors. The 
approach used here, by presenting a different perspective on the
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tax reform agenda setting process, should be seen as an 
enhancement, rather than a replacement, of existing models. It 
will focus attention on a new - in some cases - and greater range 
of elements relevant to the politics of tax reform in the 1980s.
To begin, we will briefly examine and assess the viability 
of the aforementioned models, especially for the purpose of 
explaining tax reform.
Rat ional-Comprehens ive
A natural starting point is to consider tax policy making in 
terms of rational decision making. A model of rational decision 
making represents a technique devised by economists to explain 
how decisions are made. We will look at how it might be applied 
to the tax policy making process. Basically, the theory holds, 
that when a decision or choice must be made, the assumption is 
that an objective has been identified, and a clear set of 
alternatives has been developed and considered. And once the 
chooser - who may be an individual, a group or a government - 
takes into account all the constraints and assesses the costs and 
benefits of those alternatives, he chooses the one alternative 
that will help him achieve his goal, consequently maximizing his 
utility at least cost.12
The rational comprehensive model seeks to explain policy 
making in terms of deciding (taxing) policies in light of clearly 
stated goals and after consideration of all possible
See e.g., J. Tinbergen, On the Theory of Economic Policy, (Amsterdam: 
North-Holland, 1952).
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alternatives. However clear and logical the arguments may sound, 
they do not aptly describe reality. And in the case of tax 
reform in the 1980s in Britain and France, while rational 
decision making is the ideal, it is not entirely operative.
In the sphere of public policy making the limits to this 
sort of rationality have already been well documented.13 For 
example, governments do not always clarify their (tax) policy 
goals and the means by which they intend to achieve those goals. 
Oftentimes they are vague and contradictory. Neither do 
governments allocate the time, energy and other resources 
necessary to examine all the possible alternatives and their 
consequences. Furthermore, the conflicting attitudes and 
behavior of politicians, civil servants and affected interests 
frustrate any attempt at rational comprehensive decision making. 
In the end, the outcome of any decision is usually different from 
the original intent, and the results achieved represent a "next 
best" solution.
See e.g.: H. Simon, "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice", The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.69, no.l, February 1955; A. Downs, 
Inside Bureaucracy, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967); K. Renwick, 
ed., The Economic Approach to Politics: a Critical Reassessment of the 
Theory of Rational Action, (New York: Harper Collins, 1991); R. Bauer 
and K. Gergen, eds., The Study of Policy Formation, (London: Collier- 
Macmillan, 1968); P-M. Gaudemet and E. Zoller, "Les Limites a la 
Rationalite des Choix Budgetaires" in K. Roskamp, ed., Public Choice 
and Public Finance, (Paris: Editions Cujas, 1980); C. Lindblom,
Politics and Markets, (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p.323; J. Kay, 
"Tax Reform in Context: A Strategy for the 1990s", Fiscal Studies, 
vol.7, no.4, November 1986; A. Robinson and C. Sandford, 1983, op.cit; 
A. Peyrefitte, Le Mai Francais, (Paris: Plon, 1976); G. Thompson, The 
Political Economy of the New Right, (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990) , 
p. 33; C. Heckly, RationalitS ficonomique et Decisions Fiscales, (Paris: 
LGDJ, 1987); J. Saint-Geours, Pouvoir et Finance, (Paris: Fayard,
1979).
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Incrementalism
Charles Lindblom was instrumental, though not alone, in 
developing a theory of policy making which some claim more aptly 
fits the processes we are examining. The very limits of rational 
comprehensive (or synoptic) decision making, in fact, find 
expression in a pattern of policy making which is incremental.14 
As opposed to rational decision making where problems and 
potential solutions are comprehensively reviewed, incremental 
decision making considers problems individually on an ad hoc 
basis and with little regard for long term consequences and often 
ignoring any relation with past decisions. What results are 
small, marginal, incremental changes in policy or behavior. 
Consequently, incrementalism has been described as a process 
producing "decisions effecting small changes."15
Aaron Wildavsky (1975) demonstrated the viability of this 
model in terms of the U.S. budgetary process.16 Any changes to 
budgetary policy are made upon consideration of the current base 
budget, whereupon participants in the process add or subtract 
small increments to or from the base. It is interesting to note 
that other scholars and authors have found incrementalism useful
See e.g.: C. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through", Public
Administration Review, no.14, Spring 1959, pp.79-88; D. Braybrooke and
C. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social 
Process, (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1963); Otto Davis, M. Dempster and 
A. Wildavsky, "A Theory of the Budgetary Process", American Political 
Science Review, no.60, September 1966, pp.529-547.
D. Braybrooke and C. Lindblom, 1963, op.cit., pp.62+.
A. Wildavsky, Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary Processes, 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1975).
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as a description of fiscal policy making in the United States.17
The incrementalist model has been useful in explaining tax 
policy making in, Britain and France, as well as the United 
States.18 Given an established set of taxing commitments, 
politicians - constrained by institutional forces - will do no 
more than to add or subtract small increments therefrom. However 
apt it may be as a description of the broader patterns of tax 
policy making, when one considers tax reform and the abrupt, 
large scale and non-incremental changes it often implies, 
incrementalist models which treat small, marginal changes, or 
even those which allow for large changes, are not suitable.19 
Moreover, the way tax reform appeared on governmental agendas 
cannot be explained in incremental terms.
Items often appear on agendas because they 'get hot', 'take
See e.g.: J. Witte, op.cit.; G.L. Bach, Making Monetary and Fiscal 
Policy, (Washington, D.C.: the Brookings Institute, 1971); I.
Sharkansky, The Politics of Taxing and Spending, (Indianapolis: Bobbs- 
Merrill, 1969).
See e.g.: G. Clayton and R.W. Houghton, "Reform of the British Income 
Tax System", in B. Crick and W. Robson, eds., Taxation Policy, (London: 
Penguin, 1973); J. Kay and M. King, The British Tax System, 4th ed. , 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); A. Robinson and C. Sandford, 
op.cit., p.231; C. Heckly, 1987, op.cit., p. 6. Several French 
interviewees described the outcome of French tax reform in 
incrementalist terms. Jean-Pascal Beaufret mentioned that the 
Socialist government of Francois Mitterrand decided to effect changes 
in gradual steps and, at some length, he described how tax reform 
represented a number of small steps over many years (Jean-Pascal 
Beaufret, interview in Paris, France, May 14, 1992). Commenting on the 
nature of the tax reforms in France in the 1980s, Philippe Lagayette 
said, "C'etait vrai que'elles sont partiellement ad hoc et 
conjoncturelles. . . on a une fiscalit£ qui a evolue par petits 
bouts...." Lagayette cited the example of the incremental changes in 
value added taxes from 1987 to 1992. (Philippe Lagayette, interview 
in Paris, France, May 20, 1992).
19 J. Kingdon, 1984, op.cit., pp.83-88.
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off' or 'catch on'.20 Certainly, this was the case in France; 
perhaps less so in Britain, where neo-liberal tax reform has 
deeper roots and a longer history. Yet, if one looks at the 
appearance of tax reform on the Conservative governments' agenda 
from 1979, compared to the previous government's agenda, then the 
agenda change which neo-liberal tax reform represented was 
remarkable.
Even if one does find an incremental explanation useful, it 
can only be so in part. This is as true in Britain and France, 
as in the United States. Given this limited applicability, an 
essential part of the process remains unexplained - the part 
which includes the shift points characteristic of tax reform. 
Group models
In order to conceptualize the role of groups, group (or 
pluralist) models of politics are available to guide the way.
Such models overlap somewhat with public choice and some of the 
other models examined here. According to the general (and 
popular) model of groups, the appearance of an issue and its 
translation into policy, as well as how that policy is enacted 
and implemented, are all explained in terms of the operation of 
group politics and political bargaining.21 This school maintains
20 See, J. Kingdon, op.cit., p. 85. Many of the interviewees in France and
Britain described the emergence of tax reform in similar terms. Tax 
reform had become a 'hot' issue or "a la mode" and became the focus of 
much attention.
21 See: A. Bentley, The Process of Government, (New York: Harper and Row,
1908) ; D. Truman, The Governmental Process, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 
1951) ; E. Latham, The Groups Basis of Politics, A Study in Basing-Point 
Legislation, (Ithaca: New York, 1952); R. Dahl, Polyarchy, (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1971) ; R. Macridis, "Groups and Group Theory" 
in R. Macridis and B. Brown, eds., Comparative Politics, (New York:
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that interest groups and the conflict between groups are present 
in all stages of the policy process. As R. Macridis (1977) 
maintains,
...power configuration is basically the configuration 
of competing and struggling interests organized into 
groups. Ideology, values, the state, the formal 
organization of political decision making, and the 
content of decisions are determined by a parallelogram 
of group forces.22
In such a scenario, elected politicians and administrative elites
are malleable and passive, conforming to the prevailing
pressures.23 Governmental actors and institutions referee the
group struggle, and the predominant interest is then ratified and
adopted by government.24
Some observers of the tax policy making process see tax
decisions as outcomes resulting from group competition and
political bargaining.25 Grahame Thompson (1990) goes so far as
Dorsey, 1977); G.D. Garson, Group Theories of Politics, (Sage: Beverly 
Hills, 1978); P. Dunleavy and B. O'Leary, Theories of the State, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987).
R. Macridis in R. Macridis and B. Brown, eds., op.cit., p.322.
P. Dunleavy and B. O'Leary, op.cit.
The group or pluralist model is often considered in conjunction with 
the incremental one. The relationship is made in that the competing 
demands made by opposing groups constrain decision makers from making 
anything but marginal adjustments to a given base.
See e.g.: B.G. Peters, 1991, op.cit.; A. Robinson and C. Sandford, 
op.cit.; M. Gammie, The Enactment of Teoc Legislation: an Analysis of 
the Consultative Process and Tax Legislation 1978 to 1987, (London: Law 
Society, 1988); S. Surrey , "The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist: How 
Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted", Harvard Law Review, vol.70, May 
1957; S. Mazey "Public Policy-making in France: the Art of the
Possible", West European Politics, vol.9, no.3, July 1986; The Rueff 
Commission Report, "Report on the Financial Situation of France", 
distributed by The United States Council on the International Chamber 
of Commerce, New York, 1959; J.C. Martinez, Le Statut de Contribuahle, 
Tome I, (Paris: LGDJ, 1980), p.74,179; M. Allais, Pour la RSforme de 
la FiscalitS, (Paris: Clement Juglar, 1990), p.30; C. Heckly, op.cit., 
pp.217-53.
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to say that tax policy making in Britain has been traditionally 
propelled by group politics.26 C. Heckly (1987) offers numerous 
examples of the means and results of group influence on the tax 
policy process in France.27 While, clearly, there is some 
evidence of interest group activity in the tax policy making 
process in both Britain and France, it is generally agreed, that 
this activity is greatest after policy choices have been made, 
rather than before.28 Kingdon (1984) claims that interest groups
do not often function as a source of policy or set agendas on
their own, "...lobbies often don't begin the push for legislation
or the push for agenda status."29 Groups are responding to
government proposals rather than "promoting a potential agenda 
item." In the course of our interview, Baron Cockfield, for 
example, commented on the agenda influencing roles played by such 
groups as the Institute of Fiscal Studies (IFS), the Institute 
for Economic Affairs (IEA) and the Centre for Policy Studies 
(CPS), but explained that "many of these organizations, as well 
as other groups, were reactive instead of constructively pro­
active."30 In addition, because of the secrecy which surrounds
28 G. Thompson, 1990, op.cit., pp.30-35.
27 See especially, C. Heckly, op.cit., pp.210-253.
2* See: J. Hayward, The State and the Market Economy, (Brighton:
Wheatsheaf, 1986), pp.64+; S. Mazey, 1986, op.cit., p.421; P. Hall,
"The State and the Market", in P. Hall, J. Hayward, and H. Machin, 
eds., Developments in French Politics, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990),
pp.194-5; J. Kingdon, 1984, op.cit., ch.3; J. Kay, November 1986,
op.cit., p.4; A. Robinson and C. Sandford, op.cit., p.228, ch.7; G.
Thompson, 1990, op.cit., p.33; M. Gammie, 1988, op.cit..
29 J. Kingdon, op.cit., pp.52-3).
30 Baron Arthur Cockfield, interview in London, England, June 11, 1991.
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the Treasury and Ministry of Finance budget making processes and 
the ideologically driven goals of the Conservative and (to a 
lesser degree) Socialist and RPR-UDF party leaders in government, 
the effects of pluralist activities are hard to identify.31 
Furthermore, while in practice consultation is part of the tax 
policy process in both countries, the government remains firmly 
in control and cedes little, if it so chooses, to group 
demands.32
In instances where group influence is observable (i.e. the 
CNPF and visiteurs du soir in France, or the oil companies in 
Britain), it is with difficulty that one relegates the state to a 
passive and reactive role as groups models are wont to do. In 
the final analysis, problems arise in assigning a primary, if not 
solitary, role to groups in determining British and French tax 
reform agendas.
Public choice
The public choice school makes the case that "macro-
See e.g.: B.G. Peters, 1991, op.cit., p.12; L. McQuaig, Behind Closed 
Doors, (Markham: Viking, 1987) ; R. Plant, "The Resurgence of Ideology" 
in H. Drucker, ed., Developments in British Politics, (London: 
Macmillan, 1983).
John Kay, for instance described the role of interest groups, in the 
tax policy process, as "negligible" (John Kay, interview in London, 
England, July 2, 1991). Another interviewee, Hermione Parker remarked, 
"Consultation is a farce. . . there has been less and less occasion under 
Mrs. Thatcher. The government has been very selective in terms of when 
and who it consults, and even then it is difficult to say what has come 
out of it." (Hermione Parker, interview in London, England, June'11, 
1991). On the assertion of governmental independence vis-^-vis 
interest groups, see e.g.: N. Lawson, op.cit.; P. Hall, 1986, op.cit.; 
V. Wright, "Socialism and the Interdependent Economy: Industrial
Policy-making Under the Mitterrand Presidency", Government and 
Opposition, vol.19, no.3, Summer 1984; S. Berger, "The Socialists and 
the Patronat" in H. Machin and V. Wright, eds., Economic Policy and 
Policy-making Under the Mitterrand Presidency 1981-84, (London: Frances 
Pinter, 1985) .
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political phenomena must have micro-foundations in the behavior 
of individuals."33 It starts from a deductive reasoning of the 
behavior of human beings and its consequences. A number of 
different lines of analysis have emerged from this school: 
median-voter, political business cycle/ budget maximization/ 
rent-seeking, log-rolling, fiscal illusion, to name some. Common 
to all is the assumption that individuals are "rational, utility- 
maximizing, self-interested, and (often) perfectly informed."34
Public choice analysis has been applied to the tax policy 
area with some success. As evidence of self-interested utility 
maximization, one can point to the prominence of taxation as a 
political issue during elections and its importance in election 
manifestos, or the myriad tax reliefs that riddle tax systems, or 
the efforts by governments to raise and lower taxes at various 
points in the so-called electoral - or political business -
P. Dunleavy and B. O'Leary, 1987, op.cit., p.91. See also: A. Downs, 
An Economic Theory of Democracy, (New York: Harper and Row, 1957) ; A. 
Downs, "Why the Budget is too Small in a Democracy", World Politics, 
vol.12, no.4, July I960; J. Buchanan and G. Tullock, The Calculus of 
Consent, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962) ; J. Buchanan, 
Public Finance in Democratic Process, (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1967), ch.10; M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: 
Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1971); G. Becker, "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups 
for Political Influence", Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.98, no.3, 
August 1983; W. Niskanen, Democracy and Representative Government, 
(Chicago: Aldine, 1971); J. Buchanan and R. Tollison, Theory of Public 
Choice, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1973); R. Wagner, The 
Public Economy, (Chicago: Markham, 1973); J. Buchanan, The Limits of 
Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan, (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1975); K. Roskamp, ed., Public Choice and Public Finance,
(Paris: Editions Cujas, 1980); E. Tufte, Political Control of the 
Economy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); R.E. Wagner, 
"Revenue Structure, Fiscal Illusion and Budgetary Choice", Public 
Choice, vol.25, Spring 1976; P. Van Doren, Politics, Markets and 
Congressional Policy Choices, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1991); G. Tullock, "A Simple Algebraic Logrolling Model", The American 
Economic Review, vol.60, no.3, June 1970; J. Frerejohn, Pork Barrel 
Politics, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974) .
34 P. Dunleavy and B. O'Leary, 1987, op.cit., p.88.
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cycle.
Tax reform emerged on governmental agendas because parties 
and party officials, in opposition or in government, sought to 
attract voters who appeared to demonstrate a growing predilection 
for tax cuts and other reforms. Moreover, the advocacy of tax 
reform by encompassing groups like political parties, peak 
associations, presidents and prime ministers, stemmed from their 
inherent positions and concern for the productive nature and 
welfare of society as a whole.35 Indeed, to an extent, Mancur 
Olson's (1982) argument has some value for our analysis, but it 
doesn't really provide us with an understanding of the 
process(es) by which tax reform emerged on political agendas. It 
is concerned with micro-level foundations or motivations, whereas 
we are concerned with micro-level activities and processes. Of 
course, the two cannot be entirely separated, but for the moment 
we will try first to explain how it happened and in the process, 
try to understand why.
Public choice arguments have not been universally proven or 
agreed, either in general, or with respect to explaining tax 
policy.36 Problems arise particularly with political business
35 See: M. Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, 
Stagflation and Social Rigidities, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1982); G. Mucciaroni, op.cit.
36 See e.g.: J. Diamond, "A Note on the Public Choice Approach to the
Growth in Government Expenditure", IMF Working Paper WP/88/93, 
(Washington, DC: IMF, October 21, 1988); D. Cameron, "The Expansion of 
the Public Economy: a Comparative Analysis", American Political Science 
Review, vol.72, no.4, December 1978; A.O. Hirschman, L'Economie comme 
Science Morale et Politique, (Paris: Gallimard, 1984) ; Y. M£ny and J.C. 
Thoenig, Politiques Publiques, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 1980); P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., pp.10-13; W.W. Pommerehne, 
"Public Choice Approach to Explain Fiscal Redistribution" in K.W.
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cycle, rent seeking and median voter models. Firstly, tax reform 
did not necessarily follow the concerns and patterns predicted by 
political business cycles.37 Tax cuts and tax reform did not 
always take place at predicted points in the electoral cycle. 
Secondly, it was not clear where the median voter was positioned 
with respect to the tax issue, and even less clear when opinion 
on taxation was set against opinion on spending.38 Moreover, 
there was no clear evidence that should a vote seeking politician 
find the most 'popular' position, that he/she would derive any 
benefit. Finally, one of the outstanding features of tax reform 
in the 1980s was its elimination or reduction of special tax 
privileges. Thus, many proposals resulted in concentrated costs 
and diffuse benefits.
More fundamentally, problems exist with the assumptions made 
by public choice writers. Many critics see individuals as more
Roskamp, ed., op.cit.; G. Mucciaroni, op.cit.; S. Hansen, 1983, 
op.cit., chs.l, 2; A. Rabushka, "The Tax Reform Act of 1986: 
Concentrated Costs, Diffuse Benefits - an Inversion of Public Choice", 
Contemporary Policy Issues, vol.4, October 1988; M. Schwarz and M. 
Thompson, Divided We Stand: Redefining Politics, Technology and Social 
Choice, (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990); D. North, K. Cook and M. 
Levieds, The Limits of Rationality, (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1990).
K. Monroe, "A French Political Business Cycle?" in P.G. C e m y  and M. 
Schain, eds., French Politics and Public Policy, (London: St. Martin's 
Press, 1980); J. Hayward, The State and the Market Economy, (Brighton: 
Wheatsheaf, 1986), pp.221-2; A. Cowart, "The Economic Policies of 
European Governments", Parts I and II, British Journal of Political 
Science, July 1978 and October 1978.
See e.g.: J. Duberg€, 1990, op.cit., p.308; R. Rose and T. Karran, 
1987, op.cit., pp. 95-6, 145, 167; T. Romer and H. Rosenthal, "The
Elusive Median Voter", Journal of Public Economics, vol.12, no.2, 
October 1979; L'Express, no.1735, 5-11 Octobre 1984, p.22.
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than bundles of given tastes and preferences.39 Self-interest is 
not the only motivating force. However, even if it is one among 
several, it isn't sufficient to accept it as given. How does one 
come to know what one's self-interest is (or any interest)? We 
must be prepared to account for the complex actions of 
individuals by accepting that a wide range of interests and 
motives explain human behavior. However, these interests and 
motives, as well as the strategies that guide human actions, must 
be considered endogenously and not outside of an institutional 
context.
While some lines of public choice thought have some virtue 
in furthering our understanding of the micro-level foundations of 
human behavior, as noted before, our undertaking here is 
concerned with the processes of tax reform. The neglect of an 
active institutional role in public choice analysis, moreover, 
means that we must look elsewhere for an appropriate explanation. 
Elite and state models
Given the centralized nature of tax policy making in Britain 
and France, and the elitism which characterizes the tax policy 
making cadres in both countries, the temptation to describe the
See: A. Wildavsky, "Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: 
A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation" in A.A. Berger, ed., 
Political Culture and Public Opinion, (New Brunswick: Transaction
Publishers, 1989); A. Wildavsky, "Why Self-Interest Means Less Outside 
a Social Context", Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol.6, no.2, April 
1994; M. Taylor, "Structure, Culture, and Action in the Explanation of 
Social Change" in W. Booth, P. James and H. Meadwell, eds., Politics 
and Rationality, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); K.
Thelen and S. Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Politics" in S. Steinmo, K. Thelen and F. Longstreth, eds., Structuring 
Politics, Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp.7-10.
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tax reform process in state-centric or elitist terms is hard to 
resist. But, neither model presents an accurate picture of 
reality.
In reaction to the society-centered models of pluralism some 
authors have returned to an analysis of the state and its 
capabilities. Naturally how one defines the state, and how one 
identifies and explains its autonomy, establishes important 
parameters for one's analytical framework. Some state-centric 
scholars offer related but competing visions. Rather than 
undertake a full review here, I shall refer the reader to their 
works.40
France, and to a lesser extent Britain, have been the 
subject of state-centric analysis.41 Furthermore, tax policy
See: E. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); E. Nordlinger, with T. 
Lowi and S. Fabbrini, "The Return of the State: Critique", American 
Political Science Review, vol.82, no.3, September 1988; G.A. Almond, 
"The Return to the State", Symposium, American Political Science 
Review, vol.82, no.3, September 1988; S. Krasner, "United States 
Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unravelling the Paradox of External 
Strength and Internal Weakness" in P.J. Katzenstein, ed., 1978, 
op.cit.; S. Krasner, Defending the National Interest, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1980); S. Krasner, Review Article, 
"Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical
Dynamics", Comparative Politics, vol.16, no.2, January 1984; P.B. 
Evans, D. Rueuschemeyer and T. Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); J. Hall and J.
Ikenberry, The State, (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1990).
See e.g.: K. Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe: A Study of 
an Idea and Institution, (Oxford: Robertson, 1980); P.J. Katzenstein, 
ed., 1978, op.cit.; M. Harrop, ed., Power and Policy in Liberal 
Democracies, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); J.P. Nettl, 
"The State as a Conceptual Variable" in L.J. Cantori and A.H. Ziegler 
Jr., eds., Comparative Politics in the Post-Behavioral Era, (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988); W. Andrews and S. Hoffman, eds., The 
Fifth Republic at Twenty, (Albany: SUNY Press, 1981) ; J. Hayward,
Governing France, 2nd ed., (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983); E. 
Suleiman, "State Structures and Clientelism: the French State Versus 
the 'Notaires'", British Journal of Political Science, vol.17, part 3, 
July 1987; P. Cerny, "State Capitalism in France and Britain and the 
International Economic Order" in P.G. Cerny and M. Schain, eds., 
Socialism, the State and Public Policy in France, (London: Frances 
Pinter, 1985); J. Hayward, 1986, op.cit; J. Simmie and R. King, eds.,
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making appears to be one area in which the state is in full 
control. However, the evidence shows that such assertions are 
more apparent than real.
In terms of this study here, state-centric analyses prove 
faulty in large part because they assume the state is autonomous 
in developing its tax preferences and acting on those 
preferences. While in some cases this may be true, with respect 
to the cases under study here - neo-liberal tax reform in Britain 
and France - such assumptions are less than watertight.
In both countries, state actors and institutions were not 
always in agreement on the shape and direction of tax policy. 
Serious divisions, resistance and policy over-rides characterized 
the state's preference development and policy formation 
processes.42 Moreover, at some stage, societal actors were able 
to make their influence felt, as we learned in a previous
The State in Action: Public Policy and Politics, (London: Pinter,
1990) ; P. Dunleavy, "The United Kingdom, Paradoxes of an Ungrounded 
Statism" in F. Castles, ed., The Comparative History of Public Policy, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989); A. Gamble, "Privatization, Thatcherism 
and the British State", Journal of Law and Society, vol.16, no.l, 
Spring 1989; J. Wolfe, "State Power and Ideology in Britain: Mrs. 
Thatcher's Privatization Programme", Political Studies, Vol.39, no.2, 
June 1991.
See e.g.: J. Attali, Verbatim, (Paris: Fayard, 1993); C. Heckly,
op.cit., esp. ch.4; F. Giroud, La Comedie de Pouvoir, (Paris: Fayard, 
1977); P. Favier and M. Martin-Roland, La Decennie Mitterrand, 1. Les 
Ruptures, (Paris: Seuil, 1990), 2. L'Epreuve des Faits, (Paris: Seuil,
1991); E. Dupin, L'Apres Mitterrand, (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1991); N. 
Lawson, op.cit.; M. Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, (London: Harper 
Collins, 1993); J. Bruce-Gardyne, Ministers and Mandarins, Inside the 
Whitehall Village, (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1986); J. Bruce- 
Gardyne, Mrs. Thatcher's First Administration: the Prophets Confounded, 
(London: Macmillan, 1984) ; M. Moran, "Financial Markets" in J. Simmie 
and R. King, eds., op.cit; M. Holmes, The First Thatcher Government 
1979-1983, (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1985), p.44.
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section.43 Business groups, particularly in France, were 
important in helping set the agenda. Moreover, these and other 
groups, frequently sought, with varying degrees of success, to 
obstruct reforming efforts. Such activity and its consequences, 
appear to undermine claims of state autonomy in the case of tax 
reform.
Furthermore, as we have seen, the processes with which we 
are concerned, problem recognition and agenda setting, took place 
largely outside the state.44 If tax reform appeared on 
governmental agendas, it did so because of the ideas, efforts and 
choices of actors outside the state. The press, policy experts 
and others conspired to place neo-liberal tax reform, first on 
specialized agendas - the opposition agendas of Chirac and the 
RPR and Thatcher and the Conservatives. Elections helped 
transform these specialized agendas into governmental agendas for 
both opposition parties, first the Conservatives led by Thatcher 
in Britain, and later, the RPR-UDF coalition led by Chirac in 
France. Finally, especially in the case of France, developments 
in the international environment, expecially economic and tax 
developments tied to political developments in Britain and the 
United States, made an impact on the French government's tax
See e.g.: previous footnote; J. Wolfe, op.cit.; P. Cerny in P. Cerny 
and M. Schain, eds., 1985, op.cit.; E. Suleiman, 1987, op.cit.; S. 
Mazey, 1986, op.cit.; C. Sandford, 1993, op.cit., ch.3; A. Robinson and
C. Sandford, op.cit.; M. Gammie, 1988, op.cit., pp.2, 5.
See, J. Wolfe, op.cit.
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agenda.45 Especially with economic and tax policies, the state 
is 'hemmed in', 'constrained', 'dependent', 'interdependent' and 
less than omnipotent. These and other problems reduce the weight 
of state-centric arguments as explanations of the emergence of 
tax reform on governmental agendas in Britain and France.
Elitist doctrine posits that in any society there may be a 
minority of the population which takes the major decisions. 
Government is removed, therefore, from control by the majority, 
regardless of the mechanisms.46 It is held that in the agenda 
setting process, elites play the critical role of determining 
which items to include on an agenda and which to keep off.47 
They act together as a group based on some shared purposes, 
notions and values. The elite constitute a coherent, unified and 
self-concious group bent on exploiting their positions so as to
See: S. Mazey, 1986, op.cit., p.422; P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., pp.198- 
226; V. Wright and H. Machin, eds., 1985, op.cit.; J. Hayward, 
"Conclusion" in P. Hall, J. Hayward and H. Machin, eds., 1990, op.cit.; 
M. Loriaux, France After the Hegemony, International and Financial 
Reform, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); J. Hayward, 1983, 
op.cit., p.280; P.G. Cerny and M. Schain, eds., 1985, op.cit. Cerny
(in Cerny and Schain, eds., 1985, p.208) ties in the constraints of the 
organization of private capital with the openness of the economy and 
asserts "...in an open, liberal democratic mixed economy, the 
capitalist state is limited to a role which forecloses the possibility 
that the state itself, particularly in recessionary conditions, can act 
in a truly autonomous fashion, which might mean challenging or 
replacing private capital in creating self - sustaining economic 
growth." We'll look at other resources which make more specific 
references to the international influences on the French tax agenda in 
the forthcoming discussion on learning.
For a discussion of elite theory see: P. Dunleavy and B. O'Leary, 1987, 
op.cit., ch.4; J.H. Meisel, The Myth of the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca 
and the Elite, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958); G. 
Parry, Political Elites, (New York: Praeger, 1970); P. Bachrach, The 
Theory of Democratic Elitism, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967); 
R. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1976); C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1956).
47 B.G. Peters, 1993, op.cit., p.46.
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preserve their domination. The unity of the elite can be 
explained in terms of the group's common socio-economic 
background and/or in terms of their organizational socialization 
and position or role which define their common situation, 
interest and action.
Rather than reviewing the different strands of elite theory 
our discussion here will begin with the premise that bureaucratic 
politics has become the dominant theatre of decision making in 
the modern state.48 According to J.D. Auerbach, R. Putnam and B. 
Rockman (1988) , skilled and experienced bureaucrats have gained a 
predominant influence over the agenda and hence play a 
substantive policy role.49 Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987) put the 
case thusly,
They outsay, outnumber and invariably outmanoeuvre the 
elected and less intellectually endowed political 
elite, should the latter even contemplate acting 
against the "powers that be."50
In this strand of elite theory, higher level administrators or 
bureaucrats are seen as "dominant within the political 
directorate of the liberal democratic state."51
A substantial body of literature exists which examines the
F. E. Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics and Public Policy, (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1976), p.184.
J.D. Auerbach, R. Putnam and B. Rockman, "Introduction to Bureaucrats
and Politicians in Western Democracies" in L. J. Cantori and A. Ziegler, 
Jr., eds., Comparative Politics in the Post-Behavioral Era, (London:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1988), p.288.
P. Dunleavy and B. O'Leary, 1987, op.cit., p.174.
Ibid.
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impact of administrative elites on public policy in Britain and 
France.52 Public policy making in Britain and France is often 
described as elite driven. In both countries, arguments have 
been put forward which point to the control of the policy process 
by a cohesive group of elite technocrats, in the case of France, 
and elite generalists, in the case of Britain, who share common 
socio-economic backgrounds, attitudes, ambitions and goals.
Elite arguments are problematic, however, for some of the 
same reasons mentioned above in our discussion of the weakness of 
state-centric theory: absence of unified vision and uniform 
approach, the impact of actors and events external to elites, 
etc. There is a long tradition of attributing public policy to 
elites, but various problems have surfaced to undermine elite
See e.g. : E. Suleiman, Politics, Power and Bureaucracy in France, the 
Administrative Elite, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974); 
T. Pfister, La RSpublique des Fonctionnaires, (Paris: Albin Michel, 
1988); F. de Baecque and J-L. Quermonne, eds., Administration et
Politique sous la Cinqui^me RSpublique, (Paris: Presses de la Fondation 
Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1982); C. Debbasch, L'Administration 
au Pouvoir, (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1969); M. Crozier, The Bureaucratic 
Phenomenon, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964); M.
Crozier, et.al., Oil Va 1'Administration Francaise?, (Paris: Les
Editions d'Organisation, 1974); F. Ridley and J. Blondel, Public 
Administration in France, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969); F. 
Burdeau, Histoire de 1 'Administration Francaise du 18e au 20e Si&cle, 
(Paris: Montchrestien, 1989); R. Rose, "Higher Civil Servants in
Britain" in E. Suleiman, ed., Bureaucrats and Policy Making, (New York: 
Holmes and Meier, 1984); Royal Institute of Public Affairs, Policy and
Practice, the Experience of Government, (London: RIPA, 1980); P.
Hennessy, Whitehall, (London: Secher and Warburg, 1989); W. Plowden, 
Ministers and Mandarins, (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 
1994) ; L. Pliatzky, Getting and Spending Public Expenditure, Employment 
and Inflation, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982); A. Ham, Treasury Rules, 
Recurrent Themes in British Economic Policy, (London: Quartet Books, 
1981); M. Gordon, "Civil Servants, Politicians and Parties", 
Comparative Politics, vol.4, no.l, October 1971; R. Tames, People and 
Politics, (London: Charles Knight and Co. Ltd., 1975); A. Robinson and
C. Sandford, op.cit., pp.86-87, 105-6; C. Hood, "British Tax Structure 
Development as Administrative Adaptation", Policy Sciences, vol.18, 
March 1985; F. Willson, "Policy Making and the Policy Makers" and S. 
Brittan, "The Irregulars" in R. Rose, ed., Policy Making in Britain, 
(London: Macmillan and Co., 1969); H. Heclo and A. Wildavsky, The 
Private Government of Public Money, Community and Policy Inside 
Britain, 2nd ed., (London: Macmillan, 1981).
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explanations. In Britain, as in France, administrative elites 
not only feature some non-elite traits - i.e. lack of cohesion, 
conflicting goals and attitudes, disagreements and differing 
socio-economic backgrounds - but also, they turn out to be more 
important in terms of their advisory and 'fine-tuning' capacities 
rather than in terms of their purported control of the policy 
process.
When looking at the role played by administrative elites in 
the tax reform process, elite explanations are inadequate. For 
instance, those elites relevant to the tax policy-making process 
issue from different socio-economic backgrounds, they are 
different ages and they do not, in fact, all share the same 
ideological and policy orientations.53
Furthermore, tax reform generally entails important 
decisions (perhaps incremental in the short term, but 
cumulatively significant), departures from the norm, that have 
potential and detectable political consequences. Such decisions
See e.g.: L.J. Edinger and D.D. Searing, "Social Background in Elite 
Analysis: a Methodological Inquiry", American Political Science Review, 
vol. LXI, June 1967; D.D. Searing, "The Comparative Study of Elite 
Socialisation", Comparative Political Studies, vol.l, no.4, January 
1969; J-F. Kesler, L'ENA, la SociStS, l'ttat, (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 
1985), pp.388-396; C. Gr6mion, "Le Milieu D6cisionnel Central", in F. 
de Baecque and J-L. Quermonne, eds., op.cit.; E. Suleiman, "Sur les 
limites de la mentality bureaucratique: conflit des rdles entre
cabinets minist§riels et directeurs", Sociologie du Travail, Octobre - 
Decembre 1972, pp.388-409; V. Wright, "Politics and Administration 
Under the 5th Republic", Political Studies, vol.XXII, no.l, March 1974, 
pp.52-55; A. Stevens, "Politicization and Cohesion in the French 
Administration", West European Politics, vol.l, no.3, October 1978, 
pp.68-80; E. Suleiman, 1974, op.cit.; F. Giroud, 1977, op.cit.; F. 
Dupuy and J-C. Thoenig, L'Administration en Miettes, (Paris: Fayard, 
1985); D. Mairey and P. Peugeot, "Les Ministres et les Directeurs: qui 
commande?", Pouvoirs, no.53, 1990, p.23; R. Tames, op.cit., pp.179-80; 
R. Rose, "Higher Civil Servants in Britain", in E. Suleiman, ed. , 
op.cit., p.145; S. Eldersveld, Political Elites in Modem Societies, 
Empirical Research and Democratic Theory, (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1989), pp.55-67.
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are unlikely to be made by administrative elites in the Treasury 
or the Ministry of Finance, or other bureaucratic bodies.54 
These decisions remain very much with members of government such 
as prime ministers, presidents, and more likely, in the case of 
taxation, the Chancellor of the Exchequer in Britain, and the 
Ministers of Finance and Budget in France.55 Other key players 
in the agenda setting process will issue from the political 
milieu (party members, politicians and/or political appointees) 
rather than the administrative. This does not exclude the 
possibility that administrative elites can initiate reform 
proposals, but for most of the major tax reforms of the 1980s, 
such was not the case.56 If anything, they were more likely to
See e.g.: B. Gournay in F. de Baecque and J-L. Quermonne, eds.,
op.cit.; F.F. Ridley, "French Technocracy and Comparative Government", 
Political Studies, vol.14, February 1966; A. Ham, op.cit.; Heclo and 
Wildavsky, 1981, op.cit.; R. Rose, ed. , 1969, op.cit; R. Rose in E.
Suleiman, ed., 1984, op.cit.; M. Gordon, op.cit.; RIPA, 1980, op.cit.;
D. Frost and A. Jay, To England With Love, (London: Hodder and
Stoughton, 1970); W. Plowden, 1994, op.cit.; M. Holmes, 1985, op.cit.; 
L. Pliatzky, 1982, op.cit.; R. Rose and T. Karran, 1987, op.cit.; G. 
Thompson, 1990, op.cit.; C. Sandford, 1993, op.cit., ch.3.
As Nigel Lawson (1992,p.333) states, "...tax reform is the one major 
branch of supply-side reform which is unequivocally under the direct 
control of the Chancellor."
Indeed, most of the interviewees in Britain and France, referred to the 
dominant roles played by key political actors and advisers in setting 
the tax reform agenda, with secondary or tertiary roles played by 
administrative actors in Britain's Inland Revenue and Treasury and in 
France's Service de la Legislation Fiscale, Direction G6n6rale des 
ImpSts, and the Ministry of Finance, more generally. However, the role 
of civil servants was broadly acknowledged. For example, John Biffen 
noted that although the early Thatcher policies were well-prepared in 
opposition, "As time went by - of course all that diminished because 
you then became more and more beholden to your civil servants to 
produce your ideas: but the early, and in many ways, decisive
changes... really did reflect the extent to which we came into office 
determined to be radical..." (John Biffen, interview in London, 
England, June 20, 1991). One French interviewee saw, in some of the 
changes to French tax policy, the work of elites, particularly 
Snarques. Georges Egret commenting on the company tax reductions in 
France, "II faut l'expliquer essentiellement par 1'influence de 
quelques hommes pragmatiques comme M. B£r£govoy... qui etait influence 
par toute l'£narchie qui etait autour de lui." (Georges Egret,
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be important in terms of generating alternatives than in agenda 
setting.
While state-centric and elitist arguments are frequently- 
marshalled to explain policy developments in Britain and France, 
even a less than rigorous testing of such models in the case of 
tax reform agenda setting as has been undertaken here, suggests 
their limited viability.
Culture
From culturalists we learn that a given set of beliefs, 
values and attitudes determine political ideas, human behavior 
and public policy.57 Individuals are socialized in and infused 
with culture, which predisposes them to hold certain fundamental 
beliefs and act in certain ways. Much evidence, some esoteric, 
has been called upon to substantiate the causal nature of 
political culture.58 The emergence of neo-liberal tax reform on 
governmental agendas in France and Britain can be explained by
interview in Paris, France, May 7, 1992).
See e.g.: T. Parsons and E. Shils, eds., Towards a General Theory of 
Action, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951); G. Almond and S. 
Verba, The Civic Culture, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1963); G. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes 
and Democracy in Five Nations, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965); 
L. Pye, Political Culture and Political Development, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1965); A. King, "Ideas, Institutions and 
the Policies of Governments: a Comparative Analysis", British Journal 
of Political Science, vol.3, parts 3 and 4, July 1973 and October 1973.
See e.g.: G.A. Almond and S. Verba, 1963, op.cit.; G. Sartori,
Democratic Theory, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1962); L. 
Pye and S. Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); G.A. Almond and S.
Verba, The Civic Culture Revisited, (Princeton: Princeton Univesity 
Press, 1980); R. Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966) ; G. Hofstede, Culture's
Consequences, (London: Sage, 1980) ; A. King, July 1973, October 1973, 
op.cit.; D.E. Ashford, British Dogmatism and French Pragmatism, 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1982).
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culturalists, for example, in terms of the 'low tax' or 'anti­
tax' attitudes prevalent in both Britain and France and the 'free 
market' sentiments of the masses, but more importantly, the 
policy makers.59 However, studies and opinion surveys reveal 
ambiguous and ambivalent attitudes towards taxing and spending, 
government intervention and the role of the state in the economy 
and society.60
Culturalists are not all of one mind and the existence of 
uniformly held cultural paradigms has been largely disproved.61
For evidence supporting and refuting these assumptions see: G. Ardant, 
ThSorie Sociologique de 1 'Impdt, Livre IV, (Paris: S .E.V.P.E.N., 1965), 
premidre partie; J. Duberg4, 1990, op.cit., pp.167-318; J. Rivoli, Vive 
l'Impot, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1965), pp.5-7, 13-17; SOFRES,
Opinion Publigue, Enquetes et Commentaires 1984, (Paris: Gallimard, 
1985), pp.202-7, 216-7, 273; M. Ullmann, "Vos Impots en 1984", Paris 
Match, no.1786, 19 AoOt 1983, pp.58-60; L. Mehl, "Avant-propos", D.
Borne, "'Vive le Roi Sans Gabelle' Les R^voltes Contre l'Impot en 
France du XVIIe au XXe Siecle", J. Dubergd, "Resistance Compar£e & 
l'ImpSt et aux Cotisations de Couverture Sociale" in Revue Francaise 
de Finances Publiques, no. 5, 1984; R. Rose and T. Karran, 1987,
op.cit., ch.8; A. Lewis, The Psychology of Taxation, (Oxford: Martin 
Robertson, 1982); A. Lewis and D. Jackson, "Voting Preferences and 
Attitudes Toward Public Expenditure", Political Studies, vol.33, no.3, 
September 1985; A. Robinson and C. Sandford, op.cit., ch.7; C. 
Sandford, 1993, op.cit., pp.209-211; B.G. Peters, 1991, op.cit., ch.5.
Surveys regularly show voters prefer expanding, or at least maintaining 
welfare services to cutting income taxes, if cutting taxes means 
reductions in services (see e.g. : BBC Radio 4 survey cited by M.
Cassell, "Labour Takes Offensive in Attempt to Raise Morale", Financial 
Times, March 16, 1987, p.10). The same ambiguity is evident in France 
(see e.g.: J. Duberg6, 1990, op.cit.; M. Ullmann, 1983, op.cit., p.59). 
Also see previous footnote.
On some of the problems with cultural arguments, see e.g.: B. Barry, 
Sociologists, Economists and Democracy, (London: Collier-Macmillan, 
1970); R. Fagen, The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969) ; F. Greenstein, "A Note on 
the Ambiguity of 'Political Socialization': Definitions, Criticisms, 
and Strategies of Inquiry", Journal of Politics, vol.32, November 1970; 
R. Chilcote, Theories of Comparative Politics, (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1981), ch.6; M. Needier, The Concepts of Comparative Politics, 
(New York: Praeger, 1991), ch.7; L.C. Mayer, Redefining Comparative 
Politics, (London: Sage Publications, 1989), ch.6; P. Hall, 1986,
op.cit., pp.8-10; B.G. Peters, 1991, op.cit., pp.6-7, 286; D.J. Elkins 
and R. Simeon, "A Cause in Search of its Effect, or What Does Political 
Culture Explain?", Comparative Politics, vol.11, no.2, January 1979;
C. Pateman, "Political Culture, Political Structure and Political 
Change", British Journal of Political Science, vol.l, part 3, July
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Moreover, values, beliefs and attitudes are not simply formed 
during childhood socialization, but continue to be shaped by 
one's life experiences. This appears to undermine any attempt to 
attribute a causal nexus to culture; but, perhaps not. Rather it 
may help to surmount one of the major dilemmas confronted by 
cultural arguments, that is, the dilemma of change.62
If culture stays the same, it is with much difficulty that 
we explain policy changes. On the other hand, if culture 
changes, according to the changing kaleidoscope of peoples' 
values, beliefs and attitudes, then policy change is more easily 
explained. The problem, however, is in distinguishing between 
transitory changes in public opinion and fundamental cultural 
changes. Also how one ascertains that cultural change and its 
causal force raises other problems. In other words, is the 
cultural change 'self-generated' or is it 'responding' to some 
forces in the environment?
What has emerged to renew the culturalist school is a 
conception of multiple cultures co-existing in a polity and
1971; W. Booth, P. James and H. Meadwell, eds., Politics and 
Rationality, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); S.
Peterson, Political Behavior, Patterns in Everyday Life, (London: Sage 
Publications, 1990); G. Almond and S. Verba, eds., 1980, op.cit.; P. 
Warwick, Culture, Structure, or Choice? Essays in the Interpretation 
of the British Experience, (New York: Agathon Press, 1990).
See e.g.: P. Warwick, op.cit., ch.5; C. Webber and A. Wildavsky, A 
History of Taxation and Expenditure in the Western World, (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1986); D. Kavanagh, "Political Culture in Great 
Britain: the Decline of the Civic Culture" in G. Almond and S. Verba, 
eds., 1980, op.cit.; D. Kavanagh, British Politics, Continuities and 
Change, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p.61.
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competing against one another for dominance.63 The established 
norms and precepts in a polity are accepted as dominant as long 
as they are effective. Once they lose their effectiveness, the 
game is up and other cultures or sub-cultures vie with one 
another to gain the dominant position. The discrediting of the 
standing culture may dislodge it from its dominant position while 
another is empowered by its adherents and supporters. Applying 
such concepts to the events of the late 1970s - for example, the 
discrediting of the collectivist and egalitarian cultures, 
provided an opportunity for individualistic and market cultures 
to assert themselves and spread their values.64 Once they 
overtook the collectivists and egalitarians as the dominant 
culture, controlling the levers of power, they acted to implement 
their program, which included neo-liberal tax reform.
Such an argument is a powerful one. And there is certainly 
something of value to be learned from it. However, it leaves 
unanswered the questions of why cultures compete, and how they 
perpetuate and evolve. There must be certain incentives in-built
See previous footnote, especially C. Webber and A. Wildavsky, op.cit., 
chs.9,10. Also see, P. Hall, "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and 
the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain", Comparative 
Politics, vol.13, no.l, April 1993.
John Biffen alluded to the struggle for dominance by various ideas and 
values and their advocates. He explained, "... the intellectual 
dominance gained by Chicago over the kind of modified Keynesianism 
which was otherwise in place, that all gave quite a big impetus to 
philosophically what the government was trying to do. And suddenly you 
found that what had been calculated on fairly straightforward political 
principles was being elevated into something highly respectable, now 
was beginning to win the intellectual argument. That was something 
which hadn't been altogether expected. It did mean that the Labour 
Party became in increasing difficulty to sustain the case for high 
levels of protective spending which had been at the heart of their 
Keynesian approach. It began to go out of fashion." (John Biffen, 
interview in London, England, June 20, 1991).
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in the particular institutional setting which condition the 
perceptions and expectations of individuals existing within it.65 
Furthermore, such arguments lead us to wonder whether culture is 
inherited, or alternatively, if it is learned or transmitted and 
how. If it is learned or transmitted, who and what is 
instrumental in this process? Some culturalists have found it 
difficult to maintain culture's independence outside of an 
institutional framework.
These and other dilemmas have weakened the standing of 
cultural arguments. As Paul Warwick (1990) tells us, "The fact 
that an idea or cultural trait had its origins in a certain 
society or type of society may mean that at some point it was 
useful in achieving a particular goal, but its standing as an 
independent causal force is essentially nil."66 Culture, 
therefore, while a convenient "catch-all" framework, is deficient 
when called upon as an explanatory tool, particularly for the 
process of agenda change that gave rise to tax reform; however, 
it does help us to understand a number of elements relevant to 
that process.
Learning
Tax reform in the 1980s, while not necessarily a policy 
innovation in itself (very few 'new' policies are innovations but 
old ideas re-combined and re-constituted), was certainly an idea
65
66
See, P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., ch.l, pp.230, 279.
P. Warwick, op.cit., p.55.
whose time had come.67 As we have already argued, Britain was 
the acknowledged leader in the neo-liberal tax reform movement 
which swept many countries in the 1980s.68 The tax reform agenda 
which Mrs. Thatcher and her Chancellor Geoffrey Howe brought with 
them from opposition to government in 1979, was the work of 
domestic actors and domestic ideas. So too were many of the 
reforms introduced under Nigel Lawson's chancellorship. The same 
cannot be said of France. Policy makers there did not formulate 
tax reform proposals in a self-induced 'flash of insight'.69 The 
inspiration came from elsewhere. Where did the inspiration, or 
rather the idea, come from? Here, identifying the source is not
Tax reform, however, did not make its debut from 1979. In fact, the 
idea, had earlier roots. As Kingdon (1984, p.77) remarks, "You'll 
always find that things have their start somewhere else. People don't 
sit down and think up whole new approaches in a flash of insight. They 
borrow from somewhere else." Several of the British interviewees, for 
example, commented that the tax reforms enacted under Mrs. Thatcher's 
premiership, could trace their origins at least to ideas and policies 
devised or considered by the Conservatives in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. As Cedric Sandford noted, the tax reforms enacted under 
Thatcher "grew out of a lot of Conservative thinking that had gone on 
for a long time." (Cedric Sandford, interview in Bath, England, June 
6, 1991).
See e.g.: J. Frenkel, A. Razin, and E. Sadka, International Taxation 
in an Integrated World, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), p.5; J. Kay, 
November 1986, op.cit., p.2; N. Lawson, 1992, op.cit., p.360; G. 
Thompson, 1990, op.cit., p.31; C. Sandford, 1993, op.cit., pp.40-1; J. 
Plender, "Another Wave of Change Ahead", Financial Times, March 13, 
1987, p.24. Although, one author I read assigns both the United States 
and Great Britain leading roles in the tax reform movement (N. Glazer, 
"Ideas and Politics in Britain: an American View" in J.C.D. Clark, ed., 
Ideas and Politics in Modern Britain, London: Macmillan Press, 1990).
As we have already noted, to a certain extent the same could be said 
of Britain, where many of the ideas which appeared on Thatcher's tax 
agenda had been in the pipe-line for some years. For example, when 
asked why tax reform was such an important part of the Conservative 
program in the late 1970s and post-1979, Arthur Cockfield replied that 
"It had been for a long time. Much of the language used to rationalize 
the reform proposals of the late 1970s/early 1980s, hearkened back to 
the last Conservative government and before. . . many of the same 
principles had been enunciated by Ted [Heath] and Iain [MacLeod] before 
1970." (Baron Arthur Cockfield, interview in London, England, June 11,
1991).
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as important as understanding neo-liberal tax reform as a largely 
'foreign' idea or input and how it came to take hold in the mind 
of French policy makers. However, even in the case of Britain, 
some doubts are cast on the characterization of Thatcher's tax 
reforms as 'flashes of insight'. There are some intriguing lines 
of analysis on such questions, which we will consider below.
Understanding the causes of policy change have perplexed 
many students of public policy. Whether one sees the state or 
groups pursuing their respective interests as the driving force 
behind policy change, we are left wondering, "Where do the ideas 
come from which give substance to those interests?" How do 
those interests come to be defined? This hearkens back to a 
similar question raised in our earlier discussion of public 
choice theory: do groups or the state experience flashes of 
insight and themselves originate the ideas which eventually get 
worked into viable policies? In some cases, yes. In other 
cases, the idea may not have domestic sources, but rather 
originates in developments taking place outside the borders of 
the polity. State officials and groups act on their preferences 
which have often been shaped and guided by external forces.
Some would have us believe that past policies largely 
dictate how actors in the policy process define their 
interests.70 Others make assumptions about individual level
70 See e.g.: P. Hall, 1993, op.cit., p.277-8; P. Sacks, Review Article,
"State Structure and the Asymmetrical Society: an Approach to Public 
Policy in Britain", Comparative Politics, vol. 12, no.3, April 1980, 
p.356; M. Weir and T. Skocpol, "State Structures and the Possibilities 
for 'Keynesian' Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain 
and the United States" in P. Evans, et.al., 1985, op.cit., p.119; R.
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preferences which are endogenous. Individuals act out of a self- 
regarding calculus of utility maximization. We have looked at 
such arguments already. Another approach looks at the 
relationship of the state and society in the international 
system. How do international level variables affect domestic 
politics and policy making?
New directions in understanding the causes of policy - or 
agenda - change are found in schools of thought that look to the 
international environment and learning and diffusion processes.71 
Policy change or innovation results from learning and diffusion, 
which may be an international or domestic phenomenon; although it 
was largely on the international system that we focused. Rapid 
technological advances, increasingly interdependent economies and 
markets, and the ease with which actors cross borders and 
exchange ideas are all components of the phenomena which 
contribute to the (national) mimicking or emulation of ideas and 
policies developed and applied elsewhere.72
Rose and T. Karran, 1987, op.cit.,; H. Heclo, Modern Social Politics 
in Britain and Sweden, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), p.5.
See: G. Almond, A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political 
Science, (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1989); P. Gourevitch, "The 
Second Image Reversed: The Internatinal Sources of Domestic Politics", 
International Organization, vol.32, Autumn 1978.
See e.g.: K. Kaiser, "Transnational Politics: Toward a Theory of 
MultiNational Politics", International Organization, vol.25, Autumn 
1971; R. Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in 
the Atlantic Community, (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1968); R.B. 
Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966) ; C. Adler, "Comparison 
of Intranational and International Politics", American Political 
Science Review, vol.57, no.2, June 1963; J. Rosenau, B. Vincent Davis 
and M. East, eds., The Analysis of International Politics, (Glencoe: 
Free Press, 1971); R. Keohane and J.S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: 
World Politics in Transition, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977) ; G. Breton, 
"Mondalisation et Science Politique: la fin d'un imaginaire
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According to Hugh Heclo (1974) policy innovations are the 
result of diffusion or "political learning." In his 
investigations of the evolution of the welfare state in European 
countries, in particular Britain and Sweden, and the development 
of social policy, Heclo advocates "viewing politics through the 
concept of learning."73 Political learning takes place in a 
number of ways - i.e. learning from experience, learning from 
diffusion, etc. It is on the latter which we will focus our 
attention here, although it should be noted that each form of 
learning impinges on the other.74
Authors David Collier and Richard Messick (1975) developed a 
similar line of argument to Heclo's (1974) upon analyzing the 
causes of social security development within and across nations. 
They make a strong case for learning and diffusion, with respect 
to the adoption of social security.75 The authors detected a 
clear pattern of diffusion of social security ideas and policies
th£orique?", Revue Etudes Internationales, vol.XXIV, no.3, Septembre 
1993; R. O'Brien, "The End of Geography. The Impact of Technology and 
Capital Flows", The AMEX Review, May 17, 1990; J. Rosenau, ed., Linkage 
Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International 
Systems, (New York: Free Press, 1969) ; J. Rosenau, Turbulence in World 
Politics: a Theory of Change and Continuity, (London: Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1990); S. Brown, International Relations in a Changing 
Global System, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992); J. Whitman, Copying 
Other Nations' Policies: Two American Case Studies, (Cambridge:
Schenkman, 1980); OECD, Taxation and International Capital Flows, 
(Paris: OECD, 1987); M. Loriaux, op.cit..
H. Heclo, 1974, op.cit., p.306.
Ibid., p.307.
D. Collier and R. Messick, "Prerequisites Versus Diffusion: Testing 
Alternative Explanations of Social Security Adoption", American 
Political Science Review, vol.69, no.5, December 1975.
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down a hierarchy of modernization.76 Collier and Messick claim, 
"...the diffusion approach views social security adoption as 
taking place within an international system of communication and 
influence.1,77
Learning is the acquisition and assimilation of knowledge 
and information applied to subsequent actions. Behavioral and 
policy change generally result from responses made "in reaction 
to some perceived stimulus."78
Learning can take place within the confines' of national 
frontiers. However, in our modernizing and increasingly 
interconnected world, learning takes place in a much broader 
context as Collier and Messick (1975) and Heclo (1974) 
demonstrate. No state exists in splendid isolation.79 Looking 
at the development of social policy, specifically state income 
maintenance programs, Heclo (1974) determines that such policies 
spread internationally, in most cases by a process of diffusion 
and emulation.80
Agents of change (Heclo, 1974) aware of ideas and policies 
being considered and/or tried elsewhere, diffuse their acquired
Modernization refers to the social and economic transformation 
associated with the transition from primarily agricultural to
industrial economies (D. Collier and R. Messick, op.cit., p.1303).
D. Collier and R. Messick, op.cit., p.1305.
Ibid., p.306; also see, P. Hall, 1993, op.cit., p.278.
V. Rys, "The Sociology of Social Security", Bulletin of the Social 
Science Association, vol.17, no.l, January-February 1964, quoted in D. 
Collier and R. Messick, op.cit., p.1305.
H. Heclo, 1974, op.cit., pp.10, 14.
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knowledge and information within a domestic policy community or 
in the public arena more generally.81 Or they may transmit what 
they have learned to important decision-makers who act either by 
rejecting the 'foreign' ideas/policies or by developing them - or 
having them developed - into appropriate policies for the 'home 
market'.
Ardant (1972) noted similar processes at work in the 
creation of progressive tax systems in various countries during 
the late 19th/e.arly20th centuries.82 Michael Boskin (1990) in 
explaining the new directions in tax policies in the 1980s 
observed that "ideas tried in one country then spread to 
others. "83
Several authors credit international technological and 
policy developments for the changes in domestic tax policy.84
Also see, C. Bennett, "Review Article: What is Policy Convergence and 
What Causes It?", British Journal of Political Science, vol.21, April 
1991, p.221.
See, G. Ardant, Histoire de l'Impot, Livres I et II, (Paris: Fayard, 
1972).
M. Boskin and C. McLure, eds., World Tax Reform, Case Studies of 
Developed and Developing Countries, (San Francisco: International
Center for Economic Growth, 1990), p.3.
See e.g.: G. Ardant, Livre II, 1972, op.cit., pp.372+, 425-6; A. Jack, 
"Long Arm of the Revenue Collectors", Survey, "World Taxation", 
Financial Times, May 20, 1994, p.l; D. Brean, "Policy Perspectives on 
International Taxation" in C. Sandford, ed., Key Issues in Tax Reform, 
(Bath: Fiscal Publications, 1993); OECD, Tax Information Exchange
Between OECD Member Countries, (Paris: OECD, 1994); P. Stevens, "Lawson 
Rides the Wave of International Tax Reform", Financial Times, March 9, 
1987, p. 6; P. Solal, "France: the Necessary Reform", Tax Planning 
International Review, vol.'14, no.7, July 1987; OECD, Why Economic 
Policies Change Course, (Paris: OECD, 1988); V. Tanzi, "The Response 
of Other Industrial Countries to the U.S. Tax Reform Act", National Teix 
Journal, vol.XL, no.3, September 1987; V. Tanzi, "The IMF and Tax 
Reform", IMF Working Paper no.WP/90/39, (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1990);
D.W. Lee and R.B. McKenzie, "The International Political Economy of 
Declining Tax Rates", National Tax Journal, vol.XLII, March 1989; J. 
Slemrod, "Tax Principles in an International Economy" in M.J. Boskin 
and C.E. McLure Jr., eds., op.cit.; J. Whalley, "Foreign Responses to
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Many have attributed the emergence of neo-liberal tax reform on 
governmental agendas in Britain and France to such processes.85 
However, I believe that modernization and globalization 
facilitated the exchange of information, the observations and 
interactions of agents of change and served more as catalysts to 
the process of policy change rather than the causes of policy 
change.
Although France - as will be shown - is a more obvious 
example of the impact of learning and diffusion in an 
international setting, a weaker case can be made for explaining, 
in similar terms, the emergence of neo-liberal tax reform on the 
British government's agenda in the period from 1979.86 In fact,
U.S. Tax Reform" in J. Slemrod, ed., Do Taxes Matter?, (Cambridge: The 
MIT Press, 1990).
Indeed, several of the French interviewees referred to developments 
outside France's borders as having an impact on the change in French 
tax policy. Although this factor was cited by none as the only or 
major factor. Responding to a question on the role of international 
developments Patrick Careil said, "... Indirectment...pas directement, 
mais je pense que indirectement dans le mesure ou s'influencer les 
medias et les decideurs francais qui ont augmenter les pressions en 
disant... "Voyez notre revendication est legitime puis que en touts les 
autres pays on fait comme ca..." (Patrick Careil, interview in Paris, 
France, May 25, 1992) . Georges Egret felt that the shape of tax policy 
in France during the 1980s was to a certain extent influenced by 
outside factors. He spoke at length of how early Socialist fiscal 
policies resulted in excess and particularly in terms of the costs 
imposed on businesses and the effects on the franc. Membership in the 
EC and the franc's role in the European monetary system obliged a major 
change in policies on the Socialist government. He concluded, "... 
maintenant le probl^me essentiel c'est 1'Europe; que nous soyons 
competitif dans le domaine fiscal et que par consequent si nos voisins 
baissent leurs taux, nous baissions aussi, et je crois que la reforme 
am^ricaine, qui s'est r£pandu un peu en 1'Europe a et6 un 616ment 
considerable et qui fait comprendre beaucoup des socialistes qu'ils 
doivent falloir aussi - en matiere de l'impot sur le revenu - baisser." 
(Georges Egret, interview in Paris, France, May 7, 1992).
Some of the literature hinted that in the 1979 to 1989 period tax 
policy makers in Britain were (or could have been) influenced by 
developments outside Britain's borders. See e.g.: C. Sandford, 1993, 
op.cit., pp.40-1; P. Stevens, March 9, 1987, op.cit., p.6; A. Dilnot 
and J. Kay in Boskin and McLure, eds., 1990, op.cit., p.155; M. Prowse, 
"The CBI Gives Lawson Some Food for Thought" and "CBI Group Call for
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the British experience suits a domestic model of learning (Heclo, 
1974) better than an international one. The neo-liberal tax 
reform agenda was determined more clearly, not so much by 
international developments as by the trials and errors of 
previous British governments, policy makers, policy experiments 
and legacies.87
However interesting and useful learning approaches appear to 
be, they are undermined by important shortcomings. Certain 
questions can be raised which learning and diffusion do not 
adequately or convincingly address. Who learns? From what? From 
whom? Under what circumstances? And with what effect? Learning 
does not make clear what is learned, who learns, under what 
conditions learning takes place, why people learn and what 
determines the effect learning has on the domestic policy making
Tax Reform", Financial Times, December, 17, 1985, pp.19, 36; G.
Thompson, 1990, op.cit., pp.120-2; The TUC Report 1980, Report of 112th 
Annual Trades Union Congress, (London: Trades Union Congress, 1980), 
p.262. Although, many of the British interviewees were aware of 
developments elsewhere with references made to the Chicago School, 
Arthur Laffer, events In California in 1978, the United States, Denmark 
and Australia. For example, when asked why tax reform was such an 
important part of the Conservative agenda John Biffen remarked, " I 
think there were a number of reasons. One was that one looked at 
California or one looked at Denmark, and you saw societies where the 
burden of tax was beginning to break the political structure. So we 
were in a situation where we thought that as prudent politicians we had 
better be on the side of lower taxes and more particularly lower taxes 
and I think that was more important than any Laffer-style supply 
theory..." (John Biffen, interview in London, England, June 20, 1991). 
Even the Conservative Campaign Guide of 1987 devoted a few paragraphs 
to the American tax reforms of the 1980s and how these were observed 
with "great interest" but that the "American precedent" was "not 
regarded as fully applicable to the UK." (Conservative Campaign Guide 
1987, London: Conservative and Unionist Party, 1987, p.49). The impact 
of outside developments on British tax thinking, albeit indirect, was
alluded to by Douglas French, who spoke of the "mood of the times",
the "intellectual dominance of Chicago" and the affirmation of the 
sensibleness of neo-liberal tax reform by virtue of its consideration 
and enactment in other countries (Douglas French, interview in London,
England, July 2, 1991) .
See, P. Hall, 1993, op.cit.
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environment. If one applies learning cross-nationally, and one 
assumes that the pool of (tax) knowledge is more or less 
universally accessible, why do some countries pursue policies 
different from others? Moreover, are we confident enough to 
assert that tax reform was not at all a 'homegrown' response to 
similarly and simultaneously perceived problems? Who is to say 
that tax reform developments in Britain and France were not 
simultaneous but separate manifestations of 'homegrown' responses 
to 'homegrown' problems? The inability to adequately treat such 
questions and marshal responses into a coherent framework which 
enjoys a consensus, makes learning/diffusion models unwieldy and 
clumsy.
An additional problem exists. With respect to Britain and 
France, we are unable to frame discourse on the tax reform 
agenda setting processes in identical terms. France was 
allegedly influenced by outside developments and learned 
therefrom. Its tax agenda was inspired by ideas and developments 
taking place elswhere, even though the specific measures were 
devised by domestic policy makers. Britain, on the other hand, 
learned largely from domestic experiences and experiments.
The inability to similarly frame the processes of tax reform 
in both Britain and France presents an obstacle. Nevertheless, 
models of learning and diffusion point us in a promising 
direction and offer valuable insights into a broader circle of 
factors that make up the policy process. However, in ranging so 
widely, these models become subject to accusations of incoherence
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and unmanageability.
Institutionalism
Several prominent models of politics have been reviewed and 
examined in this section. None seem entirely appropriate for 
explaining the course of tax reform in either Britain or France 
during the 1980s. However, two models, yet undiscussed, point us 
in the right direction. Institutionalism, and process streams 
and windows appear to provide more appropriate frameworks for 
conducting discourse on the complex of actors, ideas and 
institutions and the dynamic processes which engendered neo­
liberal tax reform in France and Britain in the 1980s. They are 
more comprehensive and systemic and deftly accommodate many 
elements of the models already discussed.
By now, it has been pointed out a number of times that the 
theories examined so far have failed to adequately consider the 
role of institutions. Earlier scholars like Almond and Coleman 
(1960) and Bauer and Gergen (1968) referred frequently to formal 
organization and the structure of governmental decision making as 
an important variable in the policy process in so far as it 
determines the interactive behavior of groups.88 A number of 
scholars in recent years have taken individual actors with their 
concommittant preferences, interests and resources, as the unit
88 R. Bauer and K. Gergen, eds., 1968, op.cit.; G. Almond and J. Coleman, 
eds., The Politics of Developing Areas, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1960).
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of analysis and then examined how institutions affect behavior.89 
This school views individual actors as a function of both the 
attributes of the individual (values and resources) and the 
attributes of the decision situation. The attributes of the 
decision situation are a product of the design and organization 
of the physical structures, formal rules, compliance procedures 
and standard operating practices, as well as the nature of the 
relevant good. Institutionalism insists on a more autonomous 
role for political institutions without denying the importance of 
both the social context of politics and the motives of individual 
actors; hence it acts as a bridge between state and society 
centered approaches by examining the impact of the institutional 
setting on both.
Institutionalists emphasize the notion that if an actor is 
abstracted from his particular institutional setting, not only 
will how that actor defines his role and interests change, but 
consequently his very actions will be different as well.90 Thus,
See: T. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and 
Political Theory", World Politics, vol.16, July 1964; R. Bauer and K. 
Gergen, eds., op.cit.; T. Lowi, "Decision Making Versus Policy Making: 
Towards an Antidote for Technocracy", Public Administration Review, 
vol.30, May-June 1970; D.E. Ashford, "Political Science and Policy 
Studies: Towards a Structural Solution", Policy Studies Journal, vol.5, 
special issue 1977; D.E. Ashford, ed., Comparing Public Policies: New 
Concepts and Methods, (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1978); L. Kiser and E. 
Ostrom, "Three Worlds of Action" in E. Ostrom, ed. , Strategies of 
Political Inquiry, (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982); J. March and J. Olsen, 
"The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life", 
American Political Science Review, vol.78, September 1984; P. Hall, 
1986, op.cit.; J. March and J. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, (New 
York: The Free Press, 1989) ; J. Olsen, "Modernization Programs in
Perspective: Institutional Analysis of Organizational Change",
Governance, vol.4, no.2, April 1991; S. Steinmo et al., eds., 1992, 
op.cit.
Bauer and Gergen (1968, p.174) explained that institutional rules and 
roles had a defining effect on actors in the polity and that "within 
any given political arena the variations may be patterned to conform
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institutions provide the context in which politicians, interest 
groups, bureaucrats and policy entrepreneurs define and attempt 
to realize their policy preferences. To understand policy 
processes and outputs, an examination, therefore, is required of 
a country's political, social and economic institutions - formal 
and informal, domestic and international - and how they shape and 
determine the policy preferences and actions of actors in the 
polity. Such an examination, as unwieldy as it may be, has been 
attempted in a number of policy areas, like health, railroad, 
economic, foreign economic and taxation.91
Hall's (1986) approach - which seems to draw some 
inspiration from John Zysman (1977, 1978) - for example, 
identifies five sets of variables as important determinants of 
economic policy in Britain and France: the organization of labor, 
the organization of capital, the organization of the state, the 
organization of the political system and the structural position 
of the nation in the international economy.92 The variations in 
social, political and economic organization from one country to 
another account for why different countries pursue different
to the particular role structures and rules of the subsystem."
91 See e.g.: E. Immergut, "The Rules of the Game: the logic of health
policy-making in France, Switzerland and Sweden" in S. Steinmo et.al., 
eds., 1992, op.cit; C. Dunlavy, "Political Structure, State Policy and 
Industrial Change: early railroad policy in the United States and
Prussia" in S. Steinmo et.al., eds., 1992, op.cit.; P. Hall, 1986, 
op.cit.; P.J. Katzenstein, 1978, op.cit.; S. Steinmo, "Political 
Institutions and Tax Policy in the United States, Sweden and Britain", 
World Politics, vol.61, July 1989; S. Steinmo, 1993, op.cit.
92 See especially, P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., ch.9; J. Zysman, Political
Strategies for Industrial Order, (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1977); J. Zysman, "The French State in the International 
Economy" in P.J. Katzenstein, ed., 1978, op.cit.
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policy paths. Nevertheless, these five variables are the most 
important for the course of economic policy; although, Hall does 
not rule out the operation of other explanatory variables, i.e. 
the free will of personalities and policy makers, and ideology.93 
These, however, tend to be sporadic and lack the consistency and 
continuity of the five principal variables. Hall has chosen to 
give such variables scant consideration and devote his study to 
the five principal variables which help him to distinguish the 
broad patterns in the economic policies of Britain and France.
In a similar vein, although less wide ranging, Steinmo 
(1989, 1993) explains tax policy making in Britain, Sweden and 
the United States in terms of each country's constitutional and 
electoral structures as they are designed and re-designed in 
light of political and economic developments, both domestic and 
international. Tax policy is a function of these critical 
political variables.
It is through the interaction of political variables that 
Steinmo attempts to discern broad patterns in tax policy making 
and tax policy. For example, he finds that the fragmented and 
open political system in the United States, the strong and 
disciplined majoritarian government in Britain and the neo­
corporate decision making institutions in Sweden were 
instrumental in shaping "both the conceptual and policy horizons" 
in those countries.94 These particular institutional settings
93
94
P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., p.258.
S. Steinmo, 1993, op.cit., p.206.
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impacted the interests, attitudes and behavior of actors in a 
particular way. Thus is tax policy, and tax reform, in Britain, 
Sweden and the United States explained.
The institutional approach is not without its problems.95 
The main complaints are that the framework rests on shaky 
foundations. March and Olsen (1984) question its empirical 
testability and seem ready to dismiss it as merely a good 
argument that "the organization of political life makes a 
difference."96 Furthermore, institutionalism is too broad and 
ambiguous and there is no agreement about what it means.
Different scholars define 'institutions' differently. But in 
most cases, they define institutions broadly, making their 
arguments difficult to refute. The failure to 'tighten up' 
institutional analysis appears to undermine its utility as an 
analytical framework, as almost everything can be explained in 
institutional terms. While this may be a valid criticism, in 
part, it does not diminish the usefulness of the construct in 
advancing our understanding of what goes on in a polity.
Another important criticism focuses on institutionalism's 
uncomfortable treatment of preferences which may be exogenous to 
the political system or actions which are choice based rather 
than determined by institutions. For instance can
See: J. March and J. Olsen, 1984, op.cit.; G. Jordan, "Policy Community 
Realism Versus 'New' Institutionalist Ambiguity", Political Studies, 
vol.38, no.3, September 1990; Paul Sabatier, "Toward Better Theories 
of the Policy Process", PS: Political Science and Politics, vol.XXIV, 
no.2, June 1991; S. Steinmo et al., eds., 1992, op.cit., pp.14-22.
J. March and J. Olsen, 1984, op.cit., p.74.
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institutionalism explain why Mrs. Thatcher so strongly held her 
monetarist and neo-liberal convictions? Can it explain why 
Mitterrand felt it was necessary to "faire payer les riches”?
The role of such beliefs and actions place limitations on the 
extent to which what takes place in the polity can be attributed 
to institutional forces.
Another problem surrounds institutionalism's neglect of 
individual level processes - the interactions between actors and 
ideas, the manipulation of information, how problems and 
solutions come to the attention of policy communities, policy 
entrepreneurs and decision makers. Finally, institutionalism, 
with its basis in rules, roles and physical structures, has an 
inherent bias against change and innovation.97 It is better 
suited to explaining long-standing patterns.
Both Hall (1986) and Steinmo (1989, 1993) employ an 
institutional approach to explain the persistence of national 
patterns of policy. Historical continuities within individual 
countries and cross-country differences, rather than policy 
departures - which many claim, more often than not represent a 
blip on the policy continuum - are the focus of these studies. 
However, when it comes to explaining shift points in traditional 
patterns - important policy changes - then institutionalist
97 Lawrence Dodd (1986) found this to be the case with the American
Congress, for example. The physical organization and organizational 
rules of Congress imparted a 'conservative bias' in that institution 
and the effect on policy was such that there was a "tendency to adapt 
slowly to the rise of new societal problems and new policy agendas" (L. 
Dodd, "A Theory of Congressional Cycles: Solving the Puzzle of Change" 
in G. Wright, Jr., L. Rieselbach and L. Dodd, eds., Congress and Policy 
Change, New York: Agathon Press, Inc., 1986, p.19).
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arguments falter.98
Steinmo's (1989) framework and his reliance on political 
institutions, which change rather slowly, is not particularly 
well suited to policy change. Indeed, Steinmo focuses more on 
the extent to which apparently radical governments, like Reagan's 
and Thatcher's were unable to accomplish many of their plans due 
to institutional constraints (echoing Ikenberry's (1988) 
assertion that institutional approaches better explain what is 
not possible in a given institutional context than what is)." 
Although Steinmo does admit that policy change occurred and 
explains it in terms of the structure of the political process, 
he is not entirely convincing, nor is he entirely convinced that 
policy change did indeed take place. Moreover, Steinmo's 
analysis is less useful in explaining how tax reform ideas were 
developed, by whom and why and why they were adopted by Mrs. 
Thatcher and the Conservative Party or by Reagan and the 
Republicans (and the Democrats).
With respect to the 1986 Tax Reform Act in the United 
States, Steinmo explains this departure in policy with reference
However, both Steinmo (1993, and in Steinmo, et al., eds., 1992) and 
Hall (1986/ P. Hall, "The Movement from Keynesianism to Monetarism: 
Institutional Analysis and British Economic Policy in the 1970s" in S. 
Steinmo, et al., eds., 1992, op.cit.; P. Hall, 1993) have sought to 
compensate for the 'stable' approaches of their respective 
institutional analyses. They have slightly modified their models to 
accommodate the international and domestic social, political and 
economic changes which have affected institutions and been affected by 
institutions.
G.J. Ikenberry, "Conclusion: an Institutional Approach to American 
Foreign Policy" in G.J. Ikenberry, D. Lake and M. Mastanduno, eds., The 
State and American Foreign Economic Policy, (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1988), p.242.
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to America's peculiar political institutions - fragmented, open, 
pluralistic - just as he explains the policy continuities. 
America's political institutions and the incentives they create, 
we are led to believe, would prevent reform of any kind, except 
perhaps, cosmetic.100 To be precise, he refers to the 1986 reform 
as reinforcing the already complex, burdensome and 
particularistic trends which have characterized the U.S. tax 
system in the post war period.101 This analysis, I believe, is 
deficient in that it ignores, or glosses over, important changes 
in policy and both the domestic and international politico- 
economic contexts, which, to a certain extent, alternatively 
reflected and impacted special relations among relevant ideas, 
actors and institutions.
By 1993, Steinmo appeared more generous in terms of the 
significance of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, if only slightly. In 
Taxation and Democracy (1993), he attributes the success of this 
policy change - only in some respects - in part to America's 
fragmented government, and the committee system in Congress 
particularly. The fragmentation and dispersal of power is seen,
S. Steinmo, 1993, op.cit., p.165.
Steinmo's perspective contrasts to a certain extent with that of Eugene 
Steuerle who worked at the Treasury Department and was the Department's 
Economic Coordinator for the 1984-6 Project for Fundamental Reform and 
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Analysis. 
According to Steuerle (1991, ch.8), the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
"represented one of the most sweeping tax code changes in the history 
of the country..." with lower, fewer and more equal tax rates and 
brackets and an annual net reduction of expenditures in the tax code 
equal to $193 billion in 1988. Despite this, Steuerle does admit that 
"many inefficient and inequitable differentials" remained and even some 
new problems created (p.143). (E. Steuerle, The Tax Decade, Washington, 
D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1991).
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in part, as a consequence of the congressional reforms of the 
1970s, which decentralized and opened the work of Congress, 
causing a multiplication of efforts to pursue the pork and bring 
back the bacon. A second major factor has to do with the 
electoral incentives in the United States which oblige 
congressmen to look and act on the short-term interests of their 
constituencies, even when this compromises the longer term 
interests of the nation.102
These institutional variables are employed to explain the 
very different tax bills of 1978, 1981, 1982, 1984 and 1986.
With this line of argumentation, the 1986 tax bill should have 
looked little different, say from the 1981 tax bill. However, 
one institutional variable was different. This was the 
relationship of business interests to policy makers and the 
position of those interests in the international economy. During 
the formulation and debate of the 1986 bill, Steinmo (1993) 
contends that the business community was divided. This division 
arose due to the changed matrix of incentives caused by the 
altered position of U.S. industries in the international 
economy.103 If we are to believe Steinmo, barring any structural 
changes in the Congress, the position of American business 
interests had changed to such an extent in the four year period 
between 1981 and 1985 that the enactment of two very different
102 S. Steinmo, 1993, op.cit., p.205.
103 "...as the world economy has internationalized, the tax policy 
preferences of America's corporate sector have diverged" (S. Steinmo, 
1993, op.cit., pp.166-7).
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tax bills in 1981 and 1986 should come as no surprise.
However, did the position of American businesses in the 
international economy change so significantly between 1981 and 
1985? It seems doubtful. In which case, the 1986 tax bill 
should have been little different from the 1981 bill. Steinmo 
seems to interpret the evidence to suit his thesis. His 
institutional arguments seem to be all-encompassing - able to 
explain anything, persistent patterns, as well as change.
However, he really only manages to half-explain the change in 
policy and then not very satisfactorily, because he largely 
focuses on explaining what the 1986 reform did not achieve. 
Furthermore, he avoids discussing the interactions which occurred 
between ideas, actors and institutions - in the late 1970s/early 
1980s - and how those interactions produced tax reform.104 For 
instance, he makes no mention of such important actors as Don 
Regan, the Treasury's Office of Policy Analysis, Bill Bradley, 
Jack Kemp or William Roth, Robert McIntyre, the ideas they 
promoted and how they related to one another and to institutions.
Failing this, what Steinmo does do is demonstrate how an 
institutional construct can explain policy change despite the 
largely static quality of institutions. It is suggested that 
institutional changes in Congress and the organization of capital
104 In fact, R. Strahan (1988, p.194) shows that observed tendencies and
expected patterns in the post-congressional reform tax policy process 
did indeed change in the mid-1980s. The variation is attributed, 
however, to party "political conditions associated with issues on the 
committee's agenda" which themselves appear, in part, as a result of 
changes in the socio-economic environment (R. Strahan, "Agenda Change 
and Committee Politics in the Postreform House", Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, vol.XIII, no.2, May 1988).
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in the international economy shaped and defined the ideas, goals, 
relations, strategies and behavior of actors in the American 
polity leading to a series of tax reforms in the 1980s. However, 
as I mentioned above, the role played by policy entrepreneurs and 
activists, their ideas, goals and strategies, are generally 
obscured. It is left to the reader to fit the pieces of the tax 
reform puzzle into Steinmo's framework. While Steinmo's analysis 
raises some questions, the basic tenets are sound and point us in 
an interesting direction in our search for a model.
After analyzing Steinmo's arguments as they apply to 
American tax reform, how valid are they with respect to 
explaining tax policy change in Britain and France? In Taxation 
and Democracy (1993), the author notes the changing social, 
economic and political context by the late 1970s, made the time 
"ripe for some kind of tax reform. "105 He maintains that changes 
in public attitudes regarding the role of government and the 
onerous burden of taxes, particularly on the lower and middle 
classes in a period of high inflation, prompted a political 
response. Changes in elite attitudes also had an impact. 
Political elites frustrated with politics as usual and the 
inability of the Keynesian inspired consensus to resolve the 
prevailing economic problems, looked about for new solutions.
They appeared to have found them in the ideas of the New Right. 
Moreover, French and British business elites were concerned about 
the effects of stagflation on productivity and profits and
10S S. Steinmo, 1993, op.cit., p.157.
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casting a wary eye on the rise of the Asian tigers106 and the 
visibly superior position of their American, Japanese and German 
competitors. They called for measures - tax cuts and/or tax 
incentives - which would help them lower their costs and enhance 
their competitive positions. Changes in the economic and 
technological environment, with the increasing mobility of 
capital and flexibility of location and investment strategies of 
multinational corporations, required re-thinking the design of 
taxation.
The changing domestic, but mostly international, political, 
economic and social contexts, obliged tax policy makers to 
rethink their systems and adapt them to the changing needs and 
attitudes of citizens, investors and businessmen. It is in such 
terms that Steinmo (1993) explains the change without really 
going into specifics. He reminds us that how those changes were 
perceived, their effects on tax policy makers and the outputs 
produced, depend on the configuration of institutions in each 
country. However, he treats the role of institutions on two 
levels in his approach to the thorny issue of policy change: 
dynamically, with the (in)ability of institutions to effectively 
process issues and statically, with the basic structural features 
of government.107
Steinmo (1993), for example, citing Heclo (1974), explains 
that the persistence of economic and budgetary norms
106
107
The newly industrializing countries in Southeast Asia and Japan.
S. Steinmo, 1989, op.cit., p.528.
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institutionalized in the Bank of England and the Treasury 
prevented the Labour governments in the late 1920s/early 1930s 
from making any radical economic policy departures, despite the 
availability of new ideas.108 However, new ideas eventually were 
wielded when the "orthodox economic convictions" proved 
unsatisfactory.
Established norms and procedures institutionalized in 
British economic policy making bodies were proving ineffective to 
meet new challenges. Steinmo, referring to Middlemas (1979), 
explains that the eventual change in approach came not because it 
was imposed from above, but because of "multiple responses to 
circumstances. . .of the governing institutions."109
However, the institutions didn't change or even drive the 
change, at least not initially. It was their inability to cope 
with new problems which opened a window for new actors, new ideas 
and new methods. Policy adaptation, therefore, can be seen as 
the product of resourceful and entrepreneurial men and women, 
brandishing new ideas and challenging established orthodoxies, 
working through institutions and according to certain rules, 
perhaps modifying them and/or creating new ones along the way. 
Nonetheless, inefficient institutional responses to the problems 
at hand, and the formulation of preferences and new policies, and 
their implementation within and through a given institutional
108 "...the major roadblock to any policy adaptation was a continuing 
adherence to old truths rather than any lack of political power" (H. 
Heclo, 1974, p.118 quoted in S. Steinmo, 1993, p.113).
109 K. Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Society, (Thetford: Andre Deutsch, 
1979) quoted in S. Steinmo, 1993, op.cit., p.115.
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setting, attest to the role of institutions in this process of 
policy change. But the impulse for change, and the pursuit of 
it, was in the hands of convinced and committed individuals, 
albeit operating in a particular institutional environment.110
This leads us to another level of institutional analysis put 
forward by Steinmo (1993). The Tories equipped with a radical 
economic agenda were elected to lead the country in 1979. The 
government, peopled largely by committed reformers was supported 
by a large and relatively disciplined parliamentary majority. It 
had at its disposal an economic decision making apparatus that 
was highly centralized and largely independent of societal 
pressures, but which was familiar with certain constraints, those 
institutional and policy related. This institutional setting 
paved the way for the tax reforms of the 1980s. If Mrs. 
Thatcher's government was able to enact the program it did, the 
reasons are to be found in the framework of Britain's political 
institutions.
Perhaps this analysis can be adapted for France (a country 
which Steinmo does not examine). We could argue that the neo­
liberal tax reforms enacted by the Socialist government from 
1982-86, for example, were made possible by the ineffectual
M. Mullard (Understanding Economic Policy, London: Routledge, 1992, 
p. 12) points out that governments committed to a perspective and 
program which are at odds with established norms, i.e. the Treasury 
view, may import their own economic advisers (as the Thatcher 
government did with Alan Walters, Terry Burns, Peter Middleton, Peter 
Cropper and Adam Ridley) into the Treasury in the hopes of creating a 
pluralist tension, which would set the ideas held by the government 
against the conventional wisdom of the Treasury. The competition of 
ideas, would naturally be settled in favor of the government.
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institutional responses to the economic crisis of the late 
1970s/early 1980s. We can also look at the policy (economic, 
tax) commitments of key decision makers in government, especially 
President Mitterrand, as well as the Prime Minister (first 
Mauroy, then Fabius) and the Finance Minister (first Delors, then 
Beregovoy). The adoption of tax reform by the Socialist 
government and its enactment by Parliament was assured by a 
number of institutional variables related to the political 
system: the unequivocal decision-taking role of the government, 
supported by a centralized, competent and (theoretically) 
politically neutral economic and finance administration, which 
can easily resist the entreaties of special interests, and the 
negligible economic policy-initiating role played by Parliament. 
Moreover, the government saw its tax agenda passed, because it 
enjoyed a large and disciplined (though less so than in Britain) 
parliamentary majority.
In both cases, therefore, a strong majoritarian government, 
assisted by centralized, competent and neutral economic policy­
making institutions, confronted by a powerless and divided 
parliamentary opposition and supported by an acquiescent and 
disciplined parliamentary majority acted to implement its tax 
reform agenda.
In order to accommodate changes which break the broad policy 
patterns that Steinmo is more comfortable explaining, he adapted 
his institutional framework by setting domestic institutions and 
policy makers in a broader international context. His 1993
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analysis considers the interaction of domestic political 
institutions and policy makers with international level 
variables, especially economic ones, and concludes that this 
interaction generates responses that result in policy change.
The only problem I find, in the context of this study, is how the 
agenda changes. What forces conspire to change the agenda?
From Steinmo's 1989 study we learn that Britain has the 
policies it does because of its special institutional setting. 
From his 1993 work, we learn that the impact of international 
developments on domestic actors and institutions may lead to 
changes in policy. But questions remain. Why are those domestic 
actors and institutions affected and how? In what way(s) did 
this impact lead to neo-liberal tax reform? How did neo-liberal 
tax reform come to appear on political agendas? These questions, 
for example, are not adequately treated by Steinmo. What is 
going on between ideas, actors and institutions in the evolution 
of tax reform from idea to agenda? The focus, which seems to be, 
on the forest, obscures the trees. We need to understand, as 
well, the micro-activities that bring issues onto a government's 
agenda. It will be our task to fill in these pertinent pieces of 
the puzzle.
Peter Hall's (1986) work, which preceded Steinmo's (1989, 
1993), deals with the issue of policy change somewhat more 
convincingly. His broader institutional analysis, which attempts 
to identify international level variables and their impact on the 
domestic policy processes makes Hall's study more eclectic but
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also more thorough. Hall begins by positing that institutions, 
while largely static, are not immune to change.111 He explains 
that his is not an entirely static analysis; he notes, "The 
economic strategies of Britain and France changed to some degree 
over the post-war period."112 For example, Hall argues that 
changes in policy may be due to shifts in a country's 
international position - say, France's entry into the EEC and the 
moves to integrate economies and liberalize trade - and the 
organization of the political system - for instance, the 
divisions within a party and its effects, a change in electoral 
laws or even an election which brings a new party, new leaders 
and policies to office.113 We will focus briefly on the latter.
While Hall observes that "...the organization of the 
political system...seems to have played only a subsidiary role in 
economic policy-making", when assessing the factors responsible 
for economic policy changes - as opposed to continuities - this 
variable, more susceptible to change than the others, seems to 
play an important role indeed.114
A perspective Steinmo comes to share in his later works (S. Steinmo et 
al., eds., 1992, op.cit. and Steinmo, 1993, op.cit.).
P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., p.266.
By acknowledging the capacity for change wrought by these two 
variables, Hall's analytical framework is more flexible and more 
successful than Steinmo's (1989), as it proves to be more comfortable 
with the notion and fact of policy change.
"Perhaps this organizational space is more subject to change than 
others," writes Hall (1986, p.271). Hall also notes that other 
institutional configurations like the state, capital and labor may 
change depending on such things as the dynamics of the relationship 
between state and society or circumstances like wars and long 
recessions (P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., pp.256-8, 271-280).
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...political action is not only a matter of constraint.
There is a dynamic element to state-society relations; 
and from time to time a measure of innovation in 
economic policy breaks through some of the conventional 
constraints. At such moments the political system is 
also revealed as one of the principal sources of 
innovation in economic policy.115
While a political system is generally historically developed,
slowly evolving and conducive to persisting policy patterns, it
is indeed capable of change and innovation. Parties, elected
officials and candidates vie against one another to offer a
unique and appealing set of ideas and policies. They may be
responding to perceived signals emanating from the public or
changes in the domestic and/or international environments. It
may be asserted, therefore, that the competition between parties
drives innovation and change to a large extent.116
Hall (1993) expands his thesis of policy change by adapting
a model of learning to explain Britain's move from Keynesian to
monetarist and supply-side modes of policy making. Relegating
the state to a largely subordinate role, Hall continues to
emphasize the role of politicians competing in the
political/electoral arena; but what's more, he identifies other
supporting but essential variables which had considerable impact
on the changing political discourse, i.e. the press, financial
markets and think tanks. A formerly 'exclusive' and 'closed'
policy process was opened to accommodate a broad debate of ideas
115 P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., p.273.
1X6 The innovative role of parties in the tax policy area has been noted
by C. Heckly (1987), Robinson and Sandford (1983), G. Thompson (1990) 
and Steinmo (1993).
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which, in a certain respect, broadened support for, gave greater 
credence to, and heightened the saliency of political actors and 
the alternative solutions to perceived problems which they 
championed.
James March (1988) supports the view that institutions are
not altogether rigid and inflexible,
Organizations change in response to their 
environments...There is considerable stability in 
organizations, but the changes we observe are 
substantial enough to suggest that organizations are 
remarkably adaptive, enduring institutions, responding 
to volatile environments routinely and easily, though 
not always optimally...Many of the most stable 
procedures in an organization are procedures for 
responding to economic, social and political 
contexts.117
March discusses six processes of organizational adaptation, among 
which are conflict, regeneration and contagion. Though treated 
separately, these 'perceptives' are not mutually exclusive. 
Conflict refers to the action which results from the mobilization 
and competition between diverse interests. Changes result from 
"shifts in the mobilization of participants or in the resources 
they control."118 Should the CNPF assert its influence and power 
vis-a-vis smaller and traditionally less privileged groups who 
have temporarily gained the favor of government, or if the 
center-right opposition is drawing increasing political support 
which had been captured by the Socialists only a few months
J. March, Decisions and Organization, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988),
pp.168-171.
u s Ibid., p.170.
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prior, then organizational action resulting in change may ensue. 
The party which stands to lose from these changes, namely the 
Socialists, will be compelled to act.
Regeneration refers to action which is caused by a turnover 
in personnel. Changing the mix of participants has the effect of 
bringing new people with different attitudes, interests, 
abilities and methods into an organization. Changing the mix of 
actors can take place through new appointments, elections, etc. 
The resignation of Mr. Delors as Finance Minister and Mr. Mauroy 
as Prime Minister in 1984 brought Laurent Fabius and Pierre 
Beregovoy, both keen tax reformers, to positions which enabled 
them to pursue their interests and change tax policy in 
accordance with the President's wishes and their own preferences. 
The appointment of Nigel Lawson to replace Geoffrey Howe as 
Chancellor of the Exchequer set the train in motion for an 
unprecedented period of radical tax reform. Also, the coming to 
power of a center-right government in France with its blatant 
neo-liberal program, created an opportunity for organizational 
change.
Finally, contagion is a concept which has to do with ideas 
and actions that spread from one organization to another. 
Increased contacts between organizations and actors within those 
organizations, as well as an awareness of developments going on 
outside an organization, lead to the diffusion of ideas.
Learning takes place, which may lead to emulation. The growing 
contacts between members of the tax policy community in France,
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including civil servants, party members, and academics, and their 
counterparts abroad and the interest with which people in and 
around government pay attention to policy developments elsewhere, 
facilitated and contributed to the diffusion of neo-liberal ideas 
like tax reform in France.
These processes of organizational change are reflected in 
Hall's (1986) account of policy change in institutional settings 
that are normally predisposed to persisting patterns and policy 
continuities. He observes that while "many of the most 
fundamental organizational features of society are not readily 
susceptible to change" they can and do, though usually in subtle 
ways.119 It's in the organizational spaces of the political 
system, and the position of a country in the international 
economy, that processes of change occur, which lead to (tax) 
policy change.
Political parties competing for electoral support search for 
and offer new solutions, they build coalitions and if elected may 
bring about policy change. Kavanagh (1990) notes that along with 
the politics of economic decline "the abandonment of the 
consensus must also be connected with the internal dynamics of 
the two main political parties" and the search for a "politically 
acceptable answer to the problems of inflation and trade union 
power."120 Thompson (1990, p.32) and Robinson and Sandford (1983) 
agree that political parties, as they compete against one another
1X9
120
P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., p.266.
D. Kavanagh, 1990, op.cit., pp.55-6.
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in the electoral arena or are driven by ideological concerns, are 
the primary causes of tax reform in Britain.
But confronting political parties and leaders are "obstacles 
rooted in the international system and longstanding organization 
of capital, labor and the state" not to mention the organization 
of state-society relations.121 While these longstanding 
institutional variables constrain departures from established 
policy patterns some policy departures overcome the constraints 
and succeed, to a greater or lesser degree. Success depends on 
the relative bearings of the other variables, the opportunities 
and resources at hand and the political will to make a change. 
While Hall admits that the political system - and political 
parties and leaders in particular - is the most important source 
of policy innovation, he is not too much concerned with who 
'invents' an idea - it could be an economist, a bureaucrat etc. - 
but with how and why it spreads and how that idea is translated 
into policy.122
He credits politicians, who largely exercise responsibility 
for and control of this important evolutionary step. For 
example, tax reform was initially an idea which developed largely 
outside the French party system, but was adapted and advocated by 
political advisers and adopted by politicians driven by electoral 
concerns. It was Jacques Chirac, a party leader with
121 P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., p.258.
122 Hall writes, "...the crucial step here is the one which popularizes a 
new economic idea and translates it into policy" (P. Hall, 1986, 
op.cit., p.275).
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presidential ambitions, who made the decision to adopt the idea 
and translate it (or have it translated) into policy. Hall is 
thus obliged to reconcile the role of ideas in politics with his 
institutional analysis.
Hall (1986) accommodates the role of ideas by two means. 
Firstly, actors hold and promote ideas/preferences/interests not 
exogenously, but endogenously - they are a component of the 
actor's rational choice and action as circumstances and 
situations dictate. But that choice and action, and to a certain 
degree, the circumstances and situations, are subject to an 
institutional dynamic. For example, if Chirac took up the cause 
of tax reform, it was because he was persuaded that by adopting 
the issue and pledging himself to tax reform policies, he would 
not only distinguish himself from the collectivist (or crypto­
socialist) policies of the Giscard-Barre government and the 
radical socialist policies of the left, but also forge a new 
social coalition (much as Reagan and Thatcher had done) which 
would warm to his message and propel him to the presidency. 
Chirac's roles as political leader and presidential candidate, 
the character of the political parties and the nature of the 
French electoral system, created a matrix of incentives which 
affected Chirac's perceptions, calculations, ideas and actions.
The same has been said about Mrs. Thatcher, whose strident 
neo-liberalism set her apart not just from Labour's professed 
principles and policies, but also from Heath, whose U-turns and
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resort to collectivist solutions she so despised.123 Her promises 
to reduce taxes and general campaign rhetoric were conceived and 
expressed in a manner attractive to so-called center or floating 
voters as well as Labour voters.124 These voters cast a majority 
of their votes along with Conservative voters to give the 
Conservative Party an overwhelming victory at the polls in 1979. 
Heading the new Conservative government and with a large 
parliamentary majority to support her, Mrs. Thatcher and her 
Chancellors began the reform of Britain's tax system. The 
organization of the political system therefore, was an important 
factor, not just in terms of its effect in pushing tax reform to 
the front of the political agenda, but also in determining the 
evolution of the tax reform idea into policy.
While institutionalism is useful in understanding tax reform 
in France, where tax reform came to the political agenda due to 
primarily pragmatic and astute political considerations, the case 
for applying similar arguments in Britain is less clearcut. When
See: R. Levitas, ed. , The Ideology of the New Right, (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1986), p.48; D. Kavanagh, 1990, op.cit., pp.67-70; J.J. 
Richardson, "Britain: Changing Policy Styles and Policy Innovation in 
Response to Economic Crisis" in E. Damgaard, P. Gerlich and J.J. 
Richardson, eds., The Politics of Economic Crisis, Lessons from Western 
Europe, (Aldershot: Avebury, 1989), pp.14-15; M. Thatcher, 1993,
op.cit., pp.13-15; P. Cosgrave, Margaret Thatcher, A Tory and Her 
Party, (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1978), pp.89-90.
See: D. Kavanagh, 1990, op.cit., pp.51,54-55,58,85; M. Holmes, 1985, 
op.cit., pp.15-16. Although a number of authors argue that in fact no 
new coalition was formed around Thatcherite policies (see e.g.: B. 
Cooper, A. Kornberg and W. Mishler, . eds., The Resurgence of 
Conservatism in Anglo-American Democracies, (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1988), pp.50, 264, 279, 287-9, 297; I. Crewe, February 1990, 
op.cit., pp.2-6). While no doubt many cast their votes for the 
Conservative Party, due to 'positive' reasons, i.e. the appeal of the 
various messages enunciated by the Conservatives, many also cast their 
vote due to 'negative' reasons, i.e. the Winter of Discontent, economic 
mismanagement by Labour, etc.
85
considering, for example, the ideological nature of tax reform, 
as it was espoused by the likes of Margaret Thatcher (and Ronald 
Reagan), a Hall-ian institutional analysis is not entirely 
appropriate.125
From about 1980 in France - if not earlier - neo-liberal tax 
reform was catching on. The idea was establishing itself as 
viable, attracting the attention of economists, academics, tax 
experts, the press, civil servants and certain center-right 
politicians. However, tax reform emerged on the political or 
specialized agenda of the center-right from 1981 for two reasons 
primarily: firstly, the idea's persuasiveness as a viable 
solution to many of the fiscal and economic problems facing 
France and secondly, its political utility as an opposing 
ideology - with popular appeal - to the then dominant 'leftist' 
ideology. Many center-right politicians and sympathetic societal 
actors were converted to tax reform, only after the issue had 
begun to prove itself a political talisman elsewhere, i.e. in 
Britain and the United States.
While Mrs. Thatcher, Keith Joseph and others were gripped by 
an ideology which included tax reform as a means of altering the 
economic and social structure of Britain, in France the likes of 
Jacques Chirac, Philippe Auberger, Edouard Balladur, Alain Juppe, 
Jacques Attali, Jacques Delors, Laurent Fabius, Pierre Beregovoy
Several of the British interviewees referred to Mrs. Thatcher's tax- 
cutting instincts and her profound belief that there was too much 
government and that people should be allowed to keep more of their own 
money to spend it as they see fit.
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and Francois Mitterrand gripped elements of this ideology and 
pragmatically applied them, when the opportunity availed itself, 
to the French situation. The emergence of tax reform on the 
French political/specialized and governmental agendas had little 
to do with ideological convictions. Rather it had more to do 
with a moderate, prudent search for alternative methods in 
response to the failure of reflationary, socialist economic 
policies enacted to revive the French economy.126
The British case, which so clearly demonstrates how 
ideological convictions were the motor for policy change, 
presents some difficulties for institutionalists like Hall. It 
is in such instances that Hall admits the limitations of 
institutionalism. Since ideology sits uncomfortably within his 
framework. The reasons actors - like Thatcher, Joseph, Howe, 
Lawson and Reagan - hold their particular convictions cannot be 
entirely attributed to "their organizational position in society 
or the state."127 What concerns us here, particularly in the 
British case, are those attitudes and beliefs motivating 
political actors which Hall defines as "exogenous in character in 
the sense that they derive from fundamental beliefs about 
politics or economics whose origins are not to be found in any
Roland Sturm (1986, op.cit., p.447) in his study of economic and 
budgetary policy making under institutional restrictions comments, "The
Socialist French government seemed to prefer West German Conservative 
pragmatism to the more ideologically committed Anglo-American version 
of a politique de rigeur."
127 P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., p.278.
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immediate institutional situation."128
Certain politicians conduct politics from the standpoint of 
a coherent, comprehensive set of beliefs.129 These beliefs are 
also known as ideology. Shils (in D. Sills, ed., 1968) observes 
that ideological propensities are "heightened" when "prevailing 
elites fail and are discredited and when the central institutions 
and cultures with which they associate themselves seem unable to 
find the right course of action."130 We can therefore understand 
the potentiality of a Mrs. Thatcher or a Keith Joseph emerging on 
the political stage in Britain, in light of the ineffectualness 
with which established elites, norms and institutions confronted 
economic, social and political challenges in the 1970s.
Hall (1986) attests to the power of ideology and the 
importance of politicians who maintain and promote their 
fundamental beliefs. He concedes that the role of political 
ideas limits the extent to which the attitudes of political 
actors can be explained by institutional arrangements.131 The 
ideological orientations of actors like Mrs. Thatcher - but 
unlike Chirac and Mitterrand - cannot be associated with any 
given institutional location. The role of such ideologies and
128 P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., p.277.
129 Edward Shils (in D. Sills, ed., 1968) claims that ideological politics 
are alienative politics. He explains that ideological politicians shun 
the dominant creeds and contemporaneous outlooks and the central 
institutions of the prevailing society and oppose established political 
and social arrangements (E. Shils, "The Concept and Function of 
Ideology" in D. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences, New York: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, 1968).
130 Ibid., p.75.
131 P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., p.277.
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why they are held with such conviction by some politicians, 
cannot always be explained in institutional terms.
Hall makes an effort to reconcile ideology with his 
institutional analysis. He addresses the above discussed 
limitation by explaining that institutions are indeed involved.132 
Who is to say these actors would not have shed their convictions 
were it not for the sounding boards and incubators provided by 
think tanks, central banks, the press and political parties?
While institutions may not create ideas they are to a large 
degree responsible for their nurturing, dissemination and 
diffusion. •
Apart from finding resonance for her instincts and ideas in 
institutions like the IEA, the Bow Group and later the Centre for 
Policy Studies, and in corners of the Conservative Party, these 
and other institutions helped shape and refine Mrs. Thatcher's 
'Grantham shopkeeper's daughter' and 'housewife' notions about 
budgeting, individual initiative and responsibility.133 In time 
the Conservative Party, like the Centre for Policy Studies and 
the IEA, became a ready vehicle for the dissemination of
Katherine Teghtsoonian (1992) considers the effects of ideology in her 
institutional analysis of child care policies in Canada and the U.S. 
However she discusses the roles of ideology and institutions as 
distinct variables impacting policy outputs and does attempt to not 
couch ideology in an institutional framework as Hall (1986) does (see, 
K. Teghtsoonian, "Institutions and Ideology: Sources of Opposition to 
Federal Regulation of Child Care Services in Canada and the United 
States", Governance, vol.5, no.2, April 1992).
See e.g.: N. Lawson, 1992, op.cit., pp.8-9,13-14; M. Holmes, 1985, 
op.cit., pp.51-52; P. Cosgrave, 1978, op.cit., pp.84-88; H. Young, One 
of Us, A Biography of Margaret Thatcher, (London: Macmillan, 1989) , 
ch. 7.
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monetarist and neo-liberal economic ideas.134 These ideas 
acquired a force and appeal that helped propel the Conservatives 
and Mrs. Thatcher to victory in May 1979.
The point here is to demonstrate that the role of ideas in 
politics can be accommodated - if somewhat loosely - in an 
institutional analysis, thus reaffirming Hall's central tenet 
that institutions are important in the shaping of ideas and their 
translation into policy. Hall puts forward an analytical 
framework, which for the most part succeeds in explaining not 
only policy continuities, but also policy changes over time 
within and across countries, particularly Britain and France. He 
does so largely by focusing on the innovative capacity of the 
political system.
The institutional framework has a number of advantages and 
points us in interesting directions, if we can overcome its 
deterministic inclinations. "Institutions constrain and refract 
politics, but they are never the only cause of outcomes."135 The 
policy process is a complex one. Many variables are involved.
As Hall (1986) observes, political outcomes depend, in large 
part, but not entirely, on political interactions which 
themselves are mediated by institutions.136 Basically, whatever
Someone like Enoch Powell, who was Thatcherite before Mrs. Thatcher 
was, though espousing similar ideological and economic beliefs, in the
late 1960s/early 1970s, found himself a lone voice as there was no 
institutional home to bear, shelter, nourish, diffuse and express his 
ideas.
S. Steinmo et al., eds., 1992, p. 13.
136 P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., ch.10, pp.255-58.
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happens in the policy-making process, happens because of
institutions, but not to the exclusion of other factors.
Again, this eclectic framework is vulnerable to accusations
of explaining everything, that it is too broad and all-
encompassing. Moreover, like Steinmo's approach we have an
explanation of the forest, without an understanding of what part
the trees play. What exactly happens, who is involved and how,
are not really accounted for. For example, who is involved in
identifying and acknowledging problems? How does that process
take place? Who formulates and selects solutions and translates
them into policy and how do these processes take place? As David
Caputo (1977) argues,
The decision-making process, if it is to be fully 
understood, must include a thorough understanding of- 
the individual processes and procedures by which the 
different institutions reach agreement on different 
policy issues.137
We need to take a closer look at those interactions between ideas
and actors in the polity, in particular those that gave rise to
tax reform on the governmental agendas in France and Britain. We
aim to understand what goes on in that "black box". After all,
institutions did not develop, advocate nor place tax reform 
policies on the governmental agenda, individuals did. We must 
therefore look at those individuals, their ideas, interests and 
activities. Then we can employ an institutional approach to help 
us better understand how institutions affected their preferences,
137 D. Caputo, ed., The Politics of Policy Making in America, (San 
Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1977), Conclusion.
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strategies and interactions - and vice versa - in such a way as 
to change the tax agendas in Britain and France. Institutions 
can help us put the many variables involved in the tax reform 
process in context.
Certainly, no discussion of the tax reform process can take 
place without a consideration of context dependency; in other 
words, without referring to the particular institutional setting 
in which tax reform evolved from idea to government policy. The 
beauty of institutionalism is that it can be blended with other 
approaches to help us make sense of the complex relationships and 
interactions in a given political situation. Moreover, 
institutionalism brings us much closer to a framework which can 
explain the emergence of tax reform in Britain and France in 
similar terms. It can help us to conduct discourse on the 
similarities in the approaches and policy outputs in both 
countries as well as the differences.
While up to now the institutional model seems the most 
viable as a frame of reference for the discussion of tax reform, 
it rather awkwardly accomodates the ideological element that was 
instrumental - in the British case, at least - in moving tax 
reform to a high position on the government's agenda from 1979. 
For although this exogenous element played a central role in the 
development of tax reform in Britain, it was virtually absent in 
the French case, at least in its incipient stages between 1982
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and 1986.138
In the search for a common thread linking the tax reform 
process in Britain and France, it is with hesitation that an 
institutional framework is wholeheartedly endorsed, because of 
the weak link of ideology, it's greater utility in explaining 
differences rather than similarities, and its focus on macro­
level as opposed to micro-level activities. In searching for a 
model which accommodates several features of this and previously 
examined models and thereby make up for their shortcomings, this 
analytical enquiry must be pursued further.
Process Streams and Windows
Our main purpose here is to explain how neo-liberal tax 
reform became an agenda item in France and Britain during the 
1980s and to evaluate the process(es) by which tax reform made 
the transition from idea to government policy. We hope to 
discover or elaborate a framework which will allow us, if 
possible, to discuss the processes of tax reform on similar 
terms. So far we have looked at a number of different approaches 
which have drawn attention to varied aspects of those processes. 
Each approach has had some analytical purchase in explaining tax 
reform, but has fallen somewhat short of the mark. The wide- 
ranging discussion undertaken up to this point has called up 
interesting and useful information and insights, essential to our 
primary task, but has not proven entirely satisfactory in terms
138 There were very few individuals who shared the ideological convictions 
of Reagan and Thatcher in France, and these generally were not in a 
position to set the agenda or make authoritative decisions.
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of providing an appropriate framework for analysis.
It is worth reminding, that this study is concerned with a 
limited phase of the policy process, how public problems are 
identified and solutions devised; how these come to the attention 
of public officials and key decision makers; and how the agenda 
is set.139 What problem(s) was/were present and acknowledged (and 
by whom) to which neo-liberal tax reform could be deemed an 
appropriate solution? Where did the solution come from? Was it 
a case of neo-liberal tax reform looking for a problem? Or the 
problem looking for the solution? Who advocated the solution? 
What and/who determined when and how neo-liberal tax reform 
should be considered and placed on the governmental agenda? The 
answers to these questions are essential to an identification of 
the relationships and interactions of diverse variables at play 
in this particular issue area. The heretofore considered 
'models' help us only in part.
In the attempt to discover an appropriate conceptualization 
of the tax reform pre-enactment decision processes, a review of 
some of the recent literature on tax policy making and tax reform 
has been undertaken. In the course of this review I was 
particularly struck by an observation made by Ann Robinson and 
Cedric Sandford (1983) in the conclusion of their book Tax 
Policy-Making in the United Kingdom; they said,
We will only deal superficially with how policy is formulated and 
decisions made from a number of alternatives. The latter stages of the 
policy process, policy enactment - involving authoritative decisions 
by an executive or legislature - implementation and evaluation, are 
excluded from this analysis.
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...there are many interwoven strands in the progress of 
any one tax from its inception in the mind of academic 
or politician to its actual operation in the economic 
and social systems.140
If I substitute 'tax reform' for 'any one tax', I have the
premise for my examination of the tax reform processes in France
and Britain; in other words, tax reform resulted from the
interweaving of various strands, not only in Britain, but in
France as well. Of course, this is no great revelation. But the
notion of interweaving strands focused my attention on models
which attempt to accomodate a variety of factors that make up a
decision or policy. The concept of interweaving strands recalls
the work of Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) and their 'garbage can
model' of organizational choice. Their process streams flowing
through an organization in largely haphazard and unpredictable
ways captures the sense of Robinson's and Sandford's "interwoven
strands".
Michael Cohen, James March and Johan Olsen (1972) put 
forward a model which attempts to account for the complicated and 
oftentimes unpredictable "generation of problems in an 
organization, the deployment of personnel, the production of 
solutions, and the opportunities for choice."141 Their model 
features four streams flowing through a decision-making 
organization. In the garbage can model of organizational choice
A. Robinson and C. Sandford, 1983, op.cit., p.218.
M. Cohen, J. March, and J. Olsen, "A Garbage Can Model of 
Organizational Choice" , Administrative Science Quarterly, vol.17, no.l, 
March 1972, p.2.
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a decision is an outcome of four independent "streams" flowing 
within an organization: problems, solutions, participants and 
choice opportunities.
Briefly, problems are raised prior to and/or during a choice 
situation and attract the attention of key actors and decision 
makers. The perceived problems may or may not generate 
solutions. The solutions, on the other hand, are devised or 
already available and may pertain to a particular problem or 
group of problems, or they may not. Participants are involved in 
problem raising and solving and advocating their positions vis-d- 
vis problems and solutions. They will come and go depending on a 
number of factors, i.e. time, relevance, effort, expertise, etc. 
Choice opportunities occur when decisions have to be made.
According to Cohen, March and Olsen, these streams flow 
largely independently of one another. However, it is the 
fortuitous confluence of these streams that results in 
organizational choice, optimally when the best solution solves 
the most problems relevant to the particular choice opportunity. 
They come together as a result of being simultaneously available. 
It would be instructive to take a moment and illustrate the four 
streams in a basic way: at our university our dean is resigning 
and after a given date will cease to carry out his 
responsibilities (problem); a new dean must be appointed (choice 
opportunity); the new dean should have years of experience in 
administration and public relations and have the ability to teach 
theology and philosophy and should be well known in the academic
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community with extensive contacts in many walks of life (more 
problems and also viability criteria); many people inside and 
outside the university raise problems, relevant or not to this 
situation, and work on solutions (participants); several 
qualified candidates are put forward (solutions).
Although the impression may be otherwise, these streams of 
problems, solutions, participants and choice opportunities 
generally do not float about randomly. They are affected by 
organization. They are "channelled and regulated by 
organizational and social structure."142 The authors point out 
that elements of structure influence outcomes of a garbage can 
decision process by: a) affecting the time pattern of the arrival 
of problems, choices, solutions or decision makers, b) 
determining the allocation of energy, attention and activity by 
potential participants, and c) establishing linkages among the 
various streams.
What do March and Olsen mean by organizational and social 
structure? Basically, they are referring to the rules, 
procedures and arrangements, written and unwritten, formal and 
informal, which define and organize roles, hierarchy, 
specialization, distribution of information and allocation of 
authority.143 These may act as constraints or impetus in the 
choice process. While those organizational and social structures
142 J. March and J. Olsen, Amgiguity and Choice in Organizations, (Bergen:
Universitetsforlaget, 1976), p.27. This recalls the issue machine of 
David Braybrooke (see D. Braybrooke, Traffic Congestion Goes Through 
the Issue Machine, London: Routledge, 1974) .
143 J. March and J. Olsen, 1976, op.cit., pp.31-2.
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are subject to change, sometimes incrementally, sometimes quite 
drastically, they provide the context in which the choice process 
occurs.
What is the garbage can and how does it relate to decision 
making? Briefly, the authors posit the existence of a garbage 
can - their choice opportunity - into which the participants dump 
various problems and solutions.144 The decision made depends on 
which garbage cans are available at the time, the type of garbage 
the cans contain, the rates at which the cans are emptied and 
filled, etc. Moreover, the decisions produced can be 
incremental, but also non-incremental. Such a model involves 
complicated and oftentimes unpredictable variables: the 
generation of problems in an organization, the deployment of 
personnel, the production of solutions and the opportunities for 
choice.
Through their studies, Cohen, March and Olsen sought an 
explanation of organizational behavior when confronted with 
unclear goals, technology and fluid participation - a theory of 
organized anarchy. They identified a number of common elements 
in organizational behavior from the cases they examined.
Firstly, they identified three properties characteristic of 
organizations: problematic goals (preferences), unclear 
technologies and fluid participation.
Of these three properties the first, problematic goals, 
refers to the inconsistent and nebulous nature of preferences
A choice opportunity is the situation which leads to a decision.
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which determine the behavior of participants within an 
organization, but as well may be determined by the participant's 
behavior. Goals are often not clearly defined - an observation 
echoed in studies of tax policy making.145 The second of these 
properties, unclear technology, characterizes an organization's 
processes as only partly comprehensible by its participants. 
Although it manages to take decisions and produce outcomes, 
oftentimes the individual parts do not understand one another or 
the larger purpose which drives the organization. What usually 
transpires is the result of trial and error, learning from past 
experience or pragmatic adaptations to given conditions. As to 
fluid participation, the third property, Cohen, March and Olsen 
observed activity which seemed to contradict the purposiveness of 
traditional organization theory. Rather than demonstrating 
stable activity by relevant, interested participants over the 
course of a choice (as assumed in traditional theory), these 
authors agreed that considerable variation among individuals 
exists in terms of the degree and form of attention and action. 
Participants varied in the amount of time and effort devoted to 
decisions, problems and choice situations, in general, such that 
who was involved was seen to change from one time to another. 
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) noted that the three properties of 
organized anarchies - problematic goals, unclear technology and
See e.g. : Charles Lindblom, 1977, op.cit.; A. Robinson and C. Sandford, 
op.cit.; C.L. Schultze, The Politics and Economics of Public Spending, 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968); C. Heckly,
op.cit..
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fluid participation - were to be found in any organization in 
part, part of the time. They claimed these properties are 
"particularly conspicuous in public, educational and illegitimate 
organizations.,|146
It was because of these ambiguous properties that Cohen, 
March and Olsen sought a conception of organizational choice 
distinct from the standard conception of the model. The 
ambiguity they identified is not accommodated well within that 
standard conception. Organizations which featured these three 
properties were known as organized anarchies.147 Although the 
organized anarchies which the authors observed were in fact 
educational institutions, the authors admit that other decision­
making institutions would undoubtedly show similar properties; 
for example, parliaments, businesses, political parties, the 
executive branch of government.148
To adapt this theory of choice to my own purpose I choose to 
consider government as a form of public organization. This is
Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972, op.cit., p.l.
The organizations are referred to as 'organized anarchies' because they 
exhibit an absence of clear and purposive policy goals and directives, 
because policy makers do not always know what they want, what they are 
supposed to do, what is expected of them or how what they are doing is 
related to what others are doing. Moreover, policy makers bring 
different resources time, knowledge and energy and levels of commitment 
to the choice situation. Organizations such as Cohen, March and Olsen 
have described, are characterized by three general properties: 
problematic preferences, unclear technology and fluid participation; 
hence, the term organized anarchy.
This theory of organizational choice developed from studies of decision 
making in educational institutions in Norway, Denmark and the United 
States.
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not a novel definition by any means.149 A government - whether it 
be British, French or other - is a complex organization with 
problematic goals, unclear technology and fluid participation. 
These properties are characteristic of governments in part, part 
of the time.
Generally speaking, governments often do not clarify goals 
and objectives. Usually they are limited in terms of their 
capacity to spell out in any substantive detail, their goals, the 
alternatives available, how they expect to accomplish those goals 
and what the consequences may be of achieving them. Even if they 
manage to somehow clearly state goals, after considering all the 
alternatives available, they will either, not know exactly how to 
achieve them, or what the consequences of success or failure will 
be.150 For example, a government may state it wants to simplify 
the tax structure, but will be unable to elucidate what 
specifically it means by this rather broad policy goal and how it 
intends to accomplish it. This was the case with Francois 
Mitterrand in September 1983 when he made his announcement to 
reduce the tax burden by one percent in 1985, but in fact had no 
clear ideas about how to achieve that goal.
Moreover, a government or party (or any other organized
149 See: F.W. Riggs, "Bureaucratic Politics in the U.S.: Benchmark for 
Comparison", Governance, vol.l, no.4, October 1988; P. Anderson, 
"Deciding How to Decide" in G. Edwards, S. Shull and N. Thomas, eds., 
The President and Public Policy Making, (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1985).
150 To illustrate, a major charge leveled against the Reagan 
administration's 1981 tax reform proposals was that the solutions 
proposed were simple, unstudied, unclarified in terms of effects and 
relied on misleading information (see C.E. Steuerle, 1991, op.cit., 
pp.39-54).
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anarchy) may articulate a number of different goals which, in 
fact, may conflict. For example, as Cedric Sandford pointed out 
in a conversation with the author, Lawson, as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, advocated the principle of tax neutrality, although 
several of his policies (i.e. helping charities, VAT reliefs and 
exemptions, reliefs to pension funds and PEPs) did not bear out 
this principle.151 The articulation of contradictory goals may 
occur because of the failure to coordinate between different 
areas of government and disagreements within government over 
concrete objectives.152 In the case of Lawson's reforms, the 
frequently conflicting policy preferences and policy inputs of 
the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Health and Social 
Security, and business groups made precise and consistent goal 
articulation difficult. It is no surprise that the plans drawn 
up by the Chancellor reflected internal disagreements and cross­
purposes . On the French side, an example of this is provided by 
the French government's promise to reduce taxes while 
simultaneously pledging itself to filling the deficits in the 
social security accounts - a pledge it could keep only by 
raising taxes and/or cotisations sociales (which amounts to the 
same thing anyway).
Robinson and Sandford (1983) observed this lack of clarity 
in the British system when an attempt is made to enunciate goals
151 Cedric Sandford, interview in Bath England, June 6, 1991. Also, see: 
N. Lawson, 1992, op.cit., pp.334-44,362,378,380; C. Sandford, 1993, 
op.cit., pp.46-7.
152 See, C. Heckly, op.cit., p. 148.
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concerning tax policy,
...there's something of a policy vacuum between the 
articulation of broad and general goals by parties and 
the establishment of well worked out schemes by which 
those goals can be attained.153
While Robinson and Sandford give British governments, parties and
oppositions some credit for attempting to articulate and clarify
tax goals and objectives, they question the criteria and the
means by which those goals and objectives are decided.154 The
authors noted that both the Labour and Conservative parties
expressed general but fairly clear goals: Labour to reduce taxes
for those on modest incomes and increase taxes for the well-off;
the Conservatives, to reduce taxes and simplify the system.
These goals, and the policies decided to fulfil them, 'fitted in'
with each party's general ideological stance: equality and
redistribution of wealth for Labour; and encouraging enterprise,
individual responsibility and less government, for the
Conservatives.155 Winning elections also entered into the picture
with each party proposing policies that it felt would appeal to
the greatest number of voters.
However, choosing goals based on ideological and/or
electoral considerations, while in the latter instance perhaps
politically rational, presents some problems. Firstly, can
workable policies actually be designed to fulfil lofty goals and
A. Robinson and C. Sandford, op.cit., p.224.
Ibid., p.220.
Ibid.
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principles? Secondly, if workable policies can be formulated, 
how will they be accepted and applied by other actors in the 
policy process?156 Robinson and Sandford, through their analysis 
of Labour party speeches and documentation, discovered the extent 
to which party decision makers had "failed to develop a clear, 
coherent philosophy of what they sought in advocating a reduction 
in the unequal distribution of wealth."157
Other observers of the British tax policy process have 
pointed to problems of goal articulation and/or the problems 
confronted when British governments try to translate goals into 
actual policies. The Conservatives, from 1979, according to John 
Kay (1986), were without "substantial plans", and that in 
comparison with the previous Conservative government (1970-1974), 
had bungled any meaningful realization of tax reform.158 Malcolm 
Gammie (1993) intimates that the process of tax reform in Britain 
creates a situation where tax reform policies are not "formulated
Robinson and Sandford (1983, p.221) note that, "If objectives are 
insufficiently considered and clarified by the party proposing the tax, 
the policies are more open to influence from the bureaucracy and from 
affected interest groups."
J. Kay, November 1986, op.cit.. A majority of the British interviewees 
agreed that the Conservatives were less prepared in terms of their tax 
program in 1979 than they were in 1970. According to some like Cedric 
Sandford (interview in Bath, England, June 6, 1991) and John Kay
(interview in London, England, July 2, 1991) apart from the goals of 
reducing taxes and switching the incidence from direct to indirect, 
there was no clearly worked out program when the Conservatives came to 
power in 1979. As Arthur Cockfield remarked, "A lot of the work was 
done 'on the hoof'." (Baron Arthur Cockfield, interview in London, 
England, June 11, 1991) . However, Cockfield was contradicted by claims 
made by Adam Ridley that "a very great deal was worked out beforehand, 
and what we had as background documentation was quite unprecedented." 
(Adam Ridley, interview in London, England, May 30, 1991).
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against clear and well-researched policy objectives."159 
Although, it may be argued that policy achievements fell somewhat 
short of objectives, it is difficult to fault the Conservatives 
for absence of goal specification (although, no doubt, one can 
find specific examples, i.e. the poll tax) . One only has to read 
The Right Approach to the Economy (1977) , the Conservative Party 
Campaign Guides, the November 1979 White Paper on the 
Government's Expenditure Plans 1980-81 (Cmnd.7746), Geoffrey 
Howe's and Nigel Lawson's speeches at Conservative Party 
Conferences, Lawson's January 1984 memorandum to the Prime 
Minister, various budget day speeches and Lawson's CPC pamphlet, 
"Tax Reform. The Government's Record" (1988).160 Nevertheless, in 
many cases, while general goals were articulated, substantive 
detail of how the government expected to accomplish its goals and 
the possible consequences of policies were not.
Heckly (1987) has observed problems with goal specification 
in the case of French tax policy. For instance, in France there 
has always been a strong notion of tax fairness - or la justice 
fiscale. This was often expressed in terms of "egalite devant 
l'impot" or "egalite par l'impot". Parties of all political 
colors expressed this goal in common. Difficulties however, 
arose over how best to achieve it. Should taxation be neutral?
Or should it be the instrument of an active policy of reducing
M. Gammie, February 1993, op.cit., p.100.
On the January 1984 memorandum see, N. Lawson, 1992, op.cit., pp.334- 
335.
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income inequalities? And in the case of the latter, what was to 
be the optimal level of taxation to achieve a given level of 
redistribution - if even that could be ascertained? On these 
questions, little agreement was evident.
Tax policy reflected disagreements between the parliamentary 
groups, the government, the civil servants and the public. As 
Heckly (1987) points out, "... 1'egalite devant l'impot constitue 
done un ideal accepte par tous, mais difficile a atteindre en 
practique...1,161 Whether it be a party in government, or in 
opposition, the charge of problematic goals holds for either; 
though, admittedly, for a party in government, with the wealth of 
resources, and particularly information, at its disposal, 
clarifying goals and objectives ought to be less problematic. In 
the case of France, however, with respect to taxation, the 
disagreements and divisions which frequently characterize 
relations between and within the economic policy making actors 
and institutions, as we have seen already, make goal definition 
and policy coordination difficult.162
We now move on to examine the issue of unclear technology. 
While members of a political system or a government department 
may understand their job and have a vague notion of its purpose 
in relation to the whole, given the size and scope of government 
today, it would be hard to believe that every member of a
C. Heckly, op.cit., p.33.
See, e.g.: H. Machin and V. Wright, eds., 1985, op.cit., pp.15+; S. 
Mazey, 1986, op.cit., p.420.
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government department, let alone a political system, understands 
their organization, their purpose in that organization and their 
relation to one another. Even considering the rather 
hierarchical chain of command in British and French governments 
there is often overlap in policy jurisdictions between the 
departments, especially when one looks at both sides of the 
policy process: formulation and implementation.
For instance, in Britain, although the decision structure is 
ultimately hierarchical, with tax policy firmly in the hands of 
the Chancellor and the Treasury, there do exist other important 
players that contribute to the process, like the Prime Minister, 
special adviser(s) to the Chancellor, the Inland Revenue, Customs 
and Excise, other government departments, the research 
departments of the political parties, various think tanks and 
interest groups, and international, especially European, 
developments. Some play a very limited role, others a more 
extensive one. Certainly, the potential exists for overlap and 
limited understanding of the part each is playing or the part its 
members are playing in relation to the larger scheme. As Jock 
Bruce-Gardyne (1986) has commented, "Occasionally the demarcation 
lines become confused.1,163
In France, some have detected poor vertical communication 
and control, as well as narrowness within the French executive.164
J. Bruce-Gardyne, 1986, op.cit., pp.31-2.
See: M. Crozier and E. Friedberg, 1974, op.cit.; M. Crozier, La SociitS 
Bloqu€e, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1970) .
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Jack Hayward (1983) has characterized French ministries as 
"compartmentalized aggregations of divisions... confederations of 
autonomous bureaux” where coordination (between ministries and 
divisions) is sorely lacking.165 Also the observation has been 
made elsewhere that overlap and conflicting goals are not 
uncommon in French government.166
To complete our analysis of the characteristics of French 
and British governments which qualify them as organized 
anarchies, we turn to the final property, fluid participation. 
Fluid participation is observable in any government decision 
process. Participation will change from one decision to another 
or even in one decision area. The amount of time and energy 
people in government devote to particular issues and problems 
fluctuates. As various aspects of a decision arise - i.e. new 
problems and solutions - so too will new participants come into 
play. This is furthermore complicated by turnover in government 
personnel.167
Once again, using the example of the tax policy making
J. Hayward, 1983, op.cit., p.127.
See e.g., S. Mazey, 1986, op.cit., p.420.
Several of the British interviewees referred to the changing cast of 
characters involved in Conservative tax policy making pre- and post- 
1979. For example, Adam Ridley recounted that while from 1975 to 1983 
Geoffrey Howe was certainly a constant figure in Conservative tax 
policy making other "individuals came and went - Peter Cropper went off 
at one stage and was replaced by Douglas French. . . and ministers came 
and went... it has been a slightly more collective process with a 
variety of people coming in and leaving, pushing the main stream of 
thought a little bit this way, a little bit that way. So it hasn't had 
a single coherent mind shaping every aspect of it." But Ridley also 
asserted that approximately 60 to 70% of those involved in tax policy 
making "had been involved in that stream of discussion for quite a 
while, so that you had great insurance of continuity." (Adam Ridley, 
interview in London, England, May 30, 1991).
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process in Britain, the Chancellor, or even a senior minister,
cannot devote himself entirely to any one decision concerning the
tax system and will delegate to, or enlist, junior Treasury
ministers, special advisers, and civil servants in order to help
him. Heclo and Wildavsky (1981) refer to personnel and time
problems in the Treasury decision making system, despite overall
coherence and effectiveness. In addition, Inland Revenue and
Customs and Excise officials, as well as - though less often -
other cabinet members, civil servants, select committees and
their witnesses, academics etc. will be party to the process,
moving in and out of the picture as necessary. Robinson and
Sandford (1983) note,
...at every stage of tax policy making - as policy is 
developed in the political parties, shaped in the 
departments and scrutinized in Parliament - external 
influences of various sorts are brought into play and 
may have some effect.168
The external influences may include representative bodies,
pressure groups, experts, and ad hoc working parties. While the
process may not be as open and pluralistic as in the American
system of tax policy making, fluid participation is undoubtedly a
feature of decision making in British government, as it is with
most governments, the differences being a matter of degree.
The same trait applies to the process of French policy
making. Although, as in the case of Britain, tax policy making
is largely concentrated in the hands of the Ministry of the
Economy and Finance, particularly in the Service de la
168 A. Robinson and C. Sandford, op.cit., p.189.
Legislation Fiscale (SLF) and the Direction General des Impots 
(DGI), two of its component agencies, other actors inside and 
outside government play a role, to a greater or lesser extent, 
including the president, prime minister, other government 
ministers and bureaucrats, ministerial cabinets, interest groups, 
think tanks, and international developments.169 Different actors 
with different interests, mandates and representing different 
constituencies enter and exit the tax policy process on an 
irregular basis. The changing of the guard in mid-July 1984 
during the critical stages of the much-hyped 1985 budget offers 
one example of changing tax policy actors.170 Also, one can point 
to the issue of social security finance and the rise to agenda 
prominence of the cotisation sociale generalises (CSG) . Over the 
course of almost ten years, a number of different actors across 
several governments (from Socialist to RPR-UDF and back to 
Socialist), in different ways, contributed to the process which 
eventually placed the CSG on the Rocard government's agenda.171 
Heckly (1987) notes that during the life cycle of a tax - that is 
from idea to publication in the Journal Officiel - the inputs of
169 Conversations with the French interviewees revealed a number of
different actors with a stake in the tax policy process - in the 
Ministry of Finance, the Elys6e, Matignon, other government ministries, 
etc. - and the fluidity of their involvement in that process.
170 The crucial actors in the tax policy making process were changed: the
Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, the budget minister and their 
cabinets.
171 See, S. Shaughnessy, "The Cotisation Sociale Generalise, An Idea Whose
Time Had Come", Modern and Contemporary France, vol.NS2, no.4, 1994; 
Also see, C. Heckly, op.cit., ch.4, for an account of the processes 
which created the capital gains tax (1'imposition des plus-values) - 
another illustration of fluid participation in the French tax policy 
process.
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different actors and the "changements des rapports de force entre 
les differents actants" accounted for the different stages of the 
process and the changing shape of tax policy.172
To sum up, the Cohen, March and Olsen conception of an 
organized anarchy is quite suitable as a description of modern 
government - for our purposes here, British and French 
governments.173 Both feature all the identified properties of an 
organized anarchy: problematic goals, unclear technology and 
fluid participation. Now that we have successfully characterized 
the British and French governments as organized anarchies, it 
should be easier to understand how well-suited a garbage can 
framework should be as an analytical tool to help us make sense 
of the decision making processes which occur within those 
governments.
The tax policy making processes in both Britain and France 
appear to be well-suited to a garbage can analysis. However, 
rather than testing the Cohen, March and Olson model against the 
evidence, we will use a modified version of it. The concept of 
an interactive, branching and contextual set of connections among 
participants, problems and solutions in an organization was
C. Heckly, op.cit., p.347.
Sonia Mazey (1986, p.420) describes French government in such a way 
that the organized anarchy attribution is readily inferred. She 
characterizes the French politico-administrative system as "disjointed 
and disparate" and the policy making process as "time consuming and 
cumbersome... involving large numbers of people and conflicting 
interests." These characteristics, in one respect or another, aptly 
describe French government some of the time (see: J. Hayward, 1983, 
op.cit., p.127; J. Hayward, 1986, op.cit., pp.23-25; C. Heckly, 
op.cit., pp.32-33,148; M. Crozier and E. Friedberg, eds., 1974, 
op.cit.; H. Machin and V. Wright, eds., 1985, op.cit., pp.9-17.
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adopted by John Kingdon (1984) and deftly adapted to agenda 
setting and policy formulation processes in the United States at 
the federal level - Kingdon's broadly defined organized anarchy. 
He concentrated on the health and transportation policy areas.
(In my review of the tax reform literature, I frequently came 
across Kingdon's name, and several times he was cited by various 
authors, though not necessarily as a paradigmatic reference) .174
In Kingdon's revised model, the author identifies three 
(rather than four) largely independent streams - problems, 
policies and politics - flowing through his organization, the 
federal government. Problems are raised, occur or exist.
Drawing attention to and defining problems is achieved by a 
number of means - i.e. indicators, focusing events and feedback - 
and a number of different ways - values, comparisons and 
categorizing.175 Although agendas may be set for reasons other 
than the need to solve problems, Kingdon notes, "...linking a 
proposal to a problem that is perceived as real and important..." 
enhances the agenda prospect of that proposal.176 There may be
For example see: G. Mucciaroni, "Public Choice and the Politics of 
Comprehensive Tax Reform", Governance, vol.3, no.l, January 1990; D. 
Beam, T. Conlan and M. Wrightson, "Solving the Riddle of Tax Reform: 
Party Competition and the Politics of Ideas", Political Science 
Quarterly, vol.105, no.2, Summer 1990; J. Verdier, "The President, 
Congress and Tax Reform: Patterns Over Three Decades", The Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol.499, 
September 1988.
For a fuller discussion of this stage of the policy process see, J. 
Kingdon, 1984, op.cit., ch. 5; also see: F.R. Baumgartner and B.D.
Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1993), ch.2; B.G. Peters, 1993, op.cit., 
ch.3; J.E. Anderson, Public Policy Making, (London: Nelson, 1975), 
ch. 3.
176 J. Kingdon, 1984, op.cit., p.121.
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concern about high taxes, a concern provoked, for example, by the 
effect of inflation on tax brackets and disposable income. This 
may spark attention to other problems, i.e. the quality and scope 
of government services, declining productivity and investment, 
etc.. People may recognize these 'conditions' as problems or 
they may choose to regard them as 'conditions' to be endured or 
minor problems that need no immediate attention or solution.
Regardless, as is often the case, proposals have been 
devised in anticipation of such problems or are soon devised in 
order to solve the problem(s) at hand. Policy activists or 
entrepreneurs affect the attention given to problems, and devise, 
or at least link, solutions to problems.177 They are not 
necessarily found in any location in the policy community.178 
However, it is from the policy community that proposals issue. 
Policy communities consist of civil servants, consultants, 
specialists, interest groups or academics. They may be 
associated with government or not. In any case, they are busy 
generating proposals, linked or not, to particular problems.
They may devise different solutions for one or more problems or 
various solutions for various problems which have appeared 
simultaneously.
Specialists in the policy community and policy entrepreneurs 
(they may or may not be one and the same) must persuade other
177 Kingdon (1984) prefers to use the term 'policy entrepreneur' to
'policy activist' to refer to people who invest their time, energy,
reputation and frequently money, to promote and advocate an idea or
proposal; but here they are interchangeable.
178 J. Kingdon, 1984, op.cit., p.129.
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members of the policy community, the public and most importantly, 
decision makers in government, that their proposal is viable and 
appropriate for solving a given problem. According to Kingdon 
(1984), persuasion, and diffusion of a proposal, are key elements 
in the policy stream. Persuading, publicizing, 'spreading the 
word' and educating are, to various degrees, parts of this 
process stream. Furthermore, an idea with something to recommend 
it, which meets certain conditions or criteria of acceptability - 
value, public, cost, technical - and which enjoys a large degree 
of acceptance and diffusion, stands a reasonable chance of making 
it onto the governmental agenda.179 The idea is talked about and 
brought to the attention of people in and around government, who 
consider it and decide whether or not to act upon it.
Simultaneously, but apart from the problems and policy 
streams, there flows a political stream which is composed of 
political campaigns, elections, pressure group lobbying, changes 
in an administration, changes in an administration's political 
and/or economic objectives and changes in the public mood.
Agendas are critically affected by changes in the political 
stream (but also by developments in the problems stream).
Decision makers - or more precisely, Kingdon's so-called "visible 
cluster of actors11- weigh the balance of forces in the political 
stream, judge whether action is called for or not, and then make 
a decision.180 This decision will determine the agenda status of
179
180
Ibid., p.148. 
Ibid., p.208.
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the idea or issue. Alternatively, they may not make a decision - 
for instance due to a lack of interest or the urgency of other 
problems - or make a negative decision. In such cases the idea 
usually fades and dies.
Kingdon observes a process of coalition building in the 
political stream, not too unlike that which occurs in the process 
of consensus building in the policy stream. However, the 
dynamics are different. While the process in the policy stream 
is characterized by persuasion, education, diffusion and 
softening up, support and acceptance in the political stream is 
achieved largely through negotiation, bargaining and compromise. 
The policy activist builds consensus by demonstrating how a 
particular actor will benefit from supporting a proposal or how 
he/she will lose by not doing so. Moreover, the activist may 
offer something in return for his/her support.181 Here, is where
In both the Mucciaroni (1990) and the Beam, Conlan and Wrightson (1990) 
articles, the authors found evidence of such activity - what Kingdon 
(1984, chs.6,7) calls "bandwagons and tipping" - in the process of
consensus building for the 1986 Tax Reform Act" in the U.S.. However, 
in France, and to a lesser extent in Britain, bargaining was a much 
less prevalent feature of the political stream. The organization of 
the political system characterized by the existence of responsible 
party government, with a strong head of government (and in France, head 
of State) and a large, unified and disciplined parliamentary majority 
in both countries during the 1980s supported by the institutional 
devices of the three line whip in Britain and article 49-3 in France, 
which enabled each government to impose its policies over dissenting 
voices, significantly reduced the need to assiduously build support in 
the political stream. The situation changed somewhat in France from 
1988 when Rocard, head of a minority faction in the Socialist Party, 
was chosen as prime minister to head a minority government. From 1988, 
in France, negotiation and compromise was a much more prevalent feature 
of the political stream. It should be noted that the 1986-88 Chirac 
government did not enjoy a large majority (only two seats) and itself 
was a coalition of parties. However a number of factors mitigated the 
need for bandwagons and tipping: the combined effects of the honeymoon 
period and the 1988 presidential elections, plus the almost unanimous 
consensus on tax policy built during the period of center-right 
opposition, meant the government's majority was more or less unified 
and disciplined, if not large.
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one is most likely to observe log-rolling activities taking 
place. Decision makers choose a policy, or several, for 
consideration, in light of certain criteria, i.e. technical 
feasibility, value acceptability, public acceptability and 
anticipated constraints. Others will be discarded or ignored.
In the meantime, people engage in political activity - i.e. 
lobbying or campaigning - or capitalize on a given political 
situation - i.e. a swing in national mood, a change in 
administration, electoral (un)popularity. This can lead to the 
promotion of problems and/or solutions on a government's agenda.
Common to each of these processes is the action and 
interaction of actors - governmental and non-governmental - in 
the context of a particular institutional setting. The three 
streams - like those of Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) - develop 
and operate largely independently, although this independence is 
not absolute. The actors and processes can overlap and can 
operate as an impetus or constraint on one or more of the other 
streams. For example, an academic could propose a community 
charge to replace domestic rates, and win selection by a 
constituency party organization as a candidate at the next 
election. If his idea has since been adopted as party policy, he 
may find himself engaging in political activity to advance this 
policy based on his own original idea.
Let's look at another example, a proposal to lower taxes 
which seemed opportune during an election campaign may be 
ignored, put on the back burner, or diminished, because a more
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urgent problem has arisen requiring immediate attention. The 
other, more pressing problem - say inflation or the budget 
deficit or both - has been recognized, which pushes other items 
like higher interest rates or spending cuts into prominence on 
the government's agenda.
Despite these hints of connection, Kingdon (1984) - like 
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) and March and Olsen (1976) - 
maintains that the streams remain, for the most part, independent 
and are subject to various structural factors. The institutional 
setting of the choice opportunity mediates the problems and 
solutions and affects the attitudes, perceptions, behavior and 
relations of the actors in the three streams. How a polity is 
organized will also have an effect on the rate and flow patterns 
of the streams and how they come together. Institutions regulate 
and channel the streams and thereby help explain the nature and 
appearance of those items which rise on the agenda and those 
which do not.182
Once these process streams are understood, the key to 
understanding policy, or agenda, change is their coupling. The 
coupling of these streams is a highly contextual event dependent 
on a complex of factors largely related to the rules, procedures, 
practices and physical arrangements that structure the 
relationships and interactions of the actors. Coupling takes 
place when a choice situation exists. Kingdon calls this a
See: J. Kingdon, 1984, op.cit., p.217; J. March and J. Olsen, 1976,
op.cit., p.11.
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policy window.183 Policy windows are only open for a short time. 
This is an opportunity for an actor to push his/her proposal(s) 
into agenda prominence and even into enactment. This is the time 
when an issue becomes 'hot', 'catches on' or 'takes off'. For 
example, a taxpayers' revolt in an important area of the country 
focuses attention on high taxes and spiraling and wasteful 
government spending; however, it leaves unanswered the questions 
raised concerning these issues. An actor with detailed proposals 
to solve such problems may use such an event to push his/her own 
ideas to the fore.
Policy windows open and close for a variety of reasons.
When they open, it is usually because of a change in the 
political stream - i.e. a change in administration or partisan 
composition in the legislature, a shift in the national mood - or 
because a new problem - often a crisis, for example a currency 
crisis or a national disaster - captures the attention of 
government officials.184 Kingdon tells us that there are problem 
windows and political windows. For instance, if a major defense 
contractor is on the verge of collapse, the government may cast 
about for ways to save it. This is a problem window. Or perhaps 
a politician decides that home ownership may be a convincing and 
popular theme to campaign on, then he/she will reach into the 
policy stream for ideas on how to promote home ownership. This 
is a political window.
1(3
184
For a full discussion of policy windows see, J. Kingdon (1984, ch.8).
J. Kingdon, 1984, op.cit., p.176.
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Coupling of streams depends on the opening of a policy
window. Nevertheless, coupling is oftentimes attempted even
before a policy window opens. Actors try frequently to link
problems, policies and politics in a number of different ways
before a window has actually opened. Still, items rise most
effectively, dramatically and probably on the agenda when windows
are open, according to Kingdon. If a window opens and one of the
three elements is absent, then it becomes highly unlikely that a
decision or choice will take place. The agenda will remain
unchanged. It is the fortuitous confluence of the three streams
that produces a decision and agenda change. This confluence
generally occurs when a window is open.
Again, it would be a mistake to assume that these processes
are strictly random. It should be borne in mind that each of the
three streams, their rates and flow patterns, are affected by
institutional features - physical arrangements, rules,
procedures, etc.. March and Olsen (1976) remind us that
organizations are more than just "neutral reflections of
exogenous environmental forces or neutral arenas for the
performances of individuals driven by exogenous preferences and
expectations."185 They maintain,
An organization is not simply a vehicle for solving 
given problems or for resolving conflict through 
bargaining. It is also a collection of choices looking 
for problems; issues and feelings looking for 
decisions-in-process through which they may be 
mediated; and solutions looking for questions. An 
organization is not only an instrument, with decision
185 J. March and J. Olsen, 1976, op.cit., p. 11.
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processes related to instrumental, task directed 
activities. It is also a set of procedures by which 
participants arrive at an interpretation of what they 
(and others) are doing, and who they are.186
In analyzing the operation of the process streams, institutional 
structures, arrangements and procedures, therefore, cannot be 
ignored. Policy is not merely the outcome of group pursuits nor 
state forces. Institutions imprint a certain dynamic on those 
pursuits, pressures and forces.187
Policy does not occur in a vacuum. Any institution which is 
engaged in decision making imposes a particular structure or 
organization which creates a particular matrix of incentives.
The impact of institutions has implications for the shape and 
definition, not only of preferences and actions, but ultimately 
of the outcomes as well. What happens, then, in terms of the 
inputs and outputs of the policy making process is influenced, 
sometimes conspicuously, sometimes subtly, by the institutional 
setting in which politics and policy making occur.
Now it's time to return to an examination of tax reform and 
to apply this serendipitous framework to our case studies. By 
doing so, we can ascertain its comparative explanatory power. It 
is interesting to note that other authors have identified similar
Ibid., p.84.
As James March (1988) tells us organizational attributes influence the 
outcomes of a garbage can decision process '1) by affecting the time 
pattern of the arrival of problems, choices, solutions or decision­
makers, 2) by determining the allocation of energy by potential 
participants in the decision, and 3) by establishing linkages among the 
various streams'(J. March, Decisions and Organizations, (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1988), p.300.
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processes at work in the agenda setting and policy formulation 
stages of tax reform in the U.S. in the mid-1980s. While there 
is no systematic attempt to analyze events using Kingdon's 
framework, James Verdier (1988), Gary Mucciaroni (1990), David 
Beam, Timothy Conlan and Margaret Wrightson (1990) have discussed 
tax reform - especially in the United States - with reference to 
Kingdon, or at least, in 'Kingdon-esque' terms.
Beam, Conlan and Wrightson (1990) explain the TRA in terms 
of "the new politics of reform" with its emphasis on the roles of 
ideas and policy entrepreneurs in shaping policy. The 
entrepreneurs "simplify and distill" complex ideas and "link them 
to values accepted by and familiar to the broader public."188 
While the authors credit the policy entrepreneurs - like Bill 
Bradley and Richard Gephardt - with a central role in placing tax 
reform on the governmental agenda, they admit that without the 
commitment of the President to make tax reform an agenda item of 
top priority and his fervent support, the reform would probably 
have failed.189
In addition, the energetic commitments of Dan Rostenkowski, 
chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, and Bob Packwood, 
chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, were essential elements
D. Beam, T. Conlan and M. Wrightson, op.cit., p.208.
Joseph Pechman (1989, p.81) called Reagan's support for tax reform 
"crucial" and that without it, the bill "would never have emerged from 
Congress."
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in the survival of the TRA.190 These actors, their ideas, 
strategies and circumstances, Beam, Conlan and Wrightson show, 
interacted in a mostly unpredictable manner and came together in 
a complex, yet fortuitous combination which produced dramatic 
change. Their 'model' of ideational-entrepreneurial politics 
shares many similar characteristics with Kingdon's process 
streams and windows approach. Kingdon, in fact, is deferred to 
twice: as an inspiration for a discussion of the role of ideas 
and policy entrepreneurs.
James Verdier (1988) considers the U.S. tax reform in terms 
of "political and economic forces" offering tax policy experts 
(the policy entrepreneurs) a "window of opportunity" which 
produced the right circumstances for these entrepreneurs to 
"create links between the prescriptions of experts and the needs 
and concerns of politicians and the public." Verdier attributes 
the success of the 1986 tax reform to the collaboration between 
policy experts in and outside government, to the policy 
entrepreneurs - like Bradley and Gephardt - to partisan politics 
and to the agenda setting power of the President. In a 'Kingdon- 
esque' reference, Verdier tells us, "Favorable circumstances came
Beam, Conlan and Wrightson (1990, pp.210-11) also note the favorable 
press given the issue. They insist this was critical and that without 
the media support the TRA would have foundered. This is debatable as 
public opinion seemed largely disinterested by the issue (see: Jeffrey 
Birnbaum and Alan Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch: Lawmakers, Lobbyists 
and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform, New York: Random House, 1987; 
J. Verdier, 1988, op.cit., pp.119-120). Still ,the role of the media 
was not unimportant, especially considering the role they played 
educating and 'softening up' the specialized and more general publics 
and helping to build a pro-reform coalition.
122
together..." in 1986.191
In Mucciaroni's (1990) article, the author looks’ at the 
viability of public choice arguments in explaining U.S. tax 
reform in the mid-1980s. He largely discounts, but not entirely, 
the purchase such arguments have for his case study, the 1986 Tax 
Reform Act. Rather he identifies three kinds of reform politics: 
entrepreneurial, interest group and majoritarian. In the course 
of his description of what transpired and in his analysis, 
Mucciaroni makes references to public discontent, problem 
definition, policy entrepreneurs, presidential politics, party 
competition, resolutions, policy windows, "mobilizing a 
significant proportion of the population behind issues",
"building a pro-reform majority" and "getting reform on the 
agenda." Mucciaroni describes how the problems created by the 
1981 ERTA and the attention drawn to those problems by activists 
like Charles McIntyre of the lobbying group, Citizens for Tax 
Justice, helped open a "policy window". With this window open, 
tax reform advocates could attempt to push their ideas and 
proposals and link them to the problems at hand.192 In the end 
they were successful and the agenda was changed.
Here was an example of a problem in the public spotlight - a
J. Verdier, 1988, op.cit., p.123. Verdier cites Kingdon in his 
footnote (no.10, p.120).
In describing this process, Mucciaroni (1990, p.10) cites Kingdon as 
a reference. Senator Bill Bradley and Congressman Richard Gephardt 
produced a solution in 1982 which drew on years of research and 
proposal making by tax experts outside of government, like Joseph 
Minarik of the Urban Institute, and on the Joint Committee on Taxation. 
The bill they introduced (H.R.3271) would find many of its principles 
incorporated into the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The Bradley-Gephardt 
bill was followed by other bills, like Kemp-Kasten.
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punitive and unfair tax system created in part and aggravated by
the 1981 ERTA - capturing the attention of government officials
- Bradley, Gephardt, Reagan, Kemp, Kasten, officials at the
Treasury Department, etc.. A policy window opened which incited
reformers and policy entrepreneurs to either design and advocate
new proposals, or advocate proposals already available that would
address the problems inherent in the U.S. tax system, and in part
aggravated by the 1981 ERTA. Policy activists like McIntyre
created an atmosphere that raised conciousness about the defects
of the U.S. tax system, particularly drawing attention to its
less equitable features. In such a context and confronted with
the undeniable evidence, politicians were persuaded that "reform
was an idea whose time had come."193 Bradley's "intellectual
contributions" and "tireless advocacy" made it possible "to build
a broad, bi-partisan, pro-reform coalition.1,194 Once again, the
adoption by President Reagan of this idea - which was already
part of the legislative agenda - and its place of importance on
*
t
his agenda, not to mention the President's own lobbying efforts, 
were instrumental for the success of the TRA.195 The commitments 
made to tax reform by Packwood, Rostenkowski, Don Regan, the 
Secretary of the Treasury and his successor, James Baker, were 
also important. As with the study by Beam, Conlan and Wrightson 
(1990), Mucciaroni's study of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, is even
G. Mucciaroni, op.cit., p.12.
Ibid.
Ibid., p.15.
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194
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better suited for 'testing' against Kingdon's 'model'; although, 
that will not be attempted here, as our focus is on Britain and 
France.
These authors, in their efforts to expose different aspects 
of the tax reform process, while providing a different 'spin', 
avoid explicitly analyzing their data using Kingdon's approach. 
However, their language recalls and, in some cases, mimics 
Kingdon's and their conceptualizations have strong 'Kingdon- 
esque' features. It was this reading of such scholarly efforts 
that persuaded me to consider the tax reform processes elsewhere 
in light of Kingdon's work. I felt that if a process streams and 
windows model could be tentatively and implicitly valid in the 
case of United States tax reform, how would tax reform, say, in 
Great Britain or France measure up? The evidence revealed, in 
fact, similar processes at work in both France and Britain.
CHAPTER THREE
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CHAPTER THREE
- Tax Reform: The French Context, History and Institutions -
Introduction
During ,the 1980s tax reform was ushered into France under 
the auspices of a Socialist President heading two philosophically 
different governments, one leftist and the other, conservative. 
Tax reform took two rather diverse paths during the 1980s - one 
governed by socialist doctrine and rhetoric from 1981-1982 and 
the other by neo-liberalism and free-market economics from 1983- 
89. Oddly enough, both tax reform strategies were instigated by 
a Socialist government. Tax reform, in the period 1983-89, 
received further impetus and was pursued with even greater 
conviction and vigor during the two years of conservative 
government under the premiership of Jacques Chirac from 1986-88. 
As opposed to Britain therefore, where neo-liberal tax reform was 
driven by a single party in government, the evolution of tax 
reform and the conditions under which it moved from intellectual 
debate to government policy in France are somewhat more complex.
The claim of greater complexity vis-a-vis the British 
experience is certainly a valid one given the change of 
governments, the ideological transformations of the major 
political parties from the late 1970s to the late 1980s, the 
fluidity and variety of the actors integral to tax policy making, 
as well as the special economic circumstances confronting French 
policy makers. The process streams are more numerous and 
difficult to identify, particularly because the issue soon became
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a cross party concern - as opposed to the British case where one 
political party dominated the issue - differentiated not so much 
by philosophy, as by the extent and degree to which tax reform 
was pursued and applied.
This section will recount the evolution of the tax agenda in 
France and the environment in which it evolved from the late 
1970s to the late 1980s. The emphasis will be on the various 
ideas, actors and institutions that were central to the tax 
policy process. It should become obvious, as this descriptive 
effort proceeds, that tax policy in France is the product of 
several interweaving strands of problems, policies, and politics. 
Integral to these tax policy processes were the preferences and 
activities of participants, especially policy entrepreneurs.
The period prior to the Socialist victories of May/June 1981 
will be examined briefly in order to set the stage upon which 
neo-liberal tax reform appeared in France in the 1980s. However, 
the main focus will be on the shape and direction of tax policy 
during the 1980s. By the end of this examination, it should be 
clear that tax policy was determined by a political dynamic.
That dynamic had multiple features, which for the most part can 
be organized into a limited number of process streams flowing 
through and impacted by the institutional configuration of the 
French polity.
Before an examination is undertaken of tax reform policies 
in the 1980s, it is important to understand the nature of the 
French tax system and how it evolved. This background is
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necessary in order to effectively manipulate appropriate 
terminology and conduct discourse on the topic of tax reform in 
the 1980s. An understanding, however cursory, of the tax system 
in France as it developed prior to the 1980s, can only serve to 
help us better understand the how, why, what, where and who of 
the French tax system in the 1980s.
Chapter Three, therefore, will look at the evolution of the 
nature and structure of the tax system from the French Revolution 
onwards. It will also investigate the changes to the tax system 
in light of political, economic and social developments. This is 
a necessary exercise as the policy legacies of previous 
governments have an important effect on tax policy makers as they 
consider what they can and cannot do. Chapters Four, Five and 
Six will bring us up-to-date, with an examination of the tax 
agenda, as it evolved under the Giscard and Mitterrand 
presidencies. Here, we will take a closer look at the ideas, 
actors and institutions that shaped and determined the French tax 
agenda from the mid-1970s onwards. The focus, however, will be 
on the 1980s, the period of France's liberal renaissance and the 
emergence of neo-liberal tax reform. With the background 
provided by these four chapters we should be well-equipped to 
analyze the processes which gave rise to neo-liberal tax reform 
on the agenda in France and devise an appropriate framework to 
explain them.
The Spirit of 1789 and the History of French Taxation
The history of tax reform in France has been more or less
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inspired by the credo of "liberte, egalite, fraternite." At 
least this has been true in theory.196 The tax system created by 
the ancien regime was abolished during the French Revolution.
The principle of equality before taxation was proclaimed by 
Article 13 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
Citizen, "la contribution doit etre egalement repartie entre tous 
les citoyens, en raison de leurs facultes. "197 The Declaration 
proposed - though never adopted - by M. Robespierre in 1793, 
reiterated this sentiment but was explicitly socially 
progressive,
Les citoyens dont les revenus n'excedent point ce qui 
est necessaire a leur subsistence, sont dispenses de 
contribuer aux depenses publiques. Les autres doivent 
les supporter progressivement, selon l'etendue de leur 
fortune.198
Taxation was to be a means of eroding the privileges and 
protections enjoyed by the upper bourgeois and aristocratic 
classes prior to the Revolution (and even some time after). 
However, deciding a new tax system posed genuine problems for the 
revolutionaries, who while wanting to make French society more 
egalitarian, were hostile to any dramatic changes in the economic 
organization of French society.
As C. de Brie and P. Charpentier (1973) declare, "pour 1'opinion, 
l'£galit£ devant l'impot, la juste repartition de la charge 
publique...sont reput£es fonder le systeme fiscal." (C. de Brie and P. 
Charpentier, L'InSgalitS par l'impot, Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1973, 
p.94) .
C. Debbasch and J-M. Pontier, Les Constitutions de la France, (Paris: 
Dalloz, 1983).
M. Gauchet, La Revolution des Droits de l'Homme, (Paris: Gallimard, 
1989), p.329.
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In January 1793, a delegate to the Convention claimed that 
the only way to conciliate the twin concerns of maintaining the 
structure of society and reducing inequalities was by introducing 
progressive direct taxation.199 There was an attempt to move away 
from the odious indirect taxes, which bore disproportionately on 
the poor, to direct taxation. Whereas in 1788, indirect taxes - 
i.e. traites, gabelles, aides and droits - represented 43% of the 
state's revenues, in 1809 their part had dropped to 23%.
Moreover, the Convention decided to allow the communes to impose 
extraordinary taxes on the rich which "would provide for the 
needs of numerous families and correct the revolting injustice 
between the material abundance of the rich and the excessive 
deprivation of the poor."200
The Directory and the Consulate soon put an end to this 
practical - and abused - application of tax justice and took the 
power to tax away from local governments. The financial cost of 
defending the revolution's gains and spreading its ideals beyond 
the borders of France caused the governments of the late 18th 
century much concern. They soon reversed the socially 
progressive, as well as the decentralizing, aspirations of the 
Jacobins. Direct taxes, the so-called "quatre vieilles" - taxe 
fonciere on the rental value of property, contribution des portes 
et fenetres, contribution des patentes on all non-agricultural
G. Ardant, Histoire de l'Impdt, Tome II, (Paris: Fayard, 1972), p.189.
J. Rivoli, Vive l'Impdt, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1965), p.13. The 
translation is mine.
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businesses, contribution mobiliere on the rental value of 
residences - created in the 1790s, were intended to iron out the 
discrepancies between rich and poor vis-a-vis the tax system as 
objectively as possible. This system of taxation, although 
undergoing periodic modifications, enjoyed remarkable tenacity 
and longevity.
However, even before the turn of the century, indirect taxes
were gradually making a comeback, overturning the revolutionary
tax rationale. They were less painful (in other words, less
visible) than direct taxes and so, less resented, in addition to
being more lucrative. One untiring defender of indirect taxes
was the respected parliamentarian and later first president of
the Third Republic Adolph Thiers, who wrote in 1848,
L'impot indirect est l'impot des pays avances en 
civilisation tandis que l'impot direct est celui des 
pays barbares...En un mot, pays pauvre, pays esclave et 
impot direct. Pays riche, pays libre et impot 
indirect.201
Throughout the course of the 19th century, as the 
liberalism/mercantilism of Jean-Baptiste Say (1767-1832) ,202 
Frederic de Bastiat (1801-50) ,203 Joseph Garnier (1813-1881) 204 and
G. Ardant, Tome II, 1972, op.cit., p.350.
The foremost liberal economist in France. He was responsible for
introducing and promoting the ideas of Adam Smith.
An eminent and respected economist and parliamentarian who wrote to a 
friend in 1848, "II suffirait pourtant de diminuer les taxes. Simple, 
curieux, je verrai le mat de cocagne sans y monter, la liberty y 
perira." (quoted from La Grande Encyclopedie, Tome V, Paris: H. 
Lamirault & Co., 1947, p.663).
A professor at the 6cole des Ponts et Chaussees, editor of the Journal 
des ftconomistes and author of Traitd d'Sconomie politique, Elements de 
l'Sconomie politique (Paris, 1846), which was reprinted ten times and 
translated into many different languages. He was an ardent anti-
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Leon Say (18 2 6 - 96 ) 205 swayed economic policy, indirect taxes were 
increasingly relied upon to provide the state with necessary 
resources. 206 (see Appendix A, Figure 3A) .
Successive governments, supported by the bourgeois classes, 
sought to limit the imposition of direct taxation. The 
revolutionary concerns for equality and justice, therefore, had 
quickly dissipated and were replaced by class, war and empire. 
Indirect taxes, which bore more heavily on the lower and middle 
classes than on the upper classes, provided the state with more 
than 50% of its total tax receipts by the end of the 19th 
century. As Jean Bouvier wrote, "Du point de vue fiscal, la 
Revolution francaise n'a ete qu7un accident."207 
The Spirit of 1789 Revisited
Gabriel Ardant writes, "Le systeme fiscal francais du XIXe 
siecle etait l7expression presque parfaite des interets d7une 
classe... L7ensemble de ce systeme favorisait de facon evidente 
la fortune acquise ou en voie de formation et les revenus 
eleves. 208 While it may be true that for most of the 19th century,
socialist, believed in free trade and competition, and was opposed to 
excessive state intervention in the economy.
Grandson of J-B Say, he was an economist and several times Minister of 
Finance in the Third Republic. Leon Say was a strong believer in free 
trade, low spending and low taxes.
For further information on France's liberal economic heritage see, Y. 
Breton and M. Lutfalla, eds., L'lSconomie Politique en Freuice au XIXe 
Siecle, (Paris: Economica, 1991).
J. Bouvier, "Le Systeme Fiscal Francais du XIXe Siecle", in J.Bouvier 
and J. Wolff, eds., Deux Sidcles de FiscalitS Francaise, XlXe-XXe 
Si&cle, (Paris: Mouton Editeur, 1973), p.242.
G. Ardant, Tome II, 1972, op.cit., pp.350, 353.
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the tax system in France seemed to discriminate in favor of the 
bourgeois and upper-bourgeois classes, by the turn of the 
twentieth century, attitudes towards the tax system and its many 
faults were rapidly changing. The immobilisme which had 
characterized the system, and the decision makers, for most of 
the 19th century gave way to a more democratic - and more 
leftist, if you will - element which not only sought to redress 
the injustices in the system, but also the imbalances which saw 
the state collect more than 50% of its revenues in 1881 from 
indirect taxes and around 20% from direct taxes. 209 In the last 
two decades of the 19th century, democratic elements in French 
political life, sought to broaden the debate on the state of 
French taxation and called into question long-held assumptions 
and habits related to taxation.210
Already, by the end of the Franco-Prussian war many 
political leaders were impressed by the need to tap new 
resources. The costs of waging this war (and any future war) and 
the costs of reconstruction and reparations inspired several tax 
reform proposals. In 1872, Leon Gambetta proposed to the 
Assembly a general tax on income. Given President Thiers's 
predilection for the current tax regime - which relied on 
indirect taxation - the President vigorously resisted the idea, 
and managed to persuade supporters and foes alike of the need and
209 T. Gandillot, 1988, op.cit., p.128.
210 The movement of the second half of the nineteenth century saw liberal 
and republican parties allying with socialist forces. This phenomenon 
was inextricably linked with tax reform (see, G. Ardant, Tome II, 
op.cit., p.241).
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efficacy of a special tax on income derived from capital gains.
In 1872 the government brought in the first "income" tax on 
income derived from transferable securities.211
Gambetta, however, got a second chance when as leader of the 
Republican opposition and President of the Commission du Budget 
in the Chamber of Deputies, he proposed a reform of the tax 
system in 1877, which would entail the institution of a 
progressive income tax. He was then confronted by a hostile 
President MacMahon and his ultra-conservative cabinet. In 
addition, many members of his own Republican group, particularly 
the eminent former President, Adolph Thiers - who had called 
income tax "le socialisme fiscal" - and conservative elements in 
the Senate opposed Gambetta's reform.
From 1895 some 200 projects on direct taxation were put 
forward and subsequently rejected. Then in 1907, the Minister of 
Finance, Joseph Caillaux, encouraged by the victory of the 
Socialists and Radicals in the 1906 election, tabled his project 
for a global income tax (the impot general sur le revenu, IGR) 
modeled on the British and Prussian systems.212 It was passed by 
the Chamber in 1909. After lengthy debates and much ferocious 
resistance from parliamentary forces, especially in the Senate,
Apparently this tax was first introduced as a projet de loi during the 
Second Republic by M. Garnier-Pages who claimed its purpose was less 
to raise revenue than to "introduire dans le systdme fiscal les 
principes d'equity et de justice distributive qui doivent presider & 
nos lois fiscales comme & tous nos actes politiques" (quoted from G. 
Ardant, Tome II, 1973, op.cit., p.371).
Caillaux, as Minister of Finance in Waldeck-Rousseau's cabinet, had 
tabled a project for a general income tax in 1900, but it was defeated.
134
the project was adopted in 1914. There is no doubt, the forceful 
advocacy of the Minister of Finance and a tense international 
situation on the eve of World War I contributed to the project's 
adoption.213 Moreover, similar efforts in other countries had 
been underway since the 1890s and developments in those countries 
affected the attitudes, positions and policies regarding the 
income tax reform.214 Finally, the victory of the parties of the 
left - who had included the creation of a progressive income tax 
in their party programs - in the April/May 1914 legislative 
elections was a crucial factor in the project's successful
"...que les besoins du r£armement, en attendant ceux de la guerre, 
furent le moteur Evident des reformes fiscales de cette 6poque..." 
(quoted from G. Ardant, Tome II, 1972, op.cit., p.426).
Germany, beginning with Prussia in 1891/93, the U.S. in 1892 - declared 
unconstitutional in 1894 - and again in 1909 (the 16th amendment) and 
1913, Spain in 1900, Denmark in 1903, the Netherlands in 1892/93, 
Austria in 1909, and Britain which had had an income tax - more or less 
continuously - since 1799, planned to enhance its progressivity in 
1909. G.Ardant (1972, p.425) writes that France, like the U.S., Great 
Britain and other countries, was in the habit of closely scrutinizing 
tax developments elsewhere: "Toutes ces realisations avaient £te
confrontees, compar^es, analys^es dans une serie d'etudes faites par 
des commissions de techniciens ou de parlementaires...en France avec 
les grandes enquites administratives qui servirent de base aux 
commissions parlementaires.. Legislation in other countries, tax and 
other, was published in the Ministry of Financed Bulletin de 
Statistique et de LSgislation Compar€e. The influence of external 
events prompted M. Cavaignac to argue in 1894, "Lorsque 1'fStat - ce 
qui ressemble bien & du socialisme - pr§ldve le cinqui£me du revenu de 
tous les citoyens, on ne peut meconnaitre qu'il est possible, en 
modifiant cette repartition, d'apporter quelque satisfaction k la 
passion de justice sociale qui agite la nation francaise...Toute 
1'Europe est a l'heure actuelle entrain£e par ce mouvement. 
L'Angleterre developpe, & l'heure meme oft je parle, le caractdre 
progressif de son imp6t sur le revenu. Les Pays Bas ont adopts un 
imp6t personnel et progressif sur le revenu et sur le capital. 
Ajoutez-y toute l'Allemagne, toute l'Autriche, les cantons suisses" 
(quoted from G. Ardant, Tome II, 1972, p.408). Even Joseph Caillaux, 
in 1907, on presentation of his tax reform, told the Chamber of 
Deputies, that his ideas had evolved from his research on the subject 
(see G. Ardant, Tome II, 1972, p.429).
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passage.215 Evidently, a number of factors came together to 
change the tax agenda in France in the period just prior to World 
War I. Perhaps most crucial however were the parts played by 
Caillaux, international developments, and above all politics.216
In order not to incite popular opposition, and painlessly 
accustom the French people to a new type of imposition, these 
taxes were devised simply, progressively (in the case of the 
IGR) , at low rates and easily collected. Not only was the IGR a 
new and important means of raising revenue, it also expressed 
Caillaux"s concern for "la justice fiscale". In addition to its 
progressive features it introduced a system of personal 
allowances which varied depending on family situation. Social 
justice and equality, therefore, (re)assumed their places as 
guiding principles for tax policy makers and since the early 20th 
century have motivated several reforms to the tax system. 
Continuity and Change
While the French tax system is notable for its continuity - 
several of the main taxes, the "quatre vieilles", and many 
excise duties for instance, date back to the 18th century - it 
has undergone some significant changes. The IGR and the impots
215 For this election the Socialists had granted their local party 
organizations the freedom to cast there vote for republican candidates 
(in those races where their own candidates were unlikely to win) who 
would offer guarantees "against the danger of war, for secularism and 
tax reform" (quoted from G. Ardant, Tome II, 1972, p.406) . In the end, 
socialists and radicals won over half the seats in the National 
Assembly.
216 Another law, passed in 1917, created the impots cSdulaires 
proportionnels which hit separately seven categories of income. They 
replaced the contributions directes and hit salaries (traitements et 
salaires), property and other capital income, and agricultural and 
commercial profits.
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cedulaires, already mentioned, are two examples. Income tax was 
reformed in 1948 and again in 1959 when it became known as the 
impot sur le revenu des personnes physiques (IRPP) .217 With the 
demise of the Fourth Republic and the onset of the Fifth, reform 
of France's tax system was among a number of reforms the new 
Gaullist government foresaw. The Rueff Committee Report of 
December 1958 intended to make tax reform "one of the chief means 
of rehabilitating France's economic institutions."218 The new 
IRPP abolished the duality of the old IGR and impots 
cedulaires.219 It was a global progressive income tax which took 
family situation into account. 220 It also sought to equalize the 
tax burden of different categories of taxpayers, who for one
Imp6t sur le revenu (IR) from 1971.
"Report on the Financial Situation in France" with an introduction by 
Jacques Rueff, distributed by the United States Council of the 
International Chamber of Commerce, (New York: 1959). This committee 
was set up under Jacques Rueff in September 1958 and was responsible 
for examining the financial situation of France.
From 1948 the former was known as the impdt sur les personnes physiques 
which consisted of a surtaxe progressive (a revised IGR with varying 
rates applied proportionally and the quotient familial, which reduced 
the amount of taxes owed depending on family situation) and the taxe 
proportionnelle. The taxe proportionelle was a modified version of the 
old impdts cedulaires, which treated traitements and salaires more 
favorably than other income - these income sources enjoyed a 5 V 
reduction in taxes, and continued to do so from 1959, when the taxe 
proportionnelle became the taxe complements ire, until 1970.
The IRPP was imposed at 8 rates varying from 5% to 65V (previously 10- 
70V) and by 1965 represented 17V of total tax receipts. While the 1959 
reform had the effect of slowing the progression of the income tax 
burden initially, between 1963 and 1969, revenues from this tax 
outpaced the growth in gdp. From 1959 to 1969 income tax revenue 
increased more than three and a half times while gdp grew only slightly 
more than two and a half times. As a percentage of gdp, prSl£vements 
obligatoires (the tax burden) rose from 35.4V in 1959 to 38.1V in 1965 
to 37.8V in 1967 to 38.5V in 1969. Another feature of the income tax 
system was the failure by government to index tax brackets fully with 
the increase in prices. While between 1959 and 1968 prices rose more 
than 37V, tax brackets were raised only between 20V and 28V. The 
first bracket was raised only 13.6V over this period (see, J-Y. Nizet, 
FiscalitS, Economie et Politique, L'Impdt en France, 1945-1990, Paris: 
LGDJ, 1991, pp.178-9).
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reason or another experienced gross differences in their relative
tax positions - a demand instigated in part by the Poujadiste
movement which surfaced in the mid-1950s.221
Apart from the desire to rejuvenate the French economy,
another factor influencing the 1959 reforms was the desire to
conform the structure of French income taxation with the systems
operating in other Common Market countries. As a French Ministry
of Finance document declared,
...Finally the European Economic Community requires 
that the tax structure of our country be comparable to 
that of competing nations. A tax reform should be the 
occasion of a harmonization of the principal aspects of 
the legislation and not the pretext for the 
establishment of a tax moat.222
Membership of the European Economic Community (now European
Union) had implications concerning the future structure of the
French tax system, as articles 9-27, 95-100 of the Treaty of Rome
and various subsequent Council directives, explicitly or
implicitly, committed Community members to harmonize their tax
systems, especially their systems of customs duties and indirect
taxation, including value added taxes. Moreover, with the
exposure to a wider market, entailed by membership of the
Community, French policy makers were concerned about adapting the
tax system in order to ensure the competitiveness of French
industry and prevent capital from seeking more attractive
221 See: G. TourniS, La Politique Fiscale sous la 5e RSpublique, (Toulouse: 
Privat, 1985, 1985), pp.83-84; G. Ardant, Tome II, op.cit., pp.641-669; 
or for a full account of the Poujadist phenomenon see Stanley Hoffmann, 
Le Mouvement Poujade, (Paris: A. Colin, 1956).
222 "La R^forme Fiscale", Statistiques et Etudes Financi&res, no. 136, Avril 
1960, p.349. The translation is mine.
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locations.
The same reforming spirit which had captured the first
government of the Fifth Republic and led to the reform of income
tax in 1959 was responsible for the planned reform of local
taxation. An ordinance issued in January 1959 decided the future
reform of local taxation which would entail a reassessment of
property values in order to establish a more accurate tax base.
This reform would not only "modernize1' local taxes, but was meant
to effect a fundamental restructuring of local government
finance.223 However, this was very much a long term project which
did not come to fruition until the 1970s.
Over the course of many years, local governments had assumed
exclusive reponsibility for a business tax (patente) , residence
and property taxes (contribution mobili^re, contributions
foncieres)224 - the decendants of the "quatre vieilles". As the
state increasingly became aware of the anachronistic and unjust
character of these taxes and diminished their part in the state's
* 0
tax take, local governments "adopted" them. 225 The 1959
The Rueff Committee report proposed the "planned modernization of the 
system of direct taxation by local communities, which is no longer 
adapted to present economic conditions" ("Report on the Financial 
Situation in France", op.cit., p.29).
There were two taxes foncieres, one on constructed property the other 
on non-constructed property.
Local governments came increasingly to rely on these and other taxes. 
In 1961, taxes provided local governments with resources worth FF9.2 
billion which ballooned to FF45.5 billion in 1974. Further evidence 
of the explosion of local taxes is provided by their part in total 
taxation: 9.3% in 1959 and 11.6% in 1983. For an in depth study of the 
system of local taxation see, Jacques Sylvain-Klein, L'Explosion des 
Impots Locaux, Notes & Etudes Documentaires, (Paris: La Documentation 
Francaise, 1986).
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recommendations for reform of local taxation were based on 
earlier proposals put forward by another committee studying the 
issue in 1952 .226 However, it wasn't until the 1970s that any 
substantive reform was enacted: property values were reassessed
at 1970 prices and made effective from 1974; the taxe 
d'habitation (a furnished dwelling tax) and the taxes foncieres 
des proprietes baties/non baties (developed and undeveloped 
property taxes) replaced respectively the old contributions 
mobilieres and foncieres from 1974 without really changing very 
much.227
In 1975 a more fundamental reform took place when the taxe 
professionnelle (TP) was created in place of the old patente. The 
taxe professionnelle is a trade/business tax levied locally. It 
was - like the old patente - based on the rental value of the 
premises occupied by the business. However, the rental value of 
the plant and equipment used in a business is also taken into 
account. But in terms of labor, rather than hitting the number 
employed and their productive capacity as was the case with the 
patente, the TP was applied to salaries - one-fifth of the 
salaries and wages paid by the business or if companies had under 
five employees, it was applied to receipts. The TP resulted in 
lowering by 50% the burden of the former patente on 1,400,000 
small businesses, while increasing it by between 30-500% for
See, J. Sylvain-Klein, op.cit.
For a detailed description of these and other taxes mentioned see: J-Y. 
Nizet, op.cit.; J. Sylvain-Klein, op.cit.
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500,000 others. However, the tax was so poorly devised and 
implemented, and hence so much resented, that between 1976 and 
1988 several "reforms" were deemed necessary.228
In 1959, corporate income taxation (impot sur les societes, 
IS) was also reformed. 229 However, the main recommendations 
emanating from the Rueff Report on company taxation involved a 
mitigated attack on the numerous special exemptions accorded to 
businesses, agriculture and other "private interests" by the tax 
system.
French finance is honeycombed with special exceptions 
and exemptions. The burgeoning of exemptions results 
from the surrender of public authorities to pressure 
from private interests, always in the guise of the 
public interest.230
Consequently, the Rueff Report recommended many of the exemptions
be discontinued. It also recommended an increase in the IS rate
to 50% from 47.6%. The December 1959 tax law permitted companies
to revalue their capital assets, investments and bad debts and
employ degressive amortizations over five years - a form of
accelerated depreciation - on plant and capital purchases,
For example, between 1976 and 1985 the TP was "reformed" 7 times. 
Several of the interviewees commented on the much maligned tax. For 
instance, Philippe Lagayette maintained, "Les entreprises ont 
furieusement protests contre la taxe professionnelle.. . parce que cette 
reforme avait StS malfaite." (P. Lagayette, interview in Paris, France, 
May 20, 1992). Also Patrick Careil commented, "... la rSforme de 1975 
sur la taxe professionnelle avait complStement SchouS et elle avait 
entrain^ des mouvements et des protestations violentes...w (P. Careil, 
interview in Paris, France, May 25, 1992). Beginning his commentary 
on the TP, Raymond Barre exclaimed, "C'Stait la pire des stupiditSs. . ."
(Raymond Barre, interview in Paris, France, June 2, 1992).
The impot sur les sociStis was first created in 1948 and taxed all 
corporate profits regardless of origin or nature and reemerged more or 
less intact from the 1959 reform, but at a rate of 50% (previously 
47.6%) as suggested by the Rueff Report.
230 "Report on the Financial Situation of France", op.cit., p.15.
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instead of the old linear method. This reform was deemed 
necessary and expedient for two main reasons. Firstly, inflation 
had eroded the value and efficiency of the old system. Secondly, 
degressive amortizations deducted from company profits was 
practiced by other Common Market countries.
Indirect taxes were reformed chiefly through the institution 
of a tax on business transactions in 1920 called the taxe 
generale sur les affaires (TGA) . Complaints from consumers, 
exporters, merchants and economists led to the TGA's reform in 
1925 transforming it into a single tax hitting a product only 
once, instead of at every stage of transaction. Several other 
modifications in 1936 and 1948 preceded the institution in 1954 
of a value added tax (VAT), the brainchild of Maurice Laure. The 
VAT would permit a greater degree of control, from an 
administrative point of view. It was applied at each transaction 
stage to the difference between sale and purchase. Each producer 
could deduct from his tax the tax that he paid at the previous 
stage - the tax that was part of his invoice. The Rueff Report 
recommended reform of VAT entailing reducing its complexity and 
the multiplicity of its rates, and its application to a variety 
of goods then enjoying exempt status.231 A modified version of 
the Rueff recommendations was adopted in the loi de finances for 
1959.
Beginning in the 1960s, right up to the late 1980s, VAT has 
been gradually extended to a wider range of products and
231 The Report suggested four rates instead of seven.
142
activities, and its rates modified. 232 These reforms were 
impelled by concerns for economic regulation, revenue raising, 
social justice and alternatively, levelling the playing field, 
and, of course, the Common Market.
Succession and gift taxes (droits de succession and taxe 
speciale sur les biens transmis a titre gratuit) were also 
reformed by the December 1959 tax law. Prior to 1959, upon 
death, two taxes applied, a succession tax and an estate tax.
This system was abolished in favor of one succession tax at new 
rates levied on the amount received by each beneficiary, with
large reductions in the rates applied to transfers between
spouses or in the direct line of descendants.233
The 1960s witnessed a few important reforms. 234 Some of 
these reforms had been envisaged by the Rueff Report or the later 
Rueff-Armand Report. 235 Others were hatched by planners, civil 
servants in the tax administration, or they originated in the 
political milieu. The reforms were guided by concerns for 
greater equality and social justice, as well as increasing
232 For example, VAT was increased in December 1968 from rates of 6%, 13%,
16.66%, and 20% to 7%, 15%, 19%, and 25%; beginning in 1968 VAT was
extended to trade, services and artisanal sectors. More will be said
on VAT reforms later.
Before 1959 succession tax was levied at rates of 20%, 25% or 30%. 
After, the rates were changed to between 5% and 15%.
For example, the 1963 reform of taxation of individuals' capital gains 
realized through real estate/immovable property transactions; the 1965 
reform of company taxation; the 1966 and 1968 reforms of VAT; also see 
J-Y. Nizet, op.cit., pp,161+.
The Rueff-Armand Report is otherwise known as the Rapport sur les 
Obstacles 3 1'Expansion £conomique, published in July 1960 (Paris: La 
Documentation Francaise).
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revenue. Modernizing was also a persistent theme with policy
makers throughout the decade of the 1960s.
The early governments of the new Fifth Republic saw the need
to bring the tax system up to date in order to adapt it to
changing social and economic circumstances and to meet the
growing revenue needs of the state. 236 With the growing
competition between France and its European Community partners
and between the E.E.C. and the United States, the tax reforms of
the 1960s and 1970s were concerned with making French enterprises
more competitive in the European and world markets. This had the
effect of shifting the burden from enterprises onto income
earners and consumers. As Dominique de la Martinere, a former
Chef de Service de la Legislation Fiscale and Directeur General
des Impots told students at the Ecole Superieure des Sciences
£conomiques et Commerciales in February 1968,
...au cours des dernieres annees de nombreux 
changements sont intervenus. Pour l'essentiel, la 
politique fiscale s'est resumee en un transfert massif 
et necessaire de charges fiscales au profit de 
l'entreprise et aux depens des particuliers, des 
personnes physiques ou des consommateurs.237
Indeed, throughout the 1960s personal income tax evolved much 
more rapidly and at a higher rate than the growth in gdp compared
with the IS, which throughout the 1960s grew less rapidly than
236 As Mr. Valery Giscard d'Estaing, then a Secretary of State for the
Budget, said in the National Assembly in March 1961, "Nous entendons 
faire de la fiscalit^ une arme nouvelle dans la lutte pour la
modernisation et l'expansion economique." (quoted from M. Redjah and
J. Rodrigue, Pourquoi Nous Payons Trop d'Impots: La FiscalitS
Giscardienne, Paris: Editions Sociales, 1976).
237 Quoted from J-Y. Nizet, op.cit., p.156.
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gdp.
The reforming process called forth new problems requiring 
urgent attention. With the "unification" of income taxes 
(surtaxe progressive and taxe proportionelle) , the inequality 
between various categories of taxpayers became even more evident. 
New questions emerged to trouble reformers as well as taxpayers. 
For example, should all revenue be treated and taxed identically? 
Should all taxpayers, regardless of income sources, be treated 
equally? An illustration of the discrimination practiced by the 
French tax authorities was the favorable treatment which 
continued to be given to salaried workers - who accounted for 
11.5 million out of 15 million taxpaying households: as opposed 
to other income earners, this category of taxpayers could deduct 
10% of their income from tax (justified by virtue of the 
professional fees incurred by this category) or deduct the actual 
fees from taxes. They furthermore benefitted from an exemption 
of 20% (2'abattement de 20% sur le impot sur le revenu) . And 
until 1970, they enjoyed a tax reduction of 5% of their salaries. 
This privileged treatment incited resentment and complaints of 
unequal treatment before the law by other categories of 
taxpayers, i.e. the self-employed, artisans, liberal professions 
and small merchants. With the help of new institutions like the 
Conseil des Impots, 238 the government spent much time and effort
238 The Conseil des Impots was created in 1971 and is an arm of the Cour
des Comptes. It is comprised of eleven members who regularly examine 
the operation of the tax system and its effects, economic and social. 
Periodically and at the request of the Finance Minister, the Conseil 
publishes reports on the feasibility of certain tax proposals and 
problems with the system.
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during the 1970s, redressing this discriminatory regime - a 
renewed policy, "a revenu egal, impot egal", was launched.
In any event, as in most other western industrialized 
countries, growing state intervention, and the consequent 
"adaptation" and "modernization" of the tax system, had serious 
implications for the tax burden. Over the 14 years from 1949 to 
1963, prelevements obligatoires rose from 28% to around 35% as a 
percentage of gross national product. Apparently, however, this 
rise in the tax burden was of minimal concern as long as the 
economy, standards of living and personal disposable incomes 
continued to enjoy buoyant growth, which they did, during a 
period which has come to be known as the "trentes glorieuses" - 
the thirty years of the French economic miracle.
Taxes bv Another Name
So far, discussion has centered on certain major taxes, 
direct and indirect, that comprise a large part of the French tax 
system. But these make up only a part of the total tax burden. 
There exist other taxes which are not directly politically 
devised and controlled - these taxes form what the French call 
"parafiscalite". 239 These include the myriad social charges - 
taxation by another name - which have cropped up since the end of 
World War II. The assumption by the state of various welfare 
activities has brought important changes to the French tax
They are "percues dans un intirit economique ou social au profit d'une 
personne morale de droit public ou priv§ autre que l'Etat, les 
collectivit^s territoriales et leurs etablissements publics 
administratifs (Ordinnance of January 2, 1959, art.4, line 3).
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system.
The cotisations sociales (social charges), a relatively 
recent feature of the French tax system, are theoretically tied 
to specific welfare benefits provided by the state. For example 
the cotisation maladie corresponds to health care benefits; the 
cotisation vieillesse, retirement pensions. 240 The general regime 
provides sickness insurance, maternity insurance, old-age pension 
insurance and, death and survivors' insurance. Separate regimes 
exist for family allowances and workers compensation (i.e. 
unemployment).
Social charges, or cotisations sociales, are levied on 
employers and employees, up to a certain level of salary/income. 
These 20th century social taxes, like those taxes already 
mentioned above, have had the effect of casting the net more 
widely, and some would say, more equitably, thereby imposing on a 
very broad base of taxpayers. Their contributions help pay for 
the various social welfare schemes. These schemes are semi- 
autonomously supervised by the social partners - i.e. employers, 
employees, professional associations, Chambers of Commerce etc. - 
who more or less freely determine the rates, collect the 
contributions and manage the funds. The cotisations sociales, 
with a few exceptions do not come under parliamentary scrutiny.
In the post-war period social charges have grown to represent an
For more information on the French social security system and its 
financing see: J-Y. Nizet, op.cit.; T. Gandillot, op.cit., ch.10; S. 
Shaughnessy, op.cit.; J. Berzia, Le Regime GSnSral de la SScuritS 
Sociale, (Paris: J. Delmas et Cie., 1986).
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ever larger share of the total tax burden (see Appendix A, Figure 
4A) .241 In the 1980s they ranged between 18-20% of the total tax 
burden as a percentage of gdp.
The other form of parafiscalite is comprised of numerous 
extra-statal taxes devised by various organizations and 
associations in conjunction with the tax administration and 
applied to limited groups and selected activities - usually 
members who use the Services offered by those organizations and 
associations. 242 Generally these taxes are imposed on 
transactions of particular products, i.e. books, watches etc. 
with the proceeds directed towards an organization set up to 
encourage the particular activity or trade in question.243 These 
taxes are voted by Parliament, but may be imposed by decree 
issuing from the Council of State (Conseil d'Etat) at the urging 
of the Ministry of Finance and the particular ministry concerned 
with that particular area.
Two other areas of indirect taxation which contribute 
sizeable sums to the French fisc include excise duties, and much 
less significantly, customs duties. As already mentioned 
earlier, French governments have had a predilection for indirect
As the welfare state has grown, so too have cotisations sociales. These 
have risen from 7.6% of national income in 1950 to 11.6% in 1954 to 
close to 20% in 1969.
A list of taxes parafiscales is included in every loi de finances; for 
example, see, Journal Officiel, Debats, Assemble Nationale, no. 102,
13 Novembre 1979.
For further information see, Harvard Law School International Tax 
Program, Taxation in France, World Tax Series, (Chicago: Commerce
Clearing House, Inc., 1966), pp.260-2.
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taxes (on the balance of taxation, see Appendix A, Figure 5A) . 
Traditionally, taxes on particular goods and services, like 
tobacco and alcohol, and more recently gasoline and automobiles 
have been relied upon to bring in much needed revenue. From the 
mid-1980s, French governments introduced tax reforms that were 
largely revenue neutral. For example, while lowering income 
taxes on one side, they were raising excise taxes on the other.
France is a country which has long protected its domestic 
industries from foreign competition. It has done this largely 
through the erection of high tariff barriers. Therefore, customs 
duties contributed a significant portion of total government tax 
receipts. However, since World War II, France's membership of 
GATT (now World Trade Organization) and the E.E.C. (now European 
Union), receipts from customs duties have fallen as tariff 
reductions have been agreed. Today the relative contribution of 
customs duties to government tax revenues is one of the lowest in 
the world.244 
Conclusion I
This review of the history of French taxation has provided 
not only a glimpse of the nature and structure of French 
taxation, but also some insight into the complex of factors that, 
driven by a political dynamic, combined to contribute to the 
evolution of the system. Of course, this brief review does not 
exhaust the number and variety of taxes that make up the total
244 Ibid., p.236. In 1989, customs receipts, along with the taxe 
interieure sur les produits petroliers (TIPP) and VAT collected by 
customs, represented around FF300,000 million.
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tax burden in France, but those discussed are among the most 
significant contributors to the fisc. Moreover, with the 
exception of some, the above mentioned taxes will be the focus of 
the forthcoming discussion of the evolution of tax reform in 
France in the 1980s.
Some of the taxes examined have long roots in French 
political and economic history. Others are more recent vestiges 
of proximate political, and to a lesser extent, economic choices. 
While the French tax system has evolved largely without major 
transformation in the last 200 years or so, perhaps emphasizing 
the constraints imposed by political culture or inertia, there 
have been some noteworthy changes. As will be shown, during the 
1980s the French tax system and attitudes towards it did undergo 
important changes, although perhaps not on the same scale 
witnessed in other countries like the United States and Great 
Britain.
It is essential to appreciate the shape and evolution of the 
French tax system before attempting to describe and explain the 
policy changes which took place in the 1980s. Tax policy change 
is unlikely the result of a 'clean slate' consideration of 
optimal taxation. The policy inheritance exercises an important 
contraint on policy makers and is not easily ignored. In the 
absence of a clean slate reform, therefore, an examination of the 
evolving state of French taxation will provide an important 
marker in the evaluation of tax reform in the 1980s, and at the 
very least a convenient reference source for the reader.
150
An examination of tax reform in the 1980s will be preceded 
however by a brief discussion of the institutional environment 
relevant to tax policy making. This exercise is necessary, if 
only to familiarize the reader with the important players in the 
tax policy process and further our understanding of the roles 
played by certain actors and institutions in that process and how 
they interact to produce tax policy. In the course of this 
review, the reader will be briefly acquainted with some important 
features of the neo-liberal tax reforms of the 1980s, which will 
be more fully discussed in subsequent sections.
The French Approach to Tax Reform
An array of actors and institutions comprise the tax policy 
process in France. Some are critical to the process, others are 
marginal. This discussion will not attempt to survey all of 
them, in the interest of time and space. However, the most 
important will surely come under the purview of this effort.
Even among those examined, tax policy making (including tax 
policy-influencing) actors and institutions reflect a variety of 
skills, qualities and contributions that help to give shape to 
the French tax code. We will begin by looking at the Plan, which 
has played such a major role in the political economy of France. 
We will consider its economic policy role and its tax policy 
role. This will be followed by a brief look at other 
governmental and societal institutions, groups and individuals 
that have a stake in the tax policy process, such as Parliament, 
the executive, European institutions. By analyzing the
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institutional environment in which tax policy is made we will be 
better equipped to conduct discourse on the subject of French tax 
reform in the 1980s.
* The Plan and the Economy
French economic policy in the post-war period has emphasized 
industrial modernization and economic growth. Since the end of 
World War II successive governments extended the state's control 
over key sectors of the economy: banking, coal/ steel, 
shipbuilding, chemicals, information technology etc.. In order to 
promote the goals of modernization and growth, several 
institutions were created at the outset of the Fourth Republic, 
i.e. the Planning Commissariat, the Economic and Social Council, 
INSEE, and ENA among others.245 The French government, armed with 
new institutional capabilities and financial resources (i.e. 
Marshall Aid and private American financial assistance), pursued 
dirigiste policies of Keynesian-inspired economic growth and 
expansion of public services. Major elements of the new strategy 
included a system of regulatory controls - price, credit, 
exchange - nationalizations of basic and not-so-basic industries, 
as well as a large part of the financial sector, support of the 
franc and French exports, and a highly developed system of
For a discussion of French economic policy making institutions see: C. 
Stoffaes, Politique 1tconomique de la France, (Paris: Institut d'Etudes 
Politiques, 1982) ; W.A. Spivey, Economic Policy in France 1976-81, (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan, 1982); S. Estrin and P. Holmes, French 
Planning in Theory and Practice, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983); J. 
FourastiS and J. Courtheoux, La Planification tconomique en France, 
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968); P. Cerny and M. 
Schain, eds., 1985, op.cit; P. Hall, 1986, op.cit.; V. Lauber, The 
Political Economy of France, ftfew York: Praeger, 1983).; G. Tournie, 
op.cit.
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planning which pulled all these elements together.246
The planning process, headed by the Commissariat General du 
Plan, involved the participation and contribution of other 
governmental bodies like, INSEE, the government's economic 
research and statistical arm, the Ministry of Finance and the so- 
called Modernization Commissions comprised of business leaders, 
trade unionists, academics and experts to discuss problems and 
recommend solutions.247 Following its consultations with the 
government, the planning staff integrates the reports and 
recommendations from the various commissions and then submits a 
statement of options to the Economic and Social Council and the 
National Assembly for debate. It is then formalized into a final 
plan and again given to the Economic and Social Council for 
comment and to the National Assembly for approval.
In the early Plans, targets for investment and output for 
various sectors of the economy were determined and projections 
for each year of the Plan estimated. As the 1960s progressed, 
social themes and concerns for improving the quality of life were 
figured into the Plans. While economic growth and the twin 
trends of urbanization and industrialization were transforming 
the socio-economic fabric of the country, new problems were
P. Cerny, "From Dirigisme to Deregulation? The Case of Financial 
Markets" in Paul Godt, ed., Policy Making in France, (London: Pinter 
Publishers, 1989), p.144.
Trade unionists have traditionally been hostile to the planning process 
seeing in it little benefit (see e.g., P. Hall, 1986, ch.6). The 
Confederation General du Travail (CGT) and the Force Ouvridre (FO) in 
particular, have regularly abstained from participating on planning 
commissions.
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emerging that the government was obliged to address. The Plans
1 de modernisation et d'equipement" became the Plans "de
developpement economique et social."
The importance of planning was not so much in the policies
themselves, which in later years were of questionable importance,
but in its concertation and coordination of various actors with
the objective of achieving a consensus on the framework and
direction of economic policy.
The normalization of concertation is perhaps the 
biggest claim for the Plan, and its effect is most 
difficult to assess. Certainly, in the 1950s the 
planners were breaking new ground in this respect, and 
by the 1980s consultations with the social partners had 
become part of the ordinary policy-making process in 
most ministries, agencies and local governments.248
Tax policy making is, to some extent, a part of this concertative
planning process. Among other things, planning is a means by
which the government can 'test the waters' for its own proposals
and consider the needs and demands of socio-economic groups, on
whose expertise and cooperation the government relies for
developing and implementing policy.
* Tax and the Plan
L'integration de la fiscalite dans les experiences 
francaises de planification est significative de la 
place devolue a la variable impot dans la macro- 
economie appliquee de moyen terme.249
The planning process provided an important arena for tax policy
C. Stoffaes, "Industrial Policy and the State, from Industry to 
Enterprise", in Paul Godt, ed., 1989, op.cit., p.138.
B. Bobe and P. Llau, FiscalitS et Choix Economiques, (Paris: Calmann- 
Levy, 1978), p.190.
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making. However, generally, it was the economics of taxation 
rather than the politics which preoccupied the planners. In 
other words, taxation, was above all a tool of economic 
management. The social and political implications were not the 
concern of the planners.
As far as Jean Rivoli250 was concerned, there was, at the 
height of the Plan's prestige, little worth criticizing as long 
as the tax system was conceived and applied as an effective means 
of realizing the Plan's goals. In examining some of the tax 
reforms or adjustments considered or legislated in the short life 
of the Fifth Republic (Rivoli was writing in 1964) , Rivoli saw 
the hand of politics at work, which he deemed less efficient and 
rational than those reforms which adhered to strict economic 
criteria.251 If any reform were to be undertaken, the primary 
criterion must be the success of the Plan. Other criteria were 
certainly worth considering - i.e. increasing state revenues, 
reducing the tax burden, harmonization of tax regimes in the 
E.E.C. - in order to make the system as painless and acceptable 
as possible. Nonetheless, "...en faisant du Plan le critere 
prioritaire de toute reforme fiscale, on n'elude aucun probleme: 
simplement, on remet chacun a sa place veritable."252
Consequently, tax reform in the post-war period has largely
Jean Rivoli is the pseudonym given to the author(s) of a series of
books published by Editions du Seuil whose provenance was the Finance 
Ministry, rue de Rivoli.
See, J. Rivoli, op.cit.
252 Ibid., p.121.
155
been characterized by periodic modifications to the tax code
intended to incite particular forms of behavior with respect to
consumption, investment and production, three chief areas of
concern for the planners. While Rivoli acknowledged other
objectives, i.e. political, health and most importantly the
reduction of inequalities, - which themselves had indirect
effects on the economy - the fulfilment of economic objectives
decided by politicians, planners and Social partners was the
principal determining factor.
During the preparation of a plan, a working group on
taxation (known as the Groupe Fiscalite) is set up and meets for
about a two year period. The participants include government
officials, business representatives, trade unionists, academics
and tax experts. These participants raise and discuss various
tax questions and strive to formulate a coherent policy. This
Groupe Fiscalite is part of the Commissariat's Finance Committee.
It has primary responsibility for assessing the current
situation, addressing problems and making recommendations.253
Theoretically, the work of the Fiscal Group has only a purely
consultative value. By no means is its work automatically or
completely incorporated into the Plan.
Ils constituent pour le gouvernement et les differents 
agents du developpement economique et social une source 
d' information et un guide precieux pour 1' action.254
Though it doesn't have exclusive responsibility, as other groups and 
committees, i.e. agriculture, deal with fiscal questions also.
Rapports des Comitis du 6e Plan 1971-1975, Rapport du Groupe Fiscalite, 
Comit6 du Financement, Commissariat General du Plan, (Paris: La
Documentation Francaise, 1971), p.3.
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Even the members of the Fiscal Group themselves acknowledge their 
work as a "source of information" and a "guide" for action.
Parallel with this group, the Modernization Commissions - 
like the commission d'habitation and the commission d'agriculture 
- can also deal with questions of taxation related to their 
specific areas. In fact, as Christophe Heckly (1987) writes, 
such fiscal concertation has a much bigger practical scope - "une 
plus grande portee pratique" - than one is led to believe given 
the emphasis on consultation.255 Many groups and individuals 
have, or feel they have, a stake in the tax policy making 
process. In France, official means of participating exist which 
enable a variety of actors and interests to express their 
preferences. Such concertation serves the interests of both 
government policy makers and concerned groups.
One of the first tasks of the planners with respect to 
taxation was to determine, given current legislation, how much 
revenue and savings would be available to finance the Plan's 
programs. The planners would calculate, based on various 
equations, the amount of revenue, from all sources, necessary to 
fulfill the Plan's production, consumption and investment 
goals. 256 Not only was the amount of tax revenues determined 
given existing legislation and calculations based on various 
economic scenarios assuming certain behavior on the part of
C. Heckly, op.cit., p.252.
For more information see, B. Bobe and P. Llau^ 1978, op.cit., pp.190- 
207.
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businesses, households and the administration, but also the 
amount required from certain types of taxes necessary to realize 
the objectives of the Plan.
Planners could and did make suggestions for modifications to 
the tax code in order so that they might obtain the required 
revenues, but rarely did they cut, abolish or create taxes. More 
than anything else, they were tinkerers rather than reformers. 
Because of their concern with rates of investment and savings, 
the planners were responsible for a slew of measures which 
supported and accelerated the accumulation of capital 
contributing to the financing of public as well as private sector 
activities. Their contributions, however, are far from 
insignificant and many of the suggestions made concerning tax and 
published in the Plan, have become government policy.257
The Fiscal Group, in its preparatory work for the Sixth Plan 
1970-75, recommended a gradual reduction in the 23% VAT rate to 
the intermediate rate of 17.6%. And in the preparation for the 
Seventh Plan 1975-81, the planners called for a reduction of VAT. 
The government eventually adopted this policy and adjusted 
downward the normal rate of 23% to 20%, and the lower rate from 
7.5% to 7% on January 1, 1973. Under Raymond Barre, the normal 
rate of 20% was merged with the 17.6% intermediate rate on 
January 1, 1977. The reasoning behind these similar moves by two 
different governments and in two different economic contexts was
Heckly (1987, p.252) claims that almost all the recommendations made 
by business interests participating in the Fiscal Group for the Fifth 
Plan were in fact legislated by the government between 1965 and 1970.
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twofold: 1) the tendential rapprochement of French VAT rates with 
those of its Common Market partners; 2) the desire to dampen 
inflationary pressures in the economy. How much of an impact the 
decisions of the planners had on the governmental decision agenda 
is hard to say. Neither proposal was exclusive to the planners. 
Consequently, no causal nexus can be definitively established.
But one can assert the likelihood, at least, that the planners' 
preferences did have some effect.
There exist a number of other official and semi-official 
bodies that contribute to the planning process and play a part in 
tax policy making. Another aspect of the planning process 
involves the activities of the Economic and Social Council and 
its impact on the tax policy making process. The Economic and 
Social Council is another arena for the discussion of tax 
questions and the promotion of policies dear to the various 
actors that participate on the Council. 258 The debates, hearings 
and reports of the Council and its review of government 
legislation offers another means for societal actors and 
government officials to come together in a cooperative dialogue. 
The Council, again, gives the government the opportunity to 
canvass for new ideas as well as "test the water" for its own 
proposals.
Another tax policy making arena, rather independent of the 
planning process, is the fiscal committee of the Mission
258 Georges Egret identified the Economic and Social Council as an 
occasional source of tax ideas and a useful sounding-board for the 
government (Georges Egret, interview in Paris, France, May 7, 1992).
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d'organisation administrative, created in 1971 .259 Located at 10 
rue d'Anjou, where the fiscal service of the Conseil National du 
Patronat Francais (CNPF) has its offices, the committee is 
composed of various business leaders, accountants, tax advisers 
and civil servants. Its primary purpose is to offer the 
participants of the group a permanent dialogue between business 
interests and the civil service, especially with regards to the 
implementation phase of tax legislation.
At the end of this apparently loosely coordinated 
concertative process the Plan is drawn up. Once the Plan is 
approved by the Economic and Social Council and finally by 
Parliament, it is up to the Ministry of Finance and its tax 
administration services, the Direction Generale des Impots (DGI) 
and the Service de la Legislation Fiscale (SLF) to define the tax 
measures necessary to achieve the Plan's and the government's 
goals.
Since the mid-1970s, however, as implied earlier in this 
discussion on the role of the Plan in the tax policy making 
process, planning has played a much less important role, despite 
all the intentions to revive it during the early 1980s under the 
Socialists. 260 The importance of the Plan in French economic
259 For further information see, C. Heckly, 1987, op.cit., p.253.
260 P. Hall (1986, ch.7) writes of the "evisceration of planning" which,
made necessary by changes in the international and domestic economies, 
was not an accidental phenomenon, but a strategic and philosophical 
decision made during the septennat of Valery Giscard d'Estaing. For 
political reasons, as well as economic, it was acknowledged that the 
state had to de-responsibilize itself from the planning and management 
of the economy over which it seemed to have less and less control. A
concious effort was made, therefore, to reduce the dependency of French
industry on the state for economic resources and direction. The idea
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decision making was eroded for a number of reasons, among which: 
economic conjuncture, a growing predilection for the free market 
and the hostility and jurisdictional jealousies of other 
governmental and non-governmental institutions, i.e. the Budget 
Ministry and the trade unions.261 Government tax policy continues 
to be guided by the planners, to some extent, and indeed some new 
ideas have "bubbled-up" from the planning process and found a 
place on the governmental agenda. But with increasing economic 
uncertainty and the breakdown of the consensus progressiste - of 
which more will be said later - tax policy making became subject 
more to short term concerns and political instincts than economic 
rationality and cooperative dialogue.
* The Role of Parliament
Parliament has a much reduced role in the tax policy making 
process compared to its Third and Fourth Republic counterparts.
In another comparison, it's role is more akin to that played by 
its British counterpart, as opposed to the American. With 
decision making power focused in the government, legislators, in 
most circumstances, are compelled to play "second fiddle". That 
is generally the nature of a semi-presidential regime such as 
exists in France.
The removal of financial powers from the hands of the 
sovereign was one of the first real manifestations of democracy.
was to free the economy and thus shift the burden of responsibility 
away from the state.
261 For an informed and well-conceived explanation of the decline of French
planning see, P. Hall, 1986*, op.cit.
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As early as the revolutionary Constituent Assembly, the 
legislature was responsible for voting tax and expenditure 
legislation. Although even during the Bourbon monarchy, the 
representative body, the Etats Generaux, possessed the authority 
to refuse or approve tax measures decided by the King or his 
ministers. However, this had little practical effect as the King 
often arrogated tax policy making.
The Charter of 1814 conferred on the National Assembly 
responsibilitity for voting tax legislation. According to 
article 48, "Aucun impot ne peut etre etabli ni percu s'il n'a 
pas ete vote par les deux chambres et sanctionne par le roi."
With the exception of occasional absolutist interludes, 
Parliament's supremacy with regard to taxing and spending matters 
was unquestioned until the advent of the Fifth Republic.
Under the Third and Fourth Republics little power was 
accorded to the President and his government. Governments were 
usually made up of a coalition of various parties which were more 
beholden to their own parliamentary groups than to the President 
or prime minister. The government, MPs and the President (in the 
Third Republic) had the "initiative des lois". Under the Fourth 
Republic particularly, the government was constrained from 
proposing laws whose intent was to diminish receipts or to create 
expenditure (article 14 of the 4th Republic's constitution). 
Deputies possessed the "initiative des depenses" (article 17) and 
the National Assembly was to review and vote the budget (article 
16) . If and when the government proposed new tax measures, these
162
usually reflected the position of one or more parliamentary 
group(s), and if not, they were certain to meet defeat or worse, 
could even threaten a government's stability.
In practice much government legislation was decided in 
parliamentary committees. During the Third and Fourth Republics 
parliamentary committees were "virtual counterministries, 
sufficiently powerful and knowledgeable to kill or to maim the 
government's legislative proposals and to keep the ministers in 
mortal fear for their political lives."262 While many committees 
were authorized by the governments of the Fourth Republic to 
examine the issue of tax reform, little was in fact accomplished 
with the outstanding exceptions of the income tax reforms of 1948 
and the introduction of VAT in 1954.
During the Fifth Republic, the use of committees 
(commissions or comites d'experts) to review various aspects of 
the tax system was revived. However, such committees, while 
perhaps composed in part of parliamentary representatives, were 
nominally independent and not formed under the aegis of either 
the Senate or the National Assembly. They served as a means of 
divesting the government of decision making responsibility (often 
on controversial issues) and circumventing parliamentary 
scrutiny.
With the institution of the Fifth Republic, Parliament's 
scope and powers were much reduced. Still, Parliament retained
262 J.S. Ambler and L. Scheinman, The Government and Politics of France, 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1971), p.160.
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its traditional responsibilities for tax matters, at least 
theoretically. Article 34 of the 1958 constitution consigns to 
Parliament, the determination of the base, the rates, and the 
methods of collecting taxes of all types. In practice, it is the 
government which in fact makes these determinations. Parliament 
debates the decisions made by government and presented to the 
legislature as a projet de loi. Following this, Parliament makes 
amendments and then votes on the projet de loi, or in the case of 
a finance bill, votes several times, first on its general 
principles and then several times on its various parts.
Parliament's freedom of maneuver, however, is constrained by 
constitutional innovations like article 66 - which gives the 
Constitutional Court the right to judge the constitutional 
conformity of laws passed by Parliament - and article 4 0 - which 
prevents MPs from introducing bills and amendments which decrease 
revenues or create/increase expenditures. Articles 38, 44, 45 
and 49 further constrain Parliament's freedom to take decisions 
and fulfil its legislative role. Moreover, the cotisations 
sociales, which for the most part do not figure as part of the 
state's budget - Parliament exercises control over only 40% of 
the financing of the "Social Budget" - are removed from 
parliamentary scrutiny.
Another constraint on Parliament's once formidable tax 
decision making powers is the predominance of the executive, an 
indelible feature of the Fifth Republic, made possible by the 
Constitution's rationalization of parliament, the direct election
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of the President, and the assertion of presidential primacy by 
the Fifth Republic's first president, General de Gaulle. The 
assertion of the president's authority in almost all areas of 
decision making has persisted, and even been expanded, under de 
Gaulle's successors. The interviewees were in general agreement 
that the government, in conjunction with the bureaucracy, was the 
major source of tax initiatives. Although, Parliament still 
exercises important amendment and blocking functions, it rarely 
initiates tax policy.263
Gerard Tournie (1985) offers conflicting perspectives on the 
role and power of Parliament. He asserts rightfully that 
Parliament has two key powers with respect to taxation: 
determining and consent. While the latter is a given since 
Parliament, as the legislative branch, enacts laws, the former
Several of the interviewees confirmed the absence of parliamentary 
initiative in the area of taxation. Jean Choussat, for example, said, 
"... dans le domaine fiscal il est rare que les rSformes prennent 
naissance au parlement. C'est trds rare. Ca vaudrait la peine de 
prendre les 10, 12, 15 dernieres r£formes fiscales et en face de voir 
qui a pris 1'initiative. Encore que parfois c'est de determiner qui a 
eu l'id§e le premier. . .Mais je dirai tout de meme que dans neuf cas sur 
dix les r^formes fiscales sont d'origine gouvernementale." (Jean 
Choussat, interview in Paris, France, May 12, 1992). Patrick Careil 
admitted that from time to time tax proposals are made by Parliament 
but "... les plus importantes venaient quand m£me d'un dialogue entre 
1'administration et le ministre." Reflecting on Parliament's amending 
powers in the context of the reforms made prior to 1986, Careil 
commented, "On a jamais laiss6 le parlement modifier beaucoup les 
projets en matiere de la riforme fiscale en 1981/1982...On avait le 
souvenir du d^sastre qui avait conduit les debats parlementaires de 
1977/1978 sur la taxe professionnelle. . . et done on savait que les 
modifications initi^es par le parlement...conduisaient & des 
catastrophes. Done, le parlement a jou§ un r61e que trds en marge... 
la plupart des reformes ont 6te votees - les grandes r€formes, 1'impSt 
sur la fortune, c'est le texte du gouvernement pratiquement qui £tait 
vot€, les plus values... Laurent Fabius a dit au parlement qu'il 
n'accepterait pas de modifications de la part des parlementaires. . . Les 
droits des succession c'est un projet entidrement du gouvernement. 
Quelques grandes reformes fiscales ont £t£ faites sans que le parlement 
puisse les modifier." (Patrick Careil, interview in Paris, France, May 
25, 1992).
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power escapes Parliament due to the increasing technical nature
and sophistication of taxation and the assertiveness of the
executive in this domain.
...en fait le pouvoir fiscal du parlement n'est jamais 
initial. En presence d'impots de plus en plus 
sophistiques, il est necessairement actionne par le 
gouvernement et ses pro jets de loi.264
264 G. Tournie, op.cit., p.21.
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Heckly (1987) confirms this,
On tax matters, parliamentary initiative is practically 
non-existent, the quasi-totality of laws adopted being 
by government initiative.265
However, Tournie contradicts himself and "1'opinion generale des
observateurs" by claiming Parliament is "le seul maitre de la
politique fiscale.1,266 He makes this claim on the basis that once
government projets fiscaux are tabled, Parliament engages in
serious amending or obstructing which can have a profound effect
on the projet. Tournie, moreover, characterizes the relationship
between the executive and Parliament as one of associates on tax
matters, rather than superior-inferior.
However indisputable in theory Tournie's argument may be, in
practice it is full of holes. As Heckly (1987) points out,
Si le principe de la souverainete du Parlement en 
matiere fiscale est toujours pose, conformement a la 
tradition republicaine, en pratique, les prerogatives 
gouvernementales apparaissent de plus en plus 
importantes. Le legislateur a commence par laisser au 
pouvoir executif le soin d'assurer l7application de ses 
textes, puis il lui a confie 1'elaboration des projets 
de loi, lui permettant ainsi d'exercer une influence 
determinante sur le contenu des textes fiscaux.267
Given the practice of executive initiation, formulation and
implementation in tax matters, reinforced by the imposing powers
granted to the government by articles 38, 4 0 and 4 9 of the
Constitution, Parliament's role seems unarguably subordinate. Of
course this is not a universal rule, and particularly in times of
265 C. Heckly, op.cit., p.254. The translation is mine.
266 G. Tourni6, op.cit., p.22.
267 C. Heckly, op.cit., p.254.
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slim government majorities or minority government, Parliament 
does play a more active role. This was exemplified in the 
reforms of the TP in 1976 and 1977 and budget debates of 1979 
when the government was forced to make concessions on taxation 
and spending to the parliamentary groups which made up its 
majority. Another illustration was provided during the 
premiership of Michel Rocard, heading a minority Socialist 
government from 1988: after a meeting with Pierre Mehaignerie and 
Jacques Barrot, the president and secretary of the CDS 
respectively, the government decided to lower VAT from 33% to 28% 
on a number of products previously taxed at the higher rate, and 
ultimately to further pursue the reform of VAT. The idea to 
reduce VAT and align France's rates more closely with those of 
its European partners was one dear to Raymond Barre and other 
members of the CDS, part of the government's unofficial 
parliamentary coalition on which it depended for occasional 
support. Another example is seen in the autumn of 1990 when 
Socialist MPs drew up a reform of the taxe d'habitation and 
obliged the government to assent to this reform. 268 Furthermore, 
in the late 1980s, the Socialist group in Parliament forced the 
government to concede higher rates for the ISF (wealth tax) in 
return for its vote for lower company tax rates.
While the impact of Parliament may generally be almost non­
existent in terms of initiating tax policy, it is quite clear
26* Ironically, this reform had been one of Mitterrand's 1981 110
Propositions.
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that at the amendment stage, its influence is greatly felt. It's 
at this point, also, where pressure group activity is readily 
observable.
L'intervention aupres du Parlement est moins discrete 
que 1'intervention aupres de 1'Administration...Dans la 
mesure ou la legislation fiscale appartient 
essentiellement au domaine de la loi, il est normal que 
les pressions des organisations professionnelles 
s'exercent sur les parlementaires...le parlementaire a 
tendance a priviligier les groupes de pression les plus 
influents...Les propositions de loi et les amendements 
aux projets de loi sont souvent prepares par les 
services juridiques des groupes professionnels. Ces 
propositions d'amendements ou de lois sont remises aux 
parlementaires accompagnees d'exposes des motifs et 
d'arguments a developper au cours de la discussion.269
Parliament's ability to amend projets fiscaux is not without
significance. Amendments can cripple a government-sponsored
reform proposal. 270 This was vividly illustrated during the
debates on the capital gains tax, introduced in 1976, which saw
the government's original package emasculated by over 600
parliamentary amendments. Heckly (1987) notes that 15-30% of
tax-related amendments introduced in the National Assembly are
adopted, even despite the government's prerogatives and wishes.
During the budget debates in the autumn of 1989, the
Socialist parliamentary group was ready to oppose the
government's proposal to lower IS from 39% to 37% unless it
considered other measures of a more egalitarian nature,
particularly an increase in the taxation of wealth. The
C. Heckly, op.cit., pp.162,239-41.
Raymond Barre spoke at length to the author about the successful 
blocking and amendment strategies engaged by Parliament on tax matters 
during his premiership (Raymond Barre, interview in Paris, France, June 
2, 1992) .
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government acquiesced and accepted a more burdensome ISF with a 
top rate at 1.5% instead of the government's proposed 1.3%.
While Parliament has suffered a curtailment of its decision 
making powers in the tax field, and has taken a back seat to the 
government on the initiation of tax proposals, it can still be a 
formidable power once a government projet de loi has been tabled. 
Its amendment and blocking powers have often compelled 
governments to negotiate the fate of its own bills. Generally, 
however, in the context of tax reforms, the government, in 
conjunction with the administration, tends to take the lead.
Since the general consensus points to the primacy of the 
government - that is, the executive - in formulating and 
implementing tax policy, a brief examination of the role played 
by various actors at this level is necessary.
* The Role of the Executive
Generally, it is at the executive level that most tax 
proposals originate. Recommendations can and do come from 
various quarters - some already mentioned like the Economic and 
Social Council, party officials and manifestos, the Fiscal Group, 
pressure groups; others come from tax experts, business 
representatives, ministerial cabinets, the tax administration, 
and more rarely the Cabinet (Conseil des Ministres) and the 
President.
Usually, however, the grand orientations for the tax system 
will be enunciated by the President, as when de Gaulle in late 
1968 ordained a lower rate of prelevements obligatoires.
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President Mitterrand did the same in 19 8 2 - 86 . 271 They may bring 
pet proposals to the agenda. Often, these have formed part of a 
campaign manifesto. Mitterrand's 110 Propositions of 1981 which 
called for the institution of a wealth tax and his April 1988 
"Lettre a Tous les Francais" which called for no further changes 
in income tax and sanctioned the re-institution of the wealth tax 
(known as the ISF from 1988), are two obvious examples. However, 
the President may also call for specific measures, for example, 
as Mitterrand did when he pledged to abolish the TP and lower 
income taxes by 8% in the summers of 1983 and 1984. Generally, 
while the President may "call the shots", it remains the 
responsibility of his advisers and ministers - especially the 
prime minister, the finance minister and the budget minister, 
working with their advisers and civil servants - to come up with 
plans that will satisfy the President's goals and objectives.
Other important initiatives can come from the prime 
minister. The influence of the prime minister will depend, to a 
large extent, on his or her expertise, the dynamics of his or her 
relations with the party, the president, and the finance 
minister, and the configuration of his parliamentary coalition, 
among other things. Raymond Barre, was ceded much authority by 
then President Valdry Giscard d'Estaing, especially in economic
271 Philippe Lagayette refers to Mitterrand's defining major parameters
with respect to taxation and spending, "... il a pris deux decisions 
cl£s, M. Mitterrand: la premidre c'est la reduction des pr41£vements 
obligatoires et la deuxieme c'est la limitation des deficits 
budg€taires a 3% en 1983...Ca c'etait cl€... deux barrages...et aprds 
ca tous les gens qui s'occupaient de la fiscalit§, des finances 
publiques etaient obliges de rester dans cette barridre." (Philippe 
Lagayette, interview in Paris, France, May 20, 1992).
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decision making. Barre proposed a number of reforms, for 
example, of the taxe professionnelle in 1979/1980 and reductions 
in VAT in 1977. But a hostile coalition partner and opposition 
made the achievement of some of the government's reforms 
difficult, and in some cases, impossible.
Laurent Fabius, leading a large parliamentary majority, 
enjoying the favor of the President and sharing a vision of 
taxation similar to that of his finance minister (Beregovoy), was 
a prolific tax decision maker. Patrick Careil, who worked 
closely with Fabius, spoke at great length about Fabius's leading 
role in the tax decision making process as budget minister and as 
Prime Minister. When asked who set the tax agenda in France 
between 1981 and 1986, Careil (and other interviewees) 
alternatively mentioned Mitterrand and his 1981 program and 1982 
and 1983 pronouncements, Prime Minister Mauroy, the Service de la 
Legislation Fiscale, pressure groups, especially the cadres, and 
Beregovoy. But above all, Careil emphasizes the key role played 
by Fabius. Fabius was behind a number of reforms: the droits de 
succession, capital gains, and lowering company charges. Careil 
asserts,
L'essentiel des mesures etait concerte entre Laurent 
Fabius et son cabinet, c'est-a-dire moi, et le Service 
de la Legislation Fiscale... Done, c'etait un dialogue 
entre le ministre du budget et le president et quelque 
fois avec le premier ministre pour determiner ce qui 
sera mis sur 1'agenda.272
Careil 's discussion of Fabius's role, however, largely centered
272 Patrick Careil, interview in Paris, France, May 25, 1992.
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on the early tax reforms; in other words, those made before the
neo-liberal reforms of the mid- to late 1980s.
Fabius's conservative successor, Chirac, cohabiting with a
Socialist President but leading a cohesive parliamentary
majority, exercised tremendous decision making power and
authority, even if he was not particularly expert in economic
matters. He called for an 8% income tax reduction and "un
allegement substantiel" of the TP (by 25%) in 1986. Another
example of prime ministerial decision making was evident in
Michel Rocard's decision in 1989 to institute the cotisation
sociale generalisee in 1990.
The Minister of Finance is an important source of reform
proposals, and generally, with some exceptions, the most
important decision maker,
Dans la plupart des cas, c'est du ministre des finances 
que dependra en definitive 1'acceptation ou le refus 
d'une disposition fiscale donnee.273
In order to function effectively in this capacity, Heckly (1987)
believes the Minister of Finance must possess two qualities: 1)
sufficient technical competence; but this quality is insufficient
unless the Minister of Finance has 2) the skill and persuasive
force necessary to make his will prevail. According to Heckly,
Valery Giscard d'Estaing epitomized these qualities.
Ironically, M. Giscard d'Estaing was from 1959 alternatively
Secretary of State for the Budget, then Minister of Finance and
sometime President of the Finance Committee in the National
273 C. Heckly, op.cit., p.170.
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Assembly before becoming President of the Republic in 1974. His
impact on the shape and direction of the French tax system is
undeniable. M. Redjah and J. Rodrigue (1976) referred to him, if
rather sardonically, as "un des grands artisans du systeme fiscal
tel qu'il est actuellement. "274 The significant role played by
Giscard d'Estaing in the evolution of the tax system of the Fifth
Republic is further cited by C. Heckly (1987),
II semble que M. Giscard d'Estaing, qui exerca les 
fonctions de ministre des finances de 1962 a 1965, et 
de 1969 a 1974...montrait un interet particulier pour 
les questions fiscales. Comme l'indiquent C. de Brie 
et P. Charpentier "il preside les seances de travail, 
inspire les etudes, arrete les projets, se charge 
d'emporter 1'adhesion du Parlement et des groupes de 
pression. En matiere fiscal, il developpe une activite 
plus intense qu'un habituel ministre des finances.
C'est un peu son 'domaine reserve'."275
And G. Tournie (1985) wrote of Giscard's role,
... de 1959 a 1981, M. Valery Giscard d'Estaing a ete 
pendant plus de dix-huit ans aux affaires. Si une 
paternite devait etre recherchee, ce serait 
certainement celle-la, car M. Giscard d'Estaing a eu la 
responsabilite technique ou politique, partagee ou 
exclusive, des problemes fiscaux. . ,276
All this to say, that M. Giscard d'Estaing, is recognized as a
perfect example of the impact of the finance minister on tax
policy.
However perfect an example found in M. Giscard d'Estaing, 
several reforms to the French tax system saw the light of day due 
to the decisiveness and convictions of other finance ministers,
M. Redjah and J. Rodrigue, op.cit., ch.l.
C. Heckly, op. cit., p.170.
G. Tourni6, op.cit., p.18.
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for example: M. Debre and the 1968 changes in VAT; Rene Monory
and the loi Monory in 1978; M. Beregovoy and the reductions in 
personal and corporate taxes and VAT between 1984 and 1986, and 
1988 and 1993. While these finance ministers may have been 
lacking in technical competence, a key element according to 
Heckly, they did command sufficient skill, persuasiveness and 
support to make their decisions prevail.
The importance of the finance minister in the economic 
policy decision making process is further illustrated by Edouard 
Balladur who, commenting on the decisions made during 1986-1988, 
wrote,
Durant ces deux annees, les grandes orientations ont 
toujours ete arretees par lui [Jacques Chirac] , en 
plein accord avec moi, et en general sur ma 
proposition. Je n'ai pas souvenir d'une decision 
importante de politique economique qui m'ait ete 
imposee ou que je n'aie pas acceptee volontiers.277
During the cohabitation of 1986-88, on economic policy, the prime
minister largely assumed the role of the president and pronounced
the grand orientations. It was up to the finance .nfinister to
define policies and make proposals that satisfied as much as
possible the goals set down by the Prime Minister.
Finance ministers, however, are not always successful in
making their will prevail. Such was the case with Jacques Delors
and his proposal to replace the temporary 1% levy on incomes
intended to help finance social security, with a more permanent
solution in the summer of 1983. He favored a 2% tax on all
E. Balladur, Passion et Longueur de Temps, (Paris: Fayard, 1989),
p.148.
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incomes to finance a social security "solidarity fund" and 
accompanied by a reduction in cotisations sociales for 
businesses. Part of this reform also entailed an eventual 
negative tax in place of family benefits. The project was well- 
conceived and presented. However, it incited the opposition of 
Pierre Beregovoy, the Minister for Social Affairs, and Lionel 
Jospin, the first secretary of the Socialist Party. This 
opposition was explained largely by antipathy towards Delors 
himself, and the fact that Delors's plan treated every one 
equally without taking into account the position of those on more 
modest incomes. Although, Beregovoy later moderated his 
opposition to the idea, Jospin rallied the parliamentary group as 
well as the President against the idea. The Delors tax reform 
project was thus still born.
Budget ministers can also be important definers of tax
policy. Maurice Papon in the second Barre government, Laurent
Fabius from 1981-83, and Alain Juppe from 1986-88, exemplify
■0 .»
ministers who, by virtue of their expertise, experience and 
convictions, and/or their close relations with the president or 
prime minister or parliamentary party, wielded important 
influence on tax policy. Papon's resistance to further tax 
reform after the capital gains tax debacle of 1976-79, put pause 
to any fundamental reform the Prime Minister, or anyone else may 
have wished to implement. Fabius, of whom much has already been 
said, was an instrumental figure in deciding the shape of the 
wealth tax, the institution of the 65% tax bracket and the change
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in approach to the corporate tax burden. During the cohabitation 
government of 1986-1988, Juppe's contributions were obscured - 
but no less real - by the involvement of the Minister of Finance 
and the Prime Minister. Juppe, as Budget Minister, was to 
translate the joint RPR-UDF platform's tax planks - which he was 
instrumental in designing - into government policy. 278 It was 
Juppe, along with Philippe Auberger and others, who designed the 
conservative government's tax agenda prior to its accession to 
power in March 1986. Among the policies which formed part of 
this agenda, were a reduction in the top rate of income tax from 
65% to 50%, and a cut in the IS from 45% to 34%. 279 He worked in 
close collaboration with the Finance Minister and others in 
drawing up important tax measures in the 1986 to 1988 period, for 
example the restructuring of value added taxation. 280 Juppe was
See e.g., A. Jupp6 et le Club 89, La Double Rupture, (Paris: Economica, 
1983); also see, the joint RPR-UDF platform, "Gouverner Ensemble".
Under Juppe's stewardship, the top rate of income tax fell to only 
56.8%, and company tax was lowered to 42%.
E. Balladur, 1989, op.cit., pp.39, 111-113. The rumour circulating at 
the time was that the idea did not originate with Jupp6 or Balladur, 
or even the rue de Rivoli. It was widely suspected that the 
government's coalition partner, the CDS - particularly pressure from 
its President, Pierre Mehaignerie and its secretary, Jacques Barrot, 
and encouraged by Raymond Barre - had persuaded the government of the 
necessity and benefits of reducing value added taxes in a meeting at 
the end of July 1987 (see e.g., Le Monde, 5 Septembre 1987, p.8). The 
idea was evidently not exclusive to the center-right as Laurent Fabius 
in an article appearing in Le Monde on July 21, 1987 (p. 11) wrote, 
"Comme la France a une TVA beaucoup plus 61ev6e que les autres pays 
europeens, il faudra la baisser sur un certain nombre de produits. Si 
nous ne le faisons pas par choix, nous le ferons par obligation." 
Indeed, it seems the streamlining of VAT was considered even earlier, 
as Yves Mansion told the author that the reduction in the number of VAT 
rates was being planned as early as 1984. (Yves Mansion, interview in 
Paris, France, June 2, 1992) . He revealed that the Socialist Party was 
opposed to this idea and that it would take eight years for the 
Socialist government to achieve the rationalization of VAT it desired. 
VAT rates were gradually combined, reduced and eliminated. In January 
1992, the higher rate of 22% was abolished leaving two rates of 5.5% 
and 18.6%.
177
instrumental in the moves to lower value addes taxes and limit 
the rate structure, which began, albeit tentatively, in late 
19 8 7 . 281
Other ministers - i.e., Agriculture, Housing and Social
Affairs, even Culture - can also be advocates of reform and have
an important part to play in ensuring that "pet" ideas are placed
on the government's agenda. For instance, the Minister of
Agriculture, Christian Bonnet, lobbied hard for the impot
secheresse in 1976, whose funds were directed to drought-stricken
farmers. Francois Leotard, culture minister from 1986 to 1988
announced a reduction in VAT on records in early 1987 without
first consulting the budget minister, Alain Juppe. The Minister
for Solidarity, Health and Social Protection, Claude Evin, during
Michel Rocard's premiership, was to a large degree responsible
for undertaking the consideration, formulation and advocacy of
the cotisation sociale generalisee in 1989/90, a 1% tax on all
incomes intended to finance the deficits in the Social Security 
• ■»
The rumour circulating at the time was that the idea did not originate 
with Jupp6 or Balladur, or even the rue de Rivoli. It was widely 
suspected that the government's coalition partner, the CDS 
particularly pressure from its President, Pierre Mehaignerie and its 
secretary, Jacques Barrot, and encouraged by Raymond Barre - had 
persuaded the government of the necessity and benefits of reducing 
value added taxes in a meeting at the end of July 1987 (see e.g., Le 
Monde, 5 Septembre 1987, p.8). The idea was evidently not exclusive 
to the center-right as Laurent Fabius in an article appearing in Le 
Monde on July 21, 1987 (p.11) wrote, "Comme la France a une TVA
beaucoup plus 61ev6e que les autres pays europ£ens, il faudra la
baisser sur un certain nombre de produits. Si nous ne le faisons pas 
par choix, nous le ferons par obligation." Indeed, it seems the
streamlining of VAT was considered even earlier, as Yves Mansion told 
the author that the reduction in the number of VAT rates was being 
planned as early as 1984. (Yves Mansion, interview in Paris, France, 
June 2, 1992). He revealed that the Socialist Party was opposed to 
this idea and that it would take eight years for the Socialist
government to achieve the rationalization of VAT it desired. VAT rates
were gradually combined, reduced and eliminated. In January 1992, the 
higher rate of 22% was abolished leaving two rates of 5.5% and 18.6%.
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accounts.
Suppporting ministers and their positions are the 
ministerial cabinets, that usually count among their members at 
least one tax expert and/or economic adviser. 282 These 
individuals tend to form part of the hidden cluster, in contrast 
with the actors discussed above, who make up what is known as the 
visible cluster. 283 In the cabinet, the tax expert is known 
colloquially as "le fiscal", examines all questions of a fiscal 
nature and liaises with the tax administration, the civil 
servants in the ministry as well as outside interests, who may 
have brought a tax idea or problem to the cabinet member's (or 
even the minister's) attention in the first place. "Le fiscal" 
formulates a policy often with the help of the aforementioned 
actors and attempts to persuade the directeur de cabinet and/or 
the minister of the appropriateness of the policy. The 
ministerial cabinets are often overlooked as policy initiators, 
due to the relative anonymity of their members, and the secret, 
multitudinous nature of their activities.284
John Gaffney (1991) speaks of these politico-administrative 
bodies as key to the policy process. They are "sources of 
political reflection and the promotion of ideas in policy
See, C. Heckly, op.cit., p.171.
J. Kingdon, 1984, op.cit., ch.3.
Important players in the tax policy making process and some-time 
cabinet members between 1979 and 1989 were Pierre Bilger, Patrick 
Careil, Yves Mansion, Jean Pascal Beaufret, Herv6 Hannoun, Frederic 
Saint-Geours, Jacques Attali, Francois Xavier Stasse, Francois 
Heilbronner, and ChristianrSautter.
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elaboration.1,285 Gaffney furthermore describes cabinet members as 
involved in the "elaboration of legislation at all levels of the 
process."286 Francois de Baecque (1973) supports the important 
role Gaffney assigns to cabinet members when he remarks that it 
is not unusual for the cabinet to devise the principles of a new 
policy virtually without consultation, and even for it to take on 
almost unaided the drafting of the texts which embody the 
policy.287
Presidential advisers, also on occasion, may be the source 
of policy initiatives. Examples can be found in the 1974 
proposal for a prelevement conjoncturel made by Jean Serise, an 
adviser to President Giscard d'Estaing and, as some allege, 
Jacques Attali's role behind Mitterrand's 1983 announcement for a 
reduction in prelevements obligatoires. Attali was a special 
adviser to the President for most of the 1980s. Given the 
secrecy which surrounds policy formulation at the executive level 
however, it is difficult to ascribe with certainty the origins 
and originators of tax reforms and other proposals.
Other branches of the executive that play an important role 
include the Direction Generale des Impots (DGI) and the Service
J. Gaffney, "The Political Think-tanks in the UK and the Ministerial 
Cabinets in France", West European Politics, vol.14, no.l, January 
1991, p.7.
Ibid.
F. de Baecque, L'Administration Centrale en France, (Paris: Armand 
Colin, Collection 'U', 1973), p.189.
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de la Legislation Fiscale (SLF) .288 These are the two principal
bodies of the tax administration in the Ministry of Finance and
come under the jurisdiction of the Budget Ministry. They are,
for the most part, concerned with the economic, administrative
and behavioral implications of tax decisions. While the DGI is
more concerned with administrative matters, the SLF is very much
involved in policy making. 289 With collaboration from the DGI,
the SLF provides the detailed analysis of the feasibility of tax
proposals and the operation of implemented measures. The SLF
draws up the detailed proposal which will serve as a precursor to
a legislative or regulatory text, which it also draws up.
Indeed, prior to an election, the SLF will draw up tax proposals
based on the manifesto pledges made by that party most likely to
win the election.
In their policy making role, the DGI, and more often the
SLF, make decisions according to financial - as opposed to
political - criteria. Their role is primarily technical.
On trouve done a tous les niveaux de la hierarchie 
cette meme conception selon laquelle tout probleme 
comporte une seule solution, qui n'est pas dictee par
des considerations politiques mais par des
The SLF was hived off from the DGI in 1977. The Direction des Douanes 
also draws up legislative texts on tax measures concerning its 
jurisdiction.
Several interviewees, including Patrick Careil, Michel Taly, Raymond 
Barre, Georges Egret and Pierre Bilger referred to the important role 
played by the administration fiscale in the tax policy making process, 
particularly the SLF. For a brief, but straight-forward discussion of 
the role of the SLF see, "Les Bonnes Recettes", £changes, no. 5, 
Novembre 1991, pp.19-20; and on the role of the DGI and the SLF see, 
Ministere de l'Economie, des Finances et du Budget, Direction de la 
Communication, "Les Directions et Services du Ministdre", Paris: 1991, 
pp.32-35.
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considerations techniques.290 
These agencies are staffed by selected civil servants, specially 
trained in accountancy, statistics, economics and tax writing. 
They are among the competent and technically expert "elites" on 
whom succeeding governments depend for sound and accurate advice 
and policies.
Given the less burdensome and less fragmented structure of 
the SLF, this streamlined agency is encharged with the conception 
and formulation of legislative and regulatory texts regarding 
taxation. In the preparation, formulation, deliberation, 
negotiation and modification of tax policies, agents of the SLF 
liaise closely with the DGI, and the cabinets of the Budget and 
Finance Ministers as well as with the Ministers themselves (SLF 
agents frequently attend interministerial committee meetings),
MPs and interest group representatives. Particularly as taxation 
has become a more complex and technical matter, the civil 
servants of the tax administration have come to play an 
increasing role. Regardless of the origin of a tax proposal, 
however, it remains the responsibility of the SLF, in 
collaboration and consultation with its interlocutors, to prepare 
the texts and make sure all the 't's are crossed and the 'i's 
dotted.
Routinely, it is the SLF which proposes and prepares the tax 
measures which form part of the annual projet de loi de 
finances.291 These measures are for the most part routine,
290 C. Heckly, op.cit., p. 173.
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incremental changes downward, upward, outward or inward. After 
the proposal is drawn up, it is then reviewed, and if necessary 
modified, by the Budget Minister, who takes on board political 
considerations and economic forecasts. It is then discussed, 
perhaps further modified, and decided in an interministerial 
committee, a process which may more or less be repeated 
subsequently in conseil restreint with the President in 
attendance. The final stage before tabling the budget in 
Parliament, is its evaluation by the Conseil d'Etat, which plays 
only a consultative role at this stage. Following this, the 
budget is presented and discussed in the Council of Ministers, 
which must give its approval if the budget is to proceed. 
Normally, however, the Council of Ministers wastes no time in 
giving its approval.
When texts drawn up by the administration and approved by 
the Council of Ministers are submitted to Parliament, they 
generally pass in their original form, to a greater or lesser 
degree. Firstly, this is because of the influence and strong 
advocacy of civil servants in the administration who work 
diligently to ensure that their work is not tampered with. 
Secondly, it is due to the extreme technicite of the tax measures 
concerned, and the inability of politicians to understand the 
nature and consequences of the tax measures proposed.292
In Parliament, however, amendments to tax measures put
291
292
See, C. Heckly, op.cit., p.259.
See, J.C. Martinez, op.cit., pp.82+.
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forward by the government, are a frequent occurrence, as we 
already learned. Nevertheless, they affect a very small part of 
the expected revenues. 293 J.C. Martinez (1980) looking at 
parliamentary amendments to the loi de finances for 1980 noticed 
that Parliament had not varied the total amount of expected 
revenues to be generated by proposed tax measures by more than 
.02%.294
While amendments to the loi de finances would seem to be a 
sufficient measure of parliamentary influence on the tax policy 
process, they are not an entirely accurate measure. Looking at 
amendments tabled in 1978, for example, of the total 2,110 
amendments tabled in the finance committee or in full debate in 
the National Assembly, 284 were government amendments. After 
withdrawals and 'out of orders' (article 40), 84% of government 
amendments were adopted against 3 9% of parliamentary 
amendments.295 Moreover, many of the parliamentary amendments are
merely symbolic; for example., they may change the name of a tax.
• *
Therefore, amendments are often more indicative of the potential 
influence of Parliament than they are representative of 
Parliament's real and effective influence in the tax policy 
process.
As already discussed, Parliament's amending powers are curtailed by 
articles 40 and 44 of the Constitution and article 42 of the ordoimance 
organique of 1959. For a reproduction of this ordonnance and
information on the budgetary process see, M. Basl4, Le Budget de
l'Etat, (Paris: Editions la D^couverte, 1989), pp.8-22.
J.C. Martinez, op.cit., pp.91-2.
29S Ibid., pp.91-2.
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When tax decisions emanate from outside the administration, 
these usually concern matters of a non-routine nature - veritable 
tax reforms. Such reforms are often motivated by political 
considerations. Less often are economic and financial 
considerations the triggering factor. Usually, the reform idea 
or decision is impelled by an external event or force, the 
E.E.C., for example, with changes to VAT; or the CNPF with the 
lightening of company social charges and the reform of the TP.
The reform will be announced by any one of the principal decision 
makers, the President, the Prime Minister, the Minister of 
Finance or the Budget Minister. Before committing itself to a 
decision however, the government may establish a committee of 
experts - groupe d'etude or commission a composition mixte - to 
study a proposal, consider alternatives, interview interested 
parties, and make recommendations. 296 Some examples include the 
Commission d'etude sur la politique fonciere in 1976, Commission 
d'etude d'un prelevement sur les fortunes in 1978, Comite 
d'etudes sur la fiscalite agricole in 1980, the Groupe de Travail 
CNPF-Administration in 1983 (studying the evolution of charges on 
French businesses) and the Commission d'etude sur 1'evolution de 
la taxe professionnelle (Commission Ballayer) and the Comite des 
Sages (examining social security finance) set up in 1987.
Finally, in terms of the executive, the Conseil des Impots, 
created by the government in 1971, is another important body (see
296 Parliament will also occasionally set up its own study groups with 
similar functions.
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footnote 238). Under the jurisdiction of the Cour des Comptes, 
it keeps tabs on the division of the tax burden among different 
categories of taxpayers with an eye on issues of justice and 
fairness. By 1990 it had published about ten reports pertaining 
to certain perceived problems with the tax system - i.e. 
inequalities and tax evasion - or the feasibility of new 
proposals under consideration - i.e. alignment of the regime for 
non-salaried workers with that of salaried workers and changes to 
VAT. The Conseil's opinion is solicited, by the President, the 
Prime Minister or the Finance Minister and given due attention.
In some cases, it has had a determining effect on decisions 
taken, as was the case for the plan to align the regime of non­
salaried workers with that of salaried workers in the late 1970s. 
This plan had to be abandoned when the Conseil's report found 
gross misrepresentations of declared income by non-salaried 
taxpayers.297
Other institutions and actors, like the Conseil d'Etat, the
, r >
European Commission, interest groups, ministers of agriculture or 
housing, also play a part in the tax policy making process. In 
some cases, instances of their roles have already been given or 
will be given. In other cases, little or nothing has been said 
because their roles are largely non-determining, marginal or not 
directly pertinent to this author's discussion of tax reform in 
the 1980s. The intent here is to provide as concisely as 
possible a glance at the main institutions involved in the tax
297 See, G. TourniS, op.cit., p.88.
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policy making process and not to offer an exhaustive analysis of 
the roles and functions of all the relevant players, major and 
marginal.298 
* Europe
A final word, however, should be made concerning the impact 
of the European dimension on the French tax policy process. 
Directives emanating from the European Commission have had a 
significant impact on the shape and direction of tax policy in 
France. We have already seen how the European dimension affected 
the decision to reform income tax in 1959 and VAT in the late 
1960s and 1970s. The Sixth Directive of the European Council on 
VAT harmonization of May 1977 strongly influenced the government 
towards a modification of the base and rates of VAT. Other 
examples of policy initiatives affecting French tax policy 
decisions included: the 18th and 19th Directives on indirect 
taxation, put before the Council in August 1987; 299 the 1985 
decision by member heads of government to forge a single European 
market by 1993; the early 1989 proposals of the European 
Commission on a common "deduction" - a sort of withholding tax
For a more detailed look at institutions and actors, see: C. Heckly 
(1987); J.C. Martinez, 1980, op.cit.; P.M. Gaudemet, Finances 
Pvbliques, (Paris: Editions Montchrestien, 1977).
Among the directives' proposals was one for the common institution of 
two VAT rates ranging, one from 4-9%, and the other from 14-20%. See 
e.g., Commission of the European Communities: "Draft Directive
Completing the Common System of VAT and Amending the Sixth VAT 
Directive: Approximation of VAT Rates", (Brussels: 1987), COM(87)321; 
"Draft Directive Instructing a Convergence of Rates of VAT and Excise 
Duties", (Brussels: 1987), COM(87)324; "Completion of the Internal
Market and Approximation of Indirect Taxes", (Brussels: 1989),
COM(89)260.
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of 15% on non-residents' earnings from savings instruments. 300 Such 
initiatives launched extensive debates in French academic, 
administrative, business and political circles and affected 
government decisions on changes to value-added, savings and 
corporate taxation.301
As has already been mentioned, the Treaty of Rome envisages 
the eventual harmonization of taxes among member countries (see 
earlier discussion on page 137). The European Commission and the 
European Council have taken decisions in the interest of forging a 
more harmonized tax regime in the European Union. Directives 
emanating from Brussels with respect to taxation oblige member 
governments to comply by introducing into national legislation, the 
measures and principles stipulated therein.
The Constitution of the Fifth Republic, like that of 1946, 
recognizes the supremacy of international treaties over domestic 
law (article 55) . Some questions remained, however, over the 
extent to which member governments were obliged to comply with 
European directives and court decisions, especially on important
The European Commission, in the run-up to January 1993, has sought to 
play a more involved role in promoting tax harmonization. See e.g.: 
Council Directives of December 16, 1991 (91/680/EEC) and October 19, 
1992 (92/77/EEC); Commission of the European Communities, "Report of 
the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation" (Ruding), 
(Brussels: 1992).
See e.g.: P. de Freminet, "I/Europe se Trompe de Reforme Fiscale", Le 
Monde, 12 Decembre 1988; P. Achard, "Le Marche Unique de 1992: 
perspectives pour les banques, les assurances et le systeme financier 
francais", rapport presente au Conseil Economique et Social, (Paris: 
Decembre 1987); M. Laure, "Marche Unique et TVA", (Paris: Institut du 
Commerce et de la Consommation, Juin 1987) ; M. Lazare, D. Maillard and 
T. Pujol, "Les Propositions Communautaires d'Harmonsiation de la TVA", 
Economie et Statistique, Mars 1989; J.H. David, "Fiscalite des 
Entreprises et Marche Unique Europeen", report of a working group 
chaired by J.H. David for the Commission Economique et Financiere du 
CNPF, (Paris: Octobre 1987), mimeo.
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matters of national economic sovereignty like taxation. In 
France, the question was put to rest by the Conseil d'Etat, which 
in February 1989, issued a decision on the matter (C.E. 3 Feb. 
1989, Alitalia Rec. p. 44). The Conseil ruled, in this case, 
that certain provisions of the French tax code were incompatible 
with the Sixth Directive on VAT. The code provided for a 
restricted deductibility of VAT on certain goods and services 
(used exclusively in the conduct of business), while the 
Directive allowed for deductibility under broader terms (if used 
for taxable transactions). The Conseil determined that the 
national provision was inconsistent with the objectives of the 
Directive and therefore, had become "illegal" from the date of 
entry into force of the Directive. The Conseil d'Etat recognized 
the invocabilite of European tax directives. As one author put 
it, "Le declin de 1'empire du Ministere des Finances parait en 
definitive amorce."302
The prospect of a single European market did much to awaken 
French policy makers to the need to adjust France's tax system in 
order to ensure the country's competitiveness vis-a-vis its 
European partners. A majority of interviewees felt that, in the 
late 1980s (and early 1990s), tax reform in France was largely 
the product of moves towards a single European market, and the 
need to remain competitive and offer an attractive location for
302 C. Lovit, Le Syst&me Fiscal Francais et La Construction EuropGenne,
(Aix-en-Provence: Presses Universitaires d'Aix-Marseille, 1989), p.6. 
For other examples in which French tax law has been impacted by
decisions at the European level, see P. Roseren, "The Application of
Community Law by French Courts from 1982 to 1993," Common Market Law 
Review, vol.31, no.2, April 1994.
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capital. Efforts by the European Commission to harmonize VAT,
savings taxation and company taxation were also noted. As
Philippe Lagayette commented,
... Et puis le troisieme element, un petit peu tardif, 
et qui a commence a faire evoluer la mentalite, c'est 
1'Europe. C'est le fait que, pour un certain nombre de 
domaines de la fiscalite on ne pouvait plus...faire ce 
que l'on voulait faire. On etait juridiquement 
autonome, mais en fait la France, comme les autres 
pays, ne pouvait plus s'ecarter des autres... Petit d 
petit, ce fut le cas pour la TVA...c,est plutot vers la 
fin des annees 1980 que c'est'visible. Il y a eu 
egalement la fiscalite des interets... vers...la fin 
des annees 1980 .303
Europe, from the late 1980s and into the 1990s has become an
increasingly important factor in the tax policy making process.
Prior to the mid-1980s however, Europe appeared to have had
little impact on French tax policy. 304 The Socialists, for most
of the 1980s, approached tax policy making with little regard for
Europe. 305 Jean Duberge (1990) points out that in 1985 public
officials had done nothing to prepare French tax legislation so
that it would take into account European tax harmonization
decisions and orientations. He noted,
Philippe Lagayette, interview in Paris, France, May 20, 1992.
Appearances, of course, could be deceiving. As J.C. Martinez (1980, 
pp.310-11) points out, even if tax policy makers often fail to mention 
the European source or inspiration of their reforms, the extent of 
harmonization in the tax field due to the European dimension is really 
quite significant, if not always blatant.
Of course, for economic policy, this is not entirely true since French 
policy makers were concerned with the effects of domestic and foreign 
economic policies on its own economy, and especially on the franc. 
Also, with reference to the impact of European and "international" 
developments, French policy makers were certainly keeping a wary eye 
on tax developments in Britain, the United States, Germany and 
elsewhere. However, Europe was not the concern that it would become 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
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...c'est seulement un an apres mon enquete, en fevrier
1987, que les pouvoirs publics ont commence a
s'interesser a ces problemes.306
It was in February 1988 that the committee headed by Marcel
Boiteaux to study the implications of the single market submitted
its report (Rapport d'Etape) to the Minister of Finance. 307 The
importance of the European variable in the French tax policy
process grew in the late 1980s. This fact was remarked upon by
Raymond Barre in an interview with Les Echos in April 1988,
...De plus, la perspective du grand marche interieur 
nous fait obligation de revoir notre fiscalite 
indirecte, notre fiscalite de l'epargne et le poids 
global de la fiscalite des entreprises ,308
It seems that the more and more the French economy becomes
integrated with the economies of its European partners, and more
generally, as the French economy becomes more open and
interdependent with respect to other economies around the world,
tax developments and policies originating outside France's
borders, to an ever larger degree, will influence French tax
policy makers.
Raymond Barre provided further insight into not only the 
effect of Europe on French tax policy, but the way in which 
European decisions are used by governmental decision makers. He
304 J. DubergS, 1990, op.cit., p.277.
307 Commission pr£sid§e par M. Boiteux,^ "Fiscalite et Marche Unique
Europ6en", rapport au Ministdre de l'Economie, des Finances et de la 
Privatisation, (Paris: La Documentation Francaise, 1988); other
official reports on issues of European tax harmonization included: P. 
Achard, 1987, op.cit.; D. Lebegue, "La Fiscalit§ de l'Epargne dans le 
Cadre du March6 Interieur Europ€en", 2 tomes, (Paris: Conseil National 
du Credit, 1988) .
308 Quoted in Le Monde, 12 Avril 1988, p.9..
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commented on the series of reforms to savings taxation in the 
late 1980s/early 1990s. He claimed that it was against socialist 
ideology and practice to have implemented these reforms, but 
that, nevertheless, the Socialist government was compelled to 
make these reforms and if anyone was unhappy about this 
undertaking, the governmental decision makers would pass the buck 
to Brussels,
...la serie des reformes en matiere de fiscalite de 
l'epargne est contraire a l'ideologie socialiste, mais 
la liberation des mouvements de capitaux,
1'harmonisation au sein de la communaute europeenne 
imposaient de tels amenagements, si on voulait eviter 
des mouvements de delocalisations de l'epargne.309
Barre continued,
Les gouvernements francais ont souvent pris 1'argument 
de ce qui se passe dans la communaute europeenne, pour 
faire passer des mesures qui autrement n'auraient pas 
ete acceptees ou considerees comme politiquement 
acceptables. Par example, la gauche n'aurait pas 
accepte les mesures sur la fiscalite de l'epargne; 
pourtant elle s'en arrange, parce qu'elle savait bien 
qu'elle ne pouvait pas prendre le risque de poursuivre 
une autre politique.310
The European dimension of French tax reform emanated from the
decisions and directives emanating from Brussels, and the
policies being enacted elsewhere in Europe, and became manifest
by the "scapegoating" of Brussels for any difficult or unpopular
measures the French government was obliged to introduce.
Notwithstanding, the organization - both horizontal and
vertical - of the tax policy making process, including the
309
310
Raymond Barre, interview in Paris, France, June 2, 1992.
Ibid.
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regular consultation of economic and social partners, it is
undeniable that the boundaries which circumscribe that process
have become fuzzier over the years. Tournie (1985) and Heckly
(1987) offer similar observations,
Si la politique fiscale...se definit aisement par sa 
finalite, les conditions qui president a sa mise en 
oeuvre sont plus difficiles a cerner, car elles sont 
inevitablement multiples et de differentes natures.311
Il ne s'agit done pas d'un processus purement 
rationnel...Les decisions ont done un caractere ambigu 
et conflictuel... 1'action fiscale des pouvoirs publics 
n'obeit pas forcement a une repartition verticale des 
taches...En fait, 1'influence des differents centres de 
decision varie beaucoup d'un texte a 1'autre. Il est 
done difficile de determiner des regies generales en ce 
qui concerne les processus d'elaboration des textes 
f iscaux.312
The fragmentation and ambiguity of the process has no doubt 
occurred as the state, because of its international relationships 
and commitments, has come to be influenced by, and ceded some 
decision making authority to, bodies like the European Union, the 
United Nations, the GATT/World Trade Organization and the OECD. 
Conclusion II
This review suggests that in order to understand the state 
of French taxation and the political dimensions of French tax 
reform, we must appreciate the historical, constitutional and 
institutional "cadres" of the evolution of the French tax system. 
The reforming instinct has long historical roots in France dating 
back to 1789 when revolutionary themes of "liberte, egalite et
311
312
G. Tourail, op.cit., p.15.
C. Heckly, op.cit., pp.145-6,260-1.
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fraternite" served as guiding principles for reforming the system 
devised by the ancien regime. These themes were enshrined in 
constitutional texts which also designated the representative 
body, Parliament, as the master of taxation. However, as the 
bourgeois and wealthier elements in society reemerged from the 
revolutionary rubble to dominate the National Assembly, they 
sought to promote their own class interests. This political 
development rendered the revolutionary reforms negligible and 
imposed a system of taxation - heavy indirect taxation, light 
direct taxation - which has largely survived intact to this day.
While new social and political forces sought to revive and 
actualize principles of social justice and equality in the form 
of direct taxation of income, their efforts bore little 
substantive fruit. Behind the noble rhetoric, the introduction 
of direct taxes on income seemed little more than token efforts. 
The imbalances and disparaties in French taxation reflect the 
conflicting objectives embodied by the system: equality and 
liberty; the right to property and redistribution; the 
maintenance of the economic and social structure and social 
justice; regulating the economy, raising revenue and reform. 
However, it can be asserted that they also reflect the growing 
fragmentation and ambiguity of the tax policy process, as the 
state stakes a greater role in the economy and society, and as it 
becomes increasingly vulnerable to decisions and developments 
occurring outside its borders.
New constitutions, new institutions and new actors could do
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little to resolve these contradictions. However, as long as low 
inflationary economic growth continued, politicians could 
continue to leave unresolved these contradictions, paying lip 
service to noble principles on the one hand and continuing to 
ratchet the tax burden upwards on the other. In the next chapter 
we will examine how these issues were aggravated and addressed in 
France during the Giscard presidency.
CHAPTER FOUR
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CHAPTER FOUR
- Tax Reforms the French Context, the Giscardien Septennat -
Introduction
The economic difficulties of the 1970s posed new problems
for policy making and policy makers. Economic policy, had
assumed a sort of "stop-go" rhythm following the budgetary and
monetary expansions and contractions of government as it sought
to stimulate or cool down the economy. Taxation was an oft-used
tool of government in economic management.
L'impot a ete essentiellement utilise comme instrument 
de regulation conjoncturelle.313
L'utilisation des prelevements obligatoires comme 
instrument de developpement ou de regularisation de 
l'economie. . .314
The recourse to taxation in order to manipulate the economy was
part of two interrelated dictats: 1)Keynesian theory concerning
the relationship between savings and investment and 2) the
technocratic vision of tax as one instrument among several at the
disposal of planners and civil servants to promote economic
growth and social objectives. Economic policy makers applied
these dictats with some degree of success in the 1950s and 1960s.
However, such policies ceased to have their intended effects
during the 1970s.
...le systeme fiscal francais actuel parait en 
definitive dote d'une aptitude certaine mais limitee a 
contribuer efficacement a la regulation conjoncturelle, 
les conjonctures stagflationnistes s'averant par
313
314
G. Tourni6, op.cit., p.19.
J. Rivoli, op.cit., p.87.
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ailleurs beaucoup plus difficiles a maitriser que les 
conjonctures recessionnistes ou inflationnistes des 
annees precedant la crise recente de l'economie 
f rancaise...315
It was becoming ever clearer that budgetary policy was, to a 
degree, at the mercy of fluctuations in the international and 
domestic economy. What government could do to control la 
conjoncture Sconomique via the tax system was of limited success.
This chapter will continue to examine the period prior to 
the neo-liberal tax reforms of the 1980s. Compared with the 
previous chapter, Chapter Four will provide a more detailed look 
at the events and personalities that featured in this crucial 
period. They laid the groundwork for the appearance of neo­
liberal tax reform in the 1980s. Economic and political 
circumstances, the changing attitudes towards the role of the 
state, influenced, in part, by ideas and approaches advocated 
elsewhere, and the ascendancy of new ideas and the actors 
promoting them, made this period a crucial one in the evolution 
of neo-liberal tax reform.
The Economy and Government Economic Management
By the mid-1970s the French economic miracle was running out 
of steam. The productivity gains of the post-war period were 
emasculated by the increases in prices and labor and capital 
costs. While productivity progressed at a robust 4.5% on average 
before 1973, between 1973 and 1979 it fell to an increase on 
average of 3.7% per year. Unemployment was on the rise, doubling
B. Bobe and P. Llau, op.cit., p.186.
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between 1969 to April 1975 from about 2% to 4% and rising to 6% 
in 1980. Strikes increased: with 4.4 million working days lost 
in 1971 compared with 1.7 million days in 1970. Corporate 
profits began to fall from 1969, but plunged after 1973 and in 
1980 were at 24% of value added, a 20% fall from 1973 levels. 
Corporate investment fell from just over 20% of gdp in 1970 to 
15-16% of gdp in 1979/80. The number of business failures 
increased by about 60% from mid-1973 to mid-1975. The Seventh 
Plan's (1976-81) prediction of growth rates between 5.5%-6% was 
never realized.
In order to come to grips with some of the problems 
besetting France, President Giscard d'Estaing (1974-1981), in 
true French fashion, commissioned various committees to study the 
problems in the French economy and society and make 
recommendations.316 In many cases, these committees' 
recommendations were never actualized, partly because of 
political opposition, partly because new problems were constantly 
emerging demanding immediate attention and resolution, and partly 
because there was little elaboration on the means to achieve the
These committees included: the Commission Barre in 1975 on housing and 
finance; the Commission Sudreau in 1975 on business reform; the 
Commission Wisner in 1976 on labor; the Commission Giraudet in 1976 on 
manual workers' wages; the Commission Chaigneau in 1976 on labor; the 
Commission Hannoun in 1978 on state aid to industry; the Commission 
Giraudet in 1980 on working hours; the Commission Bloch-Lain£ in 
1980/81 on the government's record. Committees set up primarily or 
otherwise to study tax issues included: the Commission des In§galites 
(The Rapport Meraud) in 1974/75; the Commission Chavanon to study the 
introduction of a prgl&vement conjoncturel in 1974; the Commission 
Monguilan to analyse the taxation of capital gains in 1975; the 
Commission de D£veloppement des ResponsabilitSs Locales (the Rapport 
Guichard) in 1976; the Commission Ventejol-Blot-Meraud on wealth and 
patrimony taxation in 1978.
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ends suggested by the reports.317 Moreover, given the political 
constraints imposed by local (1976, 1977, 1979), legislative 
(1978) , European (1979) and presidential (1981) elections, short 
term solutions were preferred to the medium-to-long-term 
solutions profferred by the special committees. Finally, one 
cannot overlook the motivations behind the setting up of these 
groups and commissions, which may as likely be found in their 
constitution as in their reports. To put it succinctly, in some 
cases the government may have authorized these study groups to 
satisfy demands for reform issuing not only from the executive 
but from other elements of the government majority. By 
consenting to set up a group to study this or that question, the 
government gave the impression that it was being sensitive to the 
demands and needs of its coalition partners, and others clamoring 
for reform.318
Valery Giscard d'Estaing came to the Elysee in 1974 intent
on redressing the economic conjunture by administering a dose of
«
liberal, market-oriented medicine to the sickly, though not yet 
morose, French economy - not unlike Edward Heath in the United 
Kingdom in 1970. Shortly after Giscard assumed office, the 
French economy, while still expanding, began experiencing
317 Francoise Giroud (1977, p.95+), "II y a des rapports sur tout en
France... La caract6ristique de ces rapports est qu'ils sont superbes 
dans le choix des fins, faibles dans le choix des moyens. 
Minutieusement descriptifs de la situation qu'il conviendrait de 
modifier, et de celle qu'il faudrait atteindre, les voies pour passer 
de l'une d 1'autre en sont absentes ou I peine esquissies. Parfois 
elles sont indiqu6es mais dans un mepris total du contexte politique, 
iconomique, social, psychologique dans lequel il faudrait operer."
31S See, P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., p.176.
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problems in the aftermath of the oil price increases of 1973 - 
rising inflation and unemployment, declining investment and 
exports, a balance of payments deficit, etc.. The first few 
months of the Giscard presidency saw policies implemented, in the 
first Fourcade plan, consistent with the president's ambivalent 
liberalism.319
The Fourcade plan, modeled somewhat on a similar German plan 
launched in the autumn of 1974, was a rather confusing array of 
measures intended to deal with the trade deficit and rising 
inflation. It sought to reduce household consumption and 
business investment (considered by the government to be primary 
causes of inflation and the trade deficit). Tax changes featured 
prominently (and painfully) as part of the plan: increased 
taxation on gas and oil, exceptional increases in income tax of 
5%, 10% and 15% depending on level of tax paid (to be partially 
reimbursed), a special capital gains tax on non-renewable real 
estate profits (profits immobiliers non reconductibles), a 
stepped up fight against tax fraud, an exceptional tax on 
companies equal to 18% of taxes paid by them in 1973, and a more 
restrictive degressive amortization regime. As part of this 
package the government created a new tax on businesses in October 
1974, the prelevement conjoncturel, meant to help fight 
inflation.320
319 Named after the Minister of Finance (1974-1976) Jean-Pierre Fourcade.
320 It was to apply to firms with a turnover of more than FFlOmillion and 
over 150 employees with reduced numbers for service industries. This 
levy, at 33-1/3% was to be applied to the inflationary increase in 
gross profit (which comprised the sum of salaries, amortization,
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The 1974-75 recession, troubled industries, high (but 
declining slowly) inflation, rising unemployment, and a worsening 
social climate, forced the government to abandon its rather 
ambivalent turn to liberal economics - not unlike the Heath U- 
turn in 1972. The Fourcade plan, and the tax measures in 
particular, revealed that if there had been any long term vision 
it had yielded to short term considerations designed to react to
these new and threatening problems.
The second Fourcade plan (also known as the Chirac plan) 
commenced in February 1975; it was launched following pressure 
from the Conseil National du Patronat Francais (CNPF) and the 
Confederation Generate des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises 
(CGPME), which were none too happy with the government's economic 
policies.
It was a plan de relance meant to fight unemployment, in the 
best Keynesian tradition, in the belief that a strong global 
recovery would come in 1976. In pursuit of economic 
competitiveness and growth, the government, headed by Prime 
Minister Jacques Chirac, attempted to stimulate the economy with
transfers to provisions and profit or loss) of the period over the 
gross profit of a standard period. It would be refunded if the 
increase in the index of prices of manufactured products was less than 
1-1/2% for three consecutive months. The intent was to penalize firms 
whose prices were rising faster than the rate of inflation. There was 
much opposition to this proposal from business groups and elements of 
the government's majority; nevertheless, after being subjected to over 
100 amendments, the prSlSvement conjoncturel was approved. Ironically, 
though, it was only applied by the Chirac government from January 1975 
to August 1975, as inflation showed signs of slowing and the 
government's attention turned to the worsening employment situation. 
Although renewed by the loi de finances for 1976 and 1977, the 
conditions for its application never materialized and this very 
illiberal tax was abrogated in the 1981 loi de finances.
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reflationary and demand management policies. The stimulus 
package included increases in old age pensions, family 
allowances, SMIC (the minimum wage) and agricultural subsidies, 
to assist those people worst affected by "la crise", new monies 
for housing and public works projects, increased subsidies and 
favorable loans for struggling industries, and fiscal aids to 
investment. These selective measures targeting specific sectors 
and social categories was known as the policy Of "petits 
paquets". In September, this phase culminated in the 
announcement of a "programme d'ensemble" or rather, more 
officially, "un programme de developpement de l'economie 
francaise" which would involve an injection of FF21 billion in 
public credits into the economy complemented by tax reliefs for 
businesses totalling FF9.6 billion. In 1976, selective tax 
relief and incentives had the effect of diminishing tax revenues 
by FF11.4 billion.
Despite this tax tinkering activity, the government also 
undertook important tax reforms: for example the patente became 
the taxe professionnelle (TP) in July 1975, a reform envisioned 
by a January 1959 ordinance. In additions, a preoccupation with 
promoting the cause of social justice led to the July 1975 report 
of the Monguilan Commission to study the imposition of capital 
gains. This report launched the hotly debated process which led 
to the introduction of the much-amended generalized capital gains 
tax in July 1976. The original objective was twofold: 1) to tax 
all capital gains realized by an individual on the disposal of an
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asset forming part of his/her fortune and, 2) to revise the 
taxation of capital gains on assets disposed by businesses.321 
However, numerous amendments limited the scope of the reform, 
exempting various categories of assets and levying different 
rates depending on the type of asset disposed. A project to 
create an impot fonder, to accompany the President's plan to 
reform property law was introduced in Parliament in the second 
half of 1975; 322 however, the government was hostile and MPs 
attached over 500 amendments, hence hastening the demise of this 
reform.
The reforms notwithstanding, as tax revenue was declining, 
the government financed the relance measures through deficit 
spending. Consequently, the budget deficit ballooned to 3% of 
gdp in 1974 from next to zero the year before. The plan actually 
did little to improve matters: imports surged, assuming a greater 
importance of the home market - for industrial products they rose 
from 21.6% to 27.3% between 1973 and 1978; household equipment 
imports rose from 33.65% to 42.5% and textile imports from 16% to 
26% over the same period323 - aggravating the trade deficit; 
businesses continued to fail in alarming numbers - increasing 23% 
over 1974; inflation continued to rise to over 10%; the franc
321 For a detailed account of the debates and events surrounding the CGT 
reform see, C. Heckly, op.cit., ch.4.
322 M. Andre Fanton (Paris-UDR), rapporteur of the Commission des lois in 
the National Assembly for the President's project, was the author of 
this proposal.
323 Groupe de Recherche sur la Regulation de l'JSconomie Capitaliste, 
Giscard, le Destin de la Crise, (Grenoble: Presses Universitaire de 
Grenoble, 1981), p.147.
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came under speculative pressure and had to leave the European 
monetary serpent in March 1976; and unemployment rose from 2.8% 
in March 1974 to 4.5% in March 1976.
The failure of this plan to achieve its objectives - lower 
unemployment and increased competitiveness - seemed to highlight 
the impotence of Keynesian inspired solutions in a world of 
rising prices for raw materials and increasing economic 
interdependence - a lesson the Socialists would ignore in 1981. 
With recovery proving elusive, the government changed course.
This change of course was vividly marked by the dramatic 
resignation of Prime Minister Chirac and his replacement by 
Raymond Barre in August 1976. The economy, in the hands of the 
competent and widely respected economist Raymond Barre, underwent 
a policy U-turn, this time towards austerity.
Barre's tenureship as prime minister and as de facto finance 
minister, was seen by some as a golden opportunity for the 
implementation of liberal economic policies a la Chicago School, 
in place of Keynesian inspired dirigisme. However, the prime 
minister, realized the inappropriateness of such policies for 
France. French inflation had sociological and structural, as 
well as monetary, sources particular to France, which limited the 
utility of a strictly monetary solution in the French context.
To address some of the structural causes of inflation, Barre 
introduced a variety of policies including, wage moderation, 
stabilization of companies' social charges, lowering the VAT 
rates, modernization of product distribution and credit channels,
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reinforcement of the stock market, encouraging share ownership, 
and selective aid to industry and deplanification. In fact, the 
latter trend, already discussed, was eulogized by the 
Confederation Francaise Democratique du Travail (CFDT) in 1978, 
"il y a abandon de la planification au profit d'une politique 
liberale d'adaptation de l'economie francaise."324
These policies, plus the partial decontrol of prices in 
1978-80 were - in a French context - not only liberal, but also 
supply-side. Raymond Barre (1981) set the record straight for 
any who would credit Ronald Reagan with the introduction and 
application of supply-side economics. He wrote in Une Politique 
pour 1'Avenir,
"les actions proposees par 1'Administration Reagan ne constituent 
en rien une innovation par rapport a celles qui sont mises en 
oeuvre en France" and affirms his own supply-side credentials 
"...le gouvernement a pratique en France depuis 1976 une 
authentique politique de 1' of f re . . .1,325 If M. Barre is to be 
believed, supply-side policies in France, then, preeded those 
introduced in the United States and Britain.
The new prime minister's plans at first sought to attain 
three objectives: 1) raise revenue, 2) control inflation, and 3) 
introduce a greater degree of fairness. In setting out these 
objectives, the Barre government differed little from its
Profil Soci£t6, L'fitat et la Politique £conomique depuis 1945, (Paris: 
Hatier, 1982), p.34.
R. Barre, 1981, op. cit., pp.167-8.
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predecessor. Furthermore, tax strategy differed slightly under 
Chirac's successor. Among the new measures of the first Barre 
government (1976-77) were: a supplementary tax on average and 
high incomes; new brackets for income tax; a contribution 
exceptionnelle for companies of 4% of taxes paid in 1975. Barre 
admitted in an interview with the author that these and other 
measures were necessary in light of the economic, political and 
administrative constraints that he faced.326
The strategy was altered after the majority's losses in the 
1977 municipal elections. With a reconstituted government under 
M. Barre (1977-78), the prime minister sensed the urgency of 
reconstructing governmental unity and standing ahead of the 1978 
legislative elections. Discussions among the parties of the 
government majority had become increasingly acrimonius, partly 
due to the growing rivalry between Chirac and President Giscard 
d'Estaing. The unity of the governing majority had been more or 
less shattered ever since Chirac had resigned as prime minister.
A good portion of the RPR acted as an opposition within the 
majority and often antagonized the government over various 
aspects of its policies. It was the Prime Minister's 
responsibility to patch up differences among the governing 
parties. Often this meant making concessions to the RPR group in 
the National Assembly. Also as part of this effort to restore 
unity, Barre hoped to win back the support of the majority's 
traditional constituents - particularly French industry - who had
Raymond Barre, interview in Paris, France, June 2, 1992.
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been put on the defensive by the government's economic and tax 
policies.
The fiscal choices made since 1974 had imposed a heavy cost 
on French industry. This sector was bearing the principal costs 
of the recession. Between 1975 and 1981, the share of company 
value added going to taxes increased from 2.7% to 4.3%. 327 This 
increase took place despite government efforts to contain the 
corporate tax burden - focussing on IS and cotisations sociales328 
- and selectively lower it.329
Local taxes and specific company taxes must bear the blame 
to a large degree for the rise. As a percentage of total direct 
local taxation, for example, the TP rose from 4 8% in 1976 to 
52.5% in 1979 falling to 52.2% in 1980 and 1981, representing an 
increase to 1981 of 15-20% per year. The global average rate of
P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., p.197.
Although by 1980, French employers still paid more social charges as 
a percentage of gdp than their counterparts in the U.K., the U.S., West 
Germany, Italy and Japan.
Taxes on corporate income, as a percentage of total taxation were:
197 3........ 5.94% 1977........5.57%
197 4 ........ 7.90% 1978........4.67%
197 5........ 5.29% 1979....... 4.77%
197 6........ 5.76% 1980........5.04%
Employers social security contributions as a percentage of total 
taxation were:
197 4 ........ 27.87% 1977.......’.29.62%
197 5........ 29.58% 1978........29.77%
197 6........ 28.77% 1979........29.29%
1980........29.03%
Payroll taxes as a percentage of total taxation were:
1970........ 1.25% 1977........2.15%
197 4 ........ 1.64% 1978........2.28%
197 5........ 1.90% 1979........2.11%
197 6........ 1.91% 1980........2.12%
Source: Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries 1965-1981
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the TP increased 18% from 1976 to 1981 . 330 The amount of TP
collected by the various authorities doubled between 1976 and
1980 from FF19.4 billion to FF39.7 billion.331 Since 1976, the
TP has been the fourth heaviest tax borne by companies, after
social charges, the IS and VAT. The non-indexation of diverse
taxes to account for inflation applied to businesses, i.e. the
taxe sur les frais generaux and the taxe sur les salaires also
contributed to the increased fiscal burden.
Consequently, in order to curry favor with this disgruntled
constituency, the government deferred and limited the application
of the prelevement conjoncturel, and the capital gains tax. In
the case of the TP, the government amended it, first by assuming
itself part of the burden, then by lowering the rates and
promising fundamental reform.
Barre had wanted to further reform the TP.
... a l'Assemblee Nationale, j'ai demande la constitution 
speciale pour modifier notamment l'assiette de la taxe 
professionnelle, parce que je trouvais completement stupide 
de faire payer les entreprises qui accroissaierit leurs 
investissements et qui accroissaient 1'emploi...Je n'ai 
jamais pu obtenir la constitution...les deputes maires et 
les senateurs maires se sont ligues pour que cette reforme 
ne passe pas...on ne pouvait pas faire cette reforme.332
Unable to proceed further on reform of the TP, the government
expended much time and effort trying to stabilize and in some
Commission d'fitude presidee par Rene Ballayer, L'Evolution de la Taxe
Professionnelle, (Paris: La Documentation Francaise, 1988), p.32.
J-Y. Nizet, op.cit., p.385.
332 Raymond Barre, interview in Paris, France, June 2, 1992.
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cases lighten companies' social charges and income tax. 333 In 
addition, VAT was lowered (from 20% to 17.6%) and share ownership 
and investment encouraged by allowing tax deductions of FF5000 
for share purchases on the Bourse (Loi Monory) ,334
In the Blois Program - the government's manifesto for the 
1978 legislative campaign - to a large extent the work of Mr. 
Barre, the Prime Minister, had communicated his ideas concerning 
taxation,
L'accroissement des charges fiscales reduit 
1'investissement des entreprises et la consommation des 
manages...pour favoriser l'emploi, 1'investissement et 
la consommation, les charges sociales et fiscales des 
entreprises et des particuliers ne seront pas 
augmentees au cours des annees 1978 et 1979.335
The Prime Minister, an economist by profession, was all too aware
of the damaging effects of ever higher taxation on profits,
investment, employment and consumption. However, given the
state's financial needs, an overall reduction of taxes was out of
the question. Nonetheless, the need to do something about the
rise in the tax burden, and its connection with the economic
problems facing the country, was astutely recognized by Barre,
even if a variety of constraints prevented him from acting on his
For example, companies hiring under 25 year olds were temporarily 
exempted from paying social charges. Moreover, the institution of tax 
exemptions - i.e. for new companies - and reliefs, lowered the IS for 
many. Also, see footnote 329 for a record of the government's success.
Many of these tax policies, favoring businesses and investors, were
designed, in part, to curry favor with the government's RPR coalition 
partners, as well as the business and financial communities. Barre is 
most proud of his efforts to lower VAT, although he admitted he had 
wanted to reduce it to 15% (Raymond Barre, interview in Paris, France, 
June 2, 1992).
335 R. Barre, Programme de Blois: Objectifs d'Action pour les Libertis et 
la Justice, (Paris: Fayard, 1978), p.39.
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ideas.
The Blois Program did not promise tax reductions. Barre,
ever the realist, could not justify such a commitment, bearing in
mind the economic and financial situation and other demands
placed on the government.
....les circonstances dans lesquelles ce gouvernement se 
trouve, c'est-a-dire, le deuxieme choc petrolier, la 
necessite de sauvegarder l'equilibre et la situation 
budgetaire aussi saine que possible, la necessite de 
remettre en ordre la securite sociale par le seul moyen 
disponible, c'est-a-dire, la hausse des cotisations, 
faisaient que l'objectif 6tait plutot la stabilisation des 
prelevements, plutot qu'une baisse des prelevements.336
The special circumstances in which Barre found himself placed 
constraints on the Prime Minister's freedom of maneuver on the 
fiscal front.
Nevertheless, the tax commitments of the Blois Program - 
most of which were carried out - and the ideas behind them, 
testified to the supply-side orientation, albeit cautious, of the 
Prime Minister. In the Blois Program there were stated 
commitments to maintain corporation tax, income tax and VAT 
(which had recently been reduced) at their current rates. But 
some selective tax reductions or exemptions were promised: for 
example, an abatement, for small and medium sized enterprises of 
a certain size, equal to 50% of cotisations sociales for any new 
employees hired between the ages of 18 and 26; and for new 
companies, an exemption from tax on profits if those profits were 
reinvested. Moreover, at the departmental level, special
Raymond Barre, interview in Paris, France, June 2, 1992.
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committees, known as comites Fourcade, set up from June 1974, 
could continue to authorize exemptions from local taxes and 
social charges for "dynamic" firms undergoing difficulties due to 
credit restrictions. 337 These decisions represented an important 
element in the government's supply-side strategy meant to "donner 
a nos entreprises de plus grandes capacites d'investissement et 
d'innovation, pour leur permettre de creer des emplois plus 
nombreux et d'exporter davantage.1,338 But at best, the strategy 
was merely "bricolage", tinkering that is, rather than the result 
of any long term thinking.
In addition, the Blois Program envisaged local tax reform. 
Among other things, it promised to give local governments the 
ability to freely determine, within government defined limits, 
the rates of local taxes, plus a restructuring of the taxe 
d'habitation in order to make it fairer. The government's plans 
to reform local taxation, met with fierce resistance from local 
representatives and MPs who, also, simultaneously held local 
office.
Despite the apparently limited vision with respect to 
taxation evidenced by some of the tax measures already discussed 
and the Blois strategy, some important tax reforms did feature in 
the first (1976-1977), second (1977-78) and third (1978-81) Barre 
governments. Some of these have already been mentioned, for
337 See, S. Berger, "Lame Ducks and National Champions: Industrial Policy 
in the Fifth Republic" in W. Andrews and S. Hoffmann, eds., 1981, 
op.cit., pp.304-5.
338 R. Barre, 1978, op.cit., p.36.
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example: the loi Monory of 1978, which offered generous tax
deductions on new share purchases; the occasional changes in 
capital gains tax and the taxe professionnelle. Additionally, 
there was the adoption of the projet de loi on the restructuring 
of direct local taxation by the National Assembly in late 19 7 9 . 339
Based on the Voisin report, 340 the reform of local taxation 
foresaw, among other things: 1) permitting local governments a 
limited freedom in setting the rates of local taxes from 1981; 2) 
making a company's value added the basis for the TP from 1982 or 
1983 after a period of reflection and experimentation; 3) 
reducing the ceiling on the amount of TP a company had to pay
from 8% to 6% of a company's value added; 4) placing a ceiling on 
the rate of TP a local authority could apply to 2.5 times the 
national average rate; 5) the creation of a TP fund 
(perequation), to which the wealthier communes would contribute a 
portion of their TP to be redistributed to the poorer, 
disadvantaged communes; and 6) reforming the base of the
departmental portion of the taxe d'habitation by applying it to
income rather than rental value (a reform which would wait ten 
years before rising onto the Socialist government's agenda).341
Moreover, significant moves were made to simplify and
Projet de loi portant am£nagement de la fiscalitS directe locale, 
no.1406, Assembl£e Nationale, November 1979.
See, Rapport no.1043, Assembl£e Nationale, by Andr6-Georges Voisin on 
the projet de loi portant am4nagement de la fiscalitS directe locale, 
May 1979.
Neither the reform of the taxe d'habitation nor most of the TP reforms 
(nos. 2 and 5) were realized in the projet de loi which became law on 
January 10, 1980.
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harmonize the value added tax. From January 1977, VAT was 
reformed eliminating the 20% rate, leaving only three rates, 7%, 
17.6% and 33.3%. From January 1979, VAT was more widely applied, 
particularly targeting agricultural activities and those of the 
liberal professions, with certain exceptions. In fact, the 
extension of the VAT base was legislated in late 1978 in order to 
comply with the Sixth Directive of the European Council of May 
1977 instructing member governments to enlarge the base of 
application of VAT - although this move was compensated by new 
exemptions.
Looking at the Giscard septennat as a whole, the tax reforms 
legislated between 1974 and 1981 did not represent any wide- 
ranging vision, with the exceptions of perhaps the loi Monory and 
the aborted local tax reform. The loi Monory was important 
because it indicated a shift in the government's position towards 
the stock market, corporate self-capitalization and profit- 
making.342 Any fundamental and needed reforms that disturbed too 
many powerful interests like local notables or civil servants, 
were fated to meet with defeat. Otherwise, tax remained a tool 
by which the government could achieve its objectives of fighting 
inflation and unemployment, supporting the franc and investment, 
and encouraging economic competitiveness.
Many of the measures were ad hoc, reactive and sometimes
The loi Monory offered a tax incentive to encourage share ownership and 
investment, which had the effect of doubling the number of small 
shareholders in France within three months (P. Hall, 1986, op.cit.,
p.188) .
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contradictory responses to the problems in the French economy. 
Despite the rhetoric to the contrary, even during Raymond Barre's 
"liberal" tutelage, long standing attitudes and habits concerning 
the tax system persisted and prevented the government of the day 
from considering the tax system more comprehensively and enacting 
more fundamental reforms. Tax, under Barre, continued to be one 
of several policy instruments available to the government in 
order to control inflation (ie. lower VAT), regulate consumption 
(lower VAT, raise allowances and benefits or underindex tax 
brackets), investment (loi Monory and various tax incentives) and 
industrial competitiveness (tax incentives, lower TP, reduce 
social charges). As Barre affirmed, "Personne ne pensait 
utiliser la fiscalit£ comme on l'a fait pendant les annees 
1980. "343
If the government failed to consider fundamental reform,
old-fashioned attitudes and techniques and economic conjoncture
were not only to blame. Political constraints - i.e. the
antagonism of the RPR and the parties of the left towards the
government and the difficulty of achieving consensus on
fundamental reform - and the budget - the need to ensure adequate
revenues - also complicated the picture. As Barre, the realist
par excellente admitted,
Pourtant, il ne m'a pas paru possible de mettre en 
oeuvre cette politique, car elle ignorait les 
contraintes economiques, politiques et sociales dont le
343 Raymond Barre, interview in Paris, France, June 2, 1992.
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responsable politique doit tenir compte.344 
While a number of constraints prevented the realization of many 
of Barre's ideas in the late 1970s/early 1980s, it is important 
to understand what changes took place, which removed or minimized 
those constraints. What made the climate more receptive to neo­
liberal tax reform in the 1980s?
As a first step we should examine the availablility of new 
ideas and solutions. What was floating around in the policy 
soup? Who were the advocates and what were their proposals? We 
will now turn to the policy community to investigate the 
proposals that were being developed, advocated and considered. 
Later we will consider other contextual factors, for example 
politics and economics, that helped propel tax reform onto the 
political agenda in France in the 1980s.
Advocates and Proposals: the left
It is important to investigate the sort of ideas and 
policies being touted by policy entrepreneurs in France in the 
late 1970s/early 1980s in order to understand the shape of the 
tax agendas promoted by governments of the left and right during 
the 1980s. Tax reform, as it was considered and implemented by 
governments of the left and right during the 1980s, did not 
appear out of thin air. This policy change was not innovative, 
in the true sense of the word, although aspects of it were indeed
R. Barre, 1981, op.cit., p.118. Several of the interviewees, including 
Pierre Bilger, Georges Egret, Patrick Careil, Yves Mansion and Francois 
Xavier Stasse referred to the economic, administrative and especially 
political obstacles faced by Barre.
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new. Many - if not most new - policies are not as new as they 
appear; they have antecedents. As mentioned before, the proposed 
reform of the taxe d'habitation which had formed part of the 
Barre government's 1979 projet de loi on local tax reform, re- 
emerged on the governmental agenda in the late 1980s/early 1990s. 
And the reductions in VAT rates and the compression in the number 
of VAT rates, first undertaken by Barre, surfaced again in the 
late 1980s/early 1990s.
Generally, policy changes do not appear as spontaneous 
flashes of insight. The ideas on which the policy changes are 
based emerged at some indeterminable point in the past. They 
were conceived, considered, tried or shelved, resurrected and 
modified and reconsidered. An examination of possible 
antecedents will provide important insight into the shaping of 
governmental tax agendas in the 1980s. Where did the policies 
which made up tax reform in the 1980s spring from and how did 
they come to the fore? Our concern will be, for the most part, 
with ideas and proposals circulating and promoted prior to 1981 
by political actors or societal actors with close ties to 
politics.
* 89 Reponses aux Questions Economiques
Prior to 1981, the main opposition group, the Socialists, 
had ideas of their own regarding the shape of France's tax 
system. A number of actors and policy experts associated with 
the left were responsible for designing and promoting various 
worthy tax proposals. For example, in 89 Reponses aux Questions
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Economiques (1977), a publication largely written by Michel 
Rocard, Jacques Attali and Andre Boulloche, the Socialists set 
out the general lines of their tax strategy. In addition to 
revenue raising, the strategy was governed by the twin objectives 
of reducing inequalities and improving social justice, "...les 
socialistes attachent tant d'importance a la reforme de la 
fiscalite afin que celle-ci soit plus juste et plus 
rentable. . . "345
Social justice was the overriding concern. The economic 
consequences of the proposals were given little attention. 
Francois Xavier Stasse admitted that the philosophy behind the 
Socialist tax program had political, rather than economic, 
underpinnings. Social justice, not economic efficiency, inspired 
the proposals. He said, "II n'y avait pas de soucis europeen ou 
l'efficacite economique comme s'est rendu compte le PS en 
1983 . "346
The reform proposals were not very ambitious and in essence 
represented a certain continuity, albeit somewhat more amplified 
in comparison with the policies of the Giscard government:347
345 M. Rocard et al., 89 Rgponses aux Questions tconomiques, (Paris:
Flammarion, 1977), p.31.
348 Francois Xavier Stasse, interview in Paris, France, June 2, 1992.
347 Indeed, many interviewees, among them, Philippe Lagayette, Francois
Xavier Stasse, Patrick Careil and Raymond Barre, commented on the 
similarities in fiscal policy between the Socialists'and the 
governments of Valery Giscard d'Estaing, both prior to and after 1981. 
M. Stasse recalled, "Au fond la gauche dans les deux premieres annEes 
de son pouvoir a fait la mEme politique Economique que la droite 
pendant la crise de 1973/1974, et de Barre et de GdE...Done il y avait 
la mEme nEcessitE absolue que M. Barre - bien vu que il n'avait pas les 
moyens politiques de le faire - soit d'arreter 1'augmentation des 
salaires, soit d'arrEter 1'augmentation des cotisations sociales qui
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Primary to the party's strategy was a stronger effort to combat 
tax fraud - which it estimated cost the Treasury around FF60 
billion - a wealth tax, and the expectation of strong economic 
growth, which would engender higher tax revenues.
In addition, the left's proposals, as embodied in 89
Reponses, covered a number of other different areas. According 
to 89 Reponses, the PS planned a "reforme d'ensemble des 
cotisations sociales."348 The intention was to harmonize the 
regimes for salaried and non-salaried workers and gradually 
diminish the rate of cotisations sociales paid by those salaried 
workers under the fixed ceilings while increasing them for those 
above. As part of this reform, it planned to transfer the old 
age regime from the social security budget to the state budget. 
In an attempt to shift the incidence of taxation from indirect - 
which bears more heavily on low-income earners - to direct, the
PS also promised a decrease in VAT, particularly on goods of
first necessity, which would enjoy a zero rating, down from the
pisent en France sur les entreprises, soit de diminuer le taux d'impit 
sur les binifices des sociitis. Jusqu'en 1983, on a rien fait de tous 
celi. Ni sous Giscard d'Estaing, ni sous Francois Mitterrand. C'est 
pourquoi je dis que de 1974 & 1983 la politique iconomique itait la 
mime." (Francois Xavier Stasse, interview in Paris, France, June 2, 
1992). Patrick Careil remarked, "Mais dans les annies 1970-1980 il y 
avait l'idie que la fiscaliti itait injuste, que les gros ne payaient 
pas, que seuls les petits payaient; il y avait un fort consensus - 
d'ailleurs...mime la droite proposait des riformes fiscales pour lutter 
contre 1'injustice, puisque Giscard a fait la riforme des plus values, 
Giscard avait mime voulu faire un impit sur la fortune...mais c'est 
Barre qui y etait opposi. Mais done, meme & droite il y avait l'idee 
qu'il fallait lutter contre l'injustice avec l'impit sur le revenu.. 
(Patrick Careil, interview in Paris, France, May 25, 1992) . Also,on a 
comparison of Giscardian tax policies and the early Mitterrandian tax 
policies, see: C. Borromee, "Les Reformes Fiscales Envisagies
Impliquent-Elles le Changement... ou la Continuiti?" Le Monde, 11 Aoflt 
1981; P. de Freminet, "Majorite d'Hier, Majoriti d'Aujourd'hui: une 
itonnante convergence," Le Monde, 24 Mai 1984, p.34.
M. Rocard et al., 1977, op.cit., p.98.
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current 7%, and envisaged a decline of all rates because they 
were "les plus eleves d'Europe.1,349 It sought to make income tax 
more progressive for the higher brackets, thereby permitting a 
decrease in the burden of taxation borne by those on more modest 
incomes.
As already mentioned, the PS promised to introduce a wealth 
tax, to be applied to fortunes over FF2 million. They also 
planned to reform inheritance and succession taxes by easing them 
on low and average incomes while making them more burdensome for 
the wealthy. The corporate tax structure was to be reformed via 
a redefinition of taxable income; this would also entail 
eliminating many tax deductions and other privileges. Rather 
confusingly however, while they intended to finance their program 
in part by an increase in charges on companies, they 
pragmatically refused to "put into question the good health" of 
industry "by an excess of charges" - "...il est notamment 
indispensable de preserver les capacites d'investissement qui 
sont a la source du progres economique et social." 350 These 
reforms, moreover, would be paid for from the revenues generated 
from anticipated economic growth.
In terms of local taxation, given the party's plans to 
decentralize, a reform of local government finance was 
inevitable. For the Socialists, this would entail allowing local 
authorities to raise more revenue by raising taxes. This would
349
350
Ibid., p.92.
Ibid., pp.30-1.
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be offset by a reduction in the state's tax take - "...l'Etat qui 
devra, de son cote, diminuer sa propre pression fiscale."351 A 
reduction in state financing of local government activities would 
occur gradually as the ability of local authorities to finance 
their own activities grew. Among other local tax reforms planned 
were: 1) the creation of an impot fonder to replace the taxes 
fonciers which would be more attune to the real value of 
buildings and property; 2) reform of the. TP and the taxe 
d'habitation in order to reduce the imposition on disadvantaged 
businesses and households; and 3) the creation of a 1 fonds de 
perequation” to which the wealthier communes, which collected 
more in tax revenue, would contribute to the benefit of the 
communes with a poorer tax base. The aims of the Socialist's tax 
program in 89 Reponses did have merit, but one was left wondering 
how they would achieve those aims. The ends were neatly spelled 
out, but the means were conspicuously omitted.
Although the Socialists apparently attached great importance 
to tax reform, it was a strategy, contingent upon the expectation 
of economic growth. Its overall objectives were equity and 
justice, and of course, increased revenue. This latter objective 
was essential in order to help a Socialist government finance its 
costly social and economic program. It was an ideological 
strategy, as well, meant to make the rich - a loosely defined
351 Ibid., p.99.
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group - individuals and companies pay. 352 To the Socialists' 
credit, many of these promises were made good, if not to the 
letter, then to the spirit. Indeed, many of these reforms were 
enacted in the 1981 to 1984 period.
As opposed to the British Conservatives in opposition during 
the late 1970s, the French Socialists in opposition, prior to 
1981, did not use the rising rate of prSlevementa obligatoires 
(as a percentage of gdp) - already at 40% in 1977, compared to 
35% in Britain - as a clarion call that the burden was too high 
and immediate reductions necessary. In 89 RSponses, the authors 
recall Valery Giscard d'Estaing's remark when Minister of 
Finance, that "au-dela de 40%, c'est le socialisme. "353 But 
rather than call for a gradual reduction in that figure, the 
Socialists, in their 1978 electoral program, foresaw a rise to 
around 43% in 1980, which the implementation of their own socio­
economic plans would entail. And instead of alarm, the 
Socialists welcomed the evolution in the rate of prelevements 
obligatoires as a necessary consequence of a modern society with 
increasing social and economic needs. Ironically, during the 
1981 campaign, in an attempt to attract centrist voters and 
dispel fears that the Socialist party would raise taxes across 
the board once in power, candidate Mitterrand promised not to let
"Le financement de notre programme se fera preincrement en demandant 
aux plus favorises un effort de redistribution..." (M. Rocard et al.,
1977, op.cit., p.31).
353 M. Rocard et al. 1977, op.cit., p.89.
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them rise above 42%.354 
* Michel Rocard
Before his contributions to 89 Reponses, Michel Rocard, when
leader of the Parti Socialiste Unifie (PSU) put forward a number
of ideas, which were published in Propositions pour Sortir de la
Crise (1974). In this work, Rocard also had recalled Giscard
d'Estaing's concern about the rising tax burden, but offered a
somewhat different perspective. He criticized the government's
predilection for raising public tariffs to contain the rise,
C'est dire que le postulat de la saturation de la 
pression fiscale se traduit, dans les faits, en 
fiscalitd supplementaire deguisee, et supportee par les 
travailleurs.355
Rocard, as head of the PSU, also had criticized the French tax 
system, claiming that taxes meant to finance expenditures and 
iron out income inequalities were not serving their purposes. He 
furthermore pointed out how inflation was pushing salaries higher 
and higher in nominal terms, and thereby elevating taxpayers to 
ever higher tax brackets.
However, rather than reducing the tax burden, Rocard sought 
to redirect and raise it by: 1) implementing new methods to 
combat tax fraud and evasion, 2) increasing company tax rates and 
increasing taxes on the wealthy, as well as 3) eliminating tax
354 Although, many interviewees did not remember this promise, a few did 
and confirmed the political motivation behind this pledge. Yves 
Mansion believed that Mitterrand made the commitment not to allow p.o. 
to rise above 42% in order to attract moderate voters and to draw 
attention to Giscard's poor record on this issue. (Yves Mansion, 
interview in Paris, France, June 2, 1992).
355 Michel Rocard et la Commission ficonomique du PSU, Propositions pour
Sortir de la Crise, (Paris: Edition de Serf, 1974) p.70.
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reliefs for capital gains and other "unearned income", i.e. the 
avoir fiscal and the prelevement libSratoire, 356 The receipts 
from these measures would be used to finance investment in 
business and public works and social programs administered by 
newly created government agencies. M. Rocard also envisioned 
shifting the incidence of taxation from indirect to direct and 
went so far as to consider the possibility of a negative tax to 
ease the VAT burden borne by low income earners.
* Francois Mitterrand
The leader of the Parti Socialiste, Francois Mitterrand, was 
not without his own views on taxation. Some of these views can 
be gleened from a compilation of his speeches in Bernard 
Pingaud's Mitterrand: lfHomme, les Idees (1974) and from 
conversations with Guy Claisse in Ici et Maintenant (1980) 
authored by Francois Mitterrand. For example, like Rocard, 
Mitterrand was ready to point out the center-right governments' 
failure to achieve their tax objectives, particularly with 
respect to correcting inequalities. He believed the tax system
The avoir £iscal, created in 1965, was a tax credit of 50% intended to 
eliminate the double imposition on company profits and allowed that a 
shareholder receiving income dispersed as dividends to pay less tax 
than one whose income was "earned". For example, if a shareholder 
received FF100, his tax credit of 50% provides him with an 'extra' 
FF50. If his tax liability is 40%, then 40% of 150 is 60, then
subtract the avoir fiscal of FF50 which gives the individual a tax
liabiility of FF10, leaving him with a net income of FF90 (see: G.
Toumi£. op. cit., pp.92-3; L. Halpern, Taxes in France, 2nd ed. ,
London: Butterworths, 1976, pp.50-1). It was considered one of the 
most popular forms of tax avoidance. The prelevement liberatoire, was 
a tax applied originally at 25%, but then modulated at different rates 
depending on "unearned" income sources (from 25% to 42%). It was 
applied to income earned from bonds and other fixed income financial 
products and for which the taxpayer may legally opt in lieu of being 
subject to the IRPP at possibly a higher rate (see: G. Tourni§, 
op.cit., p.91; J-Y. Nizet, op.cit., pp.330-1).
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had not gone far enough in accomplishing this objective. "Chaque 
annee, avant le vote du budget, le gouvernement se flatte de 
justice fiscale. Ce bavardage n'a jamais rien change et ne 
changera rien...," Mitterrand said in a 1974 speech.357
He also expressed a vague wish to see a shift in taxation 
from indirect to direct. The privileged position of companies 
due to tax avoidance/evasion and generous tax reliefs was also 
under attack by the Socialist Party leader. He proposed the 
elimination of reliefs on capital gains and a new capital gains 
tax (CGT) as well as an increase in company taxation. Other 
proposals included the restructuring of VAT, consisting of a zero 
rating for goods of first necessity, reform of the TP, the reform 
of inheritance taxes and the introduction of a wealth tax on 
fortunes over FF3 million. He also advocated a unification of 
the various social security regimes. Above all, echoing the 
promises in the 1972 Programme Commun, he sought to make the 
reduction of injustices a function of the French tax system, in 
addition to its revenue raising function.
* Pierre Uri
Pierre Uri, as the principal tax expert for the Socialist 
Party during the 1970s, was responsible for many of the ideas and 
proposals contained in the party publications and leadership 
speeches. Uri, a long-time observer and critic of the French tax 
system, published in 1981, an erudite and well-conceived book
B. Pingaud, Mitterrand: L'Homme, les IdSes, (Paris: Flammarion, 1974),
p.81.
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entitled Changer l'lmpot pour Changer la France. In it he 
attacked the social injustice and inefficiency engendered by the 
French tax system. In pursuit of efficiency and equity his 
proposals included: 1) indexation of the tax system; 2) exempting 
all SMIC and below wage earners from income tax; 3) tax relief 
for savings; 4) extending the 20% abatement sur les salaires; 5) 
combining CGT with income tax; 6) a wealth tax for fortunes over 
FF2.5 million with rates from .5% to 3%; 7) corporate tax on real 
assets; 8) eliminating deductions for VAT; 9) reform of local 
taxes including a redefinition of the taxe fonciere, the taxe 
d'habitation and the taxe professionnelle; and 10) reform of the 
taxation of husband and wife. These proposals, elaborated upon 
by Uri in his book and in other publications, were to guide part,
if not all, of the Socialist Party's tax reform agenda.358
Uri's tax strategy sought to install a tax system more
ingenious than the defrauders, and favorable to savings and to
the redistribution of resources and powers. However, he did not 
envision nor advocate a reduction in the fiscal burden. While he 
admitted that prelevements obligatoires had risen, he attributed 
the growth in that burden (relative to gross domestic product) to 
the stagnation of production and the spread of unemployment, 
rather than to deliberate increases in taxation and public
358 See: P. Uri, Changer l'lmpot pour Changer la France, (Paris: Ramsay,
1981) ; Rapport present^ au nom du Conseil lSconomique et Social, Journal 
Officiel du C.E.S., no.4, 29 Janvier 1976; Interview with M. Chauvidre, 
Le Nouvel tconomiste, no.31, 17 Mai 1976; "Tarir la Fraude Fiscale", 
Le Monde, 19-20 D^cembre 1976; "La D§taxation de 1'fSpargne", Le Monde, 
22 Juin 1978; "Les Points Forts du D£bat Fiscal", Revue Francaise de 
Finances Publiques, no.l, 1983; "Un Plafond pour les Pr§ldvements 
Obligatoires a-t-il un Sens?", Pouvoirs, no.23, 1982.
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expenditure. And, in spite of that burden, of which cotisations 
sociales formed the largest part, the return in terms of state 
provided goods and services was just recompense, according to 
Uri.
While Uri did not call into question the level of 
prelevements obligatoires, he did highlight the serious 
weaknesses in the French tax system and sought to reform the 
system in such a way as to lessen inequalities, heighten local 
autonomy, encourage savings and investment, and discourage fraud. 
Uri's was certainly a comprehensive vision, but one which would 
founder on the shallow shoals of French politics and 
administration.
* Jacques Attali
In a similar stream of thought, Jacques Attali, an academic 
at the Ecole Polytechnique, a prolific author and member of the 
Socialist Party's comite directeur, in his widely-read and well- 
regarded La Nouvelle Economie Francaise (1978) put forward some 
interesting ideas of his own. He treated taxation in the wider 
context of the role of the state in the economy, explaining how 
until 1972 economic policy had primarily been "a succession of 
transfers to businesses via tax deductions (ie., VAT deductible 
on investments, the avoir fiscal, other tax credits for 
investments, research and various social charges) and of 
subsidies, direct or indirect."359 But economic problems after
359 J. Attali, La Nouvelle fconomie Francaise, (Paris: Flammarion, 1978), 
p. 94. The translation is mine.
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1972, compounded by growing income inequalities with important 
implications for demand, he concluded, rendered this economic 
policy ineffective.
Attali's proposals for the changed economic environment in 
the post-1972 period are interesting, forward-looking and 
represent a unique vision. He made several proposals. Firstly, 
he wanted to simplify and unify all taxes on income (personal, 
unearned, capital gains and social charges) as the distinction 
and itemization of taxes was a pointless and deceptive exercise 
by government to relate tax payments to benefits received. In 
keeping with this strategy, he insisted on progressivity and the 
taxation of real income, which meant indexing thresholds and 
brackets for inflation. Secondly, Attali felt it was important 
to amalgamate wealth taxes and retirement contributions in a 
single wealth tax (or "prelevement sur la fortune"), with 
exemptions permitted under certain conditions. Thirdly, any 
reform of the French tax system would have to include a reform of 
inheritance taxes. Finally, and no less important, would be a 
reform of corporation tax based on real, rather than paper 
profits. This would involve an impot sur le resultat, combining 
all corporate income taxes and social charges, and an impot sur 
l'actif net (dividend tax) deductible from the impot sur le 
resultat. This proposal, Attali assured, would lighten corporate 
tax burdens, particularly those labor intensive, and encourage 
innovation and entrepreneurship. In an interview in the February 
1978 edition of L'Expansion, Attali, acting in his capacity as a
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member of the comit£ directeur of the PS, envisaged a fundamental 
reform of cotisations sociales patronales whereby they would be 
reduced and applied to a company's value added and not to 
salaries. Together, these recommendations, represented a radical 
vision of using the tax system to alter institutions and hence, 
transform society.
Most of the innovative ideas for reform of the tax system, 
during the 1970s, were generated by individuals and groups 
associated with the left. Since the left had been in opposition 
for so long, its adherents had found much that was wrong with the 
French tax system and developed a range of proposals to redress 
perceived problems. Above all, the privileges accorded to the 
wealthy, and generally, the inequities of the system came under 
attack. There was evidently much overlap with respect to the 
ideas advocated by various policy activists on the left and, as 
we will later see, some of these ideas emerged onto the 
governmental agenda once the left came to power.
Advocates and Proposals: the right
The tax reform proposals discussed above, coming from 
organizations and authors colored by a "leftist" ideological 
vision, bear little in common with the type of reform proposals 
gaining popularity in the United States and Great Britain in the 
late 1970s. The tax reform proposals which carried Ronald Reagan 
and Mrs. Thatcher to office, were for the most part antithetical 
to the particular vision of society nurtured in French "leftist"
circles - and indeed the majority of "rightist" circles. This
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vision embraced the need for social welfare and a strong role for 
the state. 360 Rather, it is in the liberal tendencies of the 
center-right parties, increasingly evident by the turn of the 
decade - between 1979 and 1981 - that tax reform, in its 
American and British forms and internationally popularized during 
the 1980s, found a stimulating, if not entirely stable, 
incubator. Nevertheless, the right was somewhat less prolific in 
its generation of new ideas, partly because of its dominance of 
the governmental machine since 1958 and the myopia which affects 
any party or government in power for a significant period of 
time. Moreover, by the mid-to-late 1970s, given the ideological 
climate, the tax ideas emanating from the left were given greater 
attention. This put the right in a reactive position. In fact 
some of the reforms considered by Valery Giscard d'Estaing, like 
a capital gains tax and a wealth tax, were in essence "leftist” 
ideas.
This section will not so much look at the sources and 
advocates of tax reform ideas on the right, as done with the left 
in the previous section. Indeed, such a review was already begun 
in our earlier discussion of Raymond Barre and the tax reforms 
undertaken by the governments of Valery Giscard d'Estaing. 
Moreover, very shortly, in Chapter Five, we will be looking at a 
number of ideas put forward by individiuals and groups
Of course, tax reform proposals emanating from the French left were not 
merely a function of the party's ideological position, but also, less 
obviously, were a function of the particular structure of the French 
tax system which relied less on income taxes and more on indirect taxes 
and social charges.
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affiliated, to a greater or lesser degree, with the right. These 
were the planters of the seeds and the tillers of the soil. In 
this section we will primarily focus on influential governmental 
and political actors on the right that sought to shape the 
evolving debate and indirectly, if not directly, impact the tax 
agenda.
In Raymond Barre's Blois Program we already caught a glimpse 
of the attitudes and strategy supported by some timid policy 
proposals which would prefigure 1980s-style tax reform. Since 
much has already been said about Barre's tax ideas, we will turn 
to consider proposals emanating from other actors associated with 
the right. This examination will first focus on the tax ideas 
put forward by the RPR, which in many respects was acting like an 
opposition party, although it formed part of the government's 
majority coalition. In Chapter Five, we will consider other 
groups and individuals who were largely peripheral to the tax 
policy process, but whose ideas, nonetheless, would move into the 
mainstream in the early 1980s.
* The "Statist" RPR
Neo-liberal tax reform featured as one of the principal 
elements in the center-right's economic strategy in the 1980s.
We know already, that despite government rhetoric, tax policy in 
the 1970s, under the center-right government of Giscard 
d'Estaing, was not driven by neo-liberal impulses... So how did 
neo-liberal tax reform come to appear on the center-right's 
agenda in the 1980s and replace twenty-odd years of Keynesian tax
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tinkering and attitudes about the tax system? The answer to this 
question begs an examination of the role of Jacques Chirac, the 
former Prime Minister and head of the RPR, as well as those who 
advised him.
Chirac was the leading neo-liberal light of the 1980s. But, 
in fact, he was a recent convert to the cause, unlike Mrs. 
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, to whom the credo "cut taxes" was not 
just ari expedient vote catcher, but, rather, an article of faith. 
Indeed, Chirac's record on taxation as Prime Minister is 
testament to his profligate high-spend, high-tax orientation. 
During his premiership, the tax burden rose from 36.3% of gdp in 
1974 to 39.4% in 1976. His 1975-76 Keynesian-inspired attempt to 
spend his way out of the recession set off a rise in inflation 
and taxes.361
Chirac, throughout his life as a public servant - at least 
until until 1980 - had had a penchant for a strong, active, 
interventionist and provident state. Bernard Rideau, in La 
Fiancee Chauve (1987), writes that as a candidate for the Correze 
in the elections of 1967 Chirac "mania la langue radicale- 
socialiste avec un art convaincu. Sincere, il etait.1,362 His own 
Finance Minister, Jean-Pierre Fourcade, in an interview given to 
Le Figaro (30 Avril 1975) said of him,
Nous avons des conceptions differentes de la societe.
361 Chirac in his interview for Franz-Olivier Giesbert's biography, Jacques 
Chirac, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1987, p.251) renounced his paternity 
for the September 4 plan de relance. "'Le president de la Republique 
l'a voulu. Jean Pierre Fourcade l'a concu'."
362 B. Rideau, La Fiancie Chauve, (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1987), p.83.
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II est, au fond, beaucoup plus interventionniste et 
dirigiste que moi. C'est un homme qui a ete marque par 
la sociologie de sa circonscription.363
As late as 1980, Chirac's Keynesian roots were still
apparent. While across the Channel, Mrs. Thatcher and Geoffrey
Howe were calling for reductions in inflation, the PSBR and
taxes, and across the Atlantic the mood of the American press,
Congress and the country was shifting - rapidly highlighted by
the 1978 tax revolts - in favor of neo-liberal tax cuts of the
kind advocated by Congressman Jack Kemp, Senator William Roth and
the former governor of California, Ronald Reagan, Chirac was
still giving first priority to employment and state intervention
in the economy. 364 In fact, using language which would horrify
his conservative counterparts in Britain and the United States,
in his book which came out in December 1978, La Lueur de
1'Esperance, Chirac vented his hostility to insidious liberalism,
S'abandonner au seul jeu de la liberte economique et de 
la concurrence internationale, c'est renoncer a 
controler l'avenir, c'est s'abandonner a 
1'imprevisible. Raymond Barre aime citer Frederic 
Bastiat...Cet auteur est trop oublie...il ecrivait dans 
la premiere moitie du XIXe siecle et il accordait une 
confiance religieuse aux harmonies providentielles de 
la nature. Depuis lors, on est devenu beaucoup plus 
mefiant sur les consequences du laisser-faire et du 
laisser-passer, qui ne sont pas toutes necessairement
Quoted from F-0. Giesbert, 1987, op.cit., p.258.
Congressman Jack Kemp (R-NY) was co-author with Senator William Roth 
(R-DE) of the Kemp-Roth 3-year 33% tax cut, first proposed in 1978 in 
the debate on the 1978 Revenue Bill. Reagan, in June 1980, on the 
steps of the Capitol, promised to enact the Kemp-Roth tax plan if 
elected. It became the model for the 1981 Reagan budget and the 
Economic Recovery Tax Act.
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f avorables.365
In this work, Chirac vigorously argues his case against liberal 
ideas and solutions, both past and present. He attacks both 
Bastiat and Florin Aftalion. He rejects "le liberalisme 
conservateur" as weak and irresponsible and in the interests of 
an elite class. The former Prime Minister proceeded to reject 
liberal solutions for the economic crisis and venerated the 
positive role of the state in stabilizing and renewing the 
economy. Throughout La Lueur de 1'Esperance (1978), one gets a 
clear idea of Chirac's etatiste and dirigiste nature.
Such hostility towards liberal solutions hardly bears 
witness to Chirac, the supply-side tax cutter of the 1980s. 
Although the former Prime Minister often made reference to 
remaking the instruments of a free (volontariste) economy, 
liberated from useless constraints, it was always the state, and 
not the free market, that served as the guiding and directing 
force. As late as April of 1980, when Chirac launched his idea 
of a "plan de redressement economique", Keynesian-inspired tax 
and spend solutions, rather than liberal, low tax and low spend 
solutions, were still driving the RPR leader's economic policy
J. Chirac, La Lueur de 1'EspSrance, Reflexion du Soir pour le Matin, 
(Paris: La Table Ronde, 1978), p.107. It is interesting to note that 
Raymond Barre responded to this unveiled criticism in an interview with 
Jean Boissonnat which appeared in a September 1978 issue of L'Expansion 
and was reprinted in Barre's book Une Politique pour 1'Avenir (1981, 
p.107). In his reply, the Prime Minister challenged his critics to 
look at the sorry state of affairs in the east of Europe and compare 
that with those economies that were at the time the best performing in 
the west. A brief analysis of the different methods of economic 
management applied would certainly support and vindicate the liberal 
measures the Barre government was advocating and, in some cases, 
implementing.
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prescriptions.366
Why did Chirac cling to the old rhetoric and solutions? 
Perhaps it was his experience in Gaullist governments, 
indoctrinated with old etatiste methods and solutions. Perhaps 
it was his still questioned leadership of the party and the 
prominence of old party barons like Michel Debre and Jacques 
Chaban-Delmas. Perhaps it was the unshakable influence of 
Chirac's reactionary, national-Gaullist advisers Pierre Juillet 
and Marie-France Garaud, who found suspect any new ideas which 
called into question traditional party policies and tenets.367 
Perhaps it was the ghost of de Gaulle, always suspicious of free- 
market liberalism which prevented Chirac from promoting policies
This plan involved massive public investment in public and private 
industries - especially construction, agriculture, chemicals, shipping 
and steel - and public works programs, costing a total FF30 billion 
extra per year over the level of spending in the government's current 
budget. This would be financed through budgetary savings, such as 
reducing the number of civil servants hired, smaller subsidies to 
public companies and increases in public tariffs, as well as taxation 
on wealth and on speculative capital and a renewed effort to combat tax 
fraud. Ironically, in the interview accorded to Gilbert Mathieu in Le 
Monde, 15 Avril 1980, when he unveiled this plan, Chirac let it be 
known that the state needed to reduce its "train de vie". This 
apparent incompatibility in the plan's objectives reflected not only, 
the inconsistency of Chirac who changed his mind like he changed his 
shirts (F-0 Giesbert, 1987, op.cit., p.250) but also the fundamental 
ambiguity of the RPR up to then undergoing a tug of war over its future 
direction between a reformist wing of the party led by Bernard Pons, 
Jerome Monod, Anne Marie Dupuy and Alain Jupp§ and a conservative wing 
led by Pierre Juillet, Marie-France Garaud, Charles Pasqua and Yves 
Guena; also see, P. Fysh, Gaullism and the Liberal Challenge, Ph.D. 
thesis for the London School of Economics, London: 1991, pp.111+).
Alain Juppe, in the late 1970s head of research for the RPR and the 
budget director for the city of Paris, said of Juillet and Garaud, "Le 
seul mot de r^forme les rendait fous. Des qu'on essayait de faire 
avancer une idee nouvelle, ils parlaient, avec mepris, de 'salmigondis 
technocratiques'." (Quoted from Franz-Olivier Giesbert, 1987, op.cit., 
p.289).
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that were not deemed Gaullist.368
Another plausible explanation for Chirac's anti-liberalism
can be found in the (occasional) liberal attitudes and policies
of the government and Chirac's desire to distance himself and his
party from the President and his government. As there was little
to be gained politically from positioning himself to the right of
the government, given the climate of opinion and the swing of the
political pendulum, staking out a position between the liberal
center-right and the socialist-communist left seemed to offer the
most promise from an electoral perspective. According to
Chirac's biographer, Franz-Olivier Giesbert (1987), "En ce temps-
la, Jacques Chirac n'hesite meme pas a ranger les gaullistes a
gauche." 369 This posturing was blatant in an interview for Le
Monde (4 Mars 1978) in which the RPR leader was still situating
the Gaullists on the left. He said,
II y a la tradition d'une gauche nationale...Elle est 
chez nous...II y a dans notre histoire la tradition 
d'une gauche qui revendiquait avec fermete 1'autorite 
de l'etat republicain contre toutes les formes 
d'anarchie, de desordre, d'incivisme, de 
delinquance...Elle est chez nous."370
Chirac, the Bonapartist and crypto-socialist, was evidently still
some ways off from the neo-liberal conversion which would make
Chirac made constant reference to de Gaulle in almost all his speeches 
and perhaps this constrained the RPR leader from departing dramatically 
from attitudes and policies for which the General had stood.
Quoted from F-0. Giesbert, 1987, op.cit., p.305. In fact, this 
orientation saw its apotheosis in Chirac's October 3, 1976 Egletons 
speech when he called for concertation with trades and professional 
organizations, taxation of capital and an alliance of Gaullist values 
with the "...aspirations d'un veritable travaillisme & la francaise."
(F-O. Giesbert, 1987, op.cit., p.290).
370 Quoted from F-O. Giesbert, 1987, op.cit., p.305.
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him the leading mini-Statist free-marketeer of the 1980s.
Indeed, the RPR's tax policies appeared more "gauche” than 
"droite" and reflected Chirac's true dirigiste orientation and 
combined the traditional French concern for social justice and 
the right's preoccupation with its business clients. For 
example, in its 1978 electoral program the RPR proposed: to 
remove SMIC and below income earners from the tax net, to exempt 
10% of retirement pensions from taxation, to modify VAT rates, to 
exonerate certain stock/share earnings (plus values mobilieres) 
from capital gains tax, and to introduce a wealth tax, applied to 
wealth over FF2 million, at rates of between .5% and 1%, 
deductible from income tax. The proceeds from the wealth tax 
would be directed to local governments. The RPR also proposed 
heavier local taxation, with the creation of new taxes on 
property (impot fonder assis sur la valeur venale des biens) and 
on businesses (impot professionnel annuel assis sur la valeur 
venale des immobilisations et elements mobiliers situes dans la 
commune) .371
The RPR's tax program seemed at times to have conflicting 
aims - for example, it sought to provide a conducive climate for 
business creation and expansion, yet aimed to apply new taxes on 
businesses and wealth. Overall the goals of its program, social 
justice, equity, investment and expansion, were themselves, in 
trying to be all things for all people, potentially conflictual.
For more details on the RPR's tax proposals for 1978 see: Rassemblement 
pour la R6publique, La Dimocratie du Quotidien, no.l, Decembre 1977.
236
The party's contradictory tax policies and objectives, as 
already mentioned, reflected the RPR's fundamental ambiguity; 
that is, caught between its commitment to its traditional 
business clients, while trying to undercut the center-left, with 
its expressed concerns for equity and social justice. By the 
same token, the proposals demonstrated a noteworthy continuity, 
in a certain sense. That is to say, they were more or less 
consistent with the long standing habit of viewing taxation as a 
tool to be used selectively to incite particular forms of 
economic behavior and to redistribute wealth.
Conclusion
We see in this review very little evidence of the neo­
liberal tax agenda that became prominent in France in the mid- to 
late 1980s. Public opinion favored the left. The Socialists and 
Communists, throughout the 1970s, continued to draw growing 
support. The right, hoping to keep in step, recognized the 
political unpopularity of neo-liberal ideas and took on board 
many of the ideas put forward by the left, i.e. wealth tax, a 
capital gains tax, and lower indirect taxes. None of the major 
parties of the right were prepared to carry the neo-liberal 
standard, although dissenting elements in the UDF and the RPR did 
exist.
Remember, it has been asserted that Chirac was the leading 
neo-liberal activist in French political life in the 1980s. So 
far, we have seen little evidence of that. With this insight 
into the impulses and policies that undergirded the tax program
237
advocated by Chirac and the RPR, how do we account for their neo­
liberal conversion in which tax reform would feature as an 
important element? Answering this question requires an 
examination of the ideas, proposals and activities of several key 
individuals and groups, who either directly or indirectly played 
a part, not only in changing the ideas and strategies of certain 
center-right parties and politicians, among which, Chirac and the 
RPR, but also helped to make the soil fertile for tax reform.
CHAPTER FIVE
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CHAPTER FIVE
- The Tillers of the Soil -
Introduction
Evidently, in 1978, the RPR's neo-liberal spring was still 
some ways away. While New Right economic theories prescribing a 
reduced role for the state were gaining political adherents in 
conservative parties and circles in the United States and Great 
Britain, the largest "conservative" party in France, the RPR, 
continued to dance to the same old tune. And while the party 
leader, Jacques Chirac preached the need for tax reform - "II y a 
des domaines ou il faut proceder a une refonte complete du 
systeme: c'est le cas de notre systeme fiscal, trop complexe, 
insuffisant et injuste"372 - his proposals would have been equally 
welcomed by the interventionist and redistributionist left.
On the other hand, Raymond Barre, the hope of the Chicago 
School and liberal economists and politicians, faced difficult 
economic, political, social and institutional obstacles that 
prevented him from acting freely on his liberal, market-oriented 
instincts. Consequently, he was unable to bring neo-liberal tax 
reform onto the government's agenda. Furthermore, as Barre 
himself has admitted, the economic liberalism of the Conservative 
Party in Britain and the Republican Party in the United States 
was not the economic liberalism of Valery Giscard d'Estaing or 
Raymond Barre, and certainly bore no relation to anything Chirac
3-72 From the October 1976 Egletons speech quoted from F-O. Giesbert, 1987,
op.cit., p.290.
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was calling for at the time. 373 France, given its Colbertiste 
heritage and its state dominated institutional environment, was a 
case apart.
So, where did the inspiration for tax reform in the 1980s 
come from? It did not just appear out of thin air. Identifying 
the roots of neo-liberal tax reform is a difficult, and often 
futile, exercise whether in France, Britain or elsewhere.
However, a brief discussion of the individuals and groups that 
contributed to the nurturing and promotion of neo-liberal tax 
reform ideas would be instructive, even though it may lack in 
specificity. That is, we cannot attribute, with any degree of 
certainty, a cause and effect relationship. Nonetheless, it can 
be confidently asserted that, even if those groups and 
individuals did not influence the policies directly, they did so 
indirectly, by creating a climate of opinion receptive to such 
policies. It is important, therefore, to bear in mind two 
critical things in reading this section: 1) it is not so much 
where the seed comes from that matters, but what makes the soil 
fertile and then, 2) what makes the seed germinate, grow and 
flourish. 374 In this chapter, we will look at the seed planters 
and the tillers of the soil.
Was the Soil Fertile?
Comprehensive and fundamental neo-liberal tax reform gripped
373 J. Frears, France in the Giscard Presidency, (London: Allen and Unwin,
1981), p.20. See also, T. Grjebine, ed., Recession et Relance, (Paris: 
Economica, 1984).
J. Kingdon, 1984, op-, cit., p. 81.
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political and economic circles and engendered wide-spread debate 
in Australia, Great Britain and the United States during the 
1970s. It accompanied serious doubts about the size and scope of 
the state. Such notions were still politically and economically 
marginal in France in the late 1970s and not part of mainstream 
thinking. By then, in countries like the United States, Great 
Britain and Australia, "conservative" politicians, responding to 
citizen unrest and the new economic thinking regarded tax cuts as 
a necessary panacea to slow economic growth and an over-sized 
state. It was rare for conservative politicians in France - and 
certainly anathema to those on the left - to entertain the idea 
that the scale of government activity should be reduced.375
The ideological ambiguity of liberalism, the inconsistency 
of free markets, and the lack of direction and guidance inherent 
in the "invisible hand", had left a void filled by Keynesian and 
Colbertiste principles in France during the depression of the 
1930s and the deprivation and devastation of the immediate post­
war period. The trente glorieuses - France's period of economic 
growth following World War II - confirmed the appropriateness of 
Keynes and the economic prescriptions of the technocrats. 
Nevertheless, as the economic difficulties of the 1970s shook 
governments and citizens out of their complacency - although the 
vast majority still felt that more state intervention and
375 See: J. Hayward, The One and Indivisible French Republic, (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), p. 152; J. Frears, 1981, op.cit., 
pp.20-23,128-37.
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assistance was necessary - the voices on the fringe preaching a 
different message were ringing increasingly louder and truer. 
Indeed, some of those voices came from within the government of 
President Giscard d'Estaing.
Two RPR members of the government, Alain Peyrefitte and 
Michel Giraud, and Albin Chalandon, head of Elf-Aquitaine, the 
state-owned oil company, did not shrink from criticizing the 
excesses of government intervention and providence. However, 
their positions in government or in state-owned enterprises 
mitigated the tone and effect of their criticisms. In terms of 
the RPR, they had no following, and collectively made no effort 
to win over party opinion or build a new consensus. As Peter 
Fysh (1991) tells us, these senior Gaullists, at odds with 
Chirac's strident etatisme and left-of-center economic 
orientation, "...seemed neither to have tried hard nor to have 
made much effort in swinging the party to their point of view."376 
We cannot, therefore, credit these lonely Gaullist voices with a 
liberal turn in the RPR or the advent of neo-liberal tax reform. 
But, at least, one could maintain, that these neo-liberal 
Gaullists kept the debate alive.
However, other voices on the political and economic fringe 
were making a more siginificant impact. Their arguments against 
the consensus progressiste were made initially in localized 
venues, academic symposia, thinking clubs and discussion groups 
as well as organizational publications. In the late 1970s, their
376 P. Fysh, op.cit., p.325.
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arguments were given even greater validity, however, by the 
British and American experiences. The neo-liberalism personified 
by Ronald Reagan in the United States and Margaret Thatcher in 
Britain and their electoral successes, lent credibility to ideas 
and arguments which had long been marginalized or forgotten.
Soon however, New Right and neo-liberal ideas espoused by these 
marginal groups in France were receiving national attention.
In Britain and the United States, the New Right - a vague 
collection of sociologists, clerics, economists and conservative 
politicians - had become the vehicle for attacks on the economic, 
social and political status quo which had dominated since World 
War II. Whereas Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek had long 
sustained the critique of the role of the state and popular 
Keynesian economic policies, and later became the gurus of the 
New Right, in France they were virtual unknowns.377
The economic crisis of the 1970s was the catalyst which 
gave rise to the undermining of the state and statist principles 
and induced the formation of tax reform movements and popularized 
tax cutting. France was no less immune to the economic problems
Hayek's and Friedman's ideas were disseminated and debated through 
occasional translations of their works (Hayek's Price and Production 
was translated only in 1975 and Law, Legislation and Liberty, a 
fundamental work written beteen 1973 and 1979 appeared in France in 
three volumes between 1980 and 1983) and the Society of Mont Pelerin, 
a discussion group which organized conferences and on which the likes 
of Jacques Rueff often participated. Friedman's and Hayek's theories 
were also discussed and circulated by intellectuals and academics at 
the Institut d' fStudes Politiques de Paris, the ficole Sup^rieure des 
Sciences ficonomiques et Sociales, the Universities of Dauphine, Aix-en- 
Provence and Orleans and economists like Jean-Jacques Rosa, Florin 
Aftalion, Pascal Salin, Henri Lepage, Guy Sorman and Emile Claessen 
(see article in Le Monde, 25 Juillet 1979, by M. Duverger, "L' Illusion 
de la Science") and their group, the Association pour 1'fSconomie des 
Institutions, which organized seminars and published scholarly works.
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suffered by other countries in the late 1970s, but while tax 
reform was by then on the lips of every leading French 
politician, it was conceived in the same old terms: economic 
regulation and redistribution. The old consensus on the use and 
purpose of the tax system was still largely intact.
Although, in the 1978 election campaign, all the parties 
were preaching reform of one kind or another, no one was 
proposing how to make the system simpler or calling for 
reductions in the overall tax burden or general "tax cuts" - 
except in the case of the disadvantaged and poor, which was 
consistent with the traditional French concern for social 
justice. Even with the liberal credentials of Giscard d'Estaing 
and Raymond Barre the words "tax cuts" - which so often graced 
the lips of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan - were nary to be 
heard. 378 No leading politician had emerged by 1979, who dared 
advocate the cause of neo-liberal "Lafferian" tax reform.
The reason for this is partly tied to the debate on the role 
of the state - or absence thereof. This debate had been underway 
for some time in the United States and Great Britain, and was not 
simply confined to academic circles. The role of the state, 
although perhaps coming under hard scrutiny by elites in France
Nowhere in Valery Giscard d'Estaing's L'fitat de la France (Paris: 
Fayard, 1981), his pre-election manifesto, does the President refer to 
reducing income taxes on individuals or companies or undertaking 
fundamental reform of the tax system. The same can be said of Raymond 
Barre's 1978 Programme de Blois, where the closest the Prime Minister 
got to tax reductions was a promise that taxes and social charges would 
remain stable for businesses with selective strategic tax reductions 
to incite investment, business and job creation. For (wealthy) 
individuals, taxation was to be made heavier on wealth and capital 
gains.
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during the late 1970s was still largely unquestioned at the
political and mass levels. The French people continued to look
to a more provident, more active state, to solve the problems
France was facing, regardless of the higher taxation implied.
Philippe Auberger (1984) reveals that the majority of French
people polled in the early 1980s favored an increase in taxes
when faced with the option of lower taxes but the prospect of
reduced welfare benefits and social services. Auberger remarked,
L'idee de 'l'Etat providence' est desormais bien ancree 
dans 1'esprit de nos concitoyens et il est difficile de 
les amener a y renoncer.379
Several of the interviewees supported this perception. For
example Jean-Pascal Beaufret maintained that the French generally
accepted a high level of social contributions, and consequently a
high level of p.o., because they are attached to a high level of
social protection. 380 The French, for a number of reasons, not
only their attachment to la Secu, were not receptive to the idea
of tax reform. As Auberger and others noted, in France there was
an "allergie fiscale". Therefore, in the late 1970s/early 1980s,
the odds seemed stacked against the diffusion of neo-liberal
ideas in France. A long tradition of social justice,
egalitarianism and state intervention stood in the way. And, as
we have noted, there were few politicians ready to take on the
consensus and espouse a 'new orthodoxy'.
Electorally, the left's fortunes improved during the course
379
380
P. Auberger, L 'Allergie Fiscale, (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1984), p.128.
Jean-Pascal Beaufret, interview in Paris, France, May 14, 1992.
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of the 1970s, culminating with the 1981 presidential and 
legislative election victories, while those of the right 
declined. As the left's political star ascended so did public 
opinion follow it, showing strong inclinations for the theses of 
the left. On economic matters this translated into increased 
state intervention in the forms of income redistribution, public 
investment and nationalizations. On tax matters SOFRES, the 
polling organization/ consistently showed large majorities in 
favor of a wealth tax and increases in inheritance taxes. On the 
other hand, rightist, or conservative, values - authority, 
security, profit, private enterprise, free markets - were 
suspect. The ideological battle - really a one-sided battle - 
was being won by the left. The tax reform program advocated by 
the left and favored by a large part of the electorate intended 
not to cut taxes - except on the poorest segments - but to raise 
them and "faire payer les riches". Raymond Barre comented,
"...c'etait de la fiscalite redistributrice...c'etait l'ideologie 
des annees 1970 avec un taux. . .des impositions plus elevees.1,381
The right and centre-right, in power since 1958, had become 
too complacent and seemed to have too few answers to the problems 
the country was facing. Too concerned with the task of governing 
in increasingly uncertain times and fighting amongst itself, the 
centre-right, in effect, unwittingly ceded the high ground to the 
left. Even as it attempted to retake it following the 1978 
elections (in 1980-81 for the RPR), with a greater emphasis on
381 Raymond Barre, interview in Paris, France, June 2, 1992.
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the appropriateness of neo-liberal solutions to France's 
problems, the commitment to such principles and solutions was 
unconvincing and incomplete, and in any case was out of step with 
public opinion.382
Opinion polls in France until the 1980s were very sparse on 
questions related to tax. When they were available, the 
questions generally pertained to specific taxes or higher 
taxation. The only authoritative and comprehensive work on 
public opinion vis-a-vis the tax system prior to the 1980s was 
authored by Jean Duberge.383 The few odd surveys of public 
opinion however which did surface, showed most people concerned 
with income inequalities and tax unfairness. 384 When confronted 
with the possibility of higher taxes as a measure necessary to 
combat inflation, at least half, or more than half favored 
recourse to higher taxes. But as Raymond Barre pointed out, the 
French favored higher taxation, as long as it was levied on 
higher incomes. However, even here there was a qualification.
The French believed in higher taxation on higher incomes as long 
as they were not considered among that privileged group, "faire 
payer les riches sans me compter parmi les riches."385
382 See, F. Bourricaud, Le Retour de la Droite, (Paris: Calmann-Levy,
1986), p.116.
383 See e.g., J. Dubergi, La Psychologie Sociale de l'Impdt dans la France
d'Aujourd'hui, (Paris: PUF, 1961). Gabriel Ardant in ThSorie
Sociologique de l'Impdt, (Paris: S .E .V.P.E.N., 1965) takes a more
sweeping and historical look at the evolution of tax systems and their 
sociological effects.
384 See, Sondages, nos. 2 and 3, 1978.
385 Raymond Barre, interview in Paris, France, June 2, 1992.
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However, as Duberge recognized in his new book, from 1973, 
the income tax system became increasingly resented and less and 
less tolerated by the French public. 386 This was due, he 
explained, to a number of factors: the deteriorating economic and 
social climate, the steady rise in prelevements obligatoires and 
increasing controls and verifications by the tax administration. 
Remarkably, despite the growing resentment, there was no 
extraordinary pressure from the electorate to reduce taxes, the 
tax burden or tax verifications, as had been the case in the 
1950s with the Poujadist movement. To a large extent, the ground 
appeared insufficiently fertile for the cultivation of neo­
liberal tax ideas.
The Tillers of the Soil
The voices in France advocating reform of the tax system a 
la mode americaine ou britannique, were few and far between pre- 
1979. France had no Tax Policy League, Propositions 13 or 2-1/2 
or National Association of Taxpayers, as in the United States. 
There was no Centre for Policy Studies or major political party 
with a long standing position on tax reform to give resonance to 
and disseminate such ideas, as in Britain. That is not to say 
that there weren't any advocates or fora for such ideas in 
France, because there were; among them, for instance, economists 
like Maurice Allais, Jacques Rueff, Henri Le Page, Pascal Salin, 
Jean-Jacques Rosa and later Guy Sorman; intellectuals and 
academics like Raymond Aron and Alain de Benoist; independent-
386 J. Duberg£, 1990, op.cit., pp.13,177.
248
minded politicians and businessmen like Alain Peyrefitte (UDR) , 
Albin Chalandon (UDR) and Louis Armand; civil servants and party 
advisers like Yvan Blot and Philippe Auberger;
philosophical/thinking clubs like GRECE (Groupe de Recherche et 
d'Etudes sur la Civilisation Europeenne) and the Club de 
l'Horloge; and the press, particularly the Figaro Magazine under 
the directorship of Louis Pauwels.
All these individuals and groups contributed, in one way or 
another, to making the soil fertile for the tax reform idea.
They were not lobbyists as such, and in many cases were not 
closely affiliated with any particular political party. Their 
ideas and efforts to educate both narrow and broad publics were 
far from negligible and indeed, with time, helped to create a 
receptive climate for tax reform - or, in other words, maker the 
soil fertile. Either they devised and/or advocated particular 
reform ideas or they questioned and/or attacked the consensus 
progressiste which made people receptive to tax reform ideas and 
policy entrepreneurs. These individual and organizational actors 
propogated among many ideas, those favorable to diminishing the 
size and scope of the state, liberalizing the economy and 
reducing taxes. These individuals and groups planted the tax 
reform seed and tilled the soil.
The consensus progressiste entrenched after World War II, as 
in Britain and elsewhere, espoused certain fundamental tenets, 
among which, full employment, the welfare state, Keynesian 
economic policies, were the most sacred. These tenets were
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promoted and guaranteed by an elite and allegedly ubiquitous 
technocratic class. The success and prosperity which followed 
the end of World War II and launched by parties of the centre- 
left in countries like France, Britain and the United States, 
vindicated the consensus and helped legitimize it. However, 
although a social democratic ethos emerged triumphant from the 
rubble of World War II, its acceptance was not unanimous. 
Concommitant was a small but influential intellectual lobby, who 
found their raison d'etre in the challenge to social democracy. 
Their ideas were promoted as an alternative to communism, 
socialism and fascism.
In the United States and Great Britain, the New Right was 
the conceiver of and incubator for neo-liberal economics. Over 
the decades since World War II, it sustained the attack on 
Keynesian, social-democratic and socialist prescriptions for the 
economy and society. Moreover, the liberal emphasis of its 
economic prescriptions, developed and advanced by economists and 
academics like Friedrich von Hayek, Milton Friedman and others, 
captured the imagination and support of a new generation which 
came into its own in the decades after the Second World War.387 
In France, however, the New R^ght faced an uphill battle against 
Colbertiste, social-democratic and Keynesian ideas and 
traditions. We will now turn to look at the impact of some of
Proposals to cut taxes, eliminate reliefs and broaden bases, shift from 
direct to indirect taxation, though not necessarily the exclusive 
domain of the New Right, figured prominently in the fiscal 
prescriptions of that movement.
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the so-called tillers of the soil.
* Raymond Aron
Raymond Aron, one of the most important thinkers of this 
century according to Stanley Hoffmann,388 had long sustained a 
critique of the post-war Keynesian-driven state-dominated French 
economy and society. Early works like L'Opium des Intellectuels 
(Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1955) vilified the myths of the left, the 
revolution and the proletariat and received lots of attention and 
publicity, albeit much of it negative. In this publication, Aron 
made recommendations which he believed necessary to reshape 
France in the post-war period. His participation in economic 
debates, his classes at the Sorbonne, his association with Le 
Figaro and L'Express, and his numerous books and scholarly 
articles sustained a broader economic debate; one which 
questioned the ruling economic consensus in France. He had 
little patience with "Intellectuals who, half a century behind 
the thought of their time, continue to condemn the mechanisms of 
the market or private ownership for philosophic reasons..."389 
Although not a prophet of the New Right, his opinions broadened 
the climate of political and economic thinking during the 1950s, 
1960s, and 1970s.
In Polemiques (1955), Aron criticized the effects of a high 
tax burden on the middle classes, the unjustifiable protection
388 D.J. Mahoney, The Liberal Political Science of Raymond Aron, (Lanham:
Rowman and Littlefield, 1992), back cover.
389 R. Aron, The Century of Total War, (New York: Doubleday, 1954), pp.354-
5.
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France's tax regime afforded agriculture, and the lack of
dynamism in the economy. 390 Nevertheless, he professed his belief
that a synthesis of the welfare state and economic dynamism could
best resolve the questions of the nation's prosperity. In his
publications of the 1970s and 1980s, Aron recognized the dangers
of "an unproductive redistributionist social democratic polity
that discouraged the initiative and incentives necessary for a
healthy liberal order. 1,391
During the socialist experiment of the early 1980s, Aron was
a reasoned critic of the gauchiste policies because of their
counterproductive effects and threat to entrepreneurial freedom
and individual initiative. In an article he wrote for L'Express,
he questioned the government's tax decisions and their
consequences for the economy,
...une tranche de 65%...encore faut-il ajouter les 10% 
supplementaires de 1982, les 10% d'epargne forcee de 
1983, les 1% pour la securite sociale. Les taux pour 
les tranches superieures doivent se rapprocher des 
anciens taux anglais...une consideration economique ne 
doit pas etre oubliee: le dynamisme des entreprises 
doit davantage aux ingenieurs, aux cadres, aux 
dirigeants qu'aux syndicalistes Bien qu'il soit 
malaise de saisir des phenomenes psychologique de cet 
ordre, il semble bien que l'ardeur de produire, de 
vendre, de gagner des marches ait ete atteinte par les 
mots d'ordre (front de classe), par les mesures 
fiscales, par l'ideologie du loisir.392
For Aron, the government's punitive tax measures were misguided
R. Aron, PolSmiques, (Paris: Gallimard, 1955), pp.221-225. 
D.J. Mahoney, op.cit., p.62.
392 L'Express, no.1663, 20 Mai 1983, p.79.
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and inappropriate. They stifled savings and investment, and
attacked those taxpayers most likely to invest and engage in
risk-taking, both essential for a healthy economy.
Throughout most of his lifetime, Aron continued to keep the
door from slamming shut in France on liberal notions and
solutions. His reasoned critiques and propositions gave
liberalism a respectable face and paved the way for later
advocates.
* Maurice Allais
Maurice Allais, a liberal economist writing prolifically
since the 1940s, was heralded by France Observateur in 1956 as
"le theoricien francais le plus systematique du capitalisme" and
"le grand pretre du liberalisme et de la concurrence a l'etat
pur."393 Allais had long argued for a reduced role for the state
and a reform of the French tax system, particularly capital
taxation, which he advocated as a replacement for direct taxes.
The Nobel Prize winner's views on taxation were respected but
paid little attention by political leaders. Nevertheless, his
views presented a vision of the tax system - appreciated at the
time by the likes of Milton Friedman and the Societe du Mont-
Pelerin - which would become part of the mainstream in the 1980s.
Allais did not have a very high opinion of the French tax
system. He opined,
Excessive, compliquee, couteuse, inefficace, 
discriminatoire, injuste, generatrice de mauvais choix 
economiques et de fraude, souvent arbitraire et
393 France Observateur, 31 Mai 1956.
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incoherente, demoralisante, anti-sociale et anti- 
democratique, la fiscalite d'aujourd'hui est un boulet 
que traine la nation.394
Allais wrote frequently of how the concern with social justice
and equality had actually multiplied the inequalities and
injustices in society and distorted economic decisions and hence,
the economy.
L'impot ne doit pas etre defavorable au plein 
developpement de la personality de chaque citoyen selon 
ses propres aspirations...Dans toute la mesure du 
possible, le citoyen doit etre laisse libre de ses 
choix et de l'emploi de ses revenus...cela signifie que 
la fiscalite ne doit pas avoir pour objectif de fausser 
les choix individuels que feraient autrement les 
citoyens pour satisfaire leurs besoins tels qu'ils le 
ressentent effectivement.395
Ironically, these very words and ideas would be echoed with
renewed force in the liberal revival of the late 1970s/early
1980s in France.
Allais's ideas about the role and function of taxation
predate, by 15 to 20 years, political concern regarding the
effects of high personal and corporate taxes on economic decision
making, individual freedom, incentives and entrepreneurship. The
economist broadened his critique by praising the virtues of an
economy founded on decentralized decision making, competitive
markets and private property. In his 1966 article for Droit
Social he expressed consternation at the largesse of the state's
tax take - 48.1% of national income. He wrote,
M. Allais, L'impot sur le Revenu et la Riforme MonStaire, (Paris: 
Hermann, 1977), p.50.
M. Allais, HL'Imp6t sur le Capital", Droit Social, no.9, Septembre- 
Octobre 1966, p.474.
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Un pourcentage aussi eleve n'est pas loin d'etre 
excessif. L'Etat controle d'ailleurs directement 
environ le tiers du capital national. Le moins qu'on 
puisse dire, c'est que la decentralisation du pouvoir 
et des decisions necessaires a la fois pour l'exercice 
effectif des libertes politiques et l'efficacite du 
systeme economique est singulierement compromise.396
For Allais, such imposition and intervention on the part of the
state was a serious threat to political liberty and economic
efficiency. Many works authored by Allais, many appearing in
newspapers and scholarly journals like Combat, his published
speeches delivered in various fora, expressed the economist's
convictions on such matters clearly and abundantly. 397 His
participation on various government committees and councils,
including the Economic and Social Council, ensured his opinions
were communicated outside academic circles to a wider, if not
entirely receptive, audience.
Despite Allais's notoriety - he won the Nobel Prize in 1988
- his ideas, on tax reform and free market economics, were not
wholely welcomed by political and administrative decision makers
and found little support among the general public. The reforms
were too radical, and worse, untested. They would have,
according to some, undesireable economic and sociological
effects. Moreover, they allegedly posed innumerable
Ibid., p.478.
See e.g.: La Conciliation du Libdralisme et du Socialisme par l'Impdt 
sur le Capital (published from a conference of the Groupe de Recherches 
fSconomiques et Sociales, January 4, 1949); Manifeste pour Une SociStS 
Libre of December 1958; "Les Conditions Economiques d'une Soci£t6 Libre 
in Revue des Travaux de l'Academie des Sciences Morales et Politiques, 
4e s£rie, 1959; La Politique des Revenus de 1'Avenir: les Principes 
GSniraux de la FiscalitS d'une SociStd Libre et l'impot sur le Capital, 
a report given to the Stresa Congress of the Society du Mont Pelerin, 
August 20, 1965.
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administrative problems. The climate of opinion was not 
receptive to Allais's ideas.
Instead, the way forward was signalled by de Gaulle and the
planners, not the free market and a bunch of academics. The
state was to be the leading force. The advocates of tax reform 
and market economies were largely anti- or mini-statist. In a
society being fed and nurtured by an ever more provident state,
which also took responsibility for ensuring continued economic 
growth, such views were out-of-place, unwelcome and, consequently 
fell on infertile ground.
* Jacques Rueff and Louis Armand
De Gaulle, however, was not immune to liberal influences. 
Other notable figures, closer to the political milieu, who 
considered and promoted liberal solutions in France included 
people like Jacques Rueff and Louis Armand. 398 They, like Aron 
and Allais, helped prepare the ground for the ideological 
flowering of neo-liberalism in the 1980s.399 Both men, but 
particularly Rueff, advocated the superiority of an economic 
regime founded on the free play of market forces, minimal 
intervention by the state, tight control of money and balanced
See e.g., J. Rueff, L'Ordre Social, (Paris: Librairie du Recueil
Sirey, 1945).
In fact, a book published in 1989, F. Bourricaud and P. Salin, Presence 
de Jacques Rueff, (Paris: Plon, 1989) was inspired by one of the
authors' - Francois Bourricaud - interest in examining the origins and 
impacts on the neo-liberal movement in the post-war era. Bourricaud 
singled out Jacques Rueff as one of the principal liberal lights in 
France. Louis Armand i& also given 'honorable' mention.
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budgeting. 400 Their ideas defined the parameters of their 
examination of the state of the French economy in I960, when, 
under their joint chairmanship, was constituted a government 
committee to investigate the obstacles to economic expansion.
Jacques Rueff had a decisive influence on the economic 
policy of the nascient Fifth Republic as an economic adviser to 
Antoine Pinay, Wilfrid Baumgartner and President de Gaulle. His 
"Report on the Financial Situation of France" published at the 
end of 1958, served as a program for major financial and economic 
reform to be undertaken by the French government from December of 
that year. The report prescribed strict financial discipline and 
identified those areas in which the state was intervening - i.e. 
via subsidies, trade restrictions, wage and price controls etc. - 
and was distorting the operation of the free market and thus 
holding back the country's economic growth potential.
Rueff's recommendations met with cool and even hostile 
reception on the part of many economists and ministers in de 
Gaulle's government. But, in the end, with the President's firm 
but unenthusiastic support, they became official government 
policy. The ensuing success of these measures, in terms of their 
positive effects on the French economy, pleased de Gaulle and 
vindicated Rueff, who wasted no time in drawing the government's 
attention to other problems and deficiencies in the economy.
400 "Jacques Rueff, s'imposa aussi parce qu'il etait un homme de doctrine
et de conviction...L'assurance inlassable avec laquelle, pendant 
cinquante ans, il a plaide pour sa version de l'economie lib£rale tient 
a ce qu'il la jugeait- conforme aux exigences de la reflexion, de 
1'analyse et de la verification" (from F. Bourricaud and P. Salin, 
op.cit., p .12).
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In a letter to General de Gaulle, in the summer of 1959, 
Rueff posed some very poignant questions, and urged the general 
to undertake a thorough review of the economy and identify what 
was holding back productivity, investment and consumption. Only 
a few months after the publication of his first report, Rueff was 
seeking to stoke up, what he thought was a fading reformist 
flame. The result was the Comite Armand-Rueff. It's report, 
published in September 1960, was a cornucopia of structural and 
financial reforms covering a wide variety of socio-economic 
sectors; however, it avoided the tax system and social security 
finance. In the end, many of the recommendations were adopted, 
but as Rueff noted in his autobiography, as of his writing in 
April 1976, much still was left to be done.401
Rueff's co-chairman on the committee, Louis Armand, hailed 
from the nationalized railways and was one-time President of 
Euratom. His impact was less important than Rueff's on the 
nation's economic thought and policies, however his liberal 
convictions were no less strong. Evidence of his liberal 
credentials were demonstrated in 1969 when Armand presented an 
expose on structures, mentalities and efficiency ("Structures, 
Mentalites et Efficacite") in a debate sponsored by the Academie 
des Sciences Morales et Politiques. 402 Other participants at this 
meeting were, Raymond Aron, Jean Fourastie, Wilfrid Baumgartner,
J. Rueff, De l'Aube au Cr€puscule, (Paris: Plon, 1977), p.256.
Published as La France dans la Competition tconomique, (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1969).
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Edmond Giscard d'Estaing, and Jacques Rueff among others.
In his speech, Armand lamented that France offered a hostile 
environment for businesses because of the permeation of Marxist- 
like doctrine that had encouraged domination by the state - i.e. 
planning, nationalization and bureaucratization - and an 
egalitarian ethic evident in both attitudes and policies. He 
called for less state control and intervention and more policies 
- and a change of mentality - conducive to free enterprise. As 
Armand said,
Ce qui est fondamental pour nous est 1'epanouissement 
de l'individu. II faut faire un effort pour montrer ce 
qu'un regime d'economie liberale peut obtenir dans ce 
domaine, ce qui n'exclut pas du tout...que l'Etat 
puisse avoir des idees.403
Interestingly, what Armand was advocating was a challenge to the
consensus progressiste. He offered up liberalism, as the only
ideology capable of confronting the ascendant ideology of Marxism
and the social democratic hegemony. The 'new' economist, Henri
Lepage, almost ten years later, would issue a similar call.
However, in Lepage's case, circumstances as they were, the call
was received by a more sensitive public. It would fall then to
the nouveaux economistes of the 1970s to pick up and reignite the
torch of liberalism, heralded and carried by the likes of Aron,
Allais, Rueff and Armand.
* The New Economists
The "coming out" of the new economists occurred in 1977/78,
just before the legislative elections and was heralded by the
403 Ibid., p.78.
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appearance of two books, L'Economique Retrouvee (Paris:
Economica, 1977) and Demain le Capitalisme (Paris: Collection
Pluriel, 1978). The impact of the new economists and the
importance of their work, in terms of the effect they would have
on the climate of economic opinion and debate in France, was
aptly assessed by Stephen Rial in his review which appeared in
Contrepoint and is reproduced at length here,
Henri Lepage, dans Demain le Capitalisme, nous offre un 
recensement tres exhaustif d'une litterature jusqu'ici 
d'acces difficile pour un public plus large que celui 
des specialistes. Son livre presente un immense interet 
de ce fait: car les propositions des nouveaux 
economistes americains interessent autant les 
historiens, les juristes, les sociologues ou les 
demographes ques les economistes de profession...En 
doctrine economique, le vent souffle depuis longtemps 
deja d'Amerique: mais ces temps-ci, il nous apporte un 
autre air. Le mouvement de renouvellement de la pensee 
a pris la-bas une ampleur considerable, meme s'il n'est 
pas exempt de divergences entre maximalistes, les 
"libertaires" ou "anarcho-capitalistes" et 
minimalistes, dont le discours nous est plus familier.
Le mouvement a meme atteint nos universites francaises 
puisqu'une poignee de jeunes economistes nes entre 1936 
et 1946, Jean-Jacques Rosa, Florin Aftalion, Andre 
Fourcans et quelques autres se sont recemment illustres 
par une publication collective qui a fait un certain 
bruit (L'Economique Retrouvee, Economica, 1977) et par 
une prise de position collective d'une particuliere 
nettete lors des dernieres elections.404
These young economists referred to by Rials, initially
constituted no more than a dispersed minority of academics and
journalists: Rosa was at Sciences Po and Paris-Dauphine; Aftalion
was at the Ecole des Sciences Sociales Economiques et
Commerciales (ESSEC); Fourcans was also at ESSEC; Jacques
Garello, was at the Universite d'Aix-en-Provence; Pascal Salin
404 Contrepoint, 3e trimes&re, 1978, no,20, p.150.
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was at Paris-Dauphine; while Henri Lepage was a journalist.
By the mid-1970s this group found they shared a keen 
interest in conceptual developments in Britain, and more 
substantially, in the United States. Occasionally they would 
come together, participating in seminars convened for the purpose 
of discussing these developments. L'Economique Retrouvee (1977), 
with contributions from Rosa, Aftalion and others, captured the 
essence of many of the debates undertaken at these seminars.
From 1978, the new economists began their annual colloquiums 
known as the Universite d'Ete de la Nouvelle Economie headed by 
Jacques Garello. These conferences attracted neo-liberal, free- 
market enthusiasts from all over France, Europe and the United 
States, as well as those who were merely curious as to what all 
the "noise" was about. French politicians and civil servants 
like Charles Millon, Alain Madelin and Philippe Auberger, were no 
strangers to these meetings.
Ideas emanating from the Chicago School and universities in 
Virginia, like the University of Virginia and Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute, had caught the attention of the young 
French economists. Among the new generation of neo-liberal 
afficionados was a journalist/economist, Henri Lepage. After a 
series of interviews and some months of research in the U.S. 
familiarizing himself with the "new economics" then sweeping 
American academic - and to a lesser extent, political - circles, 
Lepage returned to France and wrote his account of this
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experience. 405 His book, Demain le Capitalisme, published in 
1978, received wide-spread publicity and became a best-seller in 
France. Before long it was followed up by new editions and an 
English translation (Tomorrow, Capitalism, La Salle: Open Court 
Publishing Co., 1982). Its significance cannot be understated.
James Buchanan, one of the principal proponents of the 
public choice school, writing the forward for Tomorrow, 
Capitalism, classed Lepage's book with Hayek's The Road to 
Serfdom, Friedmans' Capitalism and Freedom and Free to Choose, 
and Simon's A Time for Truth as one of those "rare" books that 
"places its economics squarely in a philosophical setting, that 
offers the reader the big picture, that synthesizes disparate 
arguments, that makes economic theory relevant."406
The impact Lepage's book had in France, particularly in 
academic, intellectual and political circles, was immodestly 
summed up by Jacques Garello, writing in Contrepoint some years 
later,
On ne dira jamais assez le role declencheur joue dans 
notre pays par l'ouvrage d'Henri Lepage qui, des 1978 
faisait connaitre aux Francais que les esprits 
changeaient radicalement outre-atlantique...sans doute 
a l'origine de la creation du groupe des nouveaux 
economistes en France.407
Of course, the book in and of itself was not solely responsible
The new economics included monetarist theory, public choice theory, 
theory of human capital and household production, property rights 
theory and supply side theory.
H. Lepage, Tomorrow Capitalism, (La Salle: Open Court Publishing Co.,
1982), p.ix.
407 Contrepoint, no.48, 1984, pp.155-161.
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for the diffusion of new economic ideas in France. It did, 
however, capture the attention of many who were looking for an 
alternative to the consensus progressiste. The book's popularity 
was enhanced by the media exposure shrewdly used by the new 
economists to draw attention to themselves, and more importantly, 
to their ideas. Shortly before the parliamentary elections in 
1978, the self-styled new economists hired advertising space in a 
Paris newspaper and on television. 408 Other books preaching the 
virtues of more capitalism and free market economics hit the 
stands as well, capitalizing on this publicity.409
In addition to the universities and summer colloquiums, some 
of the new economists established their own influential 
organizations, or instead used their positions of influence, to 
articulate and disseminate, by means of seminars or publications, 
liberal and free market ideas. For example, Jacques Garello set 
up his Association pour la Liberte Economique et le Progres 
Social (ALEPS); Pascal Salin set up the Institut Economique de 
Paris (IEP) and Florin Aftalion was at the Presses Universitaires 
de France.410
Looking to the American example, these economists railed 
against left-wing collectivism and the distortion of capitalism
See, P. Fysh, op.cit., p.292.
These included: M. Roy, Vive le Capitalisme, (Paris: Plon, 1978); P. 
Salin et al., L'Occident en DSsarroi, (Paris: Plon, 1978); J. Medecin, 
Le Terreau de la LibertS, (Paris: Presses de la Cit€, 1978); M.
Poniatowski, L'Avenir n ’est Ecrit Nulle Part, (Paris: Albin Michel, 
1978) .
410 P. Fysh, op.cit., p.293.
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by interventionist policies. But more than criticizing and
attacking, they believed that an education of the public should
be undertaken - not unlike that in Britain spearheaded by Keith
Joseph and the Centre for Policy Studies. This education - or
"softening up" - would strive to persuade the public that
capitalism - "not current state capitalism, but tomorrow's true
capitalism..."411 - offered better solutions (to the crisis France
was then suffering). The public needed to be shown that left-
wing policies, and not capitalism, were the cause of France's
social and economic problems.
However, Lepage, sensitive to public opinion and to
political realities, was neither advocating a return to the
laissez-faire laissez-passer capitalism of the 19th century, nor
a complete retreat of the state.
I am not pleading for the abolition of public 
intervention. As I have said from the first, there is 
a demand for the state to intervene, whether to build 
roads or reduce poverty. This real demand is 
legitimate and must be satisfied. I do not propose 
that we return immediately to "zero" state but that we 
recognize the counterproductivity and the perversities 
of many public mechanisms and many current policies.
Society must be encouraged to adopt better techniques 
for revealing collective preferences and more effective 
ways of translating their real desires into action. As 
regards the welfare state, our objective should not be 
to cast doubt on the ethical basis of concern about 
social evils but to question the efficiency of the 
techniques presently employed to remedy these evils.412
Those better techniques Lepage alludes to, developed largely in
the United States by economists and academics for the economic,
411
412
H. Lepage, 1982, op.cit., p.206.
Ibid., p.208.
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social and political reform of American capitalism, were adopted, 
adapted and advocated by the new economists in France. They 
included full or partial deregulation of a variety of industries 
(ie. food, drug, transport); partial or full privatization, or 
opening up to competition of public monopolies like the postal 
service, utilities, telecommunications; rolling back the state's 
welfare responsibilities in the areas of income redistribution, 
social security, agricultural and housing subsidies, minimum wage 
and affirmative action; replacing "free" universal education with 
a voucher system - state provided education credits awarded as a 
function of family income; replacing the spider's web system of 
welfare handouts with a negative income tax - households below a 
given income threshold would be paid a fraction of the difference 
between their income and the threshold by the government; and 
cutting taxes.
These remedies, associated with the New Right in countries 
like Britain and the United States, were not among the 
prescriptions of the nouvelle droite in France.413 It is 
important to point out here that the nouvelle droite's economic
In France the nouvelle droite comprised such groups as GRECE (Groupe 
de Recherche et d'fitudes pour la Civilisation Europ^enne) headed by 
Alain de Benoist and the Club de l'Horloge, headed by Yvan Blot and 
others. The nouvelle droite in France is not entirely synonymous with 
the Anglo-saxon New Right, the latter being more generally associated 
with an economic movement sympathetic to rolling back the state and the 
free market. The new economists were, therefore, more akin to the 
Anglo-saxon New Right, than groups like GRECE. On GRECE and the 
nouvelle droite see e.g.: A-M. Duranton-Crabol, Visages de la Nouvelle 
Droite: Le G.R.E.C.E. et son Histoire, (Paris: Presses de la Fondation 
Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1988); P. Fysh, op.cit., ch.7; M. 
Vaughan, "Nouvelle Droite: Cultural Power and Political Influence" in 
D.S. Bell, ed., Contemporary French Politics, (London: Croom Helm,
1982); P. Vial, ed., Pour Une Renaissance Culturelle, (Paris: 1979); 
Le Monde, 22 Juin 1979, p. 8 and 24 Mars 1981, p. 14; Le Matin, 31 
Juillet 1979.
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views, in contrast with those of the new economists, were not
only anti-liberal, but also anti-American.414 In fact, Jean-
Jacques Rosa, quoted in Le Matin of July 31, 1979, went to great
lengths to defend the distinction between the new economists and
the nouvelle droite,
II y a chez elle [la nouvelle droite] une 
incomprehension totale du fonctionnement de l'economie.
Elle reste attachee a une defense de 1'Etat-nation qui 
n'a plus grand sens a notre epoque ou l'economie 
devient de plus en plus transnational. Nous, nous 
sommes de notre temps: mondialistes .415
The narrow economic vision and the attachment to the state
attributed to the nouvelle droite by Rosa, was even more vividly
emphasized by Jacques Garello in a 1984 issue of Contrepoint,
La "Nouvelle Droite" a tellement horreur du marche, de 
la liberty individuelle,' et cultive un tel amour pour 
la raison d'etat, qu'elle apparait aujourd'hui pour ce 
qu'elle a toujours ete; la nostalgie d'un etatisme de 
droite, un socialisme national en quelque sorte.416
The campaign to clearly distinguish the new economists from the
nouvelle droite was not merely one sided. Confronted by the
challenge of the new economists and the ascendancy of their
ideas, GRECE417 devoted its 13th annual colloquium in 1978 to an
"...the term New Right in Europe refers to a group which is different 
from what is called the New Right in the U.S.A.. In the U.S., New 
Right means the gospel that 'man is born Friedman but everywhere he is 
Keynes.' The New Right in Europe, on the contrary, is the absolute 
enemy of laissez-faire capitalism and the state of society it produces" 
(from Franz Gress, "The New Right in France and the Federal Republic 
of Germany" in The Runnymede Trust, The New Right, Image and Reality, 
(London: The Runnymeade Trust, 1986), p.52.
Francois-Henri de Virieu, "Les Nouveaux Economistes", Le Matin, 31 
Juillet 1979, p.12.
Contrepoint, no.48, 1984, p.158.
A brief introduction to GRECE and the nouvelle droite is also provided 
in footnotes 412 and 413.
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exhaustive attack on liberal theory.418
We will now turn to consider GRECE, very briefly, and the 
Club de 1'Horologe, two groups that went to great lengths to 
promote alternative ideas and solutions.
* GRECE and the Club de l'Horloge
As our discussion centers on the emergence of a neo-liberal 
agenda in France - one that included tax reform - the Club de 
l'Horloge is much more relevant than GRECE. In terms of the 
critique of the consensus progressiste and the emergence of neo­
liberal tax reform, the Club de l'Horloge is much more 
significant. The Club was founded in 1974 by Yvan Blot, Jean- 
Yves le Gallou, Michel Leroy and Henri Lesquen.419 All were 
educated at elite civil service training institutions like ENA or 
the Ecole Polytechnique. And all were affiliated, either from 
the beginning, or later, with a political party: the RPR, the PR, 
or the FN. The Club counted around 2 00 dues-paying members, but 
saw interest and participation rise to four times that by 1980- 
81. Most of its members belong to a political party, but the 
Club does not affiliate itself exclusively with any one party.
In the period prior to 1980-81, the Club's raison d'etre, in 
addition to ideology, was, like GRECE, infiltration. Thierry
418 See, P. Fysh, op. cit., p.298. A record of this colloquium was 
published in HilSments, Mars 1979, nos. 28-9, under the title "L'ficonomie 
Totalitaire."
419 Of these four, two were important government/party figures. Yvan Blot 
was in the cabinets of Poniatowski and Bonnet, both Ministers of the 
Interior during the Giscard presidency and from 1978-84 Blot was 
directeur de cabinet for two RPR general secretaries, Devaquet 1978-79 
and Pons 1979-1984. Michel Leroy was a member of the cabinets of both 
Poniatowski and Bonnet between 1977 and 1981.
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Pfister unveiled this aspect of the Club's nature,
...une presence plus immediatement politique a travers 
le club de l'Horloge. Presente par le Figaro Magazine 
comme le resevoir des futurs cadres politiques de la 
majorite, cet organisme est preside par M. Yvan Blot.420
Yvan Blot, was the chief infiltrator. Dubiously associated with
GRECE, he had worked in the cabinets of Giscardien interior
ministers Poniatowski and Bonnet before becoming the directeur de
cabinet for Alain Devaquet and Bernard Pons, both secretaries
general of the RPR between 1979 and 1984. To what extent Blot
and the Club de l'Horloge succeeded in influencing decision
making circles will be investigated, if not ascertained later.
As well as encouraging its members to participate and
present themselves as candidates in elections, the Club published
articles in Le Figaro Magazine and printed its own review from
1980, Contrepoint.421 Peter Fysh (1991) writes that Contrepoint
was later used "as a platform both for reactionary American
supporters of the Reagan revolution and for a concerted liberal
onslaught of the newly-elected French Socialists."422
Initially it had been alleged that the Club de l'Horloge was
nothing more than a political front for GRECE. 423 This may have
been true, but from 1980, the Club's enthusiasm for American neo­
T. Pfister, "La Nouvelle Droite S'Installe", Le Monde, June 22, 1979,
p.8.
S. Bauman, "Le Renouveau des Clubs?", Revue Politique et Parlementaire, 
May-June 1982, no.898, pp.63+.
P. Fysh, op.cit., p.33 9.
See: P. Sigoda, "Les Cercles Exterieurs du RPR", Pouvoirs, 1984, no.28, 
p.48; Le Monde, 22 Juin 1979; P. Fysh, op.cit., p.338.
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liberalism and new economic ideas and its increasing political 
nature distinguished it quite clearly from its more reactionary, 
subversive and "cultural" cousin. The Club de l'Horloge acquired 
a more mainstream political respectability than GRECE and 
functioned almost as a think tank for conservative politicians 
and parties. It is important to understand what was behind the 
Club's economic/philosophical transformation. This 
transformation was not spontaneous and was attributed, to a great 
degree, to the influence of the new economists.
Originally, the Club de l'Horloge espoused a vision of the 
economy not unlike GRECE's. From its inception in 1974, the Club 
de l'Horloge criticized liberal laissez faire economics, which it 
found responsible for the crash of 1929 (in contrast, the new 
economists blamed excessive state meddling). A clearer view of 
the Club's economic philosophy can be gleaned from its first 
major publication, Les Racines du Futur, Demain la France (1977, 
1984). The Club expressed a predilection for some state 
regulation of the economy, a minimum wage and an antipathy for 
"la societe marchande", which it felt fostered an undesirable 
ethic, more concerned with owning and acquiring than with 'being' 
and one's own spiritual needs. In the Autumn 1980 issue of 
Contrepoint, Michel Leroy, a member of the Club, went so far as 
to attack the concept of homo economicus, the fundamental liberal 
tenet which considers man as a rational individual who makes 
coherent decisions as a function of the problems of choice
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imposed upon him by the scarcity of resources in his universe.424
However, Les Racines du Futur (1977, 1984), in addition to 
its critique of liberalism, saw its alternatives, fascism and 
Keynesianism, as they had developed in the second half of the 
20th century, equally reprehensible: fascism, because it 
subordinated two of the state's principle functions, law-giving 
and production/consumption, to the third, defense - order and 
security were paramount concerns;425 Keynesianism/ because the 
state in correcting deficiencies in the domestic economy, soon 
became the center of economic decision making, substituting 
itself for private actors, thereby eroding personal and economic 
freedom. Moreover, in taking on economic functions, which 
entailed the frequent need to "negotiate" economic and personnel 
decisions, the state suffered a loss of authority. This 
paradoxical development left the door open for the Club de 
l'Horloge to contribute, tentatively and gradually at first, and 
then wholeheartedly, to the emerging liberal critique of the 
social democratic state. Already, evident in Les Racines du 
Futur, the Club had indicated its antipathy to price controls, 
while highly esteeming enterprise and initiative. It insisted on 
the substitution of private for public insurance, and went some 
way to identifying those activities for which the state should or
424 M. Leroy, "L'Etat et la Fonction Souveraine", Contrepoint, no.34, 
Autumn 1980, p.110.
425 This tripartite classification of s-tate functions was developed by 
George Dumezil, a French historian and linguist, much admired by. the 
nouvelle droite. See: P. Fysh, op. cit., pp.281-2; D.S. Bell, op. 
cit., p .61.
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should not be responsible.426
While GRECE continued to entrench itself behind dirigism and 
planning, the Club de l'Horloge became increasingly enamored of 
the "new economic" ideas. The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 
provided the stimulus to marry the liberalism of the new 
economists with the conservatism of the Club de l'Horloge. While 
this cooptation of free market prescriptions was not initially 
welcomed by the new economists because of the undisguised 
political motive and the suspect socio-cultural views attached to 
the Club, the Club de l'Horloge quickly established itself, with 
its oracle, Contrepoint, as the principal platform for the 
promotion of neo-liberal values and ideas. 427 It was not long 
before the new economists realized that the Club de l'Horloge was 
not a usurper, but could be used as a vehicle for spreading their 
ideas. New economists like Henri Lepage and Jacques Garello were 
invited to write articles for Contrepoint and attend roundtable 
discussions on various economic themes.
While the Club's political goals were initially ambiguous, 
its principal raison d'etre was to debate, propose and propogate 
a new blueprint for society, one intended to confront and replace 
the socialist blueprint. After the Socialist victory in 1981, 
the confrontation - mostly one-sided as the left virtually denied
426 See, J-Y. Le Gallou et le Club de l'Horloge, Les Racines du Futur, 
Demain la France, (Paris: Albatross, 1984), pp.156-174.
427 Initially the Club's membership was small - around 200 members compared 
with 3,000 for R^publique et Democratic and 30,000 for the Giscardian 
Perspectives et R£alit6s (see S. Bauman, 1982, op.cit.). It soon grew, 
as its seminar audience expanded from 200 to around 800-900 by 1981 
(see P. Fysh, op.cit., p.342).
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the existence of the New Right in France - became a crusade.428 
As matters became more politically charged, the Club's raison 
d'etre soon became equally political as ideological. The Club 
sought to "preparer l'apres socialisme en contribuant au 
renouvellement de la pensee politique de 1'opposition qui est la 
condition de 1'alternance.1,429 It even encouraged its members to 
stand in local and national elections.
Essential to the renewal of the opposition's (post-1981) 
political rethink was the dissemination and inculcation of new 
economic ideas. By the end of 1980, Philippe Baccou, a young ENA 
graduate, one of the co-authors of Les Racines du Futur, and head 
of the Club de l'Horloge's committee on the economy, published a 
book entitled the Grand Tabou (1981). This work offered a re­
examination of the concept of egalitarianism in French society 
and proceeded to expose it for the myth (or the mirage) he and 
others contributing to the book believed it to be. They stripped 
contemporary notions of egalitarianism of their purported 
revolutionary associations and demonstrated how the desire to 
"lutter contre les inegalites" had engendered a massive, 
overweening bureaucracy, stifled personal liberties, undermined 
fraternity, discouraged individual initiative, provoked 
emigration and weakened the nation. It was a blatant attack on
428 This was symbolically illustrated by the removal from Contrepoint’s
title page of a vaguely liberal de Tocqueville quotation and its 
replacement by a stridently anti-socialist one. The new quote read as 
follows: "De toutes les ideologies de masse, le socialisme est la plus 
dangereuse car elle lib§re l'homme de toute responsabilite" - Vladimir 
Bukovsky (from Contrepoint, no.39, Autumn 1981).
429 S. Bauman, 1982, op.cit., p.78.
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the welfare state and offered as an alternative a new blueprint 
for society, one open to "la concurrence pluraliste et 
meritocratique.1,430
Baccou advocated policies that would encourage private 
enterprise, entrepreneurialism, individual initiative and greater 
choice. Among the recommended solutions were: more stringent 
selectivity for school admissions; specialized attention and 
privileges for different categories of students - particularly 
those who show special skills and talents; state cash 
disbursements to parents for the purpose of helping them pay for 
their children's education - thereby removing the state from near 
total provision of "free" education; and permitting parents to 
decide where their children should go to school.
Other suggestions of a more explicitly fiscal nature 
included: reducing tax on corporate profits by one-third for the 
first four years of a company's life, and total exemption for the
P. Baccou et le Club de l'Horloge, Le Grand Tabou, (Paris: Albin 
Michel, 1981), pp.205+. It is interesting to note that Lepage (1982) 
had spoken of the need to confront socialism with a new (capitalist) 
vision of society, "The left, however, has succeeded in spreading the 
belief that passage to new systems of values is incompatible with the 
survival of a capitalist social system and that the necessary 
preliminary to such a transformation is socialism. . .Confronted with 
this assertion, our objective should be to show that, on the contrary, 
socialism will ensure that we never accomplish this social 
transformation (unless at a colossal cost, not only in degradation of 
the material standards of living but in depriving people of fundamental 
individual freedoms) . We must also show that capitalism is not at all 
incompatible with the transition to a society founded on a new system 
of values." He also insisted on the need to, "...make a gigantic 
effort to develop a new economic language and dialogue that defends 
capitalism by confronting the left on its own ground, i.e., in the 
controversy about how society can be changed for the better" (H. 
Lepage, 1982, op.cit., pp.205-6).
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first three years if the profits are reinvested;431 lower social 
charges; increasing the rate of the prelevement liberatoire; 
instituting the avoir fiscal at 100%; and other fiscal incentives 
to encourage private investors; the institution of a negative 
income tax; and phasing out income tax and replacing it with an 
extended and increased VAT.432
The Club's tax proposals evolved further in the next couple 
of years and echoed ideas - and the rationale behind them - put 
forward and put into practice in Britain and the United States.433 
Simultaneous with the publication of Guy Sorman's, La Revolution 
Conservatrice Americaine (1983), the Club de l'Horloge made 
Arthur Laffer and his famous curve the new "sacred cow".434 
American ideas began to permeate the Club. Articles were 
solicited from such American New Right scholars and disciples as 
George Nash, Irving Kristol, and Jack Kemp. The Club even 
established contacts with the Heritage Foundation and the 
American Enterprise Institute, conservative American think tanks 
which were then supplying much of the ideological fodder for the
This suggestion and others relating to businesses, reflected the wishes 
and proposals of the CNPF, and Baccou, in his book, refers to Yvon 
Gattaz (Baccou et le Club de 1'Horologe, 1981, pp.212,214) on several 
occasions.
P. Baccou et le Club de l'Horloge, 1981, op. cit., pp.205+.
See: Contrepoint, no. 39, December 1981; no.46, Autumn 1983; no.47,
Winter 1984.
This very popular book, G. Sorman, La Revolution Conservatrice 
Americaine, (Paris: Fayard, 1983), is a blow-by-blow account of the 
conservative revolution led. by Ronald Reagan underway in the United 
States and all its implications, political, economic, and social.
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Reagan revolutionaries. 435 However, the Club gallicized the 
American conservative revolution by evoking the spirit of the 
French Revolution - which was not so much about "egalite" - a 
concept much abused and distorted over the years - as about "la 
responsablite de citoyen" ("la vraie conception republicaine").
It was the latter which was deemed the true republican ideal.
The recommended solutions for taxation were neo-liberal and 
echoed many of the ideas and proposals circulating in the U.S. 
and in Britain: lowering personal and corporate taxation, raising 
indirect taxation, offering tax incentives to encourage risk- 
taking, introducing a negative income tax, etc.. In order to 
roll-back the state, it was necessary to reduce the tax burden, 
which due primarily to the heavy reliance on social contributions 
gave France "un poids superieur a celui qui est consenti par 
l'Allemagne federale et meme la Grande Bretagne."436 This 
message, which had been spread in the United States and Great 
Britain and used to justify supply-side and tax-cutting measures 
in the Reagan and Thatcher economic programs, not only appealed 
to, and was echoed by, academics, intellectuals and economists in 
France, but found adherents among the French political class.
Among those politicians who were either contributors to 
Contrepoint, sympathizers, or outright members of the Club de 
l'Horloge were, Jacques Godfrain (RPR), Jacques Toubon (RPR), 
Bruno Bourg-Broc (RPR), Daniel Meraud (RPR), Michel Aurillac
435
436
P. Fysh, op.cit., p.348.
P. Baccou et le Club de l'Horloge, 1981, op.cit., p.255.
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(RPR), Yves Lancien (RPR), Alain Madelin (UDF-PR) and Charles 
Millon (UDF-PR). Many of these same politicians - Madelin, 
Millon, plus Edmond Alphandery (UDF-UDC) and Pascal Clement (UDF- 
PR) - moved into the ambit of the new economists.437
By the late 1970s/early 1980s discussion and reflection 
groups were mushrooming. One such group, the Groupe de Recherche 
et d'Action Liberales (GRAL) served as a forum for debate and 
policy formulation in which the likes of Jacques Garello, Florin 
Aftalion, Henri Lepage and Pascal Salin came face to face with 
politicians who shared their predilection for British and 
American New Right economic theories and policies. Later, some 
of the new economists, would lend their talents to whatever 
political party seemed most sympathetic to their cause; for 
example, Andre Fourcans became a member of the conseil national 
of the UDF, was co-chairman of the UDF's economic committee and 
co-editor {coredacteur) of the 1986 joint platform.
The new economists and their Universite d'Ete, and the Club
«•
de l'Horloge, were fresh and active intellectual forces, and as 
such, had an appeal, particularly for the new generation of 
politicians - the cadets - born during and after World War II. 
Although the Club de l'Horloge was alleged to have dubious
437 Clement was one of the co-founders of the "Cercle" (the Centre d'Etudes
et de Recherches Constitutionnelies Legislatives et Economiques) along 
with Michel Noir, Philippe Seguin, Francois d'Aubert and Francois 
Froment-Meurice. This was a parliamentary 'research laboratory' 
created in 1981 for the center-right. It invited MPs, civil servants, 
business executives, academics etc. to come and exchange and debate 
ideas. It's raison d'etre was to challenge the socialists on the 
ideological battleground and prepare MPs with arguments and dossiers 
to face down their Socialist counterparts in the National Assembly. 
Jacques Fremontier in Les Cadets de la Droite, (Paris: Editions du 
Seuil, 1990, p.196) calls it "1'instrument majeur de la droite junior".
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connections with GRECE, it was recognized by many to be, in 
comparison with the new economists, the better organized - with 
its regular meetings, colloquiums and publications - and financed 
institutional home for France's neo-liberals. Its political 
orientation - pro-Reagan and anti-socialist - of increasing 
importance from 1980, made it an attractive launch pad and 
ideological home for the neo-liberal attack on the state and the 
socialists.
In his interviews with Yvan Blot, Peter Fysh (1991)
commented on Blot's accreditation of a number of factors which
made the RPR and Jacques Chirac amenable to neo-liberal arguments
and solutions: i.e., the RPR's business clients, the Reagan
victory, the growing unpopularity of the Socialist and
collectivist ideas, the shifting to the right of public opinion.
However, Fysh asserts, "Despite all this, Blot probably
underestimated his role and that of the Club in the
transformation of the party's economic policy."438 While Fysh
acknowledges the significance of these other factors, he assigns
to the Club de l'Horloge, the principal conciliating, shaping and
articulating role. Indeed, it performed this role with aplomb.
This was the service which the Club de l'Horloge, 
despite its quirky mystical and fascistic pedigree, 
performed for a section of the RPR, and which Blot 
himself performed with his memos to Chirac and his 
lectures to party workers.439
As Blot recognized, despite the relevance of all these factors,
438
439
P. Fysh, op.cit., p.352.
Ibid., p.352.
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ideas do not spread on their own, actors and organizations are 
above all responsible. 440 This admission supports the assertion 
that, to a significant degree, the Club, like the Centre for 
Policy Studies in Britain during the 1970s, was a significant 
agent of change.
As the winds of change blew into France from the United 
States and Britain, elements inside France, advocating neo­
liberal ideas and solutions, harnessed those winds and used that 
force to help propel themselves into the French mainstream. Long 
consigned to the margins of French political, economic and social 
debate, groups like the new economists and the Club de l'Horloge 
successfully utilized whatever means available - the press, 
colloquia, university classrooms, contacts in political milieux - 
to publicize and popularize their messages. As the messages 
spread, the social-democratic consensus, long dominant in France, 
was faced with a veritable challenge that it could no longer 
ignore. As the neo-liberal message infiltrated political parties 
like the RPR and the UDF, the ideological battlefield became 
intensely political. In a moment we will examine how the 
ideological and political battle between social-democracy and 
neo-liberalism changed the terms of political debate and behavior 
in France. But before we do, it is instructive, first, to give 
due credit to the role played by external factors - particularly 
the effect of the United States - in bringing about change in the 
French political agenda, and consequently the.French tax agenda.
Ibid., PP.3&2-7 3T3~.
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* The Impact of the United States
As we have shown, factors internal to France were very 
important in effecting a change in the political and economic 
debate from the late 1960s: the Club de l'Horloge and the new 
economists were instrumental here. However, the impact of 
external factors, has been hinted at, and in no uncertain terms 
were very important, either indirectly or directly, in pushing 
France to question heretofore unquestioned premises and 
principles. Indeed, the American experience was no negligible 
factor in terms of its impact on new economic thinking - which 
has already been dealt with - and on conservative politicians in 
France.
The United States represented a major source for the
ideological renovation of the generation which came of age
politically after de Gaulle. Jacques Fremontier in Les Cadets de
la Droite (1990) reveals that one in three of the post-1945
generation had visited the United States prior to 1984,
La pensee de tous en revient comme fascinee par le 
mirage de 1'esprit d'entreprise et par la nostalgie 
d'une "societe civile" non investie par l'Etat.441
Many members of the French center-right had been exposed, in one
way or another, to the American experience. According to
Fremontier, Alain Devaquet (RPR), and Edmond Alphandery (UDF-
UDC), studied for some time in the U.S.. The latter was at the
University of Chicago in the late 1960s, an experience which he
441 J. Fremontier, 1990, op.cit., p.198.
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called an "electrochoc intellectuel" . 442 Jacques Toubon (RPR), 
Francois d'Aubert (UDF-PR), Francois Fillon (RPR), Alain Madelin 
(UDF-PR), Bruno Bourg-Broc (RPR), Michel Noir (RPR), Yvan Blot - 
all in their turn made the pilgrimage, observing first hand the 
dynamism, the entrepreneurialism, and the competition which 
characterized the American economy and society.443
Alain Juppe (RPR) went to California in 1978 at the height 
of the campaign for Proposition 13, and again in 1980, when he 
was in the U.S. to observe first hand Ronald Reagan's election 
campaign, as was Jacques Toubon. Later, the Financial Times 
would surmise that these American visits influenced Juppe's new 
found enthusiasm for free market economics. 444 Philippe Auberger 
journeyed to California in 1979, in the aftermath of the tax 
revolt which enabled him to observe its repercussions in state 
and national politics.
All these "cadets" were, to one degree or another, impressed 
by their experiences. One RPR deputy enthusiastically exclaimed, 
"On ne peut plus faire de politique si on ne connait pas les 
£tats-Unis," and exalted "le gout des responsabilites, la 
liberation du risque."445 Upon their return to France, many of
442 Ibid., p.199.
443 For more information on the careers and ideology of these and other
party members see: J. Fremontier, 1984, 1990, op.cit.; B. Lecomte and
C. Sauvage, Les Giscardiens, (Paris: Albin Michel, 1978); T.
Desjardins, Les Chiraquiens, (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1986); J-L.
Remilleux, Les Barristes, (Paris: Albin Michel, 1987); M. Chamard and 
J. Mace-Scaron, La Galaxie Barre, (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1987).
444 Financial Times, June 26, 1985, "France Survey", p.3.
445 J. Fremontier, 1990, op.cit., pp.201-2.
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those who had been fascinated by what they saw, heard, and 
generally experienced in the U.S., could find organized groups of 
like-minded individuals with whom they could exchange and develop 
ideas. Apart from the longstanding clubs de reflexion like the 
Giscardien Perspectives et Realites, new fora were now available 
for seminating and incubating neo-liberal ideas, some of which 
have already been mentioned.
The American experience of many of the party cadets was 
critical. Without that, the Club de l'Horloge may well have 
remained a club de reflexion of minor importance. Although it is 
difficult to assert with any degree of certainty, the American 
experience was as integral as the Club de l'Horloge to the 
penetration and diffusion of neo-liberal ideas among the parties 
of the center-right. As we shall see, political rhetoric, party 
programs and government policies gradually incorporated many of 
these ideas.
* Agents of Change in the RPR
For the moment our focus remains on the RPR, due to the fact 
that neo-liberal tax reform was introduced into French political 
debate by the RPR. It is important, therefore to understand how 
this came about, particularly in light of the traditional 
etatiste impulses of the party. Up to this point we have focused 
on the RPR's pre-1981 thinking and position, as well as the 
forces of change that conspired to transform the RPR's economic 
thinking and political strategy. In this section, we will 
continue to examine the factors that were responsible for the
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RPR's embrace of neo-liberalism and the emergence of neo-liberal 
tax reform on the RPR's agenda, and more to the point, Jacques 
Chirac's.
Prior to 1981, Yvan Blot, Philippe Auberger and Alain Juppe
were well placed to influence their superiors and colleagues.446
Through them, to some degree, the party and the party leaders
were "persuaded" of the virtues of new right economic and social
policies. Yvan Blot, as already mentioned, through his positions
in the cabinets of the Giscardian interior ministers, Poniatowski
and Bonnet, as directeur de cabinet of RPR general secretaries
Devaquet and Pons, and as a member of the RPR's executive
committee, was in an enviable position for influencing people and
policies. During his tenureship as a high ranking party official
Fysh (1991) reports that Blot wrote 40 or 50 papers for Chirac
concerning "ideological orientation...and he gave scores of
lectures on various subjects to provincial party officials, as
part of the training courses organized by Mancel.1,447 Fysh,
however contends that Blot was not the lynchpin in Chirac's turn
to liberalism, although he did play
...a crucial role in conciliating conservative and 
liberal ideas in the party and channeling them into 
what he called 'national liberalism', in a way which 
helps explain the near unanimity with which the party 
fell into line behind the 1986 programme of 
government.448
P. Fysh, op.cit., p.326. 
Ibid., p.340.
Ibid., p.339.
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Blot's importance in the RPR's conversion is undeniable, and his 
probable impact on Chirac is difficult to refute. However, there 
were others, with a stronger claim on the party leader's ear, 
who, it could be asserted, made a greater impact.
Alain Juppe, as Chirac's speechwriter, economic adviser, 
head of RPR research and one of the co-founders of Club ' 89,449 
was one who had a stronger claim. Juppe, as one of Chirac's 
closest assistants from the mid-1970s, had been (and still is) in 
an optimal position to secure the RPR leader's ear. As a 
privileged member of Chirac's inner circle, no one could be 
better placed in 1979-81 to turn Chirac on to American neo­
liberalism and Ronald Reagan. Following his trips to the United 
States in 1978, to investigate the seismic rupture of the 
California tax revolt, and the furor which resulted from it, and 
again in 1980 when he returned as an attentive observer of the 
Reagan presidential campaign, Juppe was among those who supported 
Chirac in his bid to run for president in 1981. Not 
coincidentally, Chirac ran on a quasi-Reaganite platform in a 
campaign managed by Juppe, who was serving as directeur adjoint. 
Solan and Christian Gras (1991) said of Juppe's role,
Dans le domaine du liberalisme economique, le RPR de 
tradition plutot etatiste et colbertiste se trouve en 
port a faux. Mais il y a loin de sa theorie H la 
pratique de ses partisans. L'influence de Jupp6 permet 
de combler le fosse, et Chirac trouve une formule
The RPR's semi-independent think tank created in the fall of 1981 and 
which rivalled the Club de l'Horloge in terms of its assault on the 
ideological highground and its organization. It surpassed the Club de 
l'Horloge in terms of its political relevance.
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reconciliatrice: nMoins d'Etat, mieux d'Etat. 1,450 
The Gras note that the RPR had done an about face in terms of its 
philosophical outlook and policy approach in a very short period. 
They attribute this change, in part, to the influence of Alain 
Juppe.
Others too share the view that Juppe was a key figure in the 
Chirac inner circle. The collective opinion of those who know 
Juppe is, claims Thierry Desjardins (1986), that he, more than 
anyone, was best able to "faire du Chirac".451 However, Desjardins 
marginalizes Juppe's influence on Chirac's turn to neoliberalism. 
Contrary to the impact many - like the Gras - have attributed to 
Juppe, Desjardins contends that Chirac evolved naturally - 
"impose par les circonstances" - as would have de Gaulle, given 
domestic and international developments, to become the resolute 
neo-liberal he is today.
In any case, the point is not to ascertain who converted 
Chirac, but merely to highlight those people who were best placed 
to influence him. As Chirac's speech writer during the 1981 
campaign Juppe framed the expenditure cuts, tax cuts and supply- 
side proposals - which would have made the new economists proud - 
articulated by the RPR leader. From the autumn of 1981, as 
general secretary of the Club 89, Juppe was a principal force in
Solange et Christain Gras, Histoire de la Premiere RSpublique 
Mitterrandienne, (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1991), p.124.
T. Des-lar-dins, 1986, op.cit., p.50.
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the RPR's neo-liberal conversion and policy rethink. 452 The pre- 
1986 party program, "Libre et Responsable", reflected to a large 
degree the ideas and proposals found in Juppe's La Double Rupture 
(1983) . Moreover, Juppe himself, was directly involved in the 
drafting of the joint RPR-UDF platform, "Gouverner Ensemble"
(1986). In the run-up to the 1986 elections and as budget 
minister in the new conservative government, Juppe remained an 
ardent advocate of free-market and neo-liberal solutions. 
Moreover, as budget minister, he had a decisive influence on the 
new government's tax reform program, an important item on the 
agenda.
Philippe Auberger is one of the unsung heroes of the RPR's 
conversion to neo-liberalism. Peter Fysh (1991) places him, 
along with Blot and Juppe, as one of the main infiltrators of new 
right economic ideas in the RPR, primarily ideas related to 
taxation. As opposed to Juppe, Auberger appeared less interested 
in satisfying political ambitions and more concerned with the 
promotion and advocacy of ideas. As a former civil servant at 
the Conseil des Impots and charge de mission for economic and 
social affairs in Chirac's cabinet while Prime Minister from 
1974-76, Auberger had a keen interest in fiscal matters. As 
already mentioned, his trip to the United States in 1979 brought 
him face to face with the anti-tax movement in California, and 
which was spreading to other parts of the country.
Although declining an offer to be head of research at RPR
452 See, Jean-Louis Bourlanges, 1988, op.cit., p.115.
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headquarters, Auberger was to assume an important role as an
unofficial tax adviser. Fysh (1991) explains,
But on his return from the USA he did transmit to the 
party leader directly the fruits of his experience, 
sending him, at his request, monthly briefing papers on 
economic questions.453
Fysh's interview with Auberger quotes him as saying,
"...so those elements were used, if you like, in the 
platform (of 1981) in which Chirac began to say that we 
had to reduce taxes and that state expenditure was too 
high. "454
Auberger's contributions went beyond notes and papers to Chirac.
He also was involved in the drafting of party programs and
platforms. Between 1981 and 1986, Auberger served as the RPR's
expert on tax affairs, and many of the party's tax proposals were
generated by him. He was also asked to participate on one of the
committees set up to draft the joint RPR-UDF platform for 1986,
"Gouverner Ensemble".455 So, as Chirac's unofficial tax adviser,
and then as official RPR tax expert, it was under Auberger's
auspices that Chirac's rather cavalier and ambiguous approach to
< +
taxation was honed and became an obsession with tax cuts and 
reductions in the prelevements obligatoires. Auberger's book,
L'Allergie Fiscale (1984), prefaced by Chirac himself, though 
revealing the author's more subdued enthusiasm for a Reaganite 
approach to fiscal matters, is a balanced and intelligent case
P. Fysh, op.cit., p.327. 
Ibid.
Ibid., p.327.
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454
455
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for neo-liberal tax reform in France.456 
* Conclusion
The impact of these actors and organizations is indubitably 
difficult to measure. Although France's liberal heritage and its 
20th century adherents like Aron, Allais, Rueff, Armand and 
others had certainly helped prepare the ideological terrain - 
much as Enoch Powell, Iain McLeod, the Institute of Economic 
Affairs and the Bow Group had done in Britain - it was a new 
generation, influenced by developments outside their own country 
and eager to promote ideas and policies best able to resolve the 
economic; political and social uncertainties faced by France at 
the end of the 1970s, which was largely responsible for the 
emergence of free market economics and promoting tax reform onto 
the political agenda. Together they tilled the soil, sowed fresh 
seed and tended the crop.
While a new generation of politicians - the so-called cadets 
- emerged as promoters and advocates of neo-liberal solutions in 
the 1970s and 1980s, they were by no means 100 per cent agreed on 
philosophy, approach, specific policies or intended effects.
Their differences betrayed their particular individual 
experiences, ideological dispositions, institutional frames of 
reference and ambitions. Yet, it can be cautiously asserted that 
each, in their own way, to one degree or another, played a role 
in channeling, articulating and promoting ideas which led Jacques 
Chirac to take up the cause of free market economics, which led
See, P. Auberger, op.cit.
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the RPR to transform its economic policy, and eventually obliged 
the socialist government of Francois Mitterrand to reconsider the 
direction and efficacy of its own economic policies from 1982. 
Chirac, the Center-right and the Liberal Renaissance
Beginning with the campaign for the 1981 presidential 
elections, tax reform moved from the debating fora of 
intellectual circles to a central and very public position in 
French political debate. The successful manipulation of this 
issue by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in their respective 
election campaigns and its apparent popular appeal could not be 
ignored in France. One candidate in particular, Jacques Chirac 
intended to capitalize on this issue and make neo-liberal tax 
cuts a chief plank in his manifesto.
The failure of economic policies introduced by Giscard and 
Barre, which helped propel the left to power in 1981, opened the 
window for an opportunistic Chirac to step in and fill the policy 
and political vacuum. It was Jacques Chirac, the one-time 
crypto-socialist who adopted and advocated neo-liberal solutions 
with a conviction worthy of a Reagan or Thatcher. The tax 
message enunciated by Chirac during his bid for the presidency in 
1981 consisted of simplification, incentives for investment, tax 
cuts and shifting the incidence of taxation from direct to 
indirect. 457 In a speech at Marseilles on February 24, 1981, - 
Chirac made reference to the alarming growth in prelevements
Interestingly, a majority of ^interviewees had no recollection that 
Chirac had campaigned on a Reaganite tax cuts theme in 1981.
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obligatoires (p.o.) and outdid all the other candidates in his
promises to cut taxes. 458 By the spring of 1981, Chirac was
promising a reduction in p.o. from their current level of 42% to
40% in two years' time. He even backtracked on his earlier
enthusiasm for a wealth tax, a particular reform very popular
with the public.459 Chirac pledged to encourage the liberation of
productive forces through tax cuts and a reduction in state
administrative controls.
The other candidates were not as forthcoming as Chirac, and
the best they could do was to promise to hold p.o. steady.460
They ignored or avoided the free market debate, thus leaving the
ideological terrain wide open for Chirac to exploit,
L'economie de 1'offre est devenue depuis 1'election de 
Ronald Reagan un theme a la mode. Dans la plupart de 
ses raisonnements, M. Giscard d'Estaing tourne 
superbement le dos a cette petite revolution 
intellectuelle. Le merite de la nouvelle ecole est de 
rappeler que le moteur de l'activite economique, c'est 
la production offerte sur le marche dans des conditions 
de rentabilite normale. M. Chirac a incontestablement
He proposed reducing the tax burden by FF30 billion primarily by 
exonerating from income tax those taxpayers earning less than FF5,000 
per month, and a 5% cut for all the others (see: Le Matin, 6 Avril 
1981; Le Figaro, 6 Avril 1981).
When asked about the possibility of such a tax during his presidency, 
he answered, "Sur le capital, certainement pas. Sur les grosses 
fortunes, cel& pourrait se discuter, mais aujourd'hui je ne le propose 
pas." (Le Figaro, 6 Avril 1981, p.4). Opinion polls consistently 
showed around 80% in favor of a wealth tax.
Indeed, many interviewees asserted that taxation was not a major issue 
in the 1981 campaign. For example, Philippe Lagayette remarked "...ce 
n'§tait pas une question majeure...je ne conserve pas de souvenirs que 
c'£tait une question importante pendant la campagne..." (Philippe 
Lagayette, interview in Paris, France, May 20, 1992). However, other 
writers and my research, as well as comments from a few interviewees 
proved that the opposite was true. As Patrick Careil noted, "Le theme 
de la reforme fiscale a §t£ un des themes tres importants de la 
campagne £lectorale de 1981." (Patrick Careil, interview in Paris, 
France, May 25, 1992).
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marque un point en axant son propre programme (d'autre 
part fort imprecis) sur ce theme mobilisateur, ce que 
Giscard d'Estaing a dti reconnaitre dans son emission 
televisee (quand il s'est agit de la diminution des 
charges pesant sur les entreprises) .461
In some academic and political circles neo-liberal economics had
become the new paradigm. Chirac had made the paradigm his own,
while the other candidates chose to ignore what was seen as a
'little' and 'foreign' intellectual revolution. Unable to turn a
blind eye to the facts of the electoral victories enjoyed by
Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, and Chirac's steady rise in
the opinion polls, President Giscard d'Estaing was compelled to
poach on neo-liberal territory, at the very least, in order to
prevent Chirac drawing away support on the right. Indeed,
towards the end of the campaign, the President adopted some of
Chirac's rhetoric and ideas much to Chirac's consternation.
Despite the President's 'last-minute' acknowledgement of the
political gain to be won from neo-liberal posturing, this did
come rather late in the game to do him any good.
Given what we know about Jacques Chirac, his Gaullist,
dirigist and Keynesian tendencies, it seems almost impossible to
believe he of all people should become the standard bearer for
neo-liberal tax reform. We have put forward some possible causes
for his conversion, including the role of policy entrepreneurs
and politics. Some authors attribute Chirac's conversion to a
Le Monde, 1 Avril 1981, p.11. For an insightful look at the supply- 
side theory debate in the United States, its application by the Reagan 
administration and the French perspective see Jean Louis Syren, "fitats- 
Unis: l'fimergence de l'ficonomie de l'Offre", Revue d' £conomie
Politique, no.5, Septembre/Octobre 1981.
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natural evolution (T. Desjardins, 1986) and others to his innate 
political instincts (F-0 Giesbert, 1987). I will not attempt a 
review of the explanations concerning the causes of Chirac's neo­
liberal conversion, as others have already done so quite 
substantively. 462 Furthermore, we have already delved into a 
number of factors that could be identified as instrumental to 
that conversion.
In light of international political and economic 
developments as well as domestic developments which discredited 
the political consensus, raised the spectre of a left in power, 
and gave impetus to groups and individuals with "unconventional" 
ideas, some of whom were in prime positions to influence Chirac, 
it seems natural that Chirac should indeed recognize the appeal 
of the neo-liberal discourse. Moreover, given Chirac's 
ideological malleability, the Reaganite/Thatcherite mantle was 
assumed without remorse.463 As his biographers, Pierre Jouve and 
Ali Magoudi (1987) point out,
Jacques Chirac est le contraire du doctrinaire...Ce 
tacticien pragmatique est capable de retournements 
complets...II est aux antipodes de l'ideologie pure 
bien qu'il puisse saisir provisoirement des bribes, 
voires des pans entiers a une ideologie d'emprunt. Au
See e.g.: Peter Fysh, op.cit.; Pouvoirs, no.28, 1984; F-0 Giesbert,
1987, op.cit.); Bernard Rideau, op.cit.; Jean Badouin, "Le Moment Neo- 
Liberal du RPR: Essai d'interpretation", Revue Francaise de Sciences 
Politicoes, vol.40, no.4, D4cembre 1990; P. Jouve and A. Magoudi, 
Chirac Portrait Total, (Paris: Carrere, 1987).
Raymond Aron once characterized Chirac as, "toujours en quete d'un 
slogan electoral qu'il abandonne quelques jours apres l'avoir invent^." 
(Raymond Aron, M6moires, Paris: Julliard, 1983, p.574).
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liberalisme reaganien si necessaire ,464 
Equipped with this analysis it is easier to understand Chirac's 
conversion from social-democratic dirigiste to radical neo­
liberal. He was not firmly anchored to any one ideology or 
politico-economic philosophy. But what compelled Chirac to shed 
his etatiste past and become a neo-liberal?
Franz-Olivier Giesbert (1987), another Chirac biographer, 
reasons thusly,
L'etatiste est devenu liberal. Que s'est-il pass£ pour 
qu'il mette ainsi au rancart le Chirac des annees 
soixante-dix? Comme Zorro, Ronald Reagan est arrive.
Et, avec son verbe, il a tout change. Le maire de 
Paris a tire les conclusions du raz de maree electoral 
qui, l'annee precedente a deferle sur les Etats-Unis.
II a compris que les solutions planificatrices etaient 
passees de mode; il s'est done empresse de celebrer les 
recettes liberales. Il a trique les manuels de Keynes 
pour ceux de Frederic Bastiat... Son liberalisme est un 
role de composition mais il le tient comme s'il n'en 
avait jamais eu d'autres.465
According to Giesbert and others, it was the appearance of Reagan
and the neo-conservative (neo-liberal) revolution in the United
States that profoundly affected Chirac. Ironically, only a few
years earlier, Chirac had disparaged Bastiat and the "erreurs du
liberalisme". In early 1981, however, he was homo-liberal is.
Although the campaign speeches and pledges clearly indicate
a change prior,- some attribute Chirac's neo-liberal conversion to
Pierre Jouve and Ali Magoudi, Chirac Portrait Total, (Paris: Editions 
Carrere, 1987) p.161. Alain Juppe, commenting on Chirac's ideological 
flexibility during the tutellage of Juillet-Garaud acerbically 
remarked, "Il se laissait tellement materner qu'il n'avait plus guere 
de prise sur ses id£es. Et chaque fois qu'il prenait une initiative, 
on lui faisait comprendre qu'il n'y connaissait rien et ne disait que 
des conneries" (Franz-Olivier Giesbert, 1987, op.cit., p.291).
465 F-0. Giesbert, 1987, op.cit. p.335.
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after the elections of 1981 .466 Roger Priouret in an article for 
Le Nouvel Observateur attributes the change in strategy and the 
hasty shelving of Atout France (the RPR manifesto published in 
1980) to Chirac's marketing men. 467 In this Elie Crespi, a 
marketing specialist from the private sector who was signed on to 
conduct research and advise Chirac on his image, probably played 
an important role. He was soon made secretaire national for 
communications and a member of the RPR's executive committee.
Fysh (1991) cites Crespi as one of those men closest to Chirac 
with the most influence. 468 His interview with Yvan Blot also 
revealed that Crespi was an influential advocate of liberalizing 
economic policies, which could corroborate the assertion made by 
Roger Priouret.
Jacques Chirac, learning from the lessons taught by Reagan 
and Thatcher and intent on distancing himself from the President 
and his policies as well as the Socialist candidate, Francois 
Mitterrand, readily adopted the credo of the neo-liberals: less 
state intervention, more private intitiative, more individual
Maurice Szafran in Chirac ou les Passions de Pouvoir (Paris: Grasset, 
1986) puts Chirac's conversion to after the 1981 presidential 
elections, although he quotes Edouard Balladur as saying, "Moins 
d'§tat, en 6conomie par exemple? Mais Chirac n'a cess6 de d^fendre 
cette thSse pendant la campagne prSsidentielle" (p.290). P. Fysh 
(1991) quotes Jacques Boyon, dSlSguS national for local government at 
the Rue de Lille from 1981-84, as denying that Chirac's 1981 campaign 
was based on a liberal theme (p.222). As already noted, many 
interviewees expressed surprise- when confronted with the fact of 
Chirac's neo-libera-3r campaign theme In 1981. "As early as that?" 
exclaimed one.
Roger Priotfret, "Haro sur l'Etatisme", Le Nouvel Observateur, 23 
Fevrier 1981, pp.30-31.
P. Fysh, op.cit., p.97.
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responsibility, competition and free markets, and lower taxes.469
Sa campagne presidentielle contre la 'socialisation 
rampante' de notre economie et la bureaucratie de 
l'Etat, pour des economies budgetaires et un allegement 
de la pression fiscale, bref un 'reaganisme a la 
francaise' . . .470
Although Chirac's message continued to attract increasing support 
particularly among business executives, farmers, the liberal 
professions, small shopkeepers and artisans, he managed to place 
third overall in the first round of the election, winning a 
respectable 18% of the vote.471 However, whether seduced by 
Chirac's campaign or disenamored of Giscard d'Estaing and 
Giscardien policies, the former Prime Minister's electorate was 
very narrowly based. The large majority of voters, senior 
citizens and blue and white collar workers, were less than 
impressed with Chirac's new-found liberal message.
This apparent disinterest in liberal themes was not lost on 
Andre Fanton, the delegue national for communications at the Rue 
de Lille from 1979. After conducting several in-depth opinion 
polls on issues and candidates, he was persuaded that a Chirac
Alain Leroux, Grands tconomistes et Partis Politicoes, (Paris: La Table 
Ronde, 1983) asserts that the adoption of neo-liberal themes for his 
election campaign was done rather precipitously, "Le temps manque pour 
affdter correctement les batteries" (p.64).
Jean Chariot, "Les Consultations d'Avril-Juin 1981", Pouvoirs, no.20, 
1982, p.43.
Chirac was the preferred candidate over his rivals for a majority of 
farmers, business executives and liberal professionals (Olivier Duhamel 
and Jean-Luc Parodi, "Chronique de l'Opinion Publique", Pouvoirs, 
no.18, 1981, pp.165-6). For further information on the 1981 vote see 
Olivier Duhamel and Jean-Luc Parodi, "L7Evolution des Intentions de 
Vote, Contribution cl l7Explication de I 7 Election Presidentielle de 
1981", Pouvoirs, no.18, 1981 and Jerome Jaffre, op.cit., Pouvoirs,
no.20, 1982.
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candidacy, particularly one run on a neo-liberal platform, was 
ill-advised. In his interview with Peter Fysh (1991), Fanton 
asserted that deep down, the French are not liberal. 472 He warned 
that liberal themes a la Reagan or Thatcher would not be popular 
with a public still firmly attached to progressive taxation and a 
comprehensive social security system. 473 Apparently, though, 
Chirac's marketing men thought otherwise. 474 Needless to say, his 
warning was prophetic, at least for the short term.
Chirac, with 18% of the vote, came in third on the first 
ballot behind Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Francois Mitterrand. 
Significantly, throughout the campaign, Chirac attracted growing 
support, particularly among industrialists and professionals,
P. Fysh, op.cit., p.250-2.
Ibid., p.252. A poll conducted for L'Expansion in early 1982 showed
4 8% of French people interviewed recommended an increase in income 
taxes in the case where the state needed additional receipts 
(L'Expansion, no.187, 19 Fevrier 1982), Similarly, a BVA poll
conducted for Paris Match in early June 1982 revealed that in order to 
reduce resource inequalities a majority felt that the government should 
raise income taxes (51% v. 39%) and to maintain social security 
benefits it should raise social security contributions (59% v. 32%)
(Paris Match, no. 1727, 2 Juillet 1982) . Even as late as 1985 when the 
opposition was robustly embracing liberalism and Fabius and Beregovoy 
were attempting to reconcile socialism with the free market, SOFRES 
polls were showing a clear majority of people disapproved of any 
disengagement of the state in social matters, i.e. welfare and 
unemployment benefits, SMIC and the retirement at 60 (SOFRES, L fOpinion 
Publique en 1985, Paris: Gallimard, 1985, pp.95-7). A SOFRES poll 
conducted in January 1985 posed the question, "Since the arrival of the 
left to power, in what areas are you particularly satisfied with the 
action of Francois Mitterrand and his government?" Of most importance 
to the public was the reduction in the age of retirement to 60 (cited 
by 45%) ; next was the fifth week of paid vacation (40%) ; this was 
followed by defense of human rights (36%); then the creation of the 
wealth tax (27%) ; and in sixth place behind the 39 hour work week was 
the decision to reduce taxes by 5% in 1985 (22%). (SOFRES, L'Opinion 
Publique 1986, Paris: Gallimard, 1986, p.38). These polls reveal that 
while the French remain strongly attached to their acquis sociaux, they 
show little enthusiasm for tax cuts/reform.
474 For more information on Chirac's marketing men see e.g., J. Chariot, 
"The Fall of Giscard" in H. Penniman, ed., France at the Polls 1981 and 
1986, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), p.58, ftnt.83.
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small shopkeepers, farmers and the self-employed. 475 A core base 
of support was there. It just wasn't broad enough. However, the 
fact that Chirac's candidature and message appealed to 18% of 
those voting should not be underrated. Not only did this 
represent a core of Chirac loyalists but the message conveyed 
would become increasingly attractive to a larger public as time 
passed.476
Des sa campagne presidentielle de 1981, Jacques Chirac 
avait reussi a capter a son profit un courant 
d'hostilite a la puissance publique, encore largement 
souterrain mais que les debordements socialistes en 
matiere de prelevement fiscal et d'extension du secteur 
public allaient brutalement liberer dans 1'opinion.477
Chirac would have to wait for a more congenial alignment of
forces that would make the time right for his neo-liberal
message.
While Chirac's ideas were presented in a similar economic 
climate to that.confronting both Reagan and Thatcher, one 
apparently conducive to a neo-liberal message, the broader social
See, J. Chariot in H. Penniman, ed., op.cit., pp.48-49. Also, see, C. 
Ysmal, "D'une droite en sursis A une droite d£faite, 1974-81", in A. 
Lancelot, ed., 1981: Les Elections de l'Alternance, (Paris: Presses 
de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1986), pp.161-163.
The message became more widely diffused and popular thanks to the 
leadership and advocacy offered by Chirac, as well as the training and
'indoctrinating' efforts of RPR general secretary, Bernard Pons and his 
directeur de cabinet, Yvan Blot. Other political figures like, Raymond 
Barre and cadets of the center-right like Alain Jupp6, Alain Madelin 
and Charles Millon also were important 'agents of change'. Moreover, 
a number of organizations had been created to promote discussion and 
diffusion of free-market ideas in addition to the Club de l'Horloge and 
the new economists, i.e. Club '89, le Cercle and GRAL. For further 
information on the role played by these individuals and groups see: P. 
Sagoda, "Les Cercles Ext^rieurs du RPR" and J. Fremontier, "Les Jeunes 
filus du RPR: des heritiers ou des parricides?", Pouvoirs, no. 28, 1984; 
S. Baumann, 1982, op.cit.; J. Fremontier, 1990. op.cit.; P. Fysh, 
op.cit., chs.4,5,8.
477 J-L. Bourlanges, 1988, op.cit, p.125.
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ground was largely fallow. 478 The call for less state and lower 
taxes fell on unappreciative ears. The attachment to the welfare 
state and egalitarian policies and the preoccupation with social 
justice had far deeper roots among the French public than perhaps 
Chirac and the RPR leadership were aware. 479 Any notions, 
proposals or policies even remotely associated with the center- 
right stood little chance of success compared to those put 
forward by the left.
Unlike the American election of 1980 and the British 
election of 1979, neo-liberal tax reform was not a significant 
issue in the French presidential or legislative elections of 
1981, even if Chirac had hoped to make it one. Of most concern 
to voters, according to an April 1981 poll conducted by SOFRES, 
was unemployment followed by foreign affairs and institutions.
The public, anxious for new solutions to the problems which 
plagued France, looked to the Socialists and their vision of 
France's economic and social future. The call for less state and
Public opinion polls showed an electorate which classed itself on the 
left (42%) as opposed to on the right (31%) and a significant minority 
(27%) considered themsleves as neither (by 1985 those sympathizing with 
the values expressed by the right were in the majority) . Moreover the 
voters viewed Francois Mitterrand and his policies as most apt for 
solving the problems of principal concern to them, including fighting 
unemployment, inflation and social injustices (see, D. Lindon, he 
Marketing Politique, Paris: Dalloz, 1986, pp.21-22). For further
commentary on the state of public opinion around the time of the 1981 
campaign, see, E. Cohen, "Les socialistes et l'Sconomie" in E. 
Dupoirier and G. Grunberg, eds., La Drole Defaite de la Gauche, 
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1986), pp.78+; R. Cayrol, 
"The Electoral Campaign and the Decision-Making Process of French 
Voters" in H. Penniman, ed., 1988, op. cit., pp.141-142.
Ironically, a Louis Harris - France poll in mid-April 1980 showed that 
of all the complaints levelled against President Giscard d'Estaing, the 
largest majority of respondents (64%) mentioned heavy taxes, followed 
by aggravated social inequalities (35%) (from L'Express, 10-16 Mai 
1980, cited by J. Chariot in H. Penniman, ed., 1988, op.cit., p.26).
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lower taxes fell on unappreciative ears. Moreover, the 
attachment to the welfare state and egalitarian policies 
presented a problematic terrain for the introduction of neo­
liberal ideas and solutions. The electorate rejected 
Giscardien/Barrist methods and solutions in 1981 in favor of the 
left. However, as disaffection and disillusion with Socialist 
economic management grew, Chirac's call for less state 
intervention, lower taxes and greater individual responsibility 
took on a new saliency within two years of the Socialists' 
assumption of the reins of power. The Socialists were 
unwittingly helping to prepare the ground for neo-liberal ideas 
and solutions.
Nonetheless, whatever the outcome of the 1981 elections and 
the climate of opinion, the tax question was "out of the closet" 
and on the table for debate. Chirac had obliged the other 
candidates in the presidential election to stake out positions on 
the issue. Even Mitterrand made his own promise that the tax 
burden would not rise above 42% under a Socialist government, and 
emphasized his plans to lower taxes for those on modest 
incomes. 480 He was even heard to declare "...conduire ces 
prelevements au-dela de 42%, ce serait ruiner 1'initiative.1,481 
It has been said that the tax proposals in Mitterrand's "110 
Propositions", published in January 1981, represented a retreat
480
481
T. Gandillot, op.cit., p.79.
Le Point, no.622, 20 AoGt 1984, p.37.
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from the radical proposals of the 1970s. 482 Some interviewees 
denied that Mitterrand had softened the Socialists' "faire payer 
les riches" message. Others, like Patrick Careil, in contrast, 
asserted that Mitterrand had indeed dropped the more radical 
overtones of the Socialists' messages, in part, because of the 
changed economic climate by 1981 - this was also confirmed by 
Jean Choussat, another interviewee - compared with 1972, 1974 or 
1978, and the need to rally the support of the "grands acteurs 
economiques et des groupes internationaux. 1,483 Raymond Barre 
contended that Francois Mitterrand was merely pandering to a 
certain element in the electorate suspicious of politicians who 
sought to raise taxes. 484 Yves Mansion and Jean Choussat felt the 
this adroit maneuver was political for a number of reasons: 1) in 
order to respond to claims made by the right that a left 
government would raise taxes; 2) to attract moderate voters; and 
3) to embarass Giscard over his management of the tax burden, 
which had risen during his septennat by one percent per year on 
average (see Appendix A, Table 1A) .485
MLe programme fiscal du candidat socialiste aux Elections 
pr§sidentielles de 1981 apparait en retrait, non seulement par rapport 
au Projet socialiste, mais meme par rapport au programme de 1978" (C. 
Heckly, op.cit., p.157).
Patrick Careil, interview in Paris, France, May 25, 1992. Careil,
however, insisted that Mitterrand had made no pledge on stabilizing or 
reducing p.o. during the campaign. That pledge came later instead, he 
said, "Si ma m£moire est bonne, ce n'est pas pendant la campagne de 
1981 qu'il a fait des promesses sur les taux de pr£16vements 
obligatoires, mais en 1983 ou 1984."
Raymond Barre, interview in Paris, France, June 2, 1995.
Yves Mansion, interview in Paris, France, June 2, 1992; Jean Choussat,
interview in Paris, France, May 12, 1992.
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Put on the defensive by both Chirac and Mitterrand,
President Giscard d'Estaing changed tack late in his campaign.
He went further from his promise to "limit" the charges borne by 
companies. He was now going to "reduce" them. Also rather late 
in his campaign, he promised to reform capital taxes, simplify 
the system and reduce p.o.. Trying to regain the offensive, he 
warned taxpayers about the threat to them posed by the Socialist 
program, "Messieurs les contribuables, bonne chance, car qui 
paiera?"486 Whether these developments could be interpreted as 
poaching on Chirac's ideological terrain or as a nod to the 
electoral successes of neo-conservative politicians and taxation 
policies in the United States and Britain, or merely as typical, 
tactical campaign rhetoric remains debatable. Certainly, the 
rate of p.o. in relation to gdp presented a problem for Giscard 
d'Estaing and Mitterrand as well as Chirac. It had become an 
important indicator for various reasons. But common to all was 
the idea of a "threshold" or a "limit", based on economic, 
sociological and psychological criteria.487
Despite his defeat in the presidential election, Chirac held 
firm to his new-found ideology. Ignoring the opinion polls and 
warnings of senior party figures, he continued to vaunt the 
virtues of the free market and individual initiative. Following 
the legislative elections of June 1981 and the Socialists'
Le Matin, 7 Avril 1981, p.4.
Pierre Rosanvallon, "L'ttat-providence a-t-il un Avenir?", Faire, 
nos.70-1, Septembre/Octobre 1981.
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overwhelming victory, the RPR and the UDF in opposition commenced
a serious rethink of strategy and policy. As already noted,
existing groups like the Club de l'Horloge, or new ones, like
GRAL, le Cercle, and Club 89 served as incubators and conduits
for the ideological rejuvenation of the two major political
organizations of the center-right, the RPR and the UDF.
Neo-liberal themes caught on quickly and proved more
enduring than many would have imagined. Chirac led the march
towards neo-liberalism with the sort of conviction worthy of
Reagan and Thatcher. Chirac said in an interview with Marc
Ullmann for Paris Match in early 1982,
...pour le moment le danger est de voir un Etat 
tentaculaire reduire les espaces de liberte...la 
production exige qu'un maximum de liberte soit laisse a 
1'initiative et a la responsabilite des individus. II 
faut diminuer les contraintes, en particulier sur les 
petites et moyennes entreprises, artisanales, 
commerciales, agricoles, liberales et bien entendu, 
industrielles...la priorite doit etre donnee a la 
reduction de la pression fiscale. Elle atteint en 
France des niveaux paralysants. J'ajouterai que les 
cotisations sociales percues sur les travailleurs ne 
doivent pas etre perpetuellement augmentees. Le 
gouvernement actuel paralyse le pays.488
During this interview, Chirac in his enthusiasm proposed reducing
the total tax burden to 36% from the level of 45% which he was
predicting for the end of 1982. Later in the year, on the
occasion of the sixth anniversary of the RPR at the floral park
at Vincennes, Chirac promised to protect the acquis sociaux, but
he insisted the state should be a garantor (garant) and not a
488 Paris Match, 5 Mars 1982, p. 68.
301
manager {gerant) .489
A more pragmatic tax strategy was devised soon thereafter. 
Promises were made to reduce p.o. to 40%, as opposed to the 
ambitious (and unrealistic) figure of 36% pledged in the Ullman 
interview. He promised to lower the tax burden, reduce state 
spending - particularly on the civil service and subsidies - and 
abolish any controls "qui paralysent 1'initiative et la 
responsabilite.1,490
Chirac's discourse, neo-liberal to the core, borrowed a page 
from Mrs. Thatcher's strategy - couching economic principles in 
populist terms by appealing to basic human instincts, i.e. 
liberty, individual responsibility and initiative, "more money in 
your pockets" etc. Mrs. Thatcher's policies and rhetorical 
approach were made Chirac's own. The RPR leader employed popular 
language to strike a sympathetic chord among the public.
However, he used terminology more soothing to the French ear, 
like "renouveau republicain" and "rassemblement". He unashamedly 
vaunted duly neo-liberal values but tied them to French 
sensibilities and traditions.
The themes articulated by Chirac were further developed by 
Alain Juppe in a book written under the aegis of the Club 89 
called La Double Rupture (1983) . This book was a testament to 
the appropriateness of neo-liberalism as a remedy for the
These very words were used by Philippe Baccou (1980) in his book for 
the Club de l'Horloge, Le Grand Tabou, op.cit.
Le Monde, 7 Decembre 1982, p. 10.
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economic and moral crisis in France brought on by the progressive
"socialisation" of the economy and the "etatisation" of daily
life. The book's author called for "Moins d'Etat, plus de
liberte." The growth in p.o. was cited as evidence that "plus
d'etat" and "moins de liberte" had become the norm in France and
the cause of its problems.
Pour notre part nous sommes convaincus que le 
developpement £conomique et par consequent social de la 
France est freine et a la limite etouffe par le poids 
global des prelevements... II est evident a nos yeux 
que...l'impot tue l'impot...la reduction des 
prelevements obligatoires est uiie condition necessaire 
du redressement economique .491
The author self-righteously drew attention to the acknowledgement
by the Socialist government itself of the alarming growth in p.o.
and the need to stabilize the tax burden. La Double Rupture made
it clear that a break with past trends and habits was imperative.
Tax reform would be a major means of achieving that break.
While Juppe's book advocated a reduction in taxes, and in
fact made very specific recommendations for company taxation, it
cited the Reagan administration and the Laffer theory - despite
speaking Lafferian language, "l'impot tue l'impot" (see above
quote) - as flawed examples to follow. In effect, the author was
challenging both the supply-side and Keynesian prescriptions.492
They denied the existence of a magic potion and admitted that
taxes could not be reduced without reducing expenditures. The
491 Alain Jupp4 et le Club 89, op.cit., pp.58-61.
492 “Nous recusons ce genre de chimere et renvoyons dos-^-dos les 
€conomistes de 1'off re et les Keynesiens" (A. Jupp§ et le Club 89, 
op.cit., p.66) .
303
model, it seems, was Thatcher rather than Reagan. Public 
expenditure must be controlled and reduced. The double rupture 
with policies practiced since WWII and since 1981 would come 
about by: 1) re-establishing budgetary and economic equilibrium, 
and 2) reducing spending and taxes.
Many of the measures proposed by La Double Rupture were 
incorporated in the 1984 RPR program, "Libres et Responsables - 
Projet pour la France" (Paris: Flammarion, 1984). This RPR tract 
would serve as a pre-manifesto for the 1986 legislative 
elections. 493 It toned down the almost Hayekian stridency of La 
Double Rupture, but remained faithful to ,its central tenets. The 
tract was a compilation and elaboration of ideas and proposals 
discussed at the RPR extra-ordinary congress in January 1983.
The main theme of its approach was summed up in its commitment to 
diminish the power of the state, and to liberalize and 
decentralize France's productive capabilities. Among the 
economic priorities spelled out were denationalization of state- 
owned banks and industries and a roll-back of trade union powers.
Significant attention was given to the issue of tax reform. 
While short on specifics, the tax pledges made included reducing 
company tax and social charges, lowering the burden on 
individuals, and exempting new share purchases from income tax. 
Tax reductions were deemed urgent and necessary because the
Although its authorship was unspecified, Andr€ Fanton in an interview 
with Peter Fysh revealed that the RPR's 1984 manifesto was in fact 
written by Jean-Louis Bourlanges (author of Droite, Annde Z€ro, 
op.cit.), a one-time member of Chirac's hotel de ville team (see, P. 
Fysh, op.cit., p.204).
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continual rise in the tax burden posed a threat to democracy. To
justify its tax proposals, "Libres et Responsables" cited the
example of the tax revolt in California and the world-wide trend
to lower taxes in response to citizen unrest over the intolerable
levels of taxation.
Trop vite qualifies de neo-poujadistes, les mouvements 
de protestation anti-fiscale qui ont a des titres 
divers affecte, outre les Etats-Unis d'Amerique, la 
plupart des opinions de 1'Europe de l'Ouest, sont le 
signe d'une inquietude generale devant la progression 
d'une fiscalite aux effets d'autant plus ressentis. . .494
Whereas other countries had been marching along the path of neo­
liberal tax reform for some time, France was characterized as the 
odd man out. It was time that the level of p.o. be recognized as 
a real threat and that action be taken.
In its discussion of the situation at home, "Libres et 
Responsables" credits Jacques Chirac with bringing tax reform to 
the center of political debate during the 1981 election campaign. 
It contends that Mitterrand owed his election in part to his 
promise not to raise the level of p.o., a promise which he broke. 
The commitment to tax reductions became an essential feature of 
the RPR's program. However the issue had caught on and the other 
parties of the center-right were soon hooked. Both Raymond Barre 
and Valery Giscard d'Estaing endorsed the notion of tax reform, 
although there was some disagreement among the parties of the 
center-right over the priority which should be given to tax cuts 
versus deficit reduction. In any event, all parties were agreed
494 Rassemblement pour la Republique, Libres et Responsables, un Projet 
pour la France, (Paris: Flammarion, 1984), p.44.
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that tax reform should be made a central plank in any future 
manifesto, whether joint or individual.
The manifesto, "Plate-forme pour Gouverner Ensemble", signed 
by Jacques Chirac for the RPR, and Jean Lecanuet for the UDF, was 
published on January 16 , 1986.495 It had been put together by a 
team led by Edouard Balladur (RPR), Alain Juppe (RPR), Alain 
Madelin (PR) and Gerard Longuet (PR). It pledged to liberate 
individual initiative, to reinforce the values of responsibility 
and effort, and to redefine the state's role. Encouraged by the 
much publicized economic recovery in the United States which had 
created over one million jobs and the tax reform bill under 
debate in Congress, the right's program acquired a certain 
saliency .496
Thierry Gandillot (1988), writing about the tax reform
movement in France and elsewhere, confirmed the effect of the
American tax reform on the French public and policy makers,
La reforme fiscale americaine fut a cet egard 
1'occasion d'une remarquable cacophonie hexagonale.
L'idee dominante qui en ressortit, au moins pour le 
grand public, fut que les Etats-Unis baissaient leurs
Raymond Barre and many Barristes taking issue with some of the 
platform's less pragmatic promises, but above all because of their 
hostility towards the idea of cohabiting with a Socialist head of 
state, refrained from associating themselves with the manifesto.
This American tax bill proposed three individual tax rate brackets 
between 15% and 35%, the elimination of various "tax expenditures" 
benefitting individuals and groups, the repeal of the investment tax 
credit and other corporate "tax reliefs" and the institution of a flat 
33% corporate tax rate. The Tax Reform Act of 1986: lowered
corporation tax from 50% to 34%; substituted two tax rates - 15% and 
28% - for the earlier 14 rates, whose top rate had been 50% (this 
eventually and effectively was modified to four rate brackets at 15, 
28, 33 and 28 per cent) ; made capital gains taxable as ordinary income; 
removed 4,800,000 people from the tax rolls by doubling personal 
exemptions and raising the standard deduction; eliminated or reduced 
numerous individual and corporate tax reliefs and expenditures.
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impots de facon spectaculaire alors que les notres 
restaient tres sieves. Conclusion logique de la 
pseudo-demonstration: il faut baisser les taux francais 
de l'impot sur le revenu pour rester competitif .497
Gandillot's sentiments had been expressed even earlier in several 
articles which had appeared in the press assessing the American 
tax reform and its consequences for France. 498 One article which 
appeared after the elections of 1986 confidently proclaimed, "Et 
1'example des Etats-Unis semble bien prouver que les baisses 
d'impots, ca marche."499
The impact of the American tax reform, psychologically or 
politically, was evidently not lost on the opposition. With 
respect to some of its objectives, the RPR-UDF manifesto 
specified the measures a future right government would implement. 
Featuring prominently were the commitments to reform or lower: 
cotisations sociales patronales, the taxe professionnelle, double 
taxation of dividends, high marginal rates of income tax,500 
income tax brackets, and the wealth tax (IGF). Certainly by 
1986, almost all RPR and UDF members had jumped on board the neo­
liberal bandwagon. Tax reform had become the center-right's 
'call to arms'.
In speeches and interviews, Jacques Chirac and other RPR
T. Gandillot, op.cit., p.114.
See: L'Express, no.1701, 10 Fevrier 1984; Paris Match, 7 Juin 1985,
pp.122-3; Le Point, no.727, 25 Aoflt 1986, pp.59-60; Le Nouvel
Observateur, 29 Aoflt 1986, pp.43-46; L'Express, no.1827, 11 Juillet
1986, pp.18-25.
L'Express, no.1827, 11 Juillet 1986, p.19.
A reduction to 50V was planned for the highest rate of 65V.
307
leaders were promising to reduce the p.o. by 1% a year, thereby 
bringing it down to 40%.501 There were also promises to generally 
reduce income taxes by 8% per year, to enact measures reducing 
taxes by FF20 billion for households and the same amount for 
businesses, to lower the top rate from 65% to 50%, to cut the IS 
"par paliers successifs" from 45% to 34%, and to reduce the TP by 
20-25% in two or three years before reforming it entirely by 
basing it on value added.502
Philosophical and policy developments in the center-right 
parties, underway even prior to the Socialist victory of 1981, 
gathered force in the early 1980s. Economic mismanagement by the 
Socialists and their growing unpopularity turned attention to the 
ideas and solutions advocated by the center-right. Borrowing 
ideas and rhetoric originally wielded with such success by 
conservative political leaders in Britain and the United States, 
the center-right grew increasingly confident that the political 
pendulum was swinging back their way. With socialist and 
dirigiste techniques and solutions to a large extent discredited, 
the Socialists were compelled to play a game whose rules were 
being set by an ascendant neo-liberal ideology. Jacques Chirac 
and the center-right parties were changing the terms of political 
debate in France. Rather than get caught in the neo-liberal 
wake, Mitterrand and the Socialists, at first grudgingly, and
L'Express, no.1759, 22 Mars 1985, p.22.
See: L'Express, no.1827, 11 Juillet 1986, p.25; L'Express, 19 Juillet 
1985, pp.18-21 and no.1823, 13 Juin 1986, pp.26-7; Le Point, no.727, 
25 AoQt 1986, p.60.
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then with an aplomb that won the respect of many opposition 
members, picked up the baton and ran with it.
Conclusion
Tax reform, as a political issue in the 1980s, was not 
simply determined by a presidential or ministerial declaration or 
a vote in the legislature. The processes which gave rise to the 
issue in the first place are more complex than that. Tax reform 
first emerged on the political agenda in France in the early 
1980s, springing from the liberal critique of the consensus 
progressiste to the birth of new groups which gave institutional 
expression to that critique and incubated ideas. Those ideas 
found advocates in French political circles by the beginning of 
the decade. The evolution was lengthy, and often coincidental 
and random.
The evolution of the tax reform idea in France has been 
recounted at such length, so that we may understand those 
institutions, groups and individuals that have been either 
directly or indirectly responsible for tax reform's emergence in 
French political debate. Furthermore, this description is 
necessary in order to provide us with the material that will help 
us to understand the processes which gave rise to the idea and 
helped bring tax reform onto the governmental agenda.
Understanding the conditions under which it evolved is 
essential to any discussion of tax reform as a real political 
issue in the 1980s. Why did the idea rise to the fore at all?
Did it endure? If so, why? What problems existed which the idea
309
reasonably addressed? Who nurtured the idea, who advocated it, 
and for what reasons? These are some of the questions that 
Chapters Three, Four and Five have attempted to address, albeit 
at the expense of somewhat lengthy description. The next chapter 
will continue to describe the evolution of tax reform from the 
specialized agendas of the center-right to the governmental 
agendas of President Mitterrand and the Socialist governments, 
and later the government led by Jacques Chirac. This section 
will attempt to explain why the time was ripe for tax reform, who 
was responsible for ensuring its place on the governmental 
agenda, and how the agenda item was itself transformed.
CHAPTER SIX
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CHAPTER SIX
- Tax Reform on the Governmental Agenda: Mitterrand and Co. -
Introduction
To say the Socialists intensified the etatiste, dirigiste 
character of the French state is admittedly only a partial truth. 
The double rupture planned by the right during their period in 
opposition, by 1986 when they assumed the reins of government, 
represented a much less drastic break than originally 
anticipated. It was under a Socialist government that tax reform 
was first implemented in the 1980s. It was not under Chirac's 
auspices that tax reform became government policy in France, but 
under Francois Mitterrand's. Granted, for the Socialists, tax 
reform had a more problematic evolution from idea to government 
policy, in part due to the inconsistency of neo-liberal notions 
and policies with long-cherished socialist attitudes and values.
By the mid 1980s, however, advocacy had become a cross-party 
phenomenon, not limited to a single political current or party -
the center-right in France - as was the case in Britain with the
Conservatives. The major differences between the left and the 
right, lay in the structure of the policy agenda and the extent 
to which tax reform would be implemented. But by the middle of 
the decade both left and right were extolling the virtues of neo­
liberal tax reform. In this chapter we will examine how the
Socialist government came to adopt the tax reform issue.
The Economy and Socialist Economic Management
Initially, the Socialists set out to implement tax reform of
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a character rather different from that being considered by 
governments in the United States or Great Britain. Its ends were 
revenue raising and social justice. The means for achieving 
those ends consisted of higher taxes on the wealthy and 
businesses, exoneration from taxation for taxpayers on modest 
incomes, lower indirect taxes for items of first necessity but 
higher for everything else. Faced with a stagnating economy and 
rising unemployment, the Socialist government opted for a 
strategy of Keynesian pump priming, while its neighbors and major 
competitors had abandoned Keynes for monetarist, supply-side and 
austerity policies.
The Socialists' program of social reforms and reflationary 
measures were costly and necessitated additional revenues. The 
recourse to higher taxation and bigger budget deficits were 
deemed the price worth paying. After all, wasn't this what the 
electorate had mandated? The Socialists with their slogans of 
"changer la vie" and "faire payer les riches" had successfully 
mobilized not only the progressive forces in the country, but 
also parts of the electorate traditionally close to the right and 
the center. Furthermore, the Socialists believed that the defeat 
of Valery Giscard d'Estaing, not to mention the social and 
economic problems which Mrs. Thatcher was then facing, 
demonstrated quite vividly that the monetarist policies and 
fiscal rectitude of the former regime and the current British 
government were unenforceable in the long run because of the
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unnacceptably high economic and social strains imposed. 503 And so 
they proceeded with their plans to alter the political, economic 
and social landscape of France, just as Margaret Thatcher and 
Ronald Reagan were bent on doing in their own countries.
However, in France it was to be a transformation of 
socialist design, not neo-liberal. Its spiritual fathers were 
Marx, Keynes and Schumpeter, not Burke, Hayek and Friedman. As 
with his American and British homologues, the French President's 
first budget envisaged changes intended - according to numerous 
Socialist experts - to change the general physiognomy of French 
society within the space of a generation. The tax system would 
be key in effecting this change.
The Socialists' tax program was to a limited extent inspired 
by Pierre Uri whose proposals sought to attack the institutional, 
structural and political causes of social and economic 
inequality. Moreover, for Uri, as for the Socialists, the state 
had commitments to society which precluded any possibility of an 
overall reduction in taxation. These commitments were manifested 
in such policies as the nationalization of 9 industrial groups 
and 36 banking and financial institutions, generous increases in 
SMIC, old age pensions, family and housing benefits, the creation 
of over 100,000 public sector jobs, new public housing 
construction, and other social measures, like reducing the 
working week to 3 9 hours, the retirement age to 60, and the
Financial Times, October 1, 1981, p.26.
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introduction of a fifth week of paid vacation.504
The ambitious program of "redistributive Keynesianism" 
comprised (and necessitated) several reforms to the tax system.505 
Jacques Delors at the Ministry of Finance and, to a greater 
extent, Laurent Fabius at the Ministry for the Budget, began to 
implement their tax strategy which, in part, reflected Uri's 
vision, if not his actual design. 506 Among the tax measures 
eventually written into legislation were the impot sur les 
grandes fortunes (IGF), 507 full indexation of all brackets,
These and other measures saw the budget deficit balloon from around 
FF51 billion in May of 1981 to around FF76 billion for 1981 overall and 
over FF100 billion in 1982.
The term "redistributive Keynesianism" is borrowed from P. Hall, 1986, 
op.cit., p.194.
Patrick Careil, who worked closely with Laurent Fabius at this time, 
divulged that he had examined many of Uri's proposals, and after some 
consideration determined that they were not feasible. He advised 
Laurent Fabius of his opinion, "11 y a eu cl cette epoque un livre 
important qui est sorti qui est le livre de Pierre Uri... "Changer 
l'impot pour Changer la France"...et c'est par rapport Sl ce livre que 
ce sont positionn£ les problemes des actions du gouvernement... J'avais 
besoin de r^diger des notes...en 1980...pour lui [Laurent Fabius] dire 
il ne pouvait pas faire de la r^forme Uri. La r^forme Uri, c'6tait de 
remplacer tout le systeme fiscal pour avoir une coherence dans 
1'ensemble...Oui, j'avais fait une analyse pour Laurent Fabius du livre 
de Pierre Uri qui etait extrimement intelligent mais dans laquelle je 
disais que les bouleversements qu'il introduisait dans le systdme 
fiscal francais §taient inconcevables et provoqueraient des d£sordres 
trds grands. Et il y a eu un d£bat dans le printemps 1981 et 
finalement Laurent Fabius a choisi de ne pas suivre les propositions 
de Pierre Uri de tout reformer. . .et on a decide que plutSt que de faire 
ca on allait proc^der & une s6rie de r£formes ponctuelles dans des 
domaines diffSrents. Dds le printemps 1981, on avait Scarte l'id6e de 
faire une reforme complete du systdme fiscal... qu'avait propos€e 
Pierre Uri..." (Patrick Careil, interview in Paris, France, May 25, 
1992).
The IGF was modified from its original version. Fabius lowered the 
upper rate from the promised 8% to 1.5% on wealth over FF3 million. 
Based on taxpayers self-declared patrimoine, this tax was expected to 
accrue FF4.5 billion. In the end, it brought around FF3 billion, 
partly due to exemptions for art and antiques. Mitterrand had decided, 
after listening to those around him who foresaw a flight of art and 
antiques from the country in order to escape the tax, to allow this 
exemption - it is interesting to note that Fabius's father was an art 
dealer. Also exempted was plant and machinery (l'outil de travail - 
les biens individuels affectSs un usage professionnel agricole,
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increases in VAT on some "luxury" goods and services, decreases
for "items of first necessity", a series of "exceptional"
majorations, prelevements and surtaxes (tax increases), and a new
top rate for income tax of 65% and reform of inheritance taxes
(for a listing of the major reforms in France between 1981 and
1989, see Appendix B). The Socialists, in power for the first
time in the history of the Fifth Republic, were intent on making
good long standing promises. Francois Xavier Stasse noted,
...je crois que dans un premier temps, pendant les 
premiers mois, le president et le gouvernement ont 
pense qu'il fallait appliquer notre programme. Nous 
avions un programme de campagne electorale...c'etait un 
programme redige en 1972...done pendant dix ans la 
gauche avait convaincu les francais que ce qu'il 
fallait faire c'etait d'augmenter les salaires, 
notamment les bas salaires, relancer l'economie par la 
consommation, parce que e'est ca qui cree les emplois.
Et done en 1981, quand nous sommes arrives au pouvoir, 
presque tout le monde pensait qu'il fallait faire ca.
On ne pouvait pas tout de suite changer la politique.508
The overarching goal was the reduction in inequalities and the
enhancement of social justice. Raymond Barre supported Stasse's
point, that the Socialists' program was out of date and reflected
an ideological perspective that was rapidly changing, "...du cote
de la gauche, e'etait de la fiscalite redistributrice...c'etait
la...ideologie des annees 1970 avec...des impositions plus
elevees. "S09
industriel et commercial) under FF2 million. This exemption was 
intimated during the campaign, but arguments made by Delors and 
opposition from Francois Ceyrac, Yvon Gattaz and the CNPF ensured that 
the promise was made policy, (see, P. Favier and M. Martin-Roland, 
1990, op.cit., pp.117-18).
Francois Xavier Stasse, interview in Paris, France, June 2, 1992.
509 Raymond Barre, interview in Paris, France, June 2, 1992.
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Another interviewee, Patrick Careil, commenting on the
Socialists efforts said,
La priorite c'etait la lutte contre les inegalites...et 
pour lutter contre les inegalites il y avait 
differentes mesures possibles - la fiscalite en etait 
une, mais pas du tout la seule. Done, la fiscalite 
etait une arme de lutte contre les inegalites, ce 
n'etait pas un objectif en soi la reforme fiscale.
Voila la difference avec Ronald Reagan et Margaret 
Thatcher...510
The heavier tax burden, for many taxpayers, imposed by the 
Socialists' tax program, and its rationalization as a means of 
reducing inequalities and enhancing social justice, was not only 
out of step with policies being enacted elsewhere, notably the 
United States and Britain, but also deflated any hopes that the 
tax burden would be held at 42% of gdp, as was promised.
In light of these efforts, it was rather paradoxical to hear 
the Chef d'etat, the Prime Minister and other ministers, at 
various intervals, asserting that the level of prelevements would 
be held steady. Not only had Mitterrand promised this during the 
election campaign, but also in various public declarations 
following his election. For example, in his first press 
conference in September 1981, the President declared that the tax 
burden would not increase in 1982.511 At the end of the day, 
Francois Mitterrand's management of the rate of p.o. differed 
little from Giscard d'Estaing's (see Appendix A, Figure 1A). The
Patrick Careil, interview in Paris, France, May 25, 1992.
He also spoke of the "mauvais impot sur les plus values” which must 
disappear, and the ”r£fonte indispensable" of the TP. (See, Le Monde, 
26 Septembre 1981, pp.10-11).
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tax burden continued its upward assent from 41.9% of gdp in 1981 
to 44.6% in 1984.
In the the spring of 1982, the President enunciated two 
important guidelines for government economic policy: 1) the 
budget deficit must be kept within a limit of 3% of gdp and 2) no 
additional taxation "this year or next."512 In August 1982, after 
several reports by the press - not only right-wing - speculating 
about tax increases for the coming year, the Budget Minister, 
Laurent Fabius was compelled to denounce as "false rumors" and 
deny any plans to increase "tax pressure" next year.513 Plagued 
by a worsening social (demonstrations by farmers and small 
businessmen), political (losses in the January 1982 by-elections 
and the March 1982 cantonal elections), and economic (stagnating 
industrial production, falling investment, stubborn inflation, a 
commercial account in deficit, the franc under constant threat,514 
rising unemployment, and sluggish gdp growth) climate, the 
government undertook a serious rethink of its policies and future 
strategy.
In liaison with Philippe Lagayette, the directeur de cabinet 
and economic advisor to Jacques Delors, and Francois-Xavier 
Stasse, the economic adviser at the Elysee, the Matignon 
economics team of Henri Guillaume and Jean Peyrelevade - drew up
Financial Times, June 10, 1982, p.48.
Financial Times, August 6, 1982, p.2.
There had already been one devaluation in 1981, with a second to follow 
in June 1982 and a third in March 1983.
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a plan for rigueur involving devaluation, price and salary 
blockages, budget cuts and credit controls.515 To supplement the 
Finance Minister's anti-inflation plan unveiled in January 1982, 
the new strategy would be unveiled in stages as the plans de 
rigueur of June 1982 and March 1983.516
Above all, this change in policy was imposed by external 
developments. The economic recovery was not just around the 
corner, as many Socialists had optimistically predicted, and 
French economic policy - running counter to the restrictive 
policies pursued in the U.S. and in other EC countries - could 
not long be sustained.517 Raymond Barre commented that Mitterrand 
saw his influence, his authority in the European Community, 
threatened by the pursuit of ineffective and internationally 
unacceptable economic policies, "II a vu son autorite au sein de 
la Communaute compromise par la faiblesse de l'economie francaise 
du fait des erreurs de sa politique."518 Georges Egret, commenting 
on the changes to business taxation which have taken place in 
France, pointed out that, in general, political developments
According to Jacques Attali, the idea of price and salary blockages was 
first aired by Christian Goux, the President of the Finance Committee
in the National Assembly, in a letter to Francois Mitterrand on April 
22, 1982 (J. Attali, 1993, op.cit., p.213).
All these individuals as well as other important actors - Alain Mine, 
Jean Riboud, Jacques Attali, Laurent Fabius and Jacques Delors - were 
considered, "plus rigoureux que nature, plus capitalistes que 
socialistes, avant tout gestionnaires sans £tats d'Sme. Ils ont jou£ 
un role essentiel de juin 1982 k mars 1983, e'est-^-dire au moment des 
choix §conomiques d£cisifs" (Jean-Marie Colombani, Portrait du 
President, Paris: Gallimard, 1985, p.38).
See, The Times, July 11, 1983, p.4.
Raymond Barre, interview in Paris, France, June 2, 1992.
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outside France have - and did have - a considerable impact on 
domestic tax policy makers.519
Already by the end of 1981 important figures in the 
government were entertaining doubts about how long France could 
afford to be out of step with the rest of its partners. The 
external pressures for a new policy direction were highlighted by 
the Prime Minister himself, who said, "Les politiques de droite 
de nos partenaires nous obligent a une rigueur accrue...'1520 In 
light of the domestic economic situation and the rethinking of 
government economic and fiscal strategy, the plan to implement a 
vast socialist tax reform, inspired by Pierre Uri, coordinated 
and advocated by Pierre Joxe, and to which the President had been 
particularly attached, was suppressed.521
From the spring of 1982 the government's approach to 
business taxation began to change, albeit tentatively. Delors 
and Fabius turned their concern from alleviating the burdens of 
the unemployed and low income earners to alleviating those of 
business, which, over the period since 1981, had borne the brunt 
of the costs imposed by the government and the recession - a fact 
which the business sector through its CNPF spokesmen tirelessly
Georges Egret, interview in Paris, France, May 2, 1992.
L'Express, no.1656, 1 Avril 1982, p.60. However, when asked if the 
government was pursuing a "politique de droite", the Prime Minister
categorically denied this.
J. Attali, 1993, op.cit., pp.114,128,144,146,161.
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proclaimed. 522 In mid-April, after discussions between Pierre 
Mauroy, the Prime Minister, Jacques Delors, the Minister of 
Finance, and Yvon Gattaz, president of the CNPF, the government 
announced a reduction of FF11 billion in the TP over two years, a 
stabilization of employers' social charges, and the transfer of a 
portion of the cost of family allowances from employers to 
employees.
The change in attitudes and strategy was embodied in the 
government's Interim Plan for 1982-83 prepared by Michel Rocard. 
Among the measures featured in the Interim Plan were: 1) a 
stabilization of the social charges paid by businesses; 2) tax 
reliefs for PMEs and selected industries; 3) comprehensive reform 
of taxation and social charges in respect of greater efficiency 
and social equity, but with no increase in the tax burden, so as 
"not to compromise the competitiveness of businesses exposed to 
international competition"; 4) modernization of the impot fonder 
and a more general reform of local taxes; and 5) modification of
See, Financial Times, November 4, 1982, p. 3 and December 15, 1982,
p.15. The CNPF's social committee claimed in July 1983, that since the 
Socialists came to power the charges borne by business had been made 
heavier by FF62.4 billion. The government's director of Forecasting 
at the Ministry of Finance claimed the cost due to the Socialists was 
figured at FF27.7 billion. Despite this disagreement, both sides 
agreed that the charges borne by industry had not ceased to increase 
since the first oil shock of 1973. As a result the financial situation 
of French companies, their profitability, their investment capacity, 
etc., had been detrimentally affected (see, Le Nouvel Observateur, 
no.974, 8 Juillet 1983, p.30). L'Express confirmed, "Mime si
l'ensemble des Francais moyens sont sollicitis, le gros de l'effort 
parafiscal est demande aux cadres, aux professions liberales et aux 
patrons de l'industrie et du commerce. C'est, en effet, dans ces 
categories que se recrute la majorite des 2 million de contribuables 
qui, avec le tiers du revenu imposable global, paient pris des deux 
tiers du total de l'impot sur le revenu." (L'Express, no.1656, 1 Avril 
1983, p.67).
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consumption taxes. 523 These measures and the official rhetoric
represented a fundamental change of priorities: boosting
investment and employment through supply-side stimulation as well
as the no less important goals of reducing inflation and the
current account deficit.
On this change of strategy the Financial Times of September
28, 1982 remarked,
As one of the most important signs of change, the 
government has adopted the creed which could almost 
have come out of a Conservative party manifesto, that 
the emphasis in aid for industry should be moved 
towards tax incentives... the task now is to turn good 
intentions into results - and to impress the financial 
markets that the shift to the supply side is durable.524
All appearances indicated that the government had lifted a page
out of the Reagan/Thatcher economic strategy book with its
supply-side measures and attention to money supply and spending
targets.
We have already discussed the effects outside developments 
and pressure had on this change in policy, as well as the impact 
of internal politics, for example, a changing national mood, the 
growing appeal of the center-right, and the declining appeal of 
the Socialists as evidenced in approval ratings and election 
contests. However, internal pressure was also brought to bear by 
business groups. The role of business groups in bringing about a 
change in government policy, merits a closer examination.
Plan IntGrimaire: StratSgie pour Deux Ans 1982-1983, (Paris: La
Documentation Francaise), Novembre 1981.
524 Financial Times, September 28, 1982, p.23.
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Reduire les Charges des Entreprises
The attention paid to the charges borne by business was in 
part due not only to the facts themselves - at 17.9% (in 1984) 
the tax burden of French industry was the highest in the OECD 
(see Appendix A, Table 1A) - but to the endless complaints of the 
CNPF, and the pressure brought to bear on Mitterrand by his old 
friend Jean Riboud, PDG of Schlumberger and other "visiteurs du 
soir".525 The role of business groups was significant. 526 Many of 
the interviewees commented that while France was not subject to 
any strong tax protest from the grassroots during the 1980s, 
business groups were particularly vociferous in their criticism 
of the government's tax policies and in their calls for a change. 
For example, Philippe Lagayette noted that there was "une
The visiteurs du soir was the name used by Jacques Attali (1993) to 
describe a group of socialist business executives, technical advisers 
and ministers who met regularly with the President, including, among 
others, Jean Riboud, AndrS Rousselet, Pierre B6r6govoy, Charles 
Salzmann, Laurent Fabius, and Gaston Defferre (see J. Attali, 1993, 
op.cit., p .299).
In March 16, 1983 the Financial Times (p. 2) (see also, Financial Times 
of November 4, 1982, p. 3 and December 15, 1982, p.15) reported on the 
CNPF's efforts to persuade the government of the higher burden posed 
by heavier taxation and social charges in relation to their 
international competitors (see also, Le Nouvel Observateur, 22 Mai 
1982, p.43) and of the need to lower business charges which they 
claimed had been increased by as much as FF100 billion since 1981. In 
response, the government agreed to establish a joint committee with the 
CNPF to study and report on the matter (see, Groupe de Travail CNPF- 
Administration, Les Charges des Entreprises Francaises, Rapport au 
Premier Ministre, Paris: La Documentation Francaise, 1983). Guy Brana, 
vice-president of the CNPF was quoted by the Financial Times as saying, 
"...We have just one solution to escape the paralysis: lower the
charges on companies. " Among the proposals advocated by the CNPF were: 
1) reduce charges on companies by around FF20 billion over the next 
five years; 2) remove the wealth tax levies on capital invested in 
companies in the form of shares; and 3) increase depreciation 
allowances, allowing companies to write off 100% of the cost of new 
machinery in one year. Brana pointed out that similar measures had 
recently been enacted in Britain. He said, "I've been able to measure 
the progress in England [thanks to his links with the British Lucas 
Group] . Some very useful things have been done there. I would prefer 
to say that we are dynamic and competitive in France - but we have had 
the Socialist experience." (Financial Times, March 16, 1983, p.2).
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protestation vigoureuse des entreprises" and that the government 
began to pay serious attention to what business groups had to 
say. 527 Jean Choussat remarked, "Oui...le patronat a bien joue sa 
carte." 528 And Patrick Careil mentioned the "mouvement des cadres 
contre 1'augmentation de la pression fiscale et les reformes de 
1981 et 1982," and continued, "...moi, j'etais toujours contre 
ces reformes et je pense qu'elles ont suscitees le mouvement de 
reaction des cadres qui obligea le president de la Republique a 
s'engager a plafonner le montant des prelevements obligatoires 
par rapport au pib.1,529 The transformation in attitudes and the 
tax agenda with respect to the corporate sector was largely due 
to the pressure of business interests. Therefore, an examination 
of the part they played is indispensable.
Organized in various and disparate groups, the business 
community, and its complaints and demands, have had a particular 
resonance with governments of the right and the left. 530 The 
CNPF, as the most important representative of business interests, 
has had a privileged, if not always charmed, relationship with 
government. Moreover, it is one of the principal interlocutors 
with the DGI and the SLF. In addition, it is often represented
Philippe Lagayette, interview in Paris, France, May 20, 1992.
Jean Chousat, interview in Paris, France, May 12, 1992.
Patrick Careil, interview in Paris, France, May 25, 1992.
Among these groups, the main players are, for example: the Conseil 
National du Patronat Francais (CNPF); l'Assembiee Permanente des 
Chambres de Commerce et d'Industrie (APCCI); Societe Nationale des 
Petites et Moyennes Entreprises (SNPME); Confederation Generale des 
Petites et Moyennes Entreprises (CGPME).
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on government commissions, groupes d'etudes, as well as 
participating on the Economic and Social Council.531 With its own 
tax committee, the CNPF has long complained of the heavy fiscal 
burden it bears, the discouraging effects of the French tax 
system on employment and investment, and consequently its 
disadvantageous position vis-a-vis its counterparts in other 
countries (see Appendix A, Table 1A). Mr. Rene Pelletier, the 
Director-General for Economic Affairs at the CNPF wrote in Le 
Monde,
...la France est a la fois le pays du monde - a 
1'exclusion des pays scandinaves, du Luxembourg, et des 
Pays-Bas - ou le total des impots et des cotisations 
sociales est le plus lourd, avec 37.50% du P.N.B., et 
le pays ou la part, dans le revenu national, des impots 
sur les benefices des societes est le plus eleve (notre 
pays n'est depasse que par le Japon et le 
Luxembourg) .532
Equipped with such comparisons, the CNPF has been an untiring
advocate for lower taxation - lower social charges, lower IS and
lower or abolished TP. Despite the falling share of company tax
revenues relative to total income taxes (81% in 1959 and 46% in
1976), French companies, in comparison with their OECD 
counterparts, were being hit hard by the rise in company social 
charges and TP, not to mention an IS rate of 50%. The CNPF 
complained that compared to their American,Japanese, and British 
counterparts, "a production £gale, les entreprises francaises
See, J.C. Martinez, 1980, op.cit., p.179.
R. Pelletier, "R^ponse du CNPF au Rapport du Conseil des Impots", in 
Le Monde, 19 Juillet 1977, pp.11-12.
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paient deux foix plus d'impots et de charges sociales.1,533
In contrast, a 1977 Report from the Conseil des Impots 
emphasized the weaknesses of the corporate tax regime and 
observed that few companies actually paid 100% of the taxes 
mandated by law. 534 A parliamentary report on the fiscal position 
of oil companies noted that ELF and the Compagnie Francaise des 
Petroles paid no IS and the taxes paid by foreign subsidiaries 
were derisory. 535 An explanation is to be found in the numerous 
exemptions and tax reliefs enjoyed by many French companies - not 
to mention the not infrequent recourse to tax evasion and fraud. 
C. de Brie and P. Charpentier (1978) note that "fraude et evasion 
fiscales sont de meme nature et font partie integrante de la 
strategie de 1'entreprise. 1,536 Furthermore, de Brie and 
Charpentier (1973) comment on the government's toleration of such 
activity, particularly by SMEs, "la fraude des petits...est... 
toleree par 1'Administration. 1,537
The real low burden for some companies can also be 
explained by a device known as "contrats fiscaux". The 
government - particularly during the 1960s and 1970s - devised 
the "contrats fiscaux" in order to offer companies privileged tax
Le Nouvel Observateur, 22 Mai 1982, p.43.
See, Le Monde, 19 Juillet 1977, pp.11-12.
Journal Officiel, Documents Parlementaires, Assembl£e Nationale, 
no.1280, 1974.
C. de Brie and P. Charpentier, F Comme Fraude Fiscale, (Paris: Alain 
Moreau, 1975), p.376.
C. de Brie and P. Charpentier, 1973, op.cit., p.173.
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treatment in return for their cooperation in meeting government 
targets and other objectives as set out in the plans. Thus, 
selected companies managed to reduce their tax bills as a quid 
pro quo for cooperating with the governments' efforts to manage 
the economy. This explains, in part, the high tax burden for 
companies - the facade - and the low tax revenues generated - the 
reality.
Although taxation was a major element in the costs borne by 
business, it was not the only measure of a company's financial 
costs. Other factors must be taken on board, i.e. labor costs 
(which includes salaries, social contributions, training, paid 
vacation, etc.). In fact, France is a low wage country compared 
with its international partners. Studies undertaken by the 
Dresdner Bank, the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations 
Internationales (CEPII) and the Institut de Previsions 
Economiques et Financiere pour le Developpement des Entreprises 
(IPECODE) showed that total wage costs per unit of production 
placed France in a position either equal to, or favorable to, the 
United States, Great Britain and West Germany. 530 All things 
considered however, France has been in the top five in terms of 
the heavy costs (in theory) borne by business. 539 And business 
frequently reminded government of this fact, supporting their 
claims often with specious statistics and reports.
T. Gandillot, op.cit., p.157.
See e.g.: Groupe de Recherche sur la Regulation de 1'Economie
Capitaliste, 1981, op.cit., p.94; T. Gandillot, op.cit., p.154.
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Despite, the CNPF's high profile, its expertise on corporate 
fiscal matters, its privileged position and access to policy 
makers, the thrust of its case had been virtually ignored by 
successive Gaullist governments, which, while paying lip-service 
to the CNPF's demands, carried on with their limited and 
selective policies of subsidies, "contrats fiscaux" and 
miscellaneous tax incentives. Considering the alternatives 
(attacking the government and lending its support to the left) 
and the risk of stoking the opposition's fire, the patronat 
restrained its displeasure. C. de Brie and P. Charpentier (1973) 
note, "le Gouvernement n'a pas donne satisfaction au patronat 
pour ne pas remettre en cause la selectivity de sa 
politique..."540 By the same token, the same authors contend that 
the CNPF often exaggerates its position - as do many other 
organized groups. While it rarely admits to having benefitted 
from the government's fiscal favors, it never ceases to complain 
about the "charges excessives qui pesent sur les entreprises 
f rancaises. "541
Although both the CNPF and the government of Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing made efforts to reconcile their differences in the run­
ups to the 1978 and 1981 elections, due to mutual fears of a 
leftist victory, the underlying resentment and jealousies 
remained. The Socialists' election victories in 1981 remedied 
this tense situation. Following the government's defeat in 1981,
540
541
C. de Brie and P .Charpentier, 1973, op.cit., p.175.
Ibid., p.173.
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the patronat was effectively set free from the straight-jacket of 
its relations with the center-right. It was able to criticize 
government policy and vent its frustration without fear of the 
possible political consequences. Prior to 1981 the patronat's 
resentment and opposition to government policies was of necessity 
muted by the need to soften its criticisms of "friendly" 
governments.542
Faced with the crippling effects of the Socialist policies 
of the new government, which raised costs and introduced 
rigidities, the CNPF did not hold back. Moreover, the 
government's overt courtship of a CNPF rival, the SNPME, cast the 
the patronat in a clear position of opposition. As the CNPF 
became more and more frustrated with the direction of the 
government's economic policy, its opposition became more and more 
strident. With the semi-failure of the Socialist's relance, the 
criticisms voiced by the CNPF began to assume an air of 
credibility and people within the government began to take 
notice. Furthermore, the Socialist government soon lost patience 
with the undependability and even hostility of the SNPME, and 
other business groups, partly in reaction to the government's 
economic policies and conduct of industrial relations. The CNPF 
capitalizing on the government's vulnerability and disillusion, 
continued to lobby hard and press the government to meet its
See, S. Berger, "The Socialists and the Patronat" in H. Machin and V. 
Wright, eds., 1985, op.cit.
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/
demands. 543 Moreover, no small factor in the government's change 
of mind and tone were the nagging pleas by the President's close 
friend, Jean Riboud, PDG of Schlumberger, and other members of 
the business community with privileged access to the Elysee: 
"baisser les charges des entreprises." The vociferousness of the 
business lobby, which captured the changing climate of public 
opinion, and the pressure put on the government, soon bore fruit.
As already mentioned, in April 1982 Jacques Delors announced 
a reduction of FF11 billion in the TP over two years and a freeze 
on company social charges until July 1983 and lightening the taxe 
d'habitation by FF1 billion. In early 1982, Mitterrand had 
already agreed to do something for French businesses, when in a 
meeting of the conseil restreint on tax reform, he commanded the 
Finance Minister to lighten the charges bearing on French 
businesses. 544 In September, the Council of Ministers agreed to 
exempt from the wealth tax plant and machinery (I'outil de 
travail) and capital tied up in private businesses. The 
government also decided tax credits for research spending, 
deductions for share purchases of 25% up to a ceiling of FF7,000 
annually - previously, the old Monory law allowed deductions for 
purchases only up to FF5,000 - and the budgetization of the 
handicapped persons benefits which had been the responsibility of
543 In late 1982, the CNPF virtually blackmailed the government with a
promise to help relieve the unemployment situation by pledging to hire
up to 600,000 young people in 1983. In return the government was being 
asked to offer a ten point reduction in business social charges over 
five years and a stand-still on other taxes (see, Financial Times, 
December 15, 1982, p.15).
544 See, J. Attali, 1993, op.cit., pp.169,399.
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the Caisse Rationale d'Allocations Familiales.
Slowly but surely the government was realizing that private 
enterprises invest and create wealth and jobs. Any hope of 
promoting economic renewal and social progress depended on them. 
But in the oppressive political and economic climate created, in 
part, and aggravated by the Socialists' quixotic policies, how to 
persuade French businesses to invest, innovate and hire? The 
CNPF was only too happy to meet the government halfway and put 
forward its proposals. In the meantime influential members of 
the government like Laurent Fabius, the Budget Minister and 
Pierre Beregovoy, the Minister for Social Affairs, had come 
around to support the employers' cause. They urged the President 
and the Prime Minister to do something for businesses.
President Mitterrand himself, speaking at Figeac in 
September 1982, publicly and conspicuously recognized the plight 
of French businesses and urged his government to take action: 
the charges borne by businesses must be brought down.545
With the government attending to its needs, if only half­
heartedly, the CNPF continued to press its agenda and in 1985 
unveiled a three-year program of tax cuts worth FF40-45 billion. 
This plan would allegedly bring down p.o. by 1% per year. 546 The 
patronat, hoping to influence party programs in the run-up to the 
1986 elections, argued for cuts in the IS, the TP and social
545 The Figeac speech had been crafted by Pierre B£r§govoy, Charles 
Salzmann and Alain Boublil.
546 "Propositions pour une Politique Economique Nouvelle" was unveiled by 
the CNPF on October 22, 1985. (see: Financial Times, October 23, 1985, 
p.3; Le Monde, 23 Octobre 1985, p.l).
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charges. Although, it also recommended cuts in personal income 
tax and the wealth tax, the priority was firmly placed on 
restoring business competitiveness. The plan did not break new 
ground, but in fact, dealt with issues already familiar to the 
major parties. The proposals made by the CNPF in many respects 
merely amplified some of the measures passed by the government or 
under consideration by both the government and the opposition.
As far as the CNPF was concerned however, the program of the 
center-right seemed to be more or less in line with the proposals 
in its own program, while the Socialists' did not go far enough.
A new consensus had been developing since 1982 on the 
principle and the means of lightening the corporate tax burden. 
The outstanding questions were: by how much should it be 
lightened and where should the cuts fall? The CNPF sought to 
influence the answers to these questions with the proposals it 
made in its three-year program. To the extent that in many ways 
the government and the opposition were attentive to the plight of 
business and in the process of adopting measures which sought to 
redress their plight, the CNPF's efforts had been rewarded. 
Evidently, therefore, the impact of the CNPF, and other 
professional organizations, as well as the influence of their 
constituent members, has not been negligible when one examines 
the evolution of the French tax agenda and the tax system.
Within the Elysee itself a supply-side mentality had begun 
to take root. The suggestion had been made, as early as April 
1982, by Jacques Fournier, the secretaire general adjoint, to
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reduce or eliminate financial aids and expenditures to various
social categories and replace these with tax cuts. 547 As already
discussed, the plight of businesses had captured the concern of
both Laurent Fabius and Pierre Beregovoy, two important members
of the government with privileged access to the ear of the
President. These advocates and policy activists, becoming ever
more vocal and influential, persuaded the President of the
necessity of tackling the problem of companies' financial
charges. By early 1982, the message was getting through, when at
a meeting of the conseil restreint sur la reforme de la
fiscalite, the President was reported to have said, "Pour la
fiscalite de l'Etat, je veux qu'on allege les charges des
entreprises. . .1,548
However, the most important statement on the need to reduce
business charges came in a speech, drawn up by Pierre Beregovoy,
Charles Salzmann and Alain Boublil - respectively, Minister for
Social Affairs and advisers to the Elysee. In his speech of
September 27, 1982 at Figeac which dealt, in part, with the
problem of business charges, Francois Mitterrand exhorted his
government to take action,
...Le probleme de 1'endettement se pose comme l'une des 
explications principales de la crise. II faut que 
1'ensemble des entreprises puisse echapper aux trois 
menaces du moment: 1'alourdissement de leurs charges, 
la lourdeur des taux d'interet et la surcharge de leur
J. Attali, 1993, op.cit., p.210. Attali called Fournier's suggestion 
"Id£e f£conde, qui permettrait de r^duire & la fois la bureaucratie et 
les pr€ldvements obligatoires."
548 J. Attali, 1993, op.cit., p.169.
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endettement financier. C'est dans ces trois directions 
que je demande au gouvernement d'agir pour les 
ecarter.549
Up to this time, the change of priorities and the growing concern
with business investment and profitability represented a "catch
where catch can" situation. Measures had been hurriedly devised
to appease a variety of groups, including the CNPF. Lowering the
charges borne by companies had not been a matter of high agenda
status. This changed with the Figeac speech.
It was Mitterrand's public acknowledgement of the plight of
French business and its relation to the economic crisis, followed
by his commitment to do something about it, that made this an
urgent matter for the government. In addition, it marked a
turning point for the Socialists in government, long indifferent
to the plight of business, hostile to profit, and suspicious of
free competition. As Jacques Attali (1993) observed,
Le grand tournant ideologique est pris: on ne parle 
plus que d'allegement des charges des entreprises, de 
moratoire, de baisse des taux d'interet. Quelques 
grands patrons de gauche ont fixe la direction. Reste 
a la suivre. Mais personne ne sait vraiment encore 
comment.550
The great ideological turning point was, however, in 1982, 
strictly limited to the corporate sector. The government was 
searching for ways to free itself from the financial burden of 
loss-making and heavily indebted public companies hungry for 
capital and for ways of encouraging the private sector to lead
549
550
P. Favier and M. Martin-Roland, 1990, op.cit., p.445.
J. Attali, 1993, op.cit., p.324.
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France into the promised land of economic revival. Neo-liberal 
tax reform for the corporate sector appeared to offer hope.
This, moreover, was an important wedge in the government's tax 
agenda, one which had consequences for the government's later 
receptiveness and acceptance of neo-liberal tax reform across the 
board - for households, as well as businesses.
Beating the Center-right at its Own Game
The perception that something needed to be done about the 
state of personal, as well as corporate taxation was heightened 
by the alarming rise in prelevements obligatoires. Despite 
claims to the contrary, the President's initial promises that the 
tax burden would not increase soon appeared derisory. The tax 
burden had risen from 41.9% in 1981 to 42.8% in 1982 and 43.6% in 
1983 (see Appendix A, Figure 1A) ,551
In March 1983, Pierre Mauroy acknowledged the government's 
inability to hold p.o. steady at 42.5%, "L'objectif...n'est pas 
abandone, mais, c'est vrai, on ne peut pas l'atteindre pour le 
moment."552 On June 28, 1983 on Europe 1, the Prime Minister
lamented that p.o. would likely reach 45% of gdp in 19 8 4 . 553
Delors, more the alarmist, was warning the President that unless
551 Some of the more popular tabloids, like Paris Match, made much to do 
about the increases in taxation and the tax burden, and erroneously 
claimed that in 1983 the level of p.o. had reached 44V with 45V 
predicted for 1984. However, Paris Match, while not always entirely 
judicious with the figures, provided a good indication of taxpayer 
sentiment concerning the shape and direction of government tax policy. 
In a poll conducted in early August by BVA, a majority of those asked 
felt that taxes were higher than they expected in 1983 and would be 
excessive in 1984. (Paris Match, no.1786, 19 Aofit 1983, pp.58-60).
552 L'Express, no.1656, 1 Avril 1983, p.63.
553 L'Express, no.1669, 1 Juillet 1983, p.42.
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drastic measures were taken, p.o. were likely to reach 46% in
19 8 4 . 554 This possibility prompted L'Express to remind,
On sera loin de la promesse du candidat Francois 
Mitterrand qui s'etait engage a ne pas depasser le 
seuil du printemps 1981: un peu plus de 42%. La revue 
de l'Institut national de la statistique souligne a 
quel point les definitions et les dates de references 
rendent difficile la mesure scientifique des 
prelevements obligatoires. On ne peut pourtant 
echapper a une conclusion globale: la France est 
aujourd'hui, avec les pays nordiques, le pays 
occidental ou le chiffre est le plus eleve et augmente 
le plus vite.555
L'Express reflected a general concern among the public about the 
ever increasing tax burden. This concern was fomented by and 
capitalized upon by business groups and cadres. In turn, public 
concern with the rising rates and burden of taxation was causing 
the government some consternation. Its ratings in the opinion 
polls were dismal, and its electoral defeats boded ill for the 
1986 general elections. To address these concerns - and save its 
neck - the government was casting about for new solutions.
While the turning point in the government's tax agenda is 
generally dated to September 15, 1983, the idea to reduce taxes 
had been gestating for some time before. Jacques Fournier, the 
secretaire general adjoint at the Elysee, had suggested reducing 
or eliminating financial aids and expenditures to various social 
categories and replacing these with tax cuts. Jacques Delors in 
June 1983 had proposed a new 2% tax on all income to be called a
J. Attali, 1993, op.cit., p.492. This 46% figure was also predicted
by L'Express writer Yves Guihannec following the disclosure of the 1984 
budget, (see, L'Express, no.1680, 16 Septembre 1983, p.110).
555 L'Express, no.1680, 16 Septembre 1983, p.110.
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"contribution sociale" to finance social security.
Fournier's idea was adopted by Fabius who included it among 
his other tax proposals. From June 1982, Fabius was proposing to 
replace allocations familiales with tax deductions and lower 
company charges. The Budget Minister became firmly opposed to 
solutions that would raise the level of p.o.. 556 It is ironic 
that Fabius, one of the architects of the 1981 and 1982 
reflationary budgets should not long thereafter become an ardent 
advocate for lower spending and taxes. 557 Indeed, by mid-1982, 
Fabius was urging the President to consider, among other things, 
reining in expenditures, halting any new public sector job 
hirings, abandoning the preservation of purchasing power except 
for the least well off, and prioritizing the government's and 
public sector's investment programs. As Delors had done, Fabius 
took his crusade public. In an article for Le Monde, he wrote,
J. Attali, 1993, op.cit., pp.252,287. The success with which 
Fournier's idea had permeated government decision making circles was 
made evident in a letter from President Mitterrand to Prime Minister 
Mauroy in April 1984 in which the President mentions studies which had 
been done on the subject of tax reform whereby one of the techniques 
under consideration involved substituting tax cuts for expenditures in 
certain areas: ”...11 s'agit de rationaliser n6tre systdme de
transferts £conomiques et sociaux en substituant, chaque fois que 
possible, des diminutions d'impdt ou de cotisation cl des aides ou H des 
prestations" (J. Attali, 1993, op.cit., p.621).
In the Socialists' loi de finances rectificative for 1981, spending 
for the second half of 1981 rose to FF646billion, compared to FF617.5 
billion forecast in the original 1981 budget. For the 1982 budget, 
spending rose by 27% (over the initial 1981 budget) to FF790 billion. 
What explains Fabius's 'conversion' to supply-side economics and neo­
liberal tax reform is not altogether clear. However, a number of 
factors, no doubt, help explain his neo-liberal 'awakening': firstly, 
the disillusionment engendered by failed policies and the institutional 
constraints which made sweeping changes impossible; secondly, the 
intense lobbying by French businessmen and the realization of their key 
role in reviving the French economy; thirdly, the conservative, pro­
business policies being pursued in other countries like the U.S., 
Britain and West Germany; and finally, perhaps, the realization that 
his own political ambitions were at risk given current policies.
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...dans un pays ouvert sur le monde comme la France, 
avec une economie mixte et qui entend le rester, la 
limitation du poids des prelevements est bel et bien 
une necessite. Economiquement, car dans la competition 
internationale les charges ne peuvent s'alourdir a 
l'exces. Psychologiquement, car 1'initiative et 
1'esprit d'entreprise se marient mal avec des 
prelevements trop forts.558
By late 1982, Fabius was persuaded that the government had been
on the wrong tack. Raising taxes, as it had been doing since
June 1981, was doing more damage than good. It was important, he
recognized, for the encouragement of risk, initiative and the
international competitiveness of French industry, to limit the
tax burden. This December 1982 article was followed by a note to
the President in February 1983 in which Fabius urged that 1983 be
the year for the application of the orientations articulated at
Figeac, particularly, the "reduction des charges financieres des
entreprises. "559
Fabius's crusade seemed a quantum leap from the quixotic
redistributive socialism of his first twelve months in office.
Nevertheless, it was one very much in sympathy with the President
of the Republic whose declarations at Figeac, in the press and in
ministerial meetings, were laying the groundwork for another
grand tournant ideologique.
From the end of 1982 to the end of 1983, the French
government underwent a fundamental change of priorities in terms
L. Fabius, "Secouer Quelques Habitudes", Le Monde, 11 Decembre 1982,
p.l.
J. Attali, 1993, op.cit., pp. 373-374.
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of its fiscal policy. 560 There occurred a shift to the supply
side. In the discussions for the 1983 Budget in August of 1982
the principal decision makers were talking about the inclusion of
tax cuts, tax reform (including abolishing the CGT) and social
security finance reform.561 The President set out the parameters
of the government's budgetary approach when he said,
"Des dispositions seront prises des le budget de 1984 
pour que le pourcentage total des prelevements fiscaux 
et sociaux soit au moins stabilise, avant d'amorcer la 
dec rue."562
Evidently, the President was considering, already by the end of 
1982, a strategy of general tax reduction. Neo-liberal tax 
reform was creeping into government rhetoric, if not action, by 
stealth. The Socialists, however, could not change the agenda 
too quickly without being accused of U-turning and betrayal.563
Many Socialists, including Mitterrand himself, showed no 
shame in borrowing ideas and solutions associated with the right
Francois Xavier Stasse, an economic adviser in the Elysee at the time, 
in an interview with the author, spoke at length about the ideological 
struggle waged by the Keynesians and the "classical" economists in the 
government, "..c'Stait plutot... la discussion entre les tenants de la 
politique de la demande et la politique de l'offre... Ca c'est un d€bat 
qui avait dSjS commence du temps du gouvernement de M. Barre. A 
l'Spoque je travaillais dans le MinistSre du Plan...et cette discussion 
n'avait pas encore p6n£tr6 les Squipes 6conomiques de la gauche, en 
particulier le parti Socialiste.. II y avait sflrement des experts dans 
1'administration oil j' Stait qui participaient S 1'ensemble de ce 
debat...Ca consistait cl dire que...pour avancer la demande il faut 
s'assurer que l'offre soit competitive. C'est cette argumentation IS 
qui est entr£ aux ftats Unis et en Angleterre S la fin des ann£es 
1970s, et a progressivement gagne du terrain en 1982/1983 en France." 
(Francois Xavier Stasse, interview in Paris, France, June 2, 1992).
J. Attali, 1993, op.cit., p.302.
Cited in Le Monde, 11 Decembre 1982, p.l.
This was confirmed by many of the interviewees including, Philippe 
Lagayette, Jean Choussat, Francois Xavier Stasse, and Patrick Careil.
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and dressing them up in "new socialist" rhetoric. Privately, 
Mitterrand had admitted already some months earlier to Delors and 
Lionel Jospin, "'C'est Reagan et Thatcher qui gagnent' . " 564 In 
early September 1983, with his finger in the air, in a way, 
Mitterrand preordained the end of the left-right cleavage.
Mitterrand began to play the neo-liberal card, but subtly. 
The Socialists' move to the right in ideological and policy 
terms, while alienating the Communists, would perhaps win the 
Socialists new friends in the center. Mitterrand, sensing the 
rightward shift in public opinion, - "le glissement a la droite"
- felt a break with the communists could be to the Socialists 
advantage. 565 Political impulses were certainly at work.566
P. Favier and M. Martin-Roland, 1990, op.cit., p.451. On August 23, 
the President admitted the ideological hegemony of conservatism 
(J.Attali, 1993, op.cit., p.490).
J. Attali, 1993, op.cit., p.495. In fact, as early as the autumn of 
1982, President Mitterrand was considering an opening to the center. 
In a conversation he reportedly had with the industrialist Ambroise 
Roux, Mitterrand, with his sights set already on the 1986 elections 
anticipated, n.... 1'Emergence d'une nouvelle formation centriste. 
Quelque chose qui ne soit ni de droite ni de gauche et qui morde sur 
l'electorat conservateur...Moi, c'est un vrai parti centriste que je 
voudrais crier..." (F-O. Giesbert, Le President, Paris: Editions du
Seuil, 1990, op.cit., p.228).
Many interviewees pointed to the political nature of Mitterrand's 
adoption of neo-liberal ideas. Francois Xavier Stasse put it most 
succinctly, "II y a d'un c6te la reflection fiscale avec l'id£e du 
president que si on ne change pas la politique, ce sera le debat des 
elections suivantes que Chirac gagnera sur son terrain, parce qu'ils 
sentent que Chirac est proche de Reagan et il gagnera sur son theme... 
c'etait un argument politique. C'etait que M. Reagan aux Etats Unis 
avait gagne sa campagne eiectorale sur le theme de la diminution des 
impdts et s'est rendu tres populaire comrae cel&. Il etait evident que 
lors de la presidentielle de 1984 aux fitats Unis de nouveau le sujet 
qui fit la difference entre le candidat republicain et le candidat 
democrate, c'est le sujet fiscal...Tous les grands penseurs francais 
se faisaient de plus en plus le cours de cette pensee fiscale. . .et plus 
on approchait des elections francaises, les elections legislatives de 
1986, plus le president Mitterrand etait convaincu qu'en France aussi, 
si on n'arritait pas 1'augmentation des impots, la bataille eiectorale 
s'orientait sur le sujet fiscal... Et c'est pour ca qu'en 1983, il a 
dit qu'il fallait arreter. Il fallait stabiliser les prelevements 
obligatoires." (Francois Xavier Stasse, interview in Paris, France,
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Indeed, Mitterrand's thoughts were never far from the elections 
of 1986 and 1988.
Partly, as a result of the apparent mismanagement of the 
economy, the Socialists saw their political support drifting away 
to the center-right. 567 They were losing support among sectors of 
society which, to a great degree, had swung to them in 1981, 
namely business executives and managers, white-collar workers, 
shopkeepers and the liberal professions. The Socialists efforts 
to "faire payer les riches" were hurting the larger mass of 
taxpayers, as well as the wealthy. One Socialist deputy, Michel 
Charzat, a member of CERES, said of the old slogan, "Ca fait peur 
a tout le monde sans satisfaire personne. Et ca ne resoud rien: 
voyez la Scandinavie. "568 As already mentioned, the center-right, 
promoting neo-liberal solutions, was making significant gains at 
the left's expense. In the opinion polls, as the President's and 
the government's approval ratings fell, those of Jacques Chirac, 
Raymond Barre, the UDF and the RPR rose.
Moreover, periodic SOFRES surveys revealed that voters on
June 2, 1992) . Other reasons given for the change in strategy were the 
ineffectiveness of Socialist economic policies and the state of the 
economy, as well as pressure from France's European partners.
The defeat of the left in the January 1982 by-elections, the March 1982 
cantonal elections, the March 1983 municipal elections, as well as the 
opinion polls which showed falling confidence in both Mitterrand and 
Mauroy, served as a vivid warning to the President and his government. 
According to a SOFRES poll published in Le Figaro-Magazine on October 
1, 1983 only 38% of people questioned had confidence in the President, 
56% did not. One year later, an IFOP survey published in Le Journal 
du Dimanche, 11 November 1984, only 26% of those asked expressed 
confidence (F-0. Giesbert, 1990, op.cit., p.228).
L'Express, 17 Septembre 1982, p.106.
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the left were drifting ideologically towards the right. 569 A 
growing majority of voters on the left (as well as the center and 
right), for instance, were in favor of reducing taxes and social 
contributions (a major theme associated with the center-right). 
Francois Xavier Stasse confirmed that "II y avait des sondages, 
bien-stir, qui montraient que les francais estimaient qu'il y 
avait trop d'impots..."570 Philippe Auberger, commented that the 
strongest anti-tax sentiment was felt and expressed by the small, 
shopkeepers, the liberal professions and new anti-tax groups like 
the Ligue des Contribuables.571
These sentiments, moreover, were amplified by the press, 
especially Le Figaro magazine. As already mentioned, a more 
mobilized public, the various business groups like the CNPF and 
the CGPME, were strongly urging the government to initiate 
important and necessary tax reforms and other supply-side 
measures. This rightward shift - or "glissement a la droite" - 
reflected a public mood at odds with the misguided policies of 
the left and a growing predilection for the ideas of the right. 
Commenting on the change in the public mood, Noel-Jean Bergeroux 
wrote in L'Express, "...It carries away the entire public and 
translates into support for the right...when it is so powerful, a 
movement of ideas soon makes its influence on political
See, SOFRES, Opinion Publique, (Paris: Gallimard, 1983, 1984, 1985, 
1986).
Francois Xavier Stasse, interview in Paris, France, June 2, 1992.
Philippe Auberger, interview in Paris, France, November 8, 1993.
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behavior.572
As the above passage indicates, not only was the public 
becoming more and more interested in what the right was saying, 
but so was the press. The press, whether following or leading 
public opinion, devoted many printed pages to the right and their 
neo-liberal ideas. Taxation was a popular theme, and several 
leading journals highlighted developments in the United States 
and Great Britain and/or boldly came out themselves in favor of 
tax reform.573
It should be pointed out however, that while a growing 
number of French people felt that taxes were too onerous and that 
they needed reforming, support for tax reform itself was not 
widespread. Jean Choussat pointed out that when asked if taxes 
should be lowered, of course respondents will say yes. 574 But ask 
people what their concerns are or what problems need addressing, 
tax reform comes very low on the list, if it even gets mentioned. 
Choussat asserted, "... il faut regarder les sondages, mais quand
Noel-Jean Bergeroux, "La Droite, C'est Quoi?", L'Express, no.1790, 25 
Octobre 1985, p.43. The translation is mine.
See e.g.: Maurice Roy, "ImpSts: Vous Payez Plus que Vous ne Pensez", 
Le Point, no.494, 22 F£vrier 1982, pp.81-86; Le Point, no.609, 14 Mai 
1984, pp.61-64; Marc Ullmann, Paris Match: 17 Septembre 1982, pp.60+; 
19 AoOt 1983, pp.58-60: L'Express: no.1629, 24 Septembre 1982, p.97; 
no.1680, 16 Septembre 1983, pp.109-110; Guy Sorman, "Imp6ts Locaux: 00 
Va Notre Argent", 11 Novembre 1983; Yves Guihannec, "Vos Imp6ts Vont- 
ils Baisser?", no.1702, 17 Fevrier 1984, pp.37-39; no.1714, 11 Mai
1984, pp.39-42; no.1719, 15 Juin 1984; L'Expansion, no.210, 18 Fevrier 
1983, pp.51-53; Le Nouvel Observateur, no.981, p.27.
Jean Choussat, interview in Paris, France, May 12, 1992. In contrast, 
one or two interviewees claimed that the French didn't believe that 
they were too highly taxed. Philippe Lagayette, for example, asserted, 
"Il n'y a pas une sensibility forte des francais... qu'ils sont trop 
fortement taxy." (P. Lagayette, interview in Paris, France, May 20, 
1992).
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on demande aux francais quels sont les problemes auquels ils sont
sensibles, la reforme fiscale n'est pas citee."575 It was largely
- Choussat and others pointed out - the organized groups and
lobbies that cried the loudest for reform of the French tax
system, and of course, they got a lot of press attention.
The President's growing concern with the level of taxes was
clearly revealed at the Council of Ministers meeting of June 23,
1983 for the purpose of discussing the outlines of the 1984
budget. Mitterrand showed a glimpse of what would become almost
an obsession over the coming months. At that meeting he said,
Il ne faut pas que le gouvernement tombe dans ce grave 
danger qui consiste a augmenter indefiniment la charge 
des prelevements obligatoires. Celle-ci evolue vers un 
taux de 50% et cela ne sera pas tolere.576
Despite the President's acknowledgement of the dangers of letting
the tax burden increase inexorably, little was actually being
done in the government to stop the upward trends. Nevertheless,
the importance placed on the trend in p.o by the President and
the consequences for enterprise and risk-taking were not lost on
Jacques Delors, the Finance Minister. In a letter to the
President in mid-August 1983, he wrote,
Il arrive un moment ou l'impot decourage 1'initiative 
et le travail, la creation d'un climat favorable au 
travail, done a la productivite, et, quoi qu'on dise, a 
1'emploi....Les Francais, s'ils sont stimules, sont 
encore capables de travailler beaucoup et mieux.577
Jean Choussat, interview in Paris, France, May 12, 1992. 
P. Favier and M. Martin-Roland, 1990, op.cit., pp.498-99. 
J. Attali, 1993, op.cit., p.487.
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Not long thereafter, Mitterrand, at a luncheon meeting on August 
31, 1983, declared, "II faut faire baisser l'impot sur le 
revenu. 1,578 Again, the call was made on September 8, and on 
September 14, "II faut diminuer les impots. 1,579 The rhetoric was 
clear and unambiguous, but transforming words into concrete 
actions was to prove a lengthy and difficult process. However, 
the marker was set and the groundwork was being laid.
The 1984 Budget provided for an increase in spending by a 
mere 6.3%, or taking inflation into account, by .2%. Heavier 
taxation - to the tune of FF16 billion was inscribed in the 
budget which would raise the p.o. to 44.7% (or from 44.6% to 
45.4% according to INSEE figures). Among the measures included 
were: a 5% and 8% surtax on taxes paid above FF20,000 and 
FF30,000 respectively hitting about 2 million households - this 
measure, in effect raised the marginal rate of income tax to over 
70%; higher inheritance taxes (droits de succession) with new 
rates of 30%, 35% and 40% on top of the existing rate of 20%; the 
renewal of the "contribution" of 1% on income destined to finance 
social security; a 1% increase in the cotisation vieillesse from 
4.70% to 5.70%. (For a summary of tax measures passed under the 
Socialists, see Appendix B).
Le Nouvel Observateur called this budget "Le K.O. fiscal."580 
Le Figaro wrote of the tax measures, "la facture de deux ans de
578 Ibid., p.493.
579 Ibid., pp.495,502.
580 Le Monde, 16 Septembre 1983, p.31.
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socialisme. . . : le laminage.1,581 The president of the CNPF, Yvon
Gattaz underlined the fact that, as a result of this budget, the
French work 4.5 days out of 10 for the state, which, he
explained, was not the case in any other large, developed nation.
M. Gattaz pleaded for "moins d'Etat, moins d'impots, moins de
charges” and for "plus de libertes et d'initiatives
individuelles.1,582 Moreover, he claimed that the budget did
everything to discourage cadres and reminded that "l'excds
d'impots tue l'impot."583 The UDF expressed general satisfaction
with the austerity of the budget, but many complained that the
tax burden was too high. M. Edmond Alphandery (UDF Maine et
Loire) remarked, "a partir d'un certain seuil, l'impot tue
l'impot, car on arrive a un taux de saturation fiscale qui
decourage les contribuables. 1,584 Criticisms about the state of
French taxation were mounting. The clamor for action on the tax
front came from many quarters, expected and not-so-expected.
Then, on September 15, 1983, Mitterrand made his
announcement on television,
...trop d'impot, pas d'impot. On asphyxie l'economie, 
on limite la production, on limite les energies, et je 
veux absolument, tout le temps ou j'aurai cette 
responsabilite, revenir a des chiffres plus 
raisonnables. L'annee prochaine, il faut que, au 
moment ou nous preparerons le budget 1985, cela baisse 
d'au moins un point...II arrive un moment ou c'est
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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insupportable. Ce moment, je pense qu'il est arrive.585 
For many, this announcement came as a complete surprise. It 
seemed Francois Mitterrand had been seduced by the Laffer theory. 
The language used by the President echoed similiar statements 
made by Alphandery or Gattaz or perhaps even Laffer himself.
On the French television station, TF1, the President 
confronted the great socialist taboos head on: peace between the 
classes, including an appeasement of cadres, the virtues of 
wealth creation and profit, the dangers of protectionism, the 
impracticality of wage-price indexing, the dampening of 
consumption, the necessity of curbing spending, and most 
significantly, tax reductions. 586 Moreover the President
continued his attack on taxation calling "excessives" the social 
and fiscal charges of French companies, labelling the TP "un 
impot insense, un impot imbecile", and urging its reform. Also 
promised, was a one-percent reduction in p.o. for 1985. Tax 
reductions were the new "mot du jour", tax increases were 
"passe". Francois Xavier Stasse remarked, "... et voila!
C'etait l'air du temps, c'etait la mode."587
While several authors credit Jacques Attali and Jean-Louis 
Bianco, the Elysee's general secretary, with this "coup
Le Monde, 17 Septembre 1983, p.8.
The extent of Mitterrand's break with past orthodoxy was underscored 
by the contrasting opinion expressed by Pierre Uri on the role of 
taxation and the issue of targeting reductions in p.o. (see, P. Uri,
"Un Plafond pour les Prelevements Obligatoires a-t-il un Sens?", 
Pouvoirs, no.23, 1982).
587 Francois Xavier Stasse, interview in Paris, France, June 2, 1992.
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mediatique" and the secret hatching of a tax reform plan, Attali 
himself, denies any credit and has claimed that the idea was the 
President' s.588
A la surprise generale, il annonce aussi la baisse d'un 
point, l'annee prochaine, du taux des prelevements 
obligatoires! Tout le monde croira que cette mesure a 
ete soigneusement preparee en secret a l'Elysee. II 
n'en est rien: elle est improvisee en direct.589
It is quite possible that Attali, familiar with Laffer's ideas
and respected by the California economist, exerted some influence
on the President. 590 There is no doubt that Jacques Attali was
See e.g.: P. Favier and M. Martin-Roland, 1990, op.cit.; T. Gandillot, 
op.cit.; P. Bauchard, La Guerre des Deux Roses, (Paris: Grasset, 1986); 
F-0. Giesbert, 1990, op.cit., pp.196-7.
J. Attali, 1993, op.cit., p.502.
Attali was allegedly influenced by Arthur Laffer, author of the famous 
curve, who along with Milton Friedman was a favorite economist of 
President Reagan. F-O. Giesbert (1990, p.230) notes, "A l'Elysee, 
Arthur Laffer a un ami: Jacques Attali. C'est lui qui convaincra
Francois Mitterrand de r^duire les imp6ts. Laffer dit du conseiller 
special: 'Ce type comprend tout'." One interviewee added fuel to the 
fire in remarking that Jacques Attali was much influenced by 
developments in the United States (Jean Pascal Beaufret, interview in 
Paris, France, May 14, 1992). The interviewees, on the whole, seemed 
inclined to believe that Attali played an important role in the 
President's television announcement, but were skeptical about any plan 
of action prepared by Attali and Bianco. For example, Jean Choussat, 
referring to Mitterrand's announcement of tax cuts on TF1, said, 
"...c'est stir que Attali et les gens qui l'ont entour6 ont beaucoup 
travaill€ sur ca et ont jou§ un role tr§s positif. Ils ont demontrS
au president cette id£e l&...lui meme d'ailleurs a  assez
naturalement 6t6 gagn6 par celt...c'€tait...une chose laquelle il 
pensait profondement." However, he did not believe that there was any 
reform plan behind this announcement. (Jean Choussat, interview in 
Paris, France, May 12, 1992) . Patrick Careil similarly commented, "Ca 
a dti etre une id£e 6mise par Jacques Attali au moment oti justement il 
y a eu des reactions contre la pression fiscale, et en faveur d'un 
contrSle de la mont£e des d£penses - parce que tout le monde demandait 
plus de dSpenses - il a fait sa promesse de stopper la progression des 
prelevements obligatoires... C'etait quelquechose de compldtement 
improvisee sur une idee de Jacques Attali et que nous avons eu beacoup 
de mal apres a tenir..." (Patrick Careil, interview in Paris, France, 
May 25, 1992). Careil, as well, denied that there was any coherent 
reform plan behind the announcement, and that measures - a plan - to 
meet the President's commitment came afterwards. Careil said, "...Au 
Ministdre des Finances on l'a encadr6 apr£s...et £ Matignon aussi..." 
Moreover, Francois Xavier Stasse insisted, given his close involvement 
in such matters, that he would have known about such a plan had one 
existed (Francois Xavier Stasse, interview in Paris, France, June 2,
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highly esteemed by the President who sought his advice 
frequently. Elisabeth Guigou, one of the economic advisers in 
the Elysee during the early 1980s confirmed Attali's importance 
to the President, "'...A l'epoque Attali etait le seul du groupe 
a pouvoir exercer une influence sur le president et il a joue un 
role extremement positif. . .' "591 To attribute the source of any 
idea is a difficult exercise indeed, and it will not be attempted 
here. It is sufficient to say, however, that Attali, as well as 
several other influential figures, like Fabius, Beregovoy, and 
Riboud, among others, were well-placed, and any one of them 
capable of persuading the President of the efficacy of tax 
reform, if indeed, he needed persuading.
Despite the difficulties with which this policy priority was 
digested by the Socialists, and especially their communist 
allies, plus the technical problems of devising measures which 
would help achieve the President's objectives, Mitterrand stuck 
to his guns. The personal and public commitment of the 
President, his exhortations in the Council of Ministers and in 
committee meetings, as well as his personal contacts with 
government ministers, indicated quite clearly that tax reform was 
a priority, an imperative, placing it in a position of prominence 
on the government's agenda.
While the idea's source is an interesting point for 
reflection, what is more important is why Mitterrand was to adopt
1992).
591 P. Favier and M. Martin-Roland, 1990, op.cit., p.461.
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it and make it his own. In understanding why tax reform was 
given such prominence of place by the President on the 
government's agenda particularly from September 1983, one must 
try to explain the climate in government and/or the receptivity 
to this idea, regardless of the source (J. Kingdon, 1984).
We already discussed, to a considerable extent, the 
importance of the domestic economic and political contexts and 
their impact on the evolving approach to taxation within the 
government, the Socialist party and the opposition. Another 
important factor in the turn to neo-liberal tax reform in France 
was the international context, political, economic and 
ideational/ideological. Developments outside France's borders - 
particularly in Britain and the United States - had an undeniable 
impact on policy development and strategy. To some extent, this 
has already been touched upon, but require further attention.
For example, several authors claim that Ronald Reagan's 
success, both economically - as economic recovery in the United 
States was underway - and politically - loved by the media, 
popular with the public, and likely to win re-election in 1984, 
was a factor.
Entraines par la logique, les socialistes ont pratique 
une politique suedoise alors que le president, 
impressionne par l'efficacite de Reagan, prend 
conscience que le seuil d'intolerance etait 
depasse... Francois Mitterrand, en adoptant ce nouveau 
style, s'inspire a 1'evidence de Reagan. Comme lui, il 
va faire tomber, comme un couperet, l'annonce de la 
baisse des prelevements obligatoires.. Un socialisme 
qui chasse sur les terres du reaganisme.592
592 P. Bauchard, 1986, op.cit., pp.173,174.
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Les succes mediatiques de Ronald Reagan impressionaient 
le President francais.593
One author indirectly gave Mrs. Thatcher some credit when the
President reported to him something the British Prime Minister
had said,
Pour avoir la paix sur le front fiscal, avait dit un 
jour en riant Mme. Thatcher au president, il suffit de 
baisser les impots des faiseurs d'opinion.594
Several interviewees, including Raymond Barre, Francois Xavier
Stasse, Yves Mansion, Jean Meo, and Georges Egret spoke of the
impact of outside developments, with references to Britain, the
United States, Germany and France's other European partners, and
the spread of supply-side ideas. 595 Given Mitterrand's reputed
political astuteness, it is unlikely that he would have ignored
these developments and their consequences.
No doubt, witnessing the electoral successes and popularity
of Reagan and Thatcher, sensing the turning tide in ideas,
reflecting on his own sorry position in the opinion polls,
suffering the electoral successes of the right and their rise in
public esteem, and faced with an economy that wouldn't be
revived, Mitterrand surely felt that there was something to be
gained by changing tack. Indeed, to borrow from Peter Hall
T. Gandillot, op.cit., p.79.
F-0. Giesbert, 1990, op.cit., p.231.
Barre, in fact, surmised that President Mitterrand's trips to the 
United States in 1983 and 1984 and his contacts there with industrial, 
agricultural and service industry groups had a profound impact on him, 
"...il a eu une revelation." (Raymond Barre, interview in Paris, 
France, June 2, 1992) .
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(1986), it was the combination of economic promise and political 
advantage that rendered neo-liberal tax reform such an attractive 
option for Mitterrand.596
Evidently, a variety of pressures and problems, political, 
societal and economic, domestic and international, combined to 
influence Mr. Mitterrand's choice. Economic and political 
developments - both international and domestic - which captured 
media attention and affected public opinion made the ground 
fertile for the neo-liberal ideas advocated by the center-right. 
Such trends and their potential consequences were not lost on 
Francois Mitterrand, nor for that matter other important figures 
in the party such as Laurent Fabius, Pierre Beregovoy and Michel 
Rocard. But for many, the President's commitment was hard to 
swallow, and would be even harder to achieve.597
The President made his position clear shortly after his 
television announcement when he said at a meeting of the Council 
of Ministers,
See, P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., pp.274-75.
Although, initially, the President's announcement was met with cool 
reserve and even surprise by some members of his government. Despite 
the frequent signs evident in meetings with the President and in his 
public addresses prior to September 15, 1983, Mauroy, Delors and
B6r§govoy were completely caught off guard by the announcement as well 
as the change in strategy which seemed to abandon the economic 
objectives of the Projet socialiste. Moreover, his announcement 
appeared to call into question long cherished notions of social 
justice. Indeed, the Prime Minister sought to persuade the President 
to limit the reduction in p.o. to .5% in 1985 and .5% in 1986, but 
Mitterrand stood resolutely by his pledge to the French people. 
Delors, Fabius, Emmanuelli, Stasse and Beregovoy argued that such a 
reduction, as desired by the President, was impossible. In fact, the 
decision would be harder to implement, because with government spending 
based on a supposed increase of 1% in p.o., an actual 2% reduction in 
p.o. for 1985 would be required to meet the President's objective. 
This would mean tax cuts of FF80 billion!
351
Ce n'est pas sur 1'evolution des indices economiques 
que le gouvernement regagnera 1'opinion mais sur une 
diminution des prelevements fiscaux. Les indices, meme 
s'ils evoluent favorablement ne sont pas suffisants.
L'inflation? Les gens pensent toujours que celle-ci 
peut repartir. Le chomage? Il est peu vraisemblable 
que son niveau soit reduit. Le commerce exterieur?
Une amelioration peut avoir des effets vis-a-vis des 
operateurs internationaux, mais elle resterait 
impermeable pour la grande majorite de la population...
En revanche, la diminution d'un point de prelevement 
sera immediatement ressentie. C'est la que la majorite 
jouera sa survie. Les huit dixiemes des arguments de 
1'opposition se briseront sur cette realite.598
Evidently, as this speech indicates, the commitment to reform and
reduce taxes made by the President was above all political. This
assertion has already been put forward, to some extent, in our
earlier explanation of the government's grand tournant
ideologique. The decision to place tax reform high on the French
government's agenda was a political one. Mitterrand hoped to
save the Socialists' perilous political fortunes by cutting the
grass from under the feet of the opposition. As Francois Xavier
Stasse put it, "...c'etait une declaration que le president a
fait a la television, qui etait...purement politique... II etait
convaincu que s'il ne faisait pas cela, la bataille politique des
elections suivantes serait perdue."599
As already mentioned, the reduction in taxes promised - and
the reasoning behind it - was not only expedient, but also
represented a nod in the direction of neo-liberalism preached by
the likes of Reagan, Thatcher and Chirac. Learning from lessons
598
599
P. Favier and M. Martin-Roland, 1990, op.cit., p.500.
Francois Xavier Stasse, interview in Paris, France, June 2, 1992.
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taught by Reagan and Thatcher, and aware of the importance of tax
reform in the RPR's program and its supposed appeal, the
President tied himself firmly to the tax reform bandwagon.
Mitterrand hoped to benefit from the secret of the Reagan and
Thatcher successes while at the same time taking the wind out of
the opposition's sails. Given his doubts about the Socialists'
chances in 1986, this was necessarily a pragmatic and realistic
decision. The President was convinced that the major issues for
1986 would be employment and taxes.600
From Words to Deeds
Although lacking any firm ideas of his own, the President's
commitment to tax reform, made repeatedly in public and in
government, placed the issue in a position of prominence on the
government's agenda. Following his interview on TF1 he wrote to
Prime Minister Mauroy,
Il appartient au gouvernement de proposer les voies 
conduisant a une reduction d'au moins un point de 
prelevements obligatoires en 1985. Cette tache doit 
etre engagee sans delais. Elle exige un travail 
preparatoire que je vous demande de bien vouloir mener 
a bien d'ici la fin Octobre.601
But lowering the rate of p.o. would be a difficult effort to
realize, considering that for ten years, p.o. had increased on
average one percent per year (see Appendix A, Figure 1A) .602
600 J. Attali, 1993, op.cit., p.596.
601 Ibid., p.505.
602 Francois Xavier Stasse offered some insight into the dilemma and how 
it might otherwise have been avoided. He revealed, "Il [le president] 
a dit 'Si je veux qu'il y ait un arret, il faut que je dise on va 
baisser d'un point les pr§l£vements obligatoires,'" but, "...Et lui il 
n'etait pas technique, il etait politique... c'etait une declaration
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Neither his "liberal" predecessors at the Elysee and Matignon, 
nor his neo-liberal homologue across the Channel, had succeeded 
in reducing the tax burden. Despite the difficulty inherent in 
devising measures which would facilitate a reduction - let alone 
a stabilization - of p.o., Mitterrand repeatedly confirmed his 
wish to see the tax burden reduced, the TP abolished, and income 
taxes reduced by 5%.603
This promise, created problems for the government's 
partners, the Communists. Georges Marchais, the Communist Party 
leader, was decidedly opposed to the idea, while Charles 
Fiterman, the Transport Minister, ultimately declared himself 
favorable to "la reduction de l'impot sur le revenu, voire 
d'autres impots." 604 Within the President's own party, Delors and 
Henri Emmanuelli (the Budget Minister) balked at the President's 
demands.605 Delors had privately called the President's promise 
on p.o. absurd. 606 Such tax reductions - untimely considering 
that tax receipts were less than what had been forecast - would
que le president a fait a la tSISvision, qui Stait. . .purement 
politique. Je sais que le president Stait convaincu que si il avait 
demand^ i ces experts... 'est-ce qu'il est possible de diminuer d'un 
point les prSldvements obligatoires?', je lui aurais dit 'non, que 
c'est impossible'...mais il ne l'a pas fait... la baisse d'un point, 
ce qui d'ailleurs Stait en rSalitS deux points, puisque le train annuel 
Stait de plus d'un point... C'Stait tout £ fait impossible." (Francois 
Xavier Stasse, interview in Paris, France, June 2, 1992) .
The 5% income tax reduction was broached with the Finance Minister in 
the course of a meeting with the President on January 3, 1984 (J.
Attali, 1993, op.cit., p.562).
L'Express, no.1714, 11 Mai 1984, p.39.
J. Attali, 1993, op.cit., pp.599,604,63 0-1.
Gabriel Milesi, Jacques Delors, (Paris: Belfond, 1985), p.224.
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entail a widening of the budget deficit to over 4%. The
President remained unmoved. He called on the Prime Minister to
lower income taxes and the taxe d'habitation by 10% and abolish
the TP. 607 At the Council of Ministers meeting of January 18,
1984, Mitterrand insisted that a reduction in the overall tax
burden of French citizens was the government's "major political
priority". 608 The burden of direct taxes and social charges had
become excessive in France, according to the President. Their
reduction would be the centerpiece of the 1985 Budget. According
to the Financial Times, the rising burden of taxes and social
charges had become the most unpopular aspect of the government's
economic policy.609
Mitterrand was determined that his will be done. In the
event that key members of the government had forgotten his pledge
or were hoping to short circuit it, a few months later, in April
1984, the President wrote to the Prime Minister a letter which
Jacques Attali (1993) has called the most revolutionary that a
President has addressed to a prime minister on the subject of tax
and administrative reform.610 Mitterrand wrote,
J'ai souhaite a plusieurs reprises que soit amorcee en 
1985 la baisse des prelevements obligatoires. Cet 
objectif est une priorite politique majeure pour 
1'action du gouvernement...L'importance politique qui 
s'attache a la realisation de cet objectif de baisse
J. Attali, 1993, op.cit., p.605. 
Financial Times, January 19, 1984, p.2. 
Ibid.
J. Attali, 1993, op.cit., p.621.
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des prelevements obligatoires justifie que l'on remette 
en cause les habitudes liees a la reconduction annuelle 
des depenses dont la charge est desormais excessive aux 
yeux de nombreux Francais. Je vous remercie de veiller 
a ce que le gouvernement tout entier participe a cet 
effort de remise en cause et d' imagination.611
Evidently, the commitment by the President to this agenda item
remained unwavering - with the exception of the TP. Concerning
the TP, given the need for any and all resources available, the
abolition of a tax - no matter how heinous - which brought in
FF60biilion per year, was a difficult imperative to follow. Jean
Choussat, the Budget Director, in a missive to the President,
impassionately explained the technical impossibility of
abolishing the TP.612 Apparently, this intervention, surprising
on the part of a civil servant, arrived at the right time. The
President was persuaded, and plans to abolish the TP were
dropped.613
However, with the "glissement a la droite" gaining force,
Ibid., p.621.
Ibid., p.654.
Also, at the ElysSe, Francois Xavier Stasse and HervS Hannoun worked 
on the reform of the TP. Stasse explains, "Le president k la 
television a aussi denoncS cet imp6t injuste et imbecile. Je ne me 
souviens plus qu'il ait ajoutS qu'il fallait le supprimer...Nous avons 
beaucoup travailie pendant six mois - essentiellement deux personnes, 
HervS Hannoun, qui etait k l'Spoque le conseiller fiscal...et moi, pour 
essayer de trouver un systdme pour supprimer la taxe professionnelle, 
mais, d la fin, on l'a baisser par d'autres moyens. Je lui ai dit 
'aides moi' parce que le ministre de finances pensait que c'etait 
impossible... Nous avons beaucoup travailie...avec le directeur de 
cabinet du premier ministre, Jean Peyleverade - nous avons beaucoup 
travailie ensemble et au bout de six mois, il a dit k Pierre Mauroy, 
et moi j'ai dit au president, "Ce n'est pas possible"... "C' est trop 
compliqu^e"..."Si nous supprimons la taxe professionnelle en le 
remplacant par autre chose, ca va §tre une pagaille Spouvantable. II 
va y avoir des changements des effets de seuil, des changements des 
impositions d'un apartement k 1'autre...d'une entreprise k l'autre... 
et done le president a reconsiders..." (Francois Xavier Stasse, 
interview in Paris, France, June 2, 1992).
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evidenced by the March and June private schools demonstrations 
and particularly following the June 1984 European elections,614 
the President became even more convinced that his tax pledge 
should be implemented. In early July, in a speech in Auvergne, 
Mitterrand said, "Il faut patiemment reduire les impots."615 By 
early May 1984, the rest of the government was beginning to fall 
in line behind the President, and Delors announced that companies 
and individuals would pay lower taxes the following year, with 
income taxes probably dropping between 3% and 6%.616
On July 6, 1984, Mitterrand took the initiative in 
announcing a FF10 billion reduction in the TP and the same amount 
for households, as well as the abolition of the 1% "contribution" 
for social security and various measures intended to simplify the 
tax system.617 The President accelerated the cadence of his tax 
reform proposals, when, on July 14, 1984, on television, he 
announced an 8% general reduction in taxes, or around FF70 
billion. According to the President, "...deux sortes d'impots 
seront diminues: l'impot sur le revenu des personnes physiques et 
la taxe professionnelle."618 He asserted that the reductions in
At these elections the combined left won 3 9% of the vote, of which the 
PS, at 20.7% (just under its 1979 vote share), registered well below
its 36% share of 1981. Twenty percent of the vote had slipped to the 
right, with a total of 43% of the votes for the opposition RPR-UDF, and 
11% going to the National Front. Abstentions reached a record 43.3%.
Le Point, no.617, 16 Juillet 1984, p.34.
Financial Times, May 8, 1984, p.2.
Francois Renard, "Le Pari Difficile de la Diminution des Impots", Le 
Monde, 17 Juillet 1984, p.l.
61S Le Monde, 15 Juillet 1984, p.l.
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income tax would be "la plus forte baisse depuis la
Liberation.1,619
The 1985 budget went to great lengths to make good the
President's promises and wishes. For a Socialist government, it
represented a significant departure from previous budgets. On
the day the 1985 budget was made public, at the meeting of the
Council of Ministers, the President emphasized the consequences
of not doing anything about the rate of growth in p.o.,
Si l'on n'avait pas casse le rythme de leur 
augmentation, ils auraient atteint, a la fin du 
septennat plus de 50% du produit interieur. C'eut ete 
intolerable, on aurait etouffe 1'initiative et la 
production.620
Once again neo-liberal and supply-side arguments were called upon 
to support the President's assertions that taxes should be 
lowered. At the end of the day, the tax reductions inscribed in 
the loi de finances for 1985 were more or less what the President 
had wanted. Although there was no reduction in the taxe 
d'habitation, income taxes were lowered by 5% or FF10 billion, 
the 1% "contribution" for social security was abolished, and the 
taxe professionnelle was reduced by FF10 billion (see Appendix
Ibid.. A couple days later, the Mauroy government resigned and a new 
one was formed with two tax reformers heading it. Laurent Fabius was 
appointed Prime Minister and Pierre Beregovoy was installed at the rue 
de Rivoli. In the President's letter to the new Prime Minister, tax 
reform was an important feature. He wrote, "D'abord notre fiscalite, 
qui doit itre debarrassie de certains archaismes ou habitudes 
n6fastes...Il conviendrait notamment: 1) d'enrayer 1'augmentation
continue des prelevements obligatoires. Depuis dix ans, ces 
prelevements - impots et cotisations sociales - n'ont cesse 
d'augmenter. Grace la meilleure maitrise des depenses publiques,
cette tendance doit s'inverser des 1985; 2) de reduire regulierement 
chaque annee l'impot sur le revenu..." (J. Attali, 1993, op.cit., 
p.675) .
620 Le Point, no.626, 17 Septembre 1984, p.86.
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B) . Whether the measures decided would achieve a 1% fall in p.o. 
remained to be seen.621
The dark spot on the government's achievement was the back 
door increases in indirect taxation implemented earlier in the 
summer. For instance, in July 1984, the price of super gasoline 
was raised 22 centimes, a rise of 4.5% and then another 3 
centimes by the budget. In addition, the taxe de base 
telephonique was raised by 10 centimes, with a future rise of 5 
centimes planned. These measures prompted the President to 
caustically remark at the September 12, 1984 Council of Ministers 
meeting, "Moins d' impots, plus de taxes."622 In October, the 
government announced an increase in the wealth tax rate of 1.5% 
to 2%, in order to counter opposition accusations that under the 
Socialists a class of "new poor" had emerged, as well as to 
appease the Communists.
The increases in public tariffs, however, eliminated the 
intended effects of the tax reductions. Firstly, they undermined 
the President's promise to reduce the burden of taxation by 1%, 
by creating further impositions on taxpayers. The tariff hikes 
went some way towards neutralizing the tax cuts in the 1985 
budget for both businesses and households. Secondly, the
On the expenditure side, another significant change was the control of 
public expenditure, which was projected to rise around 6%, less than 
the projected nominal growth in gnp of 7.5%. The slowdown in state 
spending for 1985 had not been witnessed on such a scale for at least 
a decade. The Financial Times (September 10, 1984, p.l) characterized 
the squeeze as "the tightest since World War II."
J. Attali, 1993, op.cit., p.695. This was also the leader on the first 
page of Le Monde the day after the budget.
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negative publicity given to these measures overshadowed anything 
positive which might have been gleaned from the tax 
reform/cutting measures in the budget.623
In the end, according to INSEE, p.o. dropped by .1%, from 
44.6% of gdp to 44.5% for 1985 (see Appendix A, Figure 1A) .624 
Despite the failure to meet the President's promised 1% 
reduction, this government had not only been the first to 
announce a general reduction in taxes in 30 years, but was the 
first since 1971 to actually achieve the "coup d'arret".
The Socialist government encouraged by their own 
accomplishment and keen to cut the grass from under the 
opposition's feet, proceeded to promise continued reductions in 
taxation and the tax burden for 1986. The President, Fabius and 
Beregovoy, throughout the course of 1985, and in the run-up to 
the March 1986 legislative elections, made promises of future tax 
reductions, including specific measures for income tax, the IS, 
and incentives for investment. The 1985 budget contained an 
average 3% reduction in personal income taxes, the suppression of 
the 1% majoration exceptionnelle, and a reduction in the IS, in 
part, from 50% to 45%. This time, the tax reductions would not 
offset by increases in public tariffs. By the elections of 1986, 
the tax burden looked set to fall to around 44%.
See e.g.: Financial Times, September 14, 1984, p.2; L fExpress, no.1737, 
19 Octobre 1984, p.61.
INSEE, in Comptes Nationaux 1988 (Paris: La Documentation Francaise, 
1988), recorded a decrease in p.o. of .1%, from 44.6% of gdp in 1984 
to 44.5% in 1985. However, Jacques Attali (1993, p.695) claims the 
decline was .25%.
From 1985 - indeed from 1982/3 - the Socialists had 
successfully implemented a limited tax reform agenda based on 
selected reductions in personal, corporate and savings taxation 
meant to stimulate work, productivity, investment and risk- 
taking. On a more cynical level, their tax reforms were also 
announced and designed with regards to their hoped for political 
impact. In sum, the Socialists' tentative introduction of neo­
liberal tax reform in France, revealed a much changed agenda from 
the pre- and immediate post-1981 experience. The Socialists not 
only changed their own agenda, but set the agenda, to a degree, 
for the incoming center-right government. This agenda change 
extended to other areas of economic policy including 
encouragement of the Bourse, price and exchange decontrols, and 
partial and limited denationalizations. Far from the "plus 
d'Etat" policies which characterized the Socialist Party's first 
years in office, the "moins d'Etat" credo - first articulated by 
the right - guided the policies of Mitterrand, Fabius and 
Beregovoy, and of Rocard and Beregovoy in the period following 
the conservative interregnum.625 
Conclusion
Unofficially the rallying cry of the opposition - "moins
Favier and Martin-Roland (1991, pp.393-4) tell us, "...le gouvernement 
mene une politique iconomique et monetaire qui, sur bien des points, 
rejoint les idies libirales qui dominent les reflexions de 
l'ipoque...Mitterrand a fait sien cet objectif de disengagement des 
pouvoirs publics de la vie economique reclame avec insistance par les 
responsables de la droite convertis, pour la plupart, aux doctrines 
venues d'outre-Manche et d'outre-At1antique. Cette rupture avec 
l'engrenage dirigiste, dans lequel s'inscrit la France de droite et de 
gauche depuis la Liberation, vise a oter £ 1'opposition l'un de ses 
principaux arguments: 'L'fitat itouffe l'initiative priv^e'."
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d'Etat" - became Mitterrand's own. One of the keys to achieving 
the dual objectives of "moins d'Etat, plus de libertes" was 
taxation. In terms of agenda change, tax reform was surely the 
most dramatic. Absent from future budgets, for the rest of the 
decade, would be measures intended to deliberately increase the 
tax burden on businesses and high income earners - to 
deliberately "faire payer les riches" - once intended to serve 
ends of social justice and revenue raising (except with respect 
to the reimposition of a wealth tax in 1988). Instead there 
would be reductions in personal, corporate and savings taxation, 
and later in consumption taxation (see Appendix B for a summary
of important tax reforms in the 1980s).
In contrast with the United States, and Great Britain to a 
lesser extent, the Socialist's adoption of neo-liberal tax reform 
was not driven by popular pressure from below; although, it is 
doubtful whether the French taxpayer could continue to tolerate 
the sort of charges the state would have demanded had the 
government not changed course when it did. Rather, the change
was impelled by external developments which triggered a learning
and emulative process, as well as internal developments, 
influenced by majoritarian politics and the failure of 
reflationary economics.
Outside France, the general movement towards tax reform, 
justified by Arthur Laffer and other economists of the New Right, 
and fostered by Mrs. Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, made its impact 
felt in France. France, as well as other countries, studied, and
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in some cases, followed the American or British examples.
Conservative parties in France, encouraged by Reagan and
Thatcher, saw their agendas change, to a large extent, as they
developed their own neo-liberal programs, which included tax
reform in one shape or another. As the Socialist solutions
proved ineffective in dealing with the economic crisis, the
parties on the right, and their neo-liberal theses, were
attracting increasing attention and interest. Their political
victories, building on the progressive decline in support for the
left, coupled with the sad state of the economy, obliged the
Socialist government to consider other solutions.
Less than two years after the Socialists swept into power,
the President, and some of his advisers and ministers, recognized
that taxes were too high and likely to go higher. This
development was having negative effects on productivity,
investment and economic growth. As Mitterrand said to Beregovoy
during the Council of Ministers meeting of September 12, 1984
when the budget was presented,
...Quels budgets faciles auriez-vous eu si je n'avais 
pas impose l7an dernier la regie de la diminution des 
prelevements obligatoires! Pourtant, si je ne l'avais 
pas fait, nous continuerions sur la pente de leur 
augmentation continue depuis dix ans. Sans notre 
volonte farouche de les reduire, nous aurions termine 
le septennat a pres de 50% du pib et on aurait ainsi 
etouff6 1'initiative et la production.626
The negative consequences of an increasing tax burden was
apparent in the economic indicators - something the business
626 P. Favier and M. Martin-Roland, 1990, op.cit., p.186.
363
community never tired of advertising. Socially and politically, 
the electorate was unlikely to tolerate a higher tax burden and 
would hold the government responsible. This had serious 
implications for the upcoming legislative elections. The 
government was in a quandary: how to remedy the economic ills, 
win back public support, and reduce the opposition's appeal? One 
solution (among several) was already available: tax reform. 
Thatcher and Reagan had promoted and implemented it; and now 
Chirac was following in their footsteps.
The political climate made the time right for such a change. 
President Mitterrand, the ultimate policy shaper and decision 
maker in French government, acknowledged that taxes had reached 
the threshold of intolerance and changed the government's agenda 
by making tax reform a "priorite politique majeure". With tax 
reform advocates in key positions - particularly Fabius and 
Beregovoy - in the government, this priority was operationalized 
in a series of measures that sealed the fate of the Socialist's 
experiment in redistributive Keynesianism.
From 1984 through 1986 and afterwards, loyal supporters of 
the President and tax reform advocates in their own right like, 
Pierre Beregovoy, Laurent Fabius, Jacques Chirac, Michel Rocard, 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Claude Evin, Raymond Barre, Edouard 
Balladur, Alain Juppe, and Edmond Alphandery were well-placed in 
government and in government circles to ensure that tax reform
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moved on to the governmental agenda and the decision agenda.627 
Nonetheless, these actors were not necessarily the policy 
entrepreneurs, as this attribution is generally accorded less 
well-known figures and groups. As in Britain, all the principal 
French economic decision makers - President, Prime Minister, 
Ministers of Finance and Budget- were committed to tax reform and 
the reduction of the tax burden. Their commitment, manifested in 
several ways, was instrumental in keeping tax reform on the 
agenda, or at the very least ensuring it did not fade away.
Of course, in politics, as elsewhere, often the best laid 
plans go awry. Public declarations on the shape and direction of 
taxation made by tax reform advocates are not always realized. 
Other items rise up onto the agenda, displacing tax reform or 
preventing the rise of tax reform to a place of prominence on the 
agenda. Such was the case immediately following the President's 
September 1982 Figeac speech, when more pressing problems like 
the budget and social security deficits, and controlling 
inflation, unemployment and currency instability occupied the 
attention and energies of governmental decision makers.
Also, in the period from 1988 to 1993, the President's 
concern for redressing the long neglected social inequalities, 
took priority of place on the agenda, and neo-liberal tax reform 
- partly because some key decision makers felt enough had already 
been done in that regard - struggled to survive. And in some
These actors were those most frequently mentioned by interviewees and 
resource materials as key to the emergence and enactment of tax reform 
in France.
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cases, particularly with respect to VAT, savings taxation and 
company taxation, neo-liberal tax reform scored some notable 
victories over skeptics, opponents and the apathetic, thanks to 
the commitment and conviction of key decision makers, and the 
absence or minimization of effective opposition.
There are a number of other reasons why the tax reform 
agenda may not be realized. Institutional constraints can affect 
the evolution of items on the agenda and the shape that policy 
ultimately assumes. Such constraints may come in the form of the 
nature of the dynamics of the relations between the President and 
his government and parliamentary majority. Or an idea, however 
timely, may conflict with important values or policies to which a 
political figure or party is particularly attached. For example, 
if neo-liberal tax reform did not appear earlier on the 
government's agenda, it was partly due to the fact that it was 
not compatible with either Socialist ideals nor the Socialists' 
program (including Mitterrand's 110 propositions). Public and 
political support for Socialist ideas and policies was still 
quite strong.
The resistance to a neo-liberal agenda including tax reform 
was also partly due to the roles assumed by Mitterrand and the 
expectations incumbent with those roles. Mitterrand, as leader 
of the Socialist Party, was intent on democratizing government, 
moving away from the alleged autocratical presidential regimes of 
his predecessors; he would therefore not be inclined to propose 
such reforms himself, especially ones which had become the domain
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of the opposition, associated with the new right, and which had 
such little support within his own party. Were Mitterrand to 
advocate neo-liberal tax reform it would likely be seen as a 
betrayal of socialist principles and the Socialist Party and give 
the appearance that he was imposing his will on an unwilling 
party. To propose such a drastic change, moreover, with a 
majority of the left in Parliament hostile, would also defeat the 
democratizing and decentralizing efforts in the government 
decision making apparatus. Mitterrand needed the passage of time 
to help him, and others, persuade the party of the necessity of 
agenda change, in light of changing political and economic 
circumstances.
Institutional constraints can also come in the form of the 
resistance of other important actors in the process, on 
ideological or practical grounds. For instance, if the reform of 
the taxe d'habitation never rose to the decision agenda prior to 
1989, or income taxes were not more quickly reduced, this could 
be explained, for example, by the resistance of the tax 
administration (part of the Ministry of Finance) to these ideas. 
This resistance could most likely be understood in terms of the 
tax administration's decision that such reforms were too 
problematic to introduce, would result in too great a loss of 
revenue, or that their agenda was already too full to consider 
new and far-reaching changes. A vivid example of this was the 
direct contact made by Jean Choussat, the then Directeur du 
Budget, in June 1984, with President Mitterrand concerning the
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much desired abolition of the taxe prof essionelle. 628 The 
President and Prime Minister Mauroy had been pressing for the 
abolition of the TP since at least early 1984 .629 Choussat 
informed the President by message that such a policy was 
"techniquement impossible". Mitterrand, in the end, was obliged 
to agree. 630 The TP would not be abolished. The opposition or 
resistance of members of the Ministry of Finance, especially in 
the tax administration, doomed the President's idea. Unless 
powerful and influential actors can be persuaded or obliged to 
accept a particular policy or proposal - acceptance being based 
on a number of criteria - it is unlikely to move from the 
governmental to the decision agenda, or worse, will not even 
receive a serious hearing.
In addition to the above mentioned institutional 
constraints, other constraints arising from the institutional 
environment also may frustrate the movement of items onto the 
governmental agenda. For example, timing can seriously affect an 
item's progression to agenda status, and this has already been 
briefly referred to. In this case, the political calendar may 
alternatively make the time right or wrong for introducing and
In fact, the resistance of the tax administration to a reform of the 
TP predates 1984. For a brief, but good account of the blocking 
efforts made by civil servants to reform of this tax between 1975 and 
1982, see, M. Sylvain, "Taxe professionnelle: le pouvoir dans la
nasse", Pouvoirs, no.23, 1982.
President Mitterrand wanted the abolition to be compensated by a four 
point rise in VAT. The Finance Minister, Delors, resisted (see, J. 
Attali, 1993, op.cit., p.562).
J. Attali, 1993, op. cit., p.654.
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implementing reforms. To illustrate, if Prime Minister Chirac 
(1986-88) did not undertake the reform of the system of social 
security finance by introducing the cotisation sociale 
generalisee, which at the time was stongly promoted by well- 
placed advocates, it was largely because of the 1988 presidential 
elections.631 The nearness of the elections, and Chirac's 
undisguised designs on the presidency, made such a fundamental 
reform too risky. Similarly, if Mitterrand made tax reform a 
major political priority, it had much to do with his concerns 
regarding Socialist chances in the 1986 legislative election and 
his own political future.
While reform proposals were floating up and around, 
institutional constraints abounded in the forms of perceived 
civil service and party hostility, value inacceptability, role 
expectations and norms, and the budget, among others. Such 
constraints made neo-liberal tax reform an unlikely agenda item 
for a Socialist government in the early 1980s. It required a 
resolute and resourceful decision maker to assert his authority 
and place such a controversial issue on the agenda. Mitterrand 
resisted until the economic and political realities compelled him 
to consider a policy change. These realities were joined by the 
untiring advocacy of friendly, neutral, and even antagonistic 
actors, inside and outside government, who, if not induced the 
President, supported his decision to "take the bull by the
See e.g.: Le Monde, 26 Mai 1987, pp.1-2 and 24 Octobre 1987, p.28; 
L'Express, no.1826, 4 Juillet 1986, p.22.; S. Shaughnessy, op.cit.
horns"
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CHAPTER SEVEN
- The British and French Garbage Cans -
Introduction
The previous four chapters have demonstrated that tax reform 
is driven by a political dynamic. Even in an area as "economic" 
as taxation# political factors were important in the evolution of 
tax reform and its appearance on governmental agendas in France
and Britain in the late 1970s and 1980s. The purpose of the last
few chapters was to trace that evolution in France. 632 At their 
most basic, the preceding chapters provided a blow-by-blow 
account of tax policy making and the course of tax policy over 
the 1979-1989 period. While tax reform no doubt had an origin 
somewhere in the long span of history, the purpose was not to 
identify origins, British, French or other; that would be an 
exhaustive exercise in infinite regress.
Chapters three through six attempted to investigate the
roots and branches of neo-liberal tax reform in the period prior 
to and including 1979 to 1989. In the course of that 
investigation, it became apparent that a complex of factors was 
responsible for the shape and development of tax reform in 
France. Our task now is to identify, clarify and organize those 
factors, and see how they compare to the British situation.
While many of the recent reforms may have roots in ideas
While this is a comparative study, for reasons of space I have omitted 
a descriptive account of tax reform in Britain. Several thorough and 
insightful works on British tax reform are available and the reader is 
referred to the literature mentioned in footnote 5.
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formulated and floated in the 1950s, 1960s or 1970s, why and how 
tax reform moved from intellectual debate to government 
legislation in the 1980s is more important than the potentially 
futile exercise of attempting to pinpoint origins. The critical 
factor that explained the "flowering" of tax reform was not so 
much the roots - or origins - but rather the political climate, 
or the receptivity of key decision makers to the actors and the 
ideas they advocated. 633 What made the idea catch on and take hold 
is of greater import than where the idea came from. We should be 
asking, not who planted the seed, but what made the seed grow?
As we have seen, there were many tax reform ideas being 
floated by several sources: in Britain, the Bow Group, the IEA, 
the IFS, Enoch Powell, Peter Cropper, Lord Cockfield, Geoffrey 
Howe and Nigel Lawson, among others; in France, participants in 
the idea/proposal-generating and agenda setting processes 
included, the new economists, the Club de l'Horloge, Philippe 
Auberger, Jacques Chirac, Alain Juppe, Club 89, the visiteurs du 
soir, Christian Sautter, Jacques Delors, Laurent Fabius, Pierre 
Beregovoy, members of the Planning Commissariat and others. Some 
of these participants were "visible", by virtue of their public 
and high-profile positions of authority; others were among the 
"hidden cluster", out of the public eye and/or working behind the 
scenes.634
633 As Kingdon (1984) states, "...the critical thing to understand is not 
where the seed comes from but what makes the soil fertile." (J. 
Kingdon, 1984, op.cit., p.81).
634 See, J. Kingdon, 1984, op.cit., ch.3, for a more in-depth examination 
of the visible and hidden participants.
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The emergence of tax reform on the agendas of the British 
and French governments from 1979 and its "staying power" 
throughout the 1980s was due to a combination of problems, 
policies and politics and the activities and efforts of a variety 
of visible and hidden participants in a given institutional 
setting.
This thesis does not intend to assess the success or failure 
of tax reform policies. Nor does it detail their economic 
design, purpose or consequences. Rather, it seeks to examine and 
explain the pre-enactment processes which led to the emergence of 
tax reform in France and Britain in the 1980s. Moreover, the 
nature of the attention given to the issue is as important as the 
substantive policy produced as a result of that attention.
In advancing our understanding of tax reform, it was first 
necessary to examine the context in which the idea evolved into 
government policy. Following this, we must ask a number of 
questions which will help us to identify the complex of factors 
involved in the development and evolution of this issue up 
through its appearance on governmental agendas. What problems 
did the British and French governments face in the late 
1970s/early 1980s? Who in government or around government 
recognized and promoted these problems? What was done about 
these problems? What solutions were proposed? Was one of them 
neo-liberal tax reform? Who proposed and advocated the neo­
liberal tax reform solution and what were the alternatives? Was 
the solution deemed viable by people in and around government?
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And on what grounds? Did the solution survive to make the leap 
from proposal to government policy? How and why did this happen?
We will approach these questions by first looking at the 
problems - primarily political and economic - facing France and 
Britain in the late 1970s/early 1980s. Secondly, we will look at 
the policy communities and the policy soup in each country, 
including the tax ideas which were generated and floated, and why 
some found favor while others did not. Thirdly, we will examine 
the political stream: those political conditions and 
circumstances that facilitated the emergence of the tax reform 
issue on governmental agendas. Fourthly, we will look at those 
critical junctures that brought all these elements together. In 
other words, how did these elements interact and in what way was 
their interaction crucial to the evolution of tax reform from 
idea to government policy? Naturally, in this exercise we will 
be looking at the relevant actors involved and the 
institutional/organizational features that shaped and defined 
their preferences and actions. Finally, we will compare the 
processes in France and Britain, and look for similarities and 
differences in their respective situations. This final task will 
serve an additional purpose. It will enable us to assess the 
appropriateness of Kingdon's model, joined with an institutional 
conception of the body politic, in explaining the shape and 
development of the tax reform processes and illustrate how tax 
reform is best understood in a political context across, as well 
as within, Britain and France.
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The Problems Stream
Generally, before problems are recognized as such, 
conditions exist, which affect individuals in different ways. 
While some may have endured high taxes as a necessary and 
tolerable condition, others may have defined high taxes as 
problematic, with serious repurcussions for individual economic, 
financial and political behavior, and the economy more generally. 
Conditions are often tolerable, until they become problems.
People will demand that problems be resolved.
Before looking at any other factors, it is necessary to look 
at the conditions that eventually made tax reform a ripe issue. 
What conditions existed that drew attention and raised concern? 
Who paid attention to these conditions and why were the 
conditions interpreted as problems? What problems were 
acknowledged for which neo-liberal tax reform ideas were deemd 
appropriate tonics? First we will look at Britain, and then 
France; although, in many ways the basic story line is the same 
for both.
Primarily, economic problems during the 1970s alerted many 
people to a situation which needed to be addressed. In Britain, 
the country's long economic decline was not arrested by the 
economic framework of Keynesianism exercised by both Labour and 
Conservative governments since the 1930s. Although economic 
growth rose and fell periodically - reflecting the so-called 
"stop-go" strategy - by the late 1960s serious problems in 
Britain's economy surfaced and forced successive governments to
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'tinker' with it, employing fiscal and monetary mechanisms in 
hopes of reinvigorating it. However, the old solutions of the 
Keynesian consensus had little effect on a system that was 
riddled with structural deficiencies and institutional anomalies.
The new Conservative government which took office in 1970 
had pledged itself to a program of reform based on competition, 
tax reform, and less government intervention. This program 
initially represented a departure from what had gone before. The 
commitment to tax reform was made while in opposition and was 
carried into government by the Conservatives under Edward Heath. 
The commitment acknowledged the need to do something about the 
tax system, which had grown onerous, complex and inefficient.
This need was fulfilled by Anthony Barber and the Treasury, based 
on work largely done by Iain Macleod, who died only days after 
being appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer. Nevertheless, 
despite the hope engendered by the new government's plans, 
economic difficulties persisted, complicated by events in the 
international arena. Consequently, the government backpedalled 
on its neo-liberal commitments, with the exception of tax reform.
The unstable economic environment of the 1970s was 
exacerbated internationally, by the demise of Bretton Woods, oil 
price hikes, rising commodity prices, and domestically, by a 
declining industrial base and economic competitiveness, 
increasing labor agitation, a falling share of world trade, 
rising inflation and unemployment. Rather than risk the 
political and economic consequences of new, radical liberal
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economic ideas which had brought the Conservatives to power in 
1970, the Conservatives finished their term of office applying 
the old solutions with a vengeance. The incoming Labour 
government of 1974 pursued similar collectivist solutions, but 
equally with no significant or permanent success. As economic 
growth through the 1970s failed to meet expectations, government 
was hard pressed to meet the financial requirements of its 
substantial political commitments for social and other programs, 
not to mention, the costly baggage of pre- and post-war social 
and economic policy legacies.
Pressed for more revenue, the Labour government reversed the 
reforming efforts of Anthony Barber, raised tax rates, devised 
new taxes and generally made the system more complex. To make 
matters worse, rising inflation meant a heavier burden on the 
taxpayer as the effects of bracket creep placed many in higher 
tax brackets and left taxpayers with lower real net income. Many 
suffered disproportionately.
However, in the absence of any tax revolt, politicians found 
it easy to do little or nothing about reforming the tax system. 
The safest course of action was to minimize political costs 
either by maintaining old tax laws, raising rates of indirect 
taxation (i.e. VAT or excise) and national insurance 
contributions (NICs), or by introducing relatively neutral tax 
changes. However, in return for a rescue loan from the 
International Monetary Fund to help the revenue-needy Labour 
government, promises of financial rectitude and responsibility
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were made. Among other changes to Labour's economic agenda, 
taxes were brought down in the 1977 and 1978 budgets, and a 
Conservative inspired amendment was passed to henceforth raise 
thresholds and allowances in line with inflation (the Rooker-Wise 
amendment).
Although, these reforms were a refreshing change, they did 
not represent any fundamental change in Labour's thinking. 
Moreover, they did little to change the state of economic 
affairs. Economic growth did not materialize. The financial 
markets and the labor unions lost faith in the government, and 
the Liberals created problems in Parliament, wreaking havoc with 
Chancellor Denis Healey's economic plans.
Gallup polls increasingly showed that a majority of those 
surveyed felt that the Labour government was not handling the 
country's economic situation correctly. And polls continued to 
show a majority of people whose outlook for the economic 
situation as a whole was gloomy at best. The electorate was
wondering, given the state of affairs, about the Labour
government's ability to govern.
The collapse of the social contract between government and
the unions, and the ensuing failure to agree on a pay policy 
culminated in the winter of discontent during 1978-79 which saw 
the unions at odds with the government. This situation merely 
heightened the perception of moral and economic decline and 
government mismanagement associated with Labour. The government 
was fitfully losing the battle to hold together the consensus
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which had reigned supreme since the war. At the end of March 
1979, the government lost on a vote of confidence motion and an 
election was called for May.
That government did not have all the answers, was becoming 
ever more apparent. Government intervention in the public and 
private sectors of the economy had produced an economic malaise 
that cried out for a new course of action. The most resented 
public intervention by government was in the area of taxation.
The burden of taxation had grown significantly under Labour (see 
Appendix A, Figure 2A). The damage it was doing to personal and 
corporate incomes and incentives did not go unnoticed by the 
government's critics and concerned policy entrepreneurs.
Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, while in opposition, had 
consistently maintained that Labour policy took an increasing 
proportion of the national income for government. She disparaged 
the government's efforts to determine a high social wage at the 
expense of a low real real wage in the pay packet. She insisted, 
as did other opposition figures like Keith Joseph and Geoffrey 
Howe, that what people really wanted was more of their own money 
and a chance to look after themselves in their own way. 635 This 
message was not a new one, but by 1979 it had taken on more
As John Biffen recalled, "We were arguing that it was absurd for the 
top marginal rates of tax to be so high and they were out-of-line with 
what was evident elsewhere. On the whole we believed that if we could 
get taxes down, even if by only modest amounts - but particularly 
across the blue-collar worker range - we would be able to demonstrate 
that we were the party of modern liberalism which on the whole meant 
leaving people free to spend more of their own money. I mean that was 
the ideology behind it. We wanted to contrast ourselves with the 
Labour Party." (John.Biffen, interview in London, England, June 20, 
1991).
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immediate saliency. The reduction of taxation soon became the 
political talisman of the 1979 campaign.636
In France the story is not altogether different. The French 
economy and the government of Valery Giscard d'Estaing were 
buffeted by problems not unlike those experienced across the 
Channel. Rising inflation, taxes and unemployment and falling 
productivity, investment and economic growth rates - collectively 
known as 'la crise' - challenged government policy makers. Taxes 
appeared to be multiplying (ie. the prelevement conjoncturel, the 
taxe professionnelle, the capital gains tax, and a new form of 
property tax and a wealth tax were given serious consideration) 
and tax rates rising. The austerity medicine administered by 
Raymond Barre peppered with neo-liberal measures - in the form of 
price liberalization and monetarism - improved the situation only 
slightly. However, the improvement was temporary. Following the 
oil price hike of 1979, the French economy once again 
deteriorated.
On the tax front, the government gave no visible indication 
that the rising tax burden was a major concern. Early in the 
Giscardien septennat, the President's economic adviser, Lionel 
Stoleru, even indicated his willingness to see the tax burden 
rise to 40% from the then current rate of around 35%. In fact, 
Stoleru pointed to the higher burdens then existing in other 
countries as a justification for allowing the French tax burden
All of the British interviewees pointed to these problems and the 
growing appeal of the Conservatives' tax reform message in the period 
prior to the 1979 election.
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to rise. Jacques Chirac, the Prime Minister, members of the 
government's majority in Parliament and the parliamentary 
opposition, appeared predisposed to higher and heavier taxation.
The climate was not right for neo-liberal tax reform in the 
mid- to late-1970s, and there were few people advocating it, with 
the exception of a few isolated individuals and groups, including 
Maurice Allais, the nouveaux economistes, "and later the Club de 
l'Horloge. The government, however, did make an effort to hold 
company taxes steady (see the Blois Program of 1978) and lower 
VAT rates’(while expanding the base of application), as a means 
of enhancing business competitiveness and reining in inflation. 
Nevertheless, special income taxes were imposed, cotisations 
sociales were raised, and the imposition of taxation grew heavier 
with inflation and the absence of full indexation.
During Barre's tenure at Matignon, the government expressed 
real concern about the rising level of taxation. Despite 
government rhetoric of the need to contain and if possible 
reverse the rise in high taxation, neo-liberal tax reform was not 
on the governmental agenda, nor, at the time, on the specialized 
agendas of the majority or opposition parties. Problems in the 
economy were recognized but neo-liberal tax reform, while 
acknowledged in principle by some as a possible solution, was 
rejected as unpracticable.
Neo-liberal tax reform was kept off the agenda by a number 
of factors including economic, budgetary and political 
constraints, ideological ambiguity and the persistence at elite
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(especially administrative) levels of anti-reform attitudes and 
behavior. Political and administrative actors largely refrained 
from questioning the role of the state and viewed taxation in 
instrumental and technical terms. They wished to keep to a 
minimum any changes to the tax system, particularly after the 
major changes of the taxe professionnelle, the capital gains tax 
(brought in from. 1975 and 1976 respectively), the VAT (begun in 
1977) and the fiasco of the proposed impot fonder (introduced in 
Parliament in late 1975) .637 It was not until 1980 that policy 
entrepreneurs and political actors began to seriously consider 
and then promote the idea of neo-liberal tax reform.
At this point many would be inclined to stop the analysis. 
They would probably focus on the broad economic forces noted 
above as a sufficient explanation for the emergence of tax reform 
in Britain, and perhaps in France too. However to attribute the 
emergence of tax reform to economic difficulties in Britain and 
France - or anywhere - is insufficient and not entirely 
convincing. Certainly, economic challenges, like those 
experienced in the 1970s, gave a special urgency to the debate 
over taxation policy. But it was the political context that most 
decisively shaped the debate and the evolution of neo-liberal tax
637 After the reform of the CGT in 1978, Maurice Papon, the Budget Minister
declared that he favored "une pause fiscale" and an end to the 
"frenesie r^formatrice" (see: C. Heckly, op.cit., p.34 6; Le Nouvel
fconomiste, no.275, 2 Mars 1981, p.34). As has already been mentioned, 
several interviewees commented on the resistance of the civil service 
to tax reforms. For example, Georges Egret remarked, "... mais 
1'administration du Ministere des Finances est encore une vieille 
administration qui laisse parler - qui se dit, "Bon. On fera pas de 
grands bouleversements, mais on va faire quelques petites modifications 
qui vont dans le bon sens." (Georges Egret, interview in Paris, France, 
May 7, 1992).
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reform from intellectual debate to governmental agenda.
Economics set the stage, but politics provided the actors and the 
script. Furthermore, economic conditions had to be recognized as 
problematic by participants inside, if not necessarily outside, 
government, and deemed serious enough by these governmental and 
political actors to require the development and application of 
appropriate solutions. Someone in government had to find 
something urgent in the economic situation noted above and act, 
by seeking redress.
* Looking at the Signs
People in and around government keep a close eye on 
developments in the broader "problems" stream and seek to 
identify and bring those developments they see as problematical 
to the attention of decision makers or people in a position to do 
something. But how does one determine that a problem exists? 
Usually people rely on indicators (or focusing symbols like 
crises, natural disasters, social unrest or referendum results, 
etc.) of some sort to provide data and assess the state of 
things. They then place their personal interpretations on this 
data. It is their interpretations which determine whether or not 
a given condition is a problem worthy of attention. Kingdon 
(1984) says,
...data do not speak for themselves. Interpretation of 
the data transform them from statements of conditions 
to statements of policy problems. Policy makers 
consider a change in an indicator to be a change in the 
state of a system; this they define as a problem.638
638 J. Kingdon, 1984, op.cit., pp.97,99.
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Sometimes decision makers, or people in a position to do
something, fail to recognize indicator change that signals the
existence of some problem. Alternatively, they may even ignore
it. What then may bring the problem to the attention of people
in and around government is a focusing event or symbol that
forces policy makers to reckon with the problem at hand.
An example of a symbol that rather forcefully focused
attention, was the passage of Proposition 13 in California in
June of 1978. While disaffection with high property taxes was
nothing new, the "taxpayer revolt" emphasized the urgency and
saliency of this disaffection.
The passage of Proposition 13 in California, for 
example, became symbolic of a perceived restiveness 
among taxpayers, a shift in public opinion... the symbol 
diffused very rapidly, probably because it captured the 
mood rather convincingly, at least as politicians saw 
it.639
The symbol and the perceived change in public attitudes were 
useful in the arguments people were making for lower taxes in the 
late 1970s, and which Ronald Reagan adopted in his presidential 
campaign in 1979-80.
Neither in Britain nor France did such a symbol or focusing 
event directly related to taxation occur. While taxpayers may 
have registered their discontent through such "standard" methods 
as tax avoidance and evasion, there was no visibly organized tax
639 J. Kingdon, 1984, op.cit., p.102.
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revolt. 640 Rather, changes in a number of "indicators" were 
seized upon as indicative of systemic problems in the British and 
French economies and societies. Lower productivity levels, 
higher inflation, lower output, particularly a precipitous 
decline in manufacturing output, pointed to a weakened economy.
In Britain, with respect to the system of taxation, an issue 
to which the Conservatives had long been attentive, the 
Conservative Research Department, and other groups and 
individuals close to the policy making process, had been watching 
other, more closely related "indicators": the movement in the
basic rate, which rose from 30p in 1974 to 33p> then to 35p and 
then finally again to 33p in the pound, with a special rate of 
25p up to the first £750 brought in by the government in 1978; 
the rise in the top rate of tax from 75% under Barber to 83% 
under Healey, made more onerous if one is hit by the 15% 
investment income surcharge; the rise in corporation tax from 40% 
to 42% and 52%, plus a new 2% national insurance surcharge 
imposed in 1976; the erosion of thresholds and allowances - for 
example, a typical family man in early 1979 was paying income tax 
when his income was a mere 45% of the national average against 
51% in 1973 and 82% in 1964; and the increasing number of
640 In fact, the majority of those interviewed in Britain and France
pointed out that taxation was not a major issue with the broader public 
in either country and remarked on the absence of tax revolts in Britain 
and France. Although, many French interviewees referred to the 
'historic' revolts of the Poujadistes in the 1950s and the CID-UNATI 
in the 1970s. In other words, they made it quite clear that political 
rhetoric surrounding tax reform was not inspired by rumblings from the 
masses. If political leaders advocated tax reform, they did so based 
on ideological or political instincts - due to the potential electoral 
gain - or in response to rumblings from influential sectors, especially 
business.
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taxpayers scooped up in the tax net - by 1977, 2.25 million more 
than in 1973-74. Also, the Conservatives, waving reports issued 
by the New Earnings Survey, pointed to the decline in real 
purchasing power due to the increasing proportion of income paid 
in taxes and eroded by inflation.
Other indicators included international comparisons of 
starting rates of income tax and thresholds as well as the 
overall tax burden and rates of income tax and social security 
suffered by the average worker. For instance, the Conservative 
Campaign Guide of 1977 made use of international comparisons of 
income tax for a typical married couple with two children at 
various income levels. This comparison highlighted the high tax 
position Britain occupied in relation to other OECD members. A 
comparison of starting thresholds and tax rates was made which 
showed Britain with one of the highest basic rates at one of the 
lowest thresholds (see Appendix A, Table 2A). All these 
comparisons were used to show how Britain fared unfavorably in 
relation to its economic partners. These "indicators" and 
others, like Treasury and special commission reports, i.e. the 
Diamond Commission and Meade Commission reports were deemed, by 
some interested parties, symptomatic of serious problems. Very 
often they were used to highlight the detrimental effects of 
Britain's system of taxation on choice, incentive, investment and 
savings. Furthermore, the connection frequently made between 
high taxes and poor economic performance was a frequent and 
important argument in favor of reform of Britain's complex and
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punitive system of taxation.
Similarly in France, those who favored some reform of the 
tax system produced international comparisons which cast France 
as one of the most highly taxed countries, and domestic 
comparisons, which traced the inexorable rise in taxation under 
successive governments. Policy entrepreneurs like Maurice 
Allais, the new economists, including Henri Lepage and Guy 
Sorman, the Club de l'Horloge, Yvan Blot, and Philippe Auberger, 
seized upon such indicators to emphasize the need to reform 
France's system of taxation.641 In its 1980 manifesto, Atout 
France, the RPR drew attention to France's intolerable tax burden 
and overly complicated tax structure.642
As parliamentary debates revealed in the late 1970s/early 
1980s, for example on the 1980 budget, France's unenviable tax 
position in and of itself, and relative to other countries, the 
link between taxation and economic performance and the need to do 
something about it were becoming increasingly acknowledged, 
especially within the government's own majority. 643 The issue of 
neo-liberal tax reform was moving outside closed academic circles 
and economic/tax symposia and reaching a wider audience.
641 See e.g.: M. Allais, 1977, op.cit.; M. Allais, 1966, op.cit.; H.
Lepage, 1982, op.cit.; P. Salin et al., L'Occident en Desarroi, (Paris: 
Plon, 1978); P. Baccou et le Club de l'Horloge, 1981, op.cit.; Alain 
Jupp€ et le Club 89, 1983, op.cit.; P. Auberger, 1984, op.cit..
642 J. Meo and the Rassemblement pour la Republique, Atout France, (Paris: 
Editions Roudil, 1980), pp.47,326-7. According to the author(s) p.o. 
had risen from 39.7% of gdp in 1975 to 43.2% in 1979 and had thus 
exceeded "le seuil du tolerable." The warning was made that the tax 
burden should not be permitted to rise further.
643 See e.g. : Journal Officiel, Debats Parlementaires, Assembl£e Nationale, 
17 Octobre 1979, pp.8287-8,8343.
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Attitudes gradually were changing, becoming ever more partial to 
neo-liberal tax reform as an appropriate tonic for France's 
ailing economy, and as a political talisman, as had been proven 
in the United States and Great Britain.
Another important and closely watched indicator were the 
public opinion polls. At least in Britain, throughout the 1970s, 
they continued to register public distaste for high taxation and 
a need to do something about it. When Gallup began registering 
British public opinion regarding tax reductions in the late 
1970s, the majority of those polled felt reducing taxes was 
important and supported moves to reduce taxation. The 
Conservatives took an aggressive stand on the tax issue, and the 
public seemed to respond favorably.
Despite the absence of any symbol or focusing event, like a 
tax revolt, the changes in the indicators mentioned above, were 
sufficient to alert politicians to the magnitude of the problem. 
In fact, for many politicians, particularly Conservative ones, 
the changes in the indicators merely reinforced their perception 
of a long standing situation which demanded redress. While it 
would be unfair to say that Labour politicians were unaware or 
insensitive to the problems of Britain's tax system and the 
unpopularity of their tax policies - see Denis Healey's speech to 
the Parliamentary Labour Party meeting at the House of Commons644 
or Prime Minister Callaghan's speech to a joint meeting of the
644 Reported in the Times of February 2, 1976.
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Cabinet and the National Executive645 - the conditions, as they 
perceived them, apparently had not deteriorated to a point that 
required a search for, or experimentation with, 'new' tax ideas; 
although, Healey's tentative efforts t© reduce tax rates in the 
1978 budget, indicated an appreciation of the problem and the 
need to do something about it.
Labour, quite simply, was not interpreting the data in the 
same way as the Conservative opposition. Or if they were, they 
were ignoring it, or prescribing different solutions.
Regardless, Labour commitments to give priority to solving the 
problems of unemployment and inflation via monetary constrained 
demand management, plus the party's alleged predilection for high 
taxes - on account of their revenue raising and redistributional 
effects - inhibited the Labour government from taking any serious 
steps to reform the system, even if some in the party had thought 
it necessary.
In France, public discontent with the burdens of a high tax 
system was not on the same scale as it was in the U.S. or 
Britain: nor did it have the same political consequences. During 
the life of the Fifth Republic, up until 1981, there were no 
widespread tax revolts in France or major political parties 
devoted to tax cutting. In the twentieth century, the most 
outstanding exception was the Poujadiste revolts, during the 
Fourth Republic, starting in 1953 in the departement of Lot and
Reported in the Financial Times of March 15, 1978.
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which spread throughout France. 646 The Poujadiste affair was the 
most celebrated of the post-war French tax revolts, although 
other manifestations of tax resistance occurred in the 1960s, 
1970s and 1980s, with CID-UNATI (the organization for independent 
workers) and the Ligue des Contribuables (a taxpayers association 
formed in 1983 under the leadership of Jacques Bloch-Morhange) .647
In France anti-tax reaction, pre- and post-Poujade, has 
largely been reflected in the high rates of tax evasion/avoidance 
and fraud. 648 Other indicators of public discontent include the 
hefty black economy and of course, public opinion surveys. On 
the whole public opinion polls on the issue of taxation (which 
were not very common in France) showed a public fairly satisfied 
with, or at the very least tolerant of, the tax system. 649 Tax 
cutting and tax reform have never been high on the public's list 
of priorities in the way it has been in countries like Britain
From the Poujadist revolts sprang a political movement called the Union 
de Defense des Commercants et Artisans (UDCA), which sent over 52 MPs 
to Parliament in the 1956 legislative elections. Gabriel Ardant (1972, 
op.cit., p.645) writes that the essential feature of the Poujadist 
movement was the reaction against state intrusion, "...le mouvement est
la reaction de defense d'hommes libres, defense contre 1'administration 
envahisant, contre les recensements, contre 1'immatriculation, contre 
l'etatisme." However, the primary concern was relations between the 
state and the taxpayer and less the burden of taxation. Events (ie. 
European integration, Algeria) soon overtook the Poujadists who from 
the moment they entered Parliament displayed nothing more than 
political ineptitude and failed to sustain tax reform as an issue of 
high agenda status. The revolts and the movement proved to be only a 
quirk of the period rising out of the conjunction of special economic, 
social and political factors at that time.
See, "Les Resistances Sl l'Impot", Revue Francaise de Finances 
Publiques, no.5, 1984.
Different assessments put the loss to the Tresor (Treasury) at 15-25% 
of total tax receipts.
€49 See e.g.: Revue Francaise de Finances Publiques, no.5, 1984, op.cit.; 
J. Duberge, 1961, op.cit.; J. Duberg6, 1990, op.cit..
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and the United States. While in principle, the idea of tax cuts 
appears to have broad appeal, the French make a closer and more 
immediate connection between quality and level of public services 
and benefits than their British or American counterparts, and so 
are less keen on the idea of tax cuts, given the alleged effects 
such measures would entail.650
If public opinion gave any clear indications just prior to 
and immediately following the appearance of neo-liberal tax 
reform on Chirac's agenda in 1980/81, it appeared inclined to the 
sorts of reform promised by the left: higher taxes, but on the 
wealthy and businesses. While, in the early 1980s public 
attitudes towards the high rates of taxation appeared to be 
changing - perhaps in part led by the focus of media and 
political attention on the issue - there was no identifiable 
constituency for neo-liberal tax reform, apart from business 
executives and small business owners.
However, other polls were slavishly watched by political 
decision makers in France. These were the political popularity 
polls and election results (by-elections and local elections).
As the Socialists got mired down in the economic and financial 
mess created in part by their fiscal policies, public opinion and 
voting preferences began to turn against them. Poll ratings and 
electoral outcomes were perceived as veritable problems by party
Although, opinion polls- in the U.S.A. and Britain, reveal a public 
reluctant to condone reductions in taxation, when squared against the 
possibility of reduced levels and quality of public services and 
benefits.
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leaders, because if left unaddressed, the Socialists' hold on 
power would be at risk come the next general election.
It was the perception that high taxes were stifling 
incentive, choice and savings, and thereby affecting growth and 
enterprise in the British and French economies, which confirmed 
the Conservatives' belief, and later persuaded the French 
Socialists, to do something about taxation. The Conservative 
opposition under Mrs. Thatcher, harboring monetarist and supply 
side ideas, identified similar conditions - which the Labour 
government tolerated or was unable to solve - as problematic, and 
therefore deserving of serious attention. They devoted much time 
and energy to raising the profile of problems like high taxes, 
falling standards of living and low economic growth, and tied 
these problems to the solution of neo-liberal tax cuts and tax 
reform.651
The case of France, however, was slightly different. Chirac 
in 1981 and Mitterrand from 1982/83 ostensibly sought to address 
problems in the French economy - low company profits and 
investment, stifled risk-taking and initiative - which were not 
unlike those plaguing Britain. They were not entirely convinced 
that the solutions provided by the neo-liberal agenda were 
appropriate. These French political leaders were less beholden 
to neo-liberal ideology than Mrs. Thatcher and the Conservatives, 
and more concerned about their own political fortunes. While,
SSI Nearly all the British interviewees mentioned these and other tax- 
related problems, like the brain drain and the low rate of savings, as 
indicative of the harmful nature of high taxes.
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for Mitterrand and Chirac, seizing on neo-liberal ideas, like tax 
cuts and reform, was an essential element in a bid to promote 
political survival and electoral ambitions, for Thatcher (and 
Howe and Lawson), neo-liberal tax reform was borne of ideological 
conviction, and for the most part was perceived as an end in 
itself.
* How Problems are Defined
Kingdon (1984) informs us that problem definition often 
involves values, comparisons and categories. Values involve 
one's ideologically inspired judgment; comparisons are made 
between closely related factors - sometimes across nations - and 
the relative advantage or disadvantage which is discovered; 
categories signify how one classifies or attributes something - 
for instance, inner city riots will be subject to different 
definitions and solutions depending on whether one categorizes 
them as a law and order problem or as inner city blight. What 
values, comparisons and categories did participants bring to bear 
in their evaluation of conditions and problems?
The Conservatives evaluated conditions in light of all 
three: values, comparisons and categories. The anti­
interventionist and free-market sentiments which pervaded the 
Conservative leadership in the late 1970s, supported by 
monetarist and supply-side doctrine, not only helped explain the 
problems presented by high taxation, but also prescribed, or at 
least proscribed, some of the solutions. Among the prescribed 
solutions was tax reform.
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On the other hand, in France, the Socialist President and 
others in his government - once ardent big spending, "soak-the- 
rich" populists - quickly adapted their values to meet the 
pressing needs and exigencies of their business clients and the 
electoral timetable. It was expedient, in other words, to change 
tack, shed the socialist agenda, and ascribe to the notions and 
solutions put forward by the neo-liberals.
As previously discussed, various indicators were monitored 
by the Conservatives to assess the state of taxation and its 
effects on the British economy and society. These indicators 
included: OECD and Treasury international tax comparisons, the 
tax rate and threshold structure, and personal disposable income 
statistics. They were supplemented by occasional Treasury 
reports or special commission studies, like Diamond and Meade.652 
International comparisons of the type often quoted in the 
Conservative campaign guides or found in the publications of 
policy organizations like the IEA or the IFS, usually showed the 
poor position Britain occupied in relation to other OECD members. 
Britain's poor economic performance, in relation to its economic 
partners, it was argued, was at least partially explained by its 
higher burden of taxation. Moreover, comparisons between the tax 
policies and achievements of the last Conservative government 
were also drawn to justify the Conservative case for tax reform
J.E. Meade Committee, The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation, 
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1978); Diamond Commission, Royal Commission 
on the Distribution of Income and Wealth, Report no.4, Cmnd. 6626, 
(London: HMSO, 1977) .
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and its capability to best carry out that reform.
Similar comparisons were made in France, setting that 
country against others and contrasting the current state of 
taxation with what went before. The government could not escape 
comparisons made by the opposition parties, by international 
organizations - like the OECD - or the government's own agents - 
like the planners - which cast France in an unfavorable light.
Lastly, the Conservatives saw taxation not as a tool for 
social engineering, as Labour did, but as an intrusion into the 
lives of every taxpaying citizen - an intrusion that undermined 
initiative and responsibility. High taxation was the gross 
manifestation of the hand of big government making decisions 
better left to individuals in possession of more of their own 
money and functioning in a free market.
In contrast, the French Socialists did not view high and 
complex taxation in terms of the intrusive hand of the state, as 
did the Conservatives in Britain; although, this view came to be 
adopted by the center-right opposition. The Socialists, at least 
initially, considered taxation in terms of its social and 
redistributive functions. However, in the context of the 
economic crisis of the early 1980s and the changing tax 
environment internationally, the tax problem began to be seen as 
presenting an obstacle to risk and enterprise, as well as 
electoral success.
This information was used to evaluate change and determine 
the magnitude of the problem or related problems (i.e. high
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taxes, low economic growth, low investment, etc.). When the
problem was, or related problems were, identified, defined and
deemed serious, the next step was to argue the case for
government attention and action. While Britain's tax system, for
some, including Labour, may have been a tolerable condition - or
a problem - not worthy of serious government attention, the
Conservatives interpreted the situation differently in light of
their own values, comparisons and classifications. Their
particular interpretation defined the problem in terms which
mandated serious attention and action.
The center-right opposition in France, from 1981 led by
Chirac, followed the pattern of the British Conservatives to a
large degree. The Socialists however, drew somewhat different
conclusions given their different starting point and position:
marked by a leftist ideology rather than neo-liberal, as the
party in government, and their medium-term objectives of election
victory, or at the minimum, political survival. For the
Socialists, the indicators were interpreted less in ideological
terms and more pragmatically. Despite this, their slightly
different interpretation of the indicators led to tax policy
outcomes which emulated more or less those in Britain.
* Who Makes a Problem Important?
Just because a problem is identified does not mean that it
rises automatically to agenda status. As Kingdon (1984) notes,
While the emergence of a widespread feeling that a 
problem exists out there may not always be responsible 
for prompting attention to a subject, people in and 
around government still must be convinced somewhere
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along the line that they are addressing a real
problem.653
The mere fact that the tax system was considered a problem by 
certain elements in the British and French polities was not in 
and of itself sufficient to make tax reform an item of agenda 
priority. What lifted tax reform to agenda status? Who or what 
was responsible for making the right people pay attention to the 
(tax) problems?
Kingdon underscores the importance of activists in focusing 
attention on certain problems they deem important or serious 
enough to warrant resolution. Much time and effort is expended 
convincing people in and around government - but most 
specifically, key decision makers - that a given problem merits 
attention and remedy. The activist will undertake these efforts 
for any number of reasons: ideology, self-interest (ie. monetary 
or career rewards), an interest in good public policy, etc.. The 
activist may even have a ready remedy that he/she feels can best 
address a given problem.654
The activist will emphasize the adverse changes in the 
indicators, opinion surveys, commission studies and academic 
reports, to substantiate his/her claims. These activists, 
sometimes known as policy entrepreneurs, struggle to ensure that 
their interpretation of the indicators, and hence their 
definition of the problem, captures the attention of important
653 J. Kingdon, 1984, op.cit., p.121.
654 In this paper, the terms policy activist and policy entrepreneur will 
be used interchangeably.
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people. Problem identification and convincing*others that a 
problem exists, are two sides of the same coin. It's hardly 
worth going to the trouble of monitoring and interpreting the 
indicators unless the intention is to draw attention to the 
perceived problem, with the ultimate objective of seeing the 
problem solved.
Fortunately, those who recognized Britain's tax system as a 
problem, had little trouble convincing the key decision makers. 
Those watching the indicators, identifying the problems and 
proposing solutions were themselves the decision makers. People 
like Mrs. Thatcher, Sir Keith Joseph and Sir Geoffrey Howe had 
long recognized the problems of Britain's tax system and had 
canvassed, if not themselves proposed, possible solutions. 
Conservative policy makers like Thatcher and Howe, supported by 
the likes of Lord Cockfield, Nigel Lawson and Peter Cropper, 
proposed lowering income tax rates, raising expenditure taxes and 
reforming capital taxation while in opposition because they were 
convinced that they were addressing real problems.655
It had long been the Conservative position that taxes were 
too high and Britain's system too complex. 656 When the party 
leadership changed in 1975, the question of addressing Britain's 
tax problems quickly assumed a high agenda position. While tax 
reform enjoyed a prominent position before 1975 on the
655 These individuals were most frequently referred to by the British
interviewees as the important tax policy makers immediately prior to 
and after May 1979.
656 See e.g., A. Gamble, The Conservative Nation, (London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1974).
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Conservative Party's agenda, this time things were different. 
Primarily, what was different under Thatcher, was that this time, 
the Conservative approach to taxation would be backed by a 
powerful and persuasive policy paradigm, founded in New Right 
economics (P. Hall, 1993) .
Those actors defining the 'tax' problem in France were not 
among the visible cluster. In other words, in contrast to 
Britain, the problem definers were not political leaders. At 
least initially, one must first credit the role of groups, like 
the Club de l'Horloge, and the nouveaux economistes. They 
monitored the economic and political indicators and propogated 
neo-liberal ideas, including tax reform. Their effect, however, 
was important in terms of the attention accorded their views by 
the press, certain business representatives and members of the 
center-right parties.
However, developments abroad, particularly in the United 
States, were also important in shaping perceptions about 
taxation. Members of the new economists, like Henri Lepage, and 
'governmental' policy entrepreneurs, like Philippe Auberger and 
Alain Juppe, had travelled to the United States during the 1970s 
and experienced first hand the 'American' anti-tax movement, the 
changing climate of opinion, and were exposed to 'new' ideas 
floating around there. They brought these experiences back with 
them to France. For instance, Auberger developed neo-liberal tax 
reform proposals, which found their way into the campaign 
speeches of Jacques Chirac and the RPR party programs of the
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1 9 8 0 s . 657
The initial acknowledgement by people in Mitterrand's 
government that a problem existed was due in large part to the 
efforts of the employers' organizations, but more specifically 
their unofficial representatives in the Elysee - Jean Riboud, 
Gilbert Trigano, Francois Dalle, Andre Rousselet, and others, the 
so-called visiteurs du soir - who had the most direct contact and 
impact in terms of promoting this agenda item.658
Developments in the problems stream were opening a window 
for advocates to promote their ideas onto the governmental 
agenda. As the economy worsened and businesses bore an 
increasingly heavier burden of the costs, through taxation and 
higher interest charges, "reduire les charges des entreprises" 
became the rallying cry of Riboud, president director-general of 
Schlumberger, a close personal friend of Mitterrand's and a 
member of the CNPF. Frequent comparisons were made between the 
fiscal charges borne by French businesses compared with their 
main competitors abroad. Also attention was drawn to the 
increasing financial burden imposed since the Socialists had come 
to power.
With the deteriorating position of French industry, and the 
worsening economic climate, these problems and their consequences 
for the economy and the Socialists' electoral fortunes had a
657 See, P. Fysh, op.cit.
658 See: J. Attali, 1993, op.cit.; S. Berger, "The Socialists and the 
patronat: the dilemmas of co-existence in a mixed economy", in H. 
Machin and V. Wright, eds., op.cit., pp.228-30, 236-8.
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transforming effect on Socialist values and policies. To further 
ignore the pleas of such an important group would not serve the 
government's best interests. Furthermore, this group had friends 
in high places, important people who would lend a sensitive ear 
to what they had to say. Both Laurent Fabius and Pierre 
Beregovoy, ministers in the Mauroy government, listened and in 
turn pleaded the case for French businesses. The President 
himself was soon persuaded, and the tax agenda - at least the 
corporate tax agenda - soon changed.
The recognition of a problem by important decision makers is 
an important step on the way to bringing an issue to policy 
prominence. But while a problem, or its solution, may on their 
own rise to agenda prominence, unless the problem is connected 
with an appropriate solution, or vice versa, then there is a 
great likelihood that either will fade from the agenda due to 
declining interest, frustration or insolubility. The problem 
must have a solution, or the solution must have a problem.
If a problem is recognized, where do the solutions come 
from? We know that policy entrepreneurs promote problems and 
solutions, but where do the solutions come from in the first 
place? What role do the policy entrepreneurs play in determining 
solutions? The process of devising solutions or policies, is 
another important stream in the development and emergence of tax 
reform. In the next section we will learn about the policies 
stream where solutions are generated by policy comunities and 
where policy entrepreneurs promote solutions.
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The Policies Stream
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, 
both when they are right and when the are wrong are 
more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the 
world is ruled by little else...I am sure that the 
power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated 
compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas.659
Behind every new idea there is a policy community of
specialists. A policy community is comprised of a group of
generally more than one individual that shares an interest in an
issue area. These individuals are considered experts or
specialists in a particular issue area, i.e. housing, health,
environment, or tax. Sometimes policy communities operate as
part of a formal organizational network and sometimes they
operate outside the formal network. In any case, they are
engaged in generating ideas and formulating proposals.
Policy communities can be found among specialized institutes
or groups like the IFS, the IEA, the CNRS or the nouveaux
economistes, partisan and non-partisan groups like the Fabian
Society, Bow Group, or political/philosopical clubs de reflexion
like Club 89 or the Club de l'Horloge, political think tanks like
the Central Policy Review Staff, the Conservative Research
Department (CRD), or the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS),
interest groups like, the CBI, the IOD, the TUC or the CNPF,
which have their own special committees on taxation, or maybe -
though rarely - Parliament itself or its committees. Some of the
ideas produced float up to the surface, and with some advocacy,
John Maynard Keynes quoted in J. Kingdon, 1984, op.cit., p.132.
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capture the attention of someone in or around government. If the 
idea connects with a given problem and seems a promising 
solution, then it is very likely to be considered and possibly 
adopted by an important decision maker in government and placed 
on the government's agenda.
Nonetheless, despite the relation between solutions/policies 
and problems, it is important to remember that they are two 
different process streams. The policies stream in which policy 
communities operate is more or less independent from the 
political stream. But that is not an absolute and in many cases 
there will be overlap and combination. The policy communities 
pertinent to the tax reform process in Britain and France were 
not altogether independent of problems and politics. In some 
cases there was a close connection between the participants in 
the policies stream and those in the politics and problems 
streams. Participants like Yvan Blot and the Club de l'Horloge, 
the new economists, Auberger, Juppe, Delors, Fabius, Beregovoy, 
Howe, Lawson, Cropper, Cockfield, the CRD, CPS, IEA and the Bow 
Group frequently crossed from one stream to another. Many of 
them were close to, and in many cases were, key decision makers 
in the political stream.
Perceived problems regarding the economic and tax systems of 
Britain and France, and politicians looking for solutions served 
as catalysts for many of the ideas and proposals generated. 
However, in the absence of such catalysts or stimuli, it's quite 
likely new ideas would still have been produced, since members of
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the policy community are constantly exploring and devising new 
solutions, even in the absence of problems. While many ideas may 
be floated in the absence of problems, in the late 1970s/early 
1980s several "new" ideas (in some cases, old ideas 
reconstituted) appeared in response to problems related to the 
economy, and also to politics.
It was the perceived problems concerning Britain's economic 
performance, the overbearance of government and the stifling of 
initiative that gave rise (and credibility) to neo-liberal tax 
reform proposals. From the late 1970s in France a number of 
policy entrepreneurs and ideas were floating around, attempting 
to solve any number of economic, political and social problems. 
For some participants, like Chirac, - a participant in the 
political stream - an active search was underway to solve 
perceived political dilemmas (how to distinguish himself from 
Giscard d'Estaing and Mitterrand and win the presidency) and less 
importantly, economic dilemmas (how to rejuvenate the French 
economy). Some of the ideas floating in the policies stream, 
including neo-liberal tax reform, became part of the specialized 
agendas of Chirac and the center-right opposition.
On September 15, 1983 (like a year earlier in his Figeac 
speech), it was Francois Mitterrand who adopted the tax reform 
idea - or rather poached it from his political opposition - and 
made it his own. Publicly the President recognized the problems 
of rising prelevements obligatoires, as well as the negative 
effects of high taxation on the economy, and specifically, on
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production, investment and individual initiative. A solution was 
available - or rather a range of solutions collectively subsumed 
under the tax reform rubric - which appeared to adequately 
address these problems, tax reform.
As already stated elsewhere, it is not important when the 
policy communities generated their ideas, or even which ones.
The mere fact that they did is enough. Suffice to say that many 
ideas were considered at some stage. What is of greater 
importance for our purposes is to understand the conditions in 
which they emerged and why some survived and others did not.
As already shown, there were a large number of groups and 
individuals involved in the process of producing ideas.
Confronted with perceived economic (including tax) and political 
problems, these groups and individuals contemplated among other 
things: the reduction of corporate and individual tax rates; 
shifting the incidence of taxation between direct and indirect; 
indexation; simplifying the tax structure; broadening the tax 
base and closing loopholes.
The number of ideas floating about was remarkable. Some of 
the more recent ideas reappeared as modified versions of earlier 
ones. Many of the ideas survived - in original or modified form 
- to be taken up and considered by a variety of decision makers. 
The evolution of tax reform proceeded not so much by mutation, or 
the sudden appearance of an entirely new policy, as by recombina­
tion, or the new packaging of already familiar elements.660
660 J. Kingdon, 1984, op.cit., p.131.
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* The Role of Policy Entrepreneurs
In order to achieve agenda status, ideas or issues need the 
push provided by committed activists. Whether original, or 
recombined, various ideas are developed into policy proposals 
once they became the focus of attention from someone in and 
around government. However, ideas and issues mainly come to the 
attention of decision makers as a result of the advocacy of 
various individuals or groups. We have already briefly 
considered the role of policy entrepreneurs in the problems 
stream. We will now learn more about how and why policy 
entrepreneurs promote solutions in the policies stream.
Policy entrepreneurs can be found in or out of government, 
in academia, in professional and trade organizations, in research 
institutions, among a plethora of interests groups, and very 
often in the policy community itself. Howard Jarvis and Jim 
Gann, the two men who began the drive to persuade California 
voters of the need for Proposition 13 and vote 'Yes', provide two 
good examples of policy entrepreneurs.661 These two men strongly 
believed in the necessity of reversing the trend towards ever 
increasing property taxes. Over a sixteen year period prior to 
June 1978, each had tried separately to get an initiative on the 
ballot to rein back state taxes, but failed. Jarvis and Gann 
committed a great deal of their time and personal resources to
For an interesting account and analysis of the anti-tax movement in the 
United States and Proposition 13 see: T. Schwadron, ed., California and 
the American Tax Revolt, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1984); G. Kaufman and K. Rosen, The Property Tax Revolt: The Case of 
Proposition 13, (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1981).
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waging their campaigns against high taxes. By 1978, the problem 
of high taxes was perceived by a sufficient number of people to 
be serious enough to heed Jarvis and Gann and vote yes on 
Proposition 13.
When the proposal passed, decision makers in government, in 
California and elsewhere, paid attention and seriously considered 
the problem of high taxation, and various solutions then floating 
around, which sought to address this and related problems.
Similarly, in Britain and France, policy entrepreneurs 
advocated a variety of solutions to address perceived political 
and economic problems. They advocated the adoption by government 
of several solutions - some of them noted above - that promised 
to solve the problems. In some cases their solutions were 
ignored, and in others they were considered and adopted, either 
in their original or modified forms.
As noted with the example of Jarvis and Gann, success does 
not often come to policy entrepreneurs immediately, if at all.
The common thread which binds all policy entrepreneurs is their 
commitment of time, energy and resources in promoting particular 
solutions. Participation in the advocacy of a solution is often 
fluid. Policy entrepreneurs move in and out of the stream 
depending on the amount of time, energy and resources they can 
commit. In the event that a solution is not promoted to agenda 
status, it may fade away as the policy entrepreneur loses 
interest or must commit him/herself elsewhere. This is 
particularly true for solutions which are considered faddish or
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fashionable. Nevertheless, inevitably, the solution, perhaps in 
a modified form, will be resurrected and carried forward by 
another advocate. To see the fruits of one's labors usually 
takes some time.
Why do policy entrepreneurs invest so much of themselves? 
Several reasons are available: 1) their belief in the rightness 
of their cause, ideology and their desire to promote 'good' 
public policy; 2) the expectation of some form of return, i.e. 
electoral victory, career advancement, recognition, monetary 
reward; or 3) perhaps advocacy is an end in itself, engaged in 
for the enjoyment derived from simply participating. 662 It is 
often difficult to determine with any certainty which reason is 
applicable in any one case. Usually, the reality reflects a 
combination of two or all three. However important the 
incentives may be in motivating policy entrepreneurs, unless they 
demonstrate particular qualities and characteristics, alone or, 
to greater advantage, in combination, they will find success less 
easily. Among such qualities and characteristics are, expertise, 
connections, recognized and broadly supported policy authority, 
decision-making authority, and persistence. Equipped with these 
'entrepreneurial' incentives, skills and qualities, the policy 
entrepreneur maximizes his/her chances of success.
In the case of tax reform in Britain during the late 1970s, 
the policy entrepreneurs were not 'private' citizens, but public 
figures; politicians to be precise and their advisers. The
662 See, J. Kingdon, 1984, op.cit., pp.129-30,189-90.
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ideology of the Conservative leadership in the late 1970s about 
the proper role of government in the nation's social and economic 
life prompted them to advocate free market solutions. An 
important feature of those free market solutions was tax reform, 
more specifically, tax cuts. It was a solution that satisfied in 
part, Thatcher's, Joseph's and Howe's vision of smaller 
government, freer markets and greater individual choice. 
Additionally, it was a solution that struck a nerve in the 
British voter. 663 The Conservative leadership knew they were 
advocating a solution that had wide electoral appeal.
In France, the policy entrepreneurs issued from a broader 
policy community, and one initially only tangential to political 
circles. Before long, entrepreneurs advocating neo-liberal tax 
reform ideas came from academic/intellectual, as well as 
political/governmental and business/financial circles. They 
brought to the tax debate a variety of experiences, ideas and 
motivations.
* Creating a Receptive Climate and Building Support
The idea of tax reform, or more specifically, lower taxes, 
did not capture the sympathy of the general public overnight. As 
we saw in the case of Chirac during the 1981 presidential 
elections, his "tax cuts" message found favor with only a small 
portion of the French electorate. Promoting the cause would take
See e.g. : G. Heald and R. Wybrow, The Gallup Survey of Britain, 
(London: Croom Helm, 1986); Gallup Poll Index, May 1979, p.10; H. 
Penniman, ed., Britain at the Polls 1979, (Washington: AEI, 1981);
Economist, May 12, 1979, p.26.
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time and effort. In Britain, the activists - Mrs. Thatcher,
Geoffrey Howe, Keith Joseph and others - went to great lengths to
present their case to a number of audiences: the party, the
press, the City, and the general public. Through speeches in
Parliament and party conferences, lectures in universities and
polytechnics, interviews in the media, and literature issued
through the CPS, CRD, or the Bow Group, the policy activists
floated and spread their ideas and policies. In France,
entrepreneurs assiduously promoted their tax reform ideas and
policies through the lecture and conference circuits,
universities, the media and the chambers and corridors of
political power. In a climate largely suspicious of neo-liberal
ideas, the policy entrepreneurs in France faced a tough battle.
What has just been described above is a process which
Kingdon (1984) refers to as "softening up".
These entrepreneurs attempt to "soften up" both policy 
communities, which tend to be inertia-bound and 
resistant to major changes, and larger publics, getting 
them used to new ideas and building acceptance for 
their proposals.664
The ideas expressed by the Conservative party leaders were
couched in populist terms: "keep more of your own money",
"restoring incentives", "greater individual responsibility", "the
right to decide how to spend your own money", "putting choice
back into people's pockets." When expressed this way, it was
difficult to ignore tax reform's appeal. There already was
established in the party itself a group which was convinced of
6S4 J. Kingdon, 1984, op.cit., p.134.
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the need for tax reform. Indeed, as was earlier acknowledged, 
much of the groundwork, or softening up, had been anticipated by 
Enoch Powell and Iain Mcleod. 665 Mrs. Thatcher, along with 
Geoffrey Howe and Keith Joseph, extended it. They focused 
attention on the need to reduce taxes and soon people became 
interested in the idea.
The economic difficulties Britain was suffering in the 
1970s, coupled with the undeniably high rates of taxation, lent 
credibility to the idea of tax reform. The intention to switch 
taxation from personal incomes to spending, and reduce the 
overall burden if possible, was supported by typical supply side 
arguments. Gradually people tuned in to this message and the 
question of tax reform grew in terms of its saliency and 
importance to the public. In the 1979 election it was the third 
most urgent issue before the voters.666 The advocacy of the idea, 
couched in the framework of a new public philosophy, set against 
the backdrop of a deteriorating economic situation, and joined
Arthur Cockfield spoke at great length about the work done by the 
Conservatives under Ted Heath's leadership on the reform of Britain's 
tax system and the persistence and reconstitut ion of many of the 
earlier ideas under Mrs. Thatcher's leadership (Baron Arthur Cockfield, 
interview in London, England, June 11, 1991).
See e.g.: G. Heald and R. Wybrow, 1986, op.cit.; H. Penniman, 1981, 
op.cit.; Gallup Poll Index, May 1979, p.10; Economist, May 12, 1979, 
p. 26. Several of the British interviewees spoke of the the 
Conservatives' tax reform message as "politically attractive". Adam 
Ridley affirmed, "... I think there is no doubt that the political 
resonance and response to a tax cutting program was very powerful... 
we thought it was a strong card to play politically, but we had no idea 
if it was worth 1, 2 or 5% in the share of the vote. But it was a 
conviction that had a very specific electoral significance." Ridley 
went on to speak of the swing of traditional Labour voters to the 
Conservatives in 1979 and summed up, "And so tax cutting, I suspect, 
had very considerable appeal for these people along with a number of 
other policies, like the sale of council houses..." (Adam Ridley, 
interview in London, England, May 30, 1991).
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with the public sentiment against high taxation, contributed to 
the growing acceptability of the Conservatives' proposals.
In France, the "softening up" process was more difficult, 
particularly given the absence of readily evident cultural values 
or attitudes to which arguments for neo-liberal tax reform could 
refer. As the Socialists' economic policies appeared to be 
making a bad situation worse rather than better, people began to 
give some credence, or at least attention, to the tax and other 
proposals being made by the opposition center-right. Chirac and 
members of the RPR and UDF actively promoted tax reductions and 
tax reform, couching their proposals in terms which reflected 
their Thatcherite-Reaganite sympathies. In these efforts, the 
center-right was assisted, to a large extent, by the French 
media, particularly the printed media. Public opinion began to 
respond to their message, though not in any dramatic way. 
Increasingly, though, people began to resent taxation as 
intolerable or excessive.667
President Mitterrand, ever-sensitive to political trends, 
soon got the message as well. In addressing the tax issue on TF1 
in September 1983, as in Figeac in 1982, Mitterrand acknowledged 
that a threshold had been reached, and that the time had come to 
reverse trends in taxation. Before long, the President, and 
other reformers in his government, once the subjects of the 
"softening up" process, themselves engaged in "softening up" 
various publics: policy makers in government, the Socialist Party
667 See: J. Duberge, 1984, op.cit.; J. Duberge, 1990, op.cit.
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and the public.
Policy entrepreneurs are sensitive to the climate of opinion 
vis-a-vis certain issues. If they wish to .stand any chance of 
seeing their issue rise on a specialized or governmental agenda, 
they must do what is necessary to ensure that as broad a public 
as possible is receptive to the issue. A hostile climate will 
derail any hopes of agenda status. Efforts must be undertaken to 
educate and persuade the public, but more critically, 
governmental decision makers.
* Passing the Tests
Before and during the "softening up" process it is essential 
that ideas and proposed solutions pass a number of hurdles which 
stand in the way of their ultimate success, or at the very least, 
survival. These hurdles represent tests which the proposal must 
pass if it is to be taken seriously. Important decision makers 
in government as well as members of the policy community ask 
themselves a number of questions which amount to a test for any 
idea or proposal: Will the idea work? Does it conflict with
certain deep rooted beliefs or practices? Will it be opposed by 
powerful and/or influential actors? Can we afford this? If the 
perception is that the idea is unlikely to pass all the necessary 
tests, then it may never be raised. A proposal's ultimate 
survival depends on its ability to pass a series of tests.
Kingdon (1984) calls these tests "criteria for survival."668 
In order for a proposal to be considered viable, and so worthy of
668 J. Kingdon, 1984, op.cit., pp.138-146.
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attention by decision makers, it has to meet these criteria. 
Kingdon identifies a number of different but crucial criteria, 
including: 1) technical feasibility; 2) value acceptability 
within the policy community, but also within decision making 
circles; 3) tolerable cost; 4) anticipated public acquiescence 
and a reasonable chance for receptivity; and to Kingdon's 
criteria I will add, 5) minimal opposition from important 
decision makers. I will not go into a discussion of each of 
these criteria, as they are more or less self-explanatory and the 
reader is referred to Kingdon (1984) for a more in-depth 
analysis. Moreover, to a large extent, the characteristics that 
enhanced (or did not) the survival of neo-liberal tax reform in 
Britain and France from 1979 have already been mentioned, 
although perhaps not explicitly identified according to the 
aforementioned criteria in every instance. The research did 
however, confirm these criteria. If an idea or proposal failed 
to meet one or more of these criteria, its survival was in 
jeopardy, and in many cases was not acted upon.
To illustrate, if neo-liberal tax reform failed to emerge on 
the Socialist government's agenda earlier than 1982/83, it was 
because such ideas were not consistent with Socialist (tax- 
related) values of social justice and redistribution, and 
government efforts to boost public spending. Tax reform, 
therefore, did not meet the value (or receptivity) criterion. It 
also failed to meet the cost criterion, as the Socialists' 
management of public finances would not easily accommodate neo-
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liberal tax cuts or fundamental reform. Another example is 
provided by the fate of the French President's decision to 
abolish the taxe professionnelle. If the idea to abolish the TP 
wasn't enacted, it was because civil servants had determined that 
to do so would be administratively complicated and would entail 
too big a revenue loss. Here, the absence of technical 
feasibility and the cost to the budget prevented this policy 
preference from being acted upon.
In the case of Conservative tax reform there are also 
examples of proposals that were removed from the agenda, or never
made it there at all, because they failed to satisfy one or more
tests. For example, although there were very good budgetary and 
economic reasons for doing so, the inability of the Treasury, and 
Nigel Lawson as Chancellor, to act positively on the abolition of 
mortgage interest tax relief is explained by the refusal of the 
Prime Minister to tolerate the social and political consequences 
(the effect on home-owning and home-owners) of such a measure.669 
In this case, the proposal did not meet value acceptability, on 
political and ideological grounds. Nor was the public likely to 
be accepting, or at least, acquiescent, if faced with such a 
proposal.
An even earlier example is provided by the apparent 
abandonment of the tax reform agenda between 1980 and 1983. If
669 The benefit this perk brings to homeowners has declined gradually
during the 1980s and 1990s, as the ceiling on loans qualifying for 
relief has remained largely static (at £30,000 since 1983). Moreover,
the relief was limited to 20% in the March 1993 budget, and again
lowered to 15% in the December L9.93- budget, down from 4 0% three years 
prior.
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the government did not go further in the pursuit of its tax
reform agenda during Howe's chancellorship, the inaction was most
likely due to budget constraints, and the government's preference
for reducing inflation, public spending and the PSBR before
moving any further on the tax reform front. 670 As Peter Hall
(1986) remarks,
The Government's tax policies have been largely 
determined by its record on public spending and its 
policy towards the public sector deficit. Once 
Thatcher decided to reduce the PSBR at all costs, she 
could not reduce the aggregate tax burden. . .671
The rise in the tax burden was testament to the inability of the
Thatcher governments to reduce the tax burden (as they had
promised) while simultaneously reducing the PSBR.
It would be misleading to say that failure to satisfy one
criteria, while meeting all the rest, leads to the defeat of an
idea/proposal. For example, while budgetary constraints appeared
to prevent any action on President Mitterrand's calls to reform
corporate and personal taxation between 1982-84, when action
finally did come in 1985-86, the costs were not significantly
less. In other words, the state of public finances were no
better in 1984 (when the 1985 budget was devised) than in any
year previous to justify the cost of the tax reform measures
enacted in the 1985 budget. What happened was that resistance to
the agenda status of tax reform was removed by Delors's
replacement as Finance Minister by Pierre Beregovoy and the
670
671
Many of the British interviewees mentioned this fact.
P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., p.117.
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appointment of a committed reformer at the Hotel Matignon,
Laurent Fabius. These reformers assessed the situation 
differently in light of their own values and interests and felt 
the costs to the budget were small enough (and the anticipated 
economic and political benefits great enough) to warrant 
supporting and enacting this policy change.
By any number of means, policy makers and decision makers 
weigh the costs and benefits of a range of■factors before 
deciding to give an idea serious consideration and promote it to 
agenda status. They perceive and calculate the balance of 
feasibility and unfeasibility, support and opposition, benefits 
and costs and arrive at a decision to consider or not to 
consider. It is difficult to say with any certainty what matrix 
of variables people in and around government bring to bear on 
assessing the "survivability" of an idea or proposal. 672 One 
person's reading of a situation may favor action on a particular 
idea or proposal, while someone else's reading may lead to the 
opposite conclusion. The balance of factors under consideration 
must however be deemed positive (enough) before any idea or 
proposal is taken up and advocated.
* Conviction and Determination: the keys to persuasion
To merely propose and advocate an idea may not always 
suffice to win the public's approval. The specialized and 
broader publics must be convinced, as well as persuaded.
See e.g. : J. Kingdon, Congressmen's Voting Decisions, (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1981).
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Integral to the advocacy process is a firm belief in the ideas 
that are being proposed. The belief in the necessity and 
feasibility of the measures to reduce and simplify taxation was a 
necessary ingredient in persuading the various audiences to 
consider, accept, and in many cases, support the idea.
In France, the conviction with which politicians on both the 
left and right wielded the tax reform issue was less profound 
than in Britain. Both Chirac and Mitterrand, as well as many 
important policy entrepreneurs and policy makers, were relative 
late-comers to the cause. While their rhetoric matched that of 
their British counterparts, experience and history led to doubts 
about the translation of that rhetoric into reality.
The force with which neo-liberal tax reform was advocated on 
both the left and the right, had a marginal effect on the wider 
public, which was affected by its traditional adherence to the 
provident state, its pervasive suspicion of any tax reforms, and 
the perceived threat to the beloved secu. 673 Perhaps, however, 
the audience that was most vulnerable to the neo-liberal message 
was the political audience, those members of government (and the 
bureaucracy) and the party whose support was essential to the
Many of the French interviewees spoke of the conservative nature of 
French taxpayers and their suspicion of reform, and for these reasons, 
in France, there is a "conservatisme fiscal". As Georges Egret 
observed, "Les contribuables sont les plus conservateurs qui soient.. 
(Georges Egret, interview in Paris, France, May 7, 1992). Also
frequently mentioned, was the attachment of the French to their social 
security, "Et si vous trouvrez, bien sftr, beaucoup des francais 
d'accord sur le fait que il faut moins d'impots d'fstat, vous en 
trouvrez moins qui seraient d'accord pour baisser les cotisations 
sociales. Parce que ils craindraient que la protection sociale diminue 
en meme temps - et ca ils sont tres sensibles cet aspect." (Jean 
Choussat, interview in Paris, France-, May 12, 1992) .
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success of any reforming efforts. Making the connection between 
tax reform and electoral success - as Chirac, Mitterrand and 
others did - touched a sensitive nerve among government and party 
members, who began to see tax cuts and tax reform as an important 
part of a new agenda that would bring electoral manna.674 
Ideally, a broader public rallied behind such a program would be 
the ultimate guarantee of success, but given the public's general 
apathy on issues of taxation, it wasn't essential. The structure 
and norms of the French political system did not require it.
Having said that however, the public's opposition would mean 
the defeat of neo-liberal tax reform. Moreover, hostility from 
other key decision makers would frustrate efforts to change the 
tax agenda. All the right people had to be in place, supported 
by policies and people that reflected as broad a base of support 
as possible.
In the Conservatives' advocacy of tax reform there was a 
determination that was hard to deny. As Sir Geoffrey Howe 
declared at the 95th Annual Conference in Brighton in mid-October
As we have already seen, in fact, the electoral benefits were dubious. 
In opinion surveys and at the polls, political figures and political 
parties appeared to gain little from promising tax cuts and reform 
and/or enacting tax reform measures. Several of the interviewees 
commented that the alleged electoral benefits arising from promises and 
plans to cut and reform taxes often fail to materialize. Raymond Barre 
admitted, "Je ne crois pas que en France on puisse mener, gagner, les 
elections sur la fiscalit6." (Raymond Barre, interview in Paris, 
France, June 2, 1992). Barre went on to say that although he felt it 
was important to include tax proposals in an election manifesto, these 
proposals would not greatly influence voters in terms of their 
electoral behavior. Jean Pascal Beaufret and Pierre Bilger also 
asserted that tax reductions do not necessarily translate into votes 
(Jean Pascal Beaufret, interview in Paris, France, May 14, 1992; Pierre 
Bilger, interview in Paris, France, April 28, 1992). Also see, e.g.: 
L'Express, no.1735, 5 Octobre 1984, p.22; Financial Times, September, 
14, 1984, p.2.
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1978,
Have no doubt about our determination. There will be 
real and substantial cuts in income tax because nothing 
less will do. All of this I have said before. I shall 
go on saying it until we have the opportunity to let 
our actions speak louder than our words.675
There is little room for doubt that the key economic policy
makers in the Conservative Party were committed to the idea of
neo-liberal tax cuts and reform. Soon the idea diffused widely,
reaching beyond the confines of the Conservative leadership and
Conservative forums, like the Centre for Policy Studies, the Bow
Group and the annual conferences.
The economic/tax policy communities, politicians,
journalists, academics, and various institutions, came to
consider, if not embrace, many of the proposals put forward by
the Conservative activists. The more tax reform - and all that
it implied - was discussed, the more accepted it became. The
persistent agitation by the Conservative Party leadership for
reform of the British tax system compelled many people to weigh
the arguments they were making in light of pressing economic
concerns. Scholarly journals, and more importantly, the popular
media, began to feature the ideas and the proposals being put
forward. Gallup polls registered increasing voter preference for
the Conservative Party on the issue of taxation. What was
needed, as Sir Geoffrey mentioned in the quote above, was the
opportunity to put words into action.
675 "The Next Government", Politics Today, no.18, (London: Conservative 
Research Department, October 30, 1978) .
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The much anticipated opportunity generally appears because 
of a serious problem or propitious political event(s). In both 
Britain and France, political developments were critical to tax 
reform's placement on the governmental agendas.
The Politics Stream676
The event that would give the Conservatives their much 
desired opportunity is part of what Kingdon (1984) calls the 
politics stream. This stream consists of such political 
activities as lobbying, national moods, campaigns, elections, 
changes in administration, government personnel or the partisan 
composition of a governmental body. The term 'political' is used 
by Kingdon not so much in its broader sense - i.e. the 
authoritative allocation of values - but rather assumes a 
narrower definition, one that accommodates the existence and role 
•of pressure groups, politicians, elections, public opinion etc..
Developments in the political stream take place "quite 
-apart" from what happens in the policy and problems streams. The 
jpolitical stream flows, in spite of what is happening in the 
jproblems or policies streams. By the same token, the political 
.•stream is not isolated from developments in the problems and 
jpolicies streams.
The agenda is affected by events in the political stream in 
(dramatic and various ways. For instance, a change in the public 
imood enabled Jarvis and Gann to place Proposition 13 high on the
The 'politics stream' is also referred to throughout this paper as the 
'political stream.'
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California state government's agenda. This alone would have 
created a climate receptive for the Jarvis-Gann initiative. Of 
course, it was helped and affected by the rampant inflation and 
its consequences for property and tax assessments. The Kemp-Roth 
proposals, though defeated in the U.S. Senate in 1978, became - 
in a somewhat modified form - an important feature of Ronald 
Reagan's tax reform agenda once he came to the White House in 
1981. Instructive though these American examples may be, what 
about Britain and France? What happened in the political streams 
in Britain and France to propel tax reform onto the governmental 
agendas?
* The National Mood
One aspect of this process stream involves national mood or
public opinion.
People in and around government sense a national 
mood...The idea goes by different names - the national 
mood, the climate in the country, changes in public 
opinion, or broad social movements.677
Each of these terms refer to a shared perspective on an issue or
set of issues by a significant number of people. The extent to
which the national mood is perceptible will often influence which
items are considered or ignored by the decision makers. Changes
in the national mood can therefore act as an impetus or a
constraint. If public opinion is inclined in a certain way then
an idea may find a favorable climate and flourish.
Alternatively, it may confront a hostile climate and die.
J. Kingdon, 1984, op.cit., p.153.
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National mood is of particular importance because of the effects 
it can have on creating fertile ground. If the seed, or rather 
the idea, finds fertile soil, then it will germinate and develop.
Conservative leaders believed they were in tune with the 
national mood when they criticized the high level of taxes and 
proposed measures to reduce them. 678 The opinion polls certainly 
showed that there was a growing concern in the country over the 
burden of taxation and a general feeling that something had to be 
done about it. 679 Even the Labour Prime Minister, James 
Callaghan, had noticed the public's growing distaste for paying 
ever higher taxes when he spoke in March of 1978 of the public's 
interest in paying less tax. Mrs. Thatcher too, often spoke of 
the public's dislike of high taxes. The Conservative Party's 
policy document, "The Right Approach to the Economy" (1977) 
claimed that "more and more people can see the sense in shifting 
part of this burden on to the pockets of those who spend and can 
afford to do so." This assessment was made to legitimize the 
proposed shift from direct to indirect taxation, which the
John Biffen spoke about the central place tax reform occupied on the 
Conservatives' agenda, "If you go back to the late 1970s, I don't think
we quite realized it, but we were much more with the mood of the
times." (John Biffen, interview in London, England, June 20, 1991).
See e.g.: H. Penniman, 1981, op.cit.; Economist, May 12, 1979, pp.22-
26; Economist, April 21, 1979, pp.21+; Gallup Political Index, no. 225, 
May 1979, no.226, June 1979. Several of the British interviewees spoke 
about public opinion in vague terms. For example, allusion was often 
made to a "general feeling" that taxes were too high. Others were less 
vague; for example, John Hoskyns commented that there was "a strong 
feeling in the public as a whole of the unacceptability of high rates 
of taxation." (John Hoskyns, interview in London, England, June 11, 
1991) . Adam Ridley recalled, "I don't think there was much doubt that 
there was a very healthy, independent resentment [about the burden of 
taxation]." (Sir Adam Ridley, interview in London, England, May 30, 
1991).
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Conservatives effected once in power.
Finally, the press constantly reported on the public's 
discontent with the levels of taxation, as well as the overall 
state of the economy. For example, the Economist in its April 
21, 1979 issue, quoted the historian Lord Blake who wrote, "There 
is a wind of change in Britain and in much of the democratic 
world and it comes from the right, not the left." Lord Blake had 
argued that this wind of change was reflected in the widespread 
expectation that a new Tory government would dramatically reduce 
the burden of taxation and increase incentives.680
'People', 'the public', 'widespread expectations' - these 
are all connotations for the 'national mood'. It is difficult to 
ascertain the sources of the national mood, but no doubt it can 
be measured in a number of ways by attentive politicians: 
newspaper editorials, public opinion surveys, interest group 
demands, questions and comments by citizens in television and 
lecture audiences, and citizen-sponsored initiatives.
Certainly, one cannot discount the effect that the national 
mood had on the Conservatives' agenda in opposition. This effect 
was concentrated on the fit between certain Conservative policies 
and the national mood. Conservative policy makers discerned a 
general discontent with the tax system, the trade unions, and 
Labour's economic management. These were salient issues with the 
public, as supported by press reports and opinion surveys at the 
time. Important decision makers in the Conservative Party linked
680 Economist, April 21, 1979, p.39.
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policies on trade unions, taxes and economic management with the 
problems these subjects posed. The policy activists, or 
entrepreneurs in the party, or associated with it, went before 
the general public to persuade them of their perception of the 
problems and the viability of their solutions.
In any event, the Conservatives sensed a changing mood and 
cultivated what they perceived to be growing discontent over the 
burden of taxation in Britain. The unprecedented saliency 
taxation had acquired for the British voter by the late 1970s 
made the ground ripe for the Conservatives' tax reform message. 
The favorable national mood therefore enhanced the viability of 
tax reform. This had important consequences for the Conservative 
party's electoral fortunes.
In the case of France, as already mentioned, the change in 
national mood, evident from the early 1980s, was not of the 
magnitude witnessed in Britain, nor was it as clear. In other 
words, while public opinion seemed to be increasingly receptive 
to the idea of tax cuts and tax reform, there was no significant 
consensus on the issue in the broader public. Appeals to liberal 
values, of the sort made in Britain, confronted contrary 
prevailing attitudes, norms and practices.
Although politicians and the press focused attention on the 
issue of neo-liberal tax reform and seemed to strike a sensitive 
anti-tax nerve among French taxpayers, they did not manage to win 
unequivocal support. As^already mentioned, neo-liberal tax 
reform and the principles which supported it, failed to gain
425
significant ground among the French public because of the 
widespread belief in the state's central role, and the fear of 
the effect of reform on social security as well as on those who 
benefitted from the tax system in its current form.
Nevertheless, movement in public opinion was significant 
enough to persuade some political decision makers and policy 
entrepreneurs that a sufficient constituency existed that 
supported tax reform. At the very least, tax reform had few 
visible detractors. Furthermore, those who did advocate tax 
reform the loudest, like business groups and the press, had the 
sort of economic and political clout that was not easy to ignore.
In France, as opposed to Britain, the national mood would be 
a less important development in the political stream than the 
pressure brought to bear by powerful interest groups, like the 
CNPF, the electoral situation and party competition, the changing 
agendas of government personnel and the turnover in government 
personnel.681
Indeed, most of the French interviewees spoke of the absence of 
grassroots pressure for reform of the tax system, but acknowledged the 
significant pressure exerted by employers groups and the press. Jean 
Choussat opined, "Est-ce qu'il existait au fond une demande de r^forme 
fiscale? Non..." But Choussat admitted that, "II y a par la presse 
specialist, la presse patronale, dans les organisations 
professionnelles, il y a bien stir une grande sensibility au problemes 
fiscaux.... le patronat notamment a tr£s bien jou6 cette carte en 
arrivant a convaincre le gouvernement que pour Stre un bon europtn, 
pour etre competitive, pour titre modeme, il fallait titre un peu prtis 
dans le moyen pour les taux de prtiltivements obligatoires. . ." (Jean 
Choussat, interview in Paris, France, May 12, 1992) . As a reason for 
the general absence of demand from the masses, almost every interviewee 
cited the fact that at least one half of eligible taxpayers do not pay 
tax and the countless exemptions that diminish a taxpayer's nominal 
imposition. As Jean Choussat noted, and this was typical of the 
comments, "... £ peu pres la moititi des francais ne paye pas d'impots 
sur le revenu; il y a a peu pres un foyer fiscal sur deux qui ne paye 
pas d'impot sur le revenu et, bien entendu, ce sont les foyers les 
moins riches...statistiquement en tout cas."
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* Elections and Personnel Changes in Government
According to Kingdon (1984), agendas change because some of 
the major participants in and around government change.682 
Governmental decision makers affect agenda change in two 
important ways. One way involves action taken by them to change 
the priority they attach to certain items. Another way involves 
a change in particular governmental decision makers such that 
some are replaced by others who bring new priorities to the 
agenda. That turnover explains, to a large degree, why new items 
rise onto the agenda. It is the change in government personnel, 
if you will, that best accounts for the emergence of tax reform 
in Britain and France.
When the Labour government turned its attention to tax 
reductions in the 1977 and 1978 budgets, it seemed, on the face 
of it, to reflect a change in the government's priorities. 
However, tax reform it was not. The new Thatcher administration, 
in 1979, structured its policy agenda according to the priority 
it planned to give certain items, among them, reining back 
government spending and borrowing, establishing money supply 
targets, a limited selling of national assets, and lowering 
(direct) taxes. These priorities had been sustained during the 
five years of opposition and were backed up with detailed policy 
worked out by the CPS, CRD, the party leadership and their 
advisers. Finally, they appeared in the Conservatives' 1979 
election manifesto, which although short on specifics,
J. Kingdon, 1984, op.cit., p.160.
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constituted a vague expression of the future government's policy 
agenda.
The fact that Mrs. Thatcher opened the Conservatives' 1979
election campaign with a promise to reduce taxes, reflected the
prominent place tax reductions occupied on the party's
specialized agenda, and would occupy on the governmental agenda
once in power. Promises of tax reform and tax reductions
punctuated the Conservative campaign in the run up to the general
election. But as Kingdon (1984) notes,
There is nothing automatic about campaign pledges 
finding their way into public policy. For a campaign 
promise to gain policy agenda status, it must be 
accompanied by something else - perhaps a firm 
presidential commitment or a constituency that pushes 
the idea and tries to hold the president to his 
promise.683
In the British case, tax reform found a receptive and vaguely 
identifiable constituency of support - among the voting public 
and, especially, among business groups. It also carried the firm 
commitment of Mrs. Thatcher and her Shadow Chancellor, Geoffrey 
Howe, as well as Nigel Lawson, Lord Cockfield, and other future 
members of the Thatcher governments. There was no mistaking 
their determination to carry out the kind of changes they were 
promising once they attained office. The belief that tax 
reductions and other reforms were a necessary part of the 
solutions to be applied to Britain's economic and social problems 
followed Mrs. Thatcher and the Conservatives to power in May 
1979.
Ibid., p .66.
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Therefore the election was a critical point in the emergence 
of tax reform on the government's agenda. It produced a new 
government comprised of decision makers for whom tax reform would 
occupy a spot at the top, or near the top, of the government's 
agenda. The decision to implement part of the reform program in 
the first budget of June 1979 testified to the importance 
attached to this policy goal. However, to some extent, those tax 
reform measures appeared because of the need to "deliver the 
goods" - part of the "implicit exchange" whereby support for 
candidates is given in return for action on the promises.684
In this sense, the change in administration which resulted 
from the election provided a new opportunity for new solutions 
and new players. Suddenly a whole "host of players" previously 
excluded or marginalized: i.e. monetarists, supply-siders, 
privatizers, free-marketeers, family groups etc. saw the new 
Thatcher government as an opportunity to press their particular 
cases, and an expectation that they would receive a sympathetic 
hearing. Hugo Young (1989) writes how during the opposition 
years certain principles and characters were raised up which Ted 
Heath had "cast into the outer darkness." 685 Some of■ those 
outcasts shed their collectivist facades, and those who had stuck 
to their principles, emerged to participate in a more favorable 
political climate. The Conservative Party led by Mrs. Thatcher 
provided certain opportunities for these "characters" and their
685 H. Young, 1989, op.cit., p.102.
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"principles".
Before moving on, the part played by groups in this process 
deserves a little more attention, since groups constitute an 
important element in the political stream. While established 
interlocuteurs in France eventually came to play an important 
role in the agenda setting process, in Britain, they were 
regarded with suspicion. In fact, the Thatcher government's 
suspicion of groups - like the TUG and even the IOD and CBI for a 
time - bordered on hostility and it was little inclined to 
consult them, let alone actively rally their support behind the 
government's tax agenda. In Britain, as opposed to France, group 
pressure was not a significant factor contributing to the 
emergence of tax reform on the governmental agenda.
In France, developments in the electoral arena related to 
party competition, changing agenda priorities among government 
personnel, and turnover in government personnel were instrumental 
in the emergence of tax reform on the governmental agenda.
Later, in 1986 and again in 1988, changes in political 
administrations - from socialist to conservative and back again 
to socialist - would be important to the persistence and 
reinforcement of neo-liberal tax reform on the governmental 
agenda. As already mentioned, the changing national mood was a 
factor but not among the most important, except perhaps, to the 
extent that it translated into defeat for the Socialists in the 
electoral arena and catalyzed the forces of party competition.
The emergence of neo-liberal tax reform on the broader
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governmental agenda first occurred in the context of presidential 
campaign politics in 1980/81.
Initially advocated from 1981 by Jacques Chirac, the intent 
was not to solve an identifiable problem (although a problem was 
ostensibly identified), but, rather, to seek electoral advantage 
by invoking an issue which apparently had contributed to the 
electoral successes of Ronald Reagan and Mrs. Thatcher. Neo- 
liberal tax reform, as it figured in Reagan's and Thatcher's 
programs, and as it was adopted by Chirac, was largely ignored by 
his main opponents in the 1981 presidential race, Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing and Francois Mitterrand. As we saw, however, the time 
wasn't ripe for Chirac's tax reform message. As the 1980s 
progressed, the situation changed. The issue was catching on and 
soon both the RPR and the UDF had made tax reform a major 
(electoral) theme.
However, while the issue was given a place of prominence on 
the opposition's agenda, it was somewhat slower in coming to the 
government's agenda, for reasons already mentioned. Several 
developments in the political stream conspired and combined to 
bring tax reform to the Socialist government's agenda. As we 
have already discussed, pressure from business representatives, 
i.e. the visiteurs du soir and business groups like the CNPF, 
were instrumental in prompting agenda change. The government's 
changed approach to corporate tax policy was, in part, 
masterminded by these groups and advocated from within government 
by influential decision makers associated with these groups, like
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Laurent Fabius and Pierre Beregovoy, whose own tax and spend 
agendas underwent a significant transformation in the 1981-84 
period, partly in response to these societal pressures.
At a conseil retreint on tax reform held on February 13,
1982, Mitterrand exhorted his government to reduce company 
charges. 686 The conseil restreint and more publicly, the 
President's speech at Figeac in September 1982, represented the 
"open window" which pushed the reduction of company charges (the 
precursor of a broader reform of the corporate tax system) onto 
the decision agenda. The concern with reducing the fiscal burden 
on businesses was just the tip of a wedge which would usher in 
tax reform on a larger scale in France. 687 One year later, in 
September 1983, the President pledged himself on television to 
tax reductions and tax reform.
As in the aftermath of the President's Figeac speech, in the 
months following the announcement on TF1, the ministers 
concerned, namely, Mauroy, Delors and Emmanuelli, were not in any 
rush to realize Mitterrand's agenda. As mentioned earlier, they 
were preoccupied by more pressing problems and were convinced, 
given the current economic and financial situation, that the 
President's tax agenda was not feasible. When the aforementioned
68S J. Attali (1993, p.169) notes, "'Reduire les charges des entreprises':
la petite musique de Jean Riboud commence £ se faire entendre."
687 The spread of one subject area to another related subject area is
called "spillover" by Kingdon (1984, pp.200-204). He notes, for
example, how de-regulation policies were first enacted for the airline 
industry; similar measures were soon considered for trucking and 
railways. The same effect is observed with tax reform in France.. 
Beginning with the small steps of reducing company charges and the taxe 
professionnelle, this effort was expanded into a far-ranging reform of 
corporation, personal and consumption taxation.
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problems became less pressing and a solution, or a series of 
solutions, was found which would solve the tax problem without 
aggravating the other problems, attention was re-focused on the 
issue of tax reform. The momentum increased with the ministerial 
changes of July 1984 and the appointment of committed tax 
reformers to key posts in the government, particularly Laurent 
Fabius as Prime Minister, and Pierre Beregovoy as Finance 
Minister.
Both Britain and France provide evidence that events in the 
problems stream, and to a greater extent, the political stream 
threw open windows of opportunity for agenda change. Economic 
decline and electoral concerns were the problems which a number 
of ideas and solution, including neo-liberal tax reform, were 
designed to address. But more importantly, changes in national 
mood, governments, government personnel and agenda priorities, as 
well as group pressure and election campaigns, were critical to 
the appearance of neo-liberal tax reform on governmental agendas. 
* Review of the Politics Stream
Although the politics stream flows independently of the 
problems and policy streams - as Kingdon (1984) tells us, it 
flows "according to its own dynamics and its own rules" - it can 
be, and often is, affected by problems and policies, as well as 
organization.688 Once again, the broader definition of politics 
is considered here and includes such things as swings in national 
mood, changes in administration, election campaigns and interest
J. Kingdon, 1984, op.cit., p.170.
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group lobbying. Politics, in one form or another, has a powerful 
effect on agendas.
Firstly, perceptions of the national mood can suppress the 
movement of a particular item onto the agenda or it can create 
the right climate for the promotion of an item. If the public 
appears predisposed to a particular course of action, then a 
government may adopt and/or act on an agenda item which 
corresponds to the public's mood. Conversely, if public opinion 
appears hostile to a particular course of action, a government 
will weigh the costs and benefits of persevering with an 
unpopular agenda item, or dropping it.
Secondly, agenda change can result from turnover in 
government, whether at the executive (including the bureaucracy), 
legislative, or even judicial levels. Turnover in government 
personnel can put key decision makers in positions that enable 
them to restructure the agenda with new items or reprioritize the 
current agenda, emphasizing those items they deem worthy of 
action, and de-emphasizing others. Although, a change in agenda 
priorities and objectives may take place without a change in 
government personnel or governments.
Thirdly, election campaigns and electoral promises can have 
an effect on the agenda either by committing the political 
candidate to particular items which presumably he/she will carry 
into government if elected, or by giving incumbent decision 
makers the incentive to adopt new agenda items which may have 
broad electoral appeal but were heretofore absent from, or low
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priority on, the government's agenda.
Fourthly, government officials in a pluralist democracy are 
generally compelled to pay attention to the diverse and sometimes 
conflicting needs of groups in the economy and society; or at the 
very least they try to give the impression that they do. When 
pressure is brought to bear on these officials by a powerful 
group or groups - either in an attempt to promote an item onto 
the agenda or to defeat or modify an item already on the agenda - 
a calculation will be made from the consideration of the balance 
of forces arrayed and the costs of meeting or resisting the 
demands. Upon making this calculation, the government will act 
accordingly. Agenda change is facilitated by a "constituency in 
favor of it and hampered by the absence of such a constituency or 
by the active opposition of organized interests."689 However, the 
outcome is not always determined by the balance of organized 
forces. Sometimes, they are surmounted - witness the 1986 U.S. 
Tax Reform Act - or merely ignored - as demonstrated with 
Lawson's reform of life assurance premium reliefs and the changes 
in capital allowances in 1984 .690
Political forces affect agenda change in a variety of ways 
and to differing degrees. Sometimes they impact the process 
jointly or separately, in concert or conflict. In any event, the
J. Kingdon, 1984, op.cit., p.171.
See, N. Lawson, op.cit., ch.28. For accounts of the role of groups in 
the stages leading up to the 1986 Tax Reform Act see e.g.: G.
Mucciaroni, op.cit.; D. Beam, T. Conlan and M. Wrightson, op.cit.; J. 
Birnbaum and A. Murray, Showdown at Gucci Gulch: Lawmakers, Lobbyists 
and the Unlikely Triumph of Tax Reform, (New York: Random House, 1987) .
435
politics stream is an important promoter and/or inhibitor of 
agenda status. It is probably more important than the policies 
or problems streams. In terms of British tax reform the 
simultaneity of the national mood - which reflected a deep 
resentment of high taxes in a stagflating economy - and elections 
- those of 1979 - were very powerful elements in the emergence of 
tax reform. The equation of national mood and elections resulted 
in a change of administration, bringing into government a group 
of decision makers who had promised a high priority for tax 
reform. In France, the dictates of the electoral timetable and 
the dynamics of party competition, preceded by intense lobbying 
by privileged groups and, to some extent, a changing national 
mood, combined to create a receptive climate for policy
entrepreneurs advocating neo-liberal tax reform. The
government's tax agenda changed through the willful decision of a 
President persuaded that such a change was imperative.
The Confluence of the Streams
Now that the three streams and what they represent have been 
identified and explained, what brings about their fortuitous 
confluence? To take stock, one has a problem, a ready and viable 
solution, and engages in politics or finds allies in politics to 
promote both problems and solutions as items worthy of attention 
and action. But what brings them all together to produce the 
desired change in public policy?
By way of illustration, we will rely on the example of the
three streams which came together to produce tax reform in
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Britain from 1979. Geoffrey Howe, writing in the Times
proclaimed that the economic problems which beset Britain were
partly due to Labour's belief in high taxation.691 He proceeds to
explain the problems caused by the tax system "distorted by
inflation and socialism", i.e. tax avoidance/evasion, the effects
on incentive and enterprise, the lower rates enjoyed in other
countries. He then offers the 'Conservative' solutions, i.e.
reducing rates, notably the higher rate from 83% to 60%, reducing
capital transfer tax (CTT) and indexing CGT. He wrote,
...the Conservative Party has clear ideas on what has 
to be done. We are impatient for the opportunity.692
In that one article, one catches a glimpse of the three streams :
the problem, the policy and the political. What is absent is
"the opportunity", a window of opportunity, that represents the
most propitious moment for bringing the streams together. 693 This
is the opportunity Sir Geoffrey refers to.
* Policy Windows
Agenda change occurs when the separate streams come
together. The streams come together at critical times. John
Times, August 8, 1977, p.19.
Ibid.
One interviewee, Arthur Cockfield, hinted at the imminent policy window 
that would open for corporate tax reform, "It wasn't until Nigel Lawson 
became Chancellor, that the conditions appeared right to move ahead 
with tax reform. Many of his measures had already been worked out, 
like the changes to corporation tax, and were just waiting for the 
right moment." (Baron Arthur Cockfield, interview in London, England, 
June 11, 1991) . In this case, a policy window was opened - "the right 
moment" - when Nigel Lawson, a committed tax reformer, became 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. With sufficient advocacy and minimal 
constraints, and meeting certain criteria of acceptability, corporate 
tax reform became an item on the governmental agenda.
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Kingdon (1984) writes,
A problem is recognized, a solution is developed and 
available in the policy community, a political change 
makes it the right time for policy change and the 
potential constraints are not severe.694
It is when these process streams are joined that agenda change is
most likely to occur. The most telling occasion for this
coupling is when a policy window opens. Kingdon (1984) tells us
that policy windows are "opportunities for action on given
initiatives" which "present themselves and stay open for short
periods." 695 The major changes in public policy result from the
appearance of these opportunities. Participants with policies to
advocate must usually wait for the right opportunity - the
opening of a policy window - to push their policies onto the
agenda.
Why do windows open? Kingdon (1984) tells us,
Basically a window opens because of a change in the 
political stream (e.g. a change of administration, a 
shift in partisan or ideological distribution of seats 
in the Congress or a shift in national mood)... a 
change in administration is probably the most obvious 
window in the policy stream.696
As already discussed, Britain and France offer two examples of
windows opened by developments in the political stream. The
defeat of the Labour government in the May 1979 election and the
arrival of Mrs. Thatcher at 10 Downing Street and Sir Geoffrey
J. Kingdon, 1984, op.cit., p.174. 
Ibid.
Ibid., p .176
694
695
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Howe at number 11, provided a window of sorts for those with 
ideas on how to reform the tax system. Moreover, several 
measures had already been worked out by members of the Shadow 
Treasury team and their advisers while in opposition and who took 
positions with the new government. In the absence of 
constraints, many of those measures were ensured a prominent 
place on the agenda for tax reform.
For the most part, the policy entrepreneurs were themselves 
important decision makers in the Conservative Party and their 
advisers. They were, therefore, in prime positions to affect the 
agenda. Several times already, reference has been made to people 
like Sir Geoffrey Howe, Peter Cropper, Lord Cockfield, Nigel 
Lawson, and Adam Ridley, who, when in opposition, had devised and 
advocated various proposals, and had been receptive to ideas 
proposed by others in the policy community. Once in government, 
they were well-placed to move those proposals onto the 
governmental and decision agendas, barring significant 
constraints.
In France, the window opened more than once, depending on 
which agenda one is looking at. The specialized tax agenda of 
Chirac and the RPR-UDF was transformed when Chirac decided to run 
as a presidential candidate in 1981, thereby opening a window.
The governmental tax agenda, which was the Socialists' concern, 
changed due to a window thrown open by Mitterrand's Figeac and 
TF1 speeches, and the change in government personnel in July 
1984. These windows came to be opened due to a combination of
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group pressure, economic problems and electoral anxieties.
The appearance of tax reform on the governmental agenda was 
the product of the coming together of several streams flowing 
through the organization of French government. A couple of 
related problems were recognized: electoral decline and 
unpopularity, high tax burden and rates, and their negative 
impact on the economy. The problems stream was therefore opening 
a window for appropriate solutions. A solution was available in 
the policy community and recommended: neo-liberal tax reform and 
its component measures. Political developments also had the 
effect of opening a window and made the time right for policy 
change: a shifting national mood, the threat of electoral defeat 
in 1986 at the hands of the center-right and the need to renew 
voters' confidence in the Socialist party/government, and the 
lobbying of influential business interests.
The most visible manifestation of change in the political 
stream was provided by the President's speech at Figeac in 
September 1982 and his announcement on TF1 one year later. These 
commitments.to reform the tax system for the benefit of 
businesses, investors and households, put the government in the 
market for new policies, thereby creating an unmistakable window 
for policy activists. Neo-liberal tax reform, an 'umbrella' 
solution, which had been floating around in the policy stream for 
some time, would address the economic problems plaguing the 
country and the Socialist government. More importantly, was the 
political salvation the tax reform idea seemed to offer.
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Ironically, not only was Mitterrand instrumental in opening the 
policy window, but himself became a forceful policy entrepreneur. 
He was the most visible among the cluster of actors to link 
problems, policies and politics and change the government's 
agenda.
How does one know when a window is open? And how does one 
know when that open window is beckoning? And what happens when 
one pushes a proposal successfully through the window? Firstly, 
windows are not universally perceived. While a change in 
administration may seem to many an obvious open window, some 
activists may misperceive or misjudge*it, or just miss it 
altogether. For instance, a few members of the policy community 
in Britain, i.e. the IEA and the IFS, produced proposals to 
reduce and/or abolish mortgage interest tax relief, a popular tax 
expenditure, but one with extremely high costs to the Treasury 
and with perverse effects on the housing market. The perception 
by participants in or related to the IEA and the IFS that a new 
government committed to tax simplicity and markets free from 
distortions had opened a window for such proposals proved wrong. 
Many of the arguments, sensible though they were, were rejected 
or ignored.
In France, wide-ranging proposals, including abolition of 
the TP and reforming social security finance, were pushed onto 
the agenda once the tax reform windows were opened by the 
election of a neo-liberal center-right government in March 1986. 
Both the RPR and the UDF had explicitly promised, or had at least
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intimated, that the time had come to abolish the TP and reform 
social security finance. However, apparently, policy 
entrepreneurs, both outside and inside government, although 
finding decision makers in sympathy with their proposals in 
principle, met with resistance and inaction in practice. In all 
cases, while these proposals had made it to the decision agenda, 
they were rejected.
Secondly, open windows are not always predictable. If, for 
example, a program authorized by government is in need of renewed 
funding or is reaching the end of its operating life, here is a 
predictable window. However, in many cases, it is anybody's 
guess when a window opens. Usually an event in the problems 
stream - a natural disaster - or in the political stream - an 
election campaign - will open a window for participants to put 
forward policies, link them to problems and push for their 
adoption by important people in and around government. When such 
a window opens, however, it is usually a surprise. The 
successful activist will have prepared him/herself well in 
anticipation of just such an opportunity, just in case. If the 
activist is caught unprepared, then he/she will probably have a 
hard time persuading anyone to pay attention to certain problems 
and policies, or the opportunity may pass them by entirely, as 
windows do not stay open long.
Thirdly, if a window opens and an activist proposes his/her 
policy, and persuades those in or around government of its 
optimality, the outcome of that policy may differ from the
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original intention. How that policy is actually legislated and 
implemented will very likely be different as it gets processed in 
the garbage can. The Green Paper on Corporation Tax (Cmnd 8456) 
in 1982 was clearly a window and many participants used the 
opportunity to make their case for changes (or no changes) to the 
system of corporate taxation. Most of the interested parties 
pressed for no change or for special tax privileges. In fact Sir 
Geoffrey Howe commented later in his Budget speech of March 15, 
1983,
There is one impression that stands out, and that is 
the overwhelming desire on the part of industry for 
stability in the corporate tax regime. I recognise the 
force in this. Change is not costless. I have 
therefore concluded that there should be no change in 
the broad structure of the present arrangements.697
Apparently, the Chancellor had been persuaded of the need for
stability. However, by 1984, other developments in another
garbage can resulted in a sweeping reform of the broad structure
of corporate taxation which bore little resemblance to the
original solutions/policies brought to the government's attention
during the consultative stage of the 1982 Green Paper.
When President Mitterrand proposed abolition of the TP and
advocated an 8% reduction in income taxes in 1984, he had little
control over how these policy objectives would turn out. Would
his objectives be achieved? Or would they be compromised by the
assessments and policy interests of other participants in the
garbage can? In the end, the policy outcomes differed from the
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Session 1982-83, 
Sixth Series, vol.39, col. 149, (London: HMSO), p.85.
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objectives articulated and desired by the President.
The policy windows for tax reform opened and closed several 
times during the 1979-1989 period in Britain and France. When 
and if the window closed, as it seemed to in Britain from 1980- 
1983, and in France from 1989 it did so largely for one or more 
of the following three reasons: 1) because of the belief that 
enough had been done, at least for the time being - as in the 
case of the basic rate which was dropped in Britain from 33% to 
30 % in 1979 and then not touched again until 1986, or Francois 
Mitterrand's public acknowledgement in his 1988 Lettre a tous les 
Francais that enough had been done in terms of income tax 
reductions; 2) because of a development in the problem or 
political stream - for instance, the problems of inflation, the 
budget deficit and public spending temporarily closed windows in
both countries on further major reforms to the system; or 3)
because insufficient interest exists, or lack of agreement, as 
exemplified by the inaction of the concerned ministers following 
Mitterrand's speeches in 1982 and 1983. In most instances during 
this period, it is likely that tax reform got squeezed out by 
other priorities and was forced to assume a lower position among 
the governments' priorities, to be resurrected later and acted on 
should conditions be more favorable.698
698 Most interviewees, both British and French, when assessing the
evolution of tax reform in their respective countries, referred to the 
emergence or immediateness of more pressing problems like budget 
deficits, public spending, inflation and currency fluctuations, as 
inhibiting progress on the tax reform front. Typical was the comment 
made by Hermione Parker, referring to economic problems, "This limited 
their [the Conservatives'] room for maneuver and contributed to their 
abandoning radical [tax] reform until economic conditions made them
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Over the longue durSe, however, it can be argued that the 
window for tax reform remained constantly open. But, while an 
open window, correctly perceived, may be an open opportunity to 
promote items to agenda prominence, agenda change is not 
automatic. Several conditions must be met for agenda change to 
take place. We will look at those conditions next.
* Coupling
When the window is opened, if agenda change is to happen,
the three streams must be joined together. "Coupling" is the
term Kingdon (1984) uses to describe this action.
There comes a time when the three streams are joined.
A pressing problem demands attention, for instance, and 
a policy proposal is coupled to the problem as its 
solution. Or an event in the political stream, such as 
a change of administration, calls for different 
directions. At that point, proposals that fit with 
that political event, such as intitiatives that fit 
with the new administration's philosophy, come to the 
fore and are coupled with the ripe political climate. 
Similarly, problems that fit are highlighted, and 
others are neglected.699
A link 'Is made when all three streams are joined. This link 
produces agenda change. If one or more of the process streams is 
missing, then agenda change is unlikely to occur. Without 
problems there would be little point in advocating solutions, 
without solutions, problems wouldn't be solved, and without 
politics, the incentive to promote and link problems and
more viable." (Hermione Parker, interview in London, England, June 11, 
1991) .
J. Kingdon, 1984, op.ci.t., p.211.
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solutions is rendered non-existent. In the event that all three 
streams are present, the appearance of a policy window is the 
most propitious time for linking to take place. Often the window 
stays open only briefly and if coupling doesn't take place, the 
window usually closes.
Tax reform emerged on the agendas of the Conservative and 
French governments because of the fortuitous confluence of the 
three streams discussed in detail above. When the window 
opened, what or who was responsible for the linking? It was not 
a spontaneous confluence. People cause agenda change; people 
equipped with conviction, energy, expertise, and connections, and 
aided by events. Those people who effect the confluence are 
known as policy entrepreneurs, whom we have already discussed. 
John Kingdon (1984) explains, "Entrepreneurs who advocate their 
pet alternatives are responsible for this coupling."700 
Entrepreneurs are people who spend much time, energy and other 
resources promoting their conception of problems and/or their 
solutions. However, they also analyze situations and anticipate 
those propitious moments when the time is right for them to act.
Policy entrepreneurs see their chances enhanced once the 
windows are opened. They capitalize on propitious events and 
circumstances and use their influential positions to promote 
their ideas with the aim of changing the agenda. At those 
moments, the policy entrepreneurs are a critical factor in the
700 Ibid. p.204.
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coupling. The role of the entrepreneur is, therefore, crucial. 
Without him/her, good ideas remain just that. Problems remain 
unsolved and political events come and go without incident.
In the context of tax reform in Britain, for the most part, 
the most important policy entrepreneurs were Geoffrey Howe and 
Nigel Lawson, with supporting roles played by Lord Cockfield, 
Peter Cropper, and other advisers such as Adam Ridley. Perhaps 
it would be attributing too much to Howe and Lawson to identify 
them as solely responsible for the appearance of tax reform on 
the government's agenda in the 1980s. Certainly a larger cast of 
characters played various and not insignificant parts, many of 
whom I have already mentioned. However, both Sir Geoffrey and 
Nigel Lawson were the central figures in the process of reforming 
Britain's tax system.701
In France, as mentioned earler, the policy entrepreneurs 
included, among others, Philippe Auberger, Alain Juppe, Jacques 
Chirac, the Club de l'Horloge, the new economists, Club 89, and 
Laurent Fabius, Pierre Beregovoy, the CNPF, the visiteurs du 
soir, perhaps Jacques Attali and Jean-Louis Bianco, and the 
President himself. These entrepreneurs worked assiduously to 
connect problems to solutions, and then problems and solutions to 
politics. The commitment to reform taxes made and maintained by 
President Mitterrand, as well as other key figures in the 
alternating Socialist and center-right governments and
Nearly all those interviewed mentioned either Geoffrey Howe or Nigel 
Lawson or both together as 'instrumental', 'crucial' or 'key' figures 
in the tax reform process in Britain after 1974.
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oppositions (and leading advocates outside government) throughout 
the 1980s, meant that the issue would not just fade away. Tax 
reform continued to remain an important agenda item for some 
years. During the 1980s several proposals were devised and made 
available in the policy stream. Considered acceptable in terms 
of their economic and political viability and potential to solve 
the given problems, some of these policies were coupled to events 
in the political and problems streams and so changed the tax 
policy agenda in France.
Among the most important policy entrepreneurs during this 
period were Chirac, Mitterrand, Fabius, Beregovoy and Juppe.
They formed part of the visible cluster responsible for linking 
the streams. Supporting them was a whole cast of other important 
actors, many of whom formed part of the hidden cluster identified 
above. Nevertheless, to a great extent, interviewees identified 
Fabius, Beregovoy and Juppe as the key tax reformers in French 
governments during the 1980s.
Neo-liberal tax reform remained high on the French and 
British governments' agendas for a number of reasons, but mostly 
because of the efforts and commitments of key decision makers in 
government. These decision makers saw reform of the tax system 
as a necessary condition for effecting the sort of changes that 
would create new businesses, new jobs and new wealth. But in 
addition, tax reform offered the prospect of electoral success, 
even if a direct link could not be definitively ascertained.
There can be no doubt, that the reforming instincts of Howe
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and Lawson, Fabius, Beregovoy and Juppe, and their positions as 
key decision makers were critical to the agenda status and 
enactment of tax reform legislation between 1979 and 1989. The 
joining of the separate streams depended on these entrepreneurs, 
but did not depend on them alone. Nonetheless, it was the their 
presence, dispositions and activities - in the right place at 
the right time, advocating the right policies - that linked the 
three streams of problems, policies and politics and thereby 
placed tax reform high on their governments' agendas, where it 
remained for most of the 1980s.
While the outstanding feature of the processes examined here 
is the joint effect of factors coming together at once, these 
processes are not entirely random nor do they operate under a 
momentum all their own. The institutional environment of our 
organization, both domestic and international, imparts a 
particular dynamic that alternatively impels and constrains the 
process streams.
The Role of Institutions
While events in the process streams do not occur in a neat 
and orderly fashion and the outcomes of these processes can be 
rather unpredictable, there is some degree of pattern evident. 
Events and activities in each of the three streams are subject to 
some criteria or conditions which help us to make sense of what 
is going on and to predict what will happen. For example, as we 
have seen, conditions must be identified and defined as problems 
according to generally acceptable values, comparisons and
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categories. Otherwise they remain conditions and go unaddressed. 
If policy entrepreneurs and key decision makers do not 
acknowledge the existence of a problem, then nothing happens. In 
order for solutions to become policy they must find a receptive 
climate, be seen to respond to a given problem and meet 
particular criteria of acceptability: value, technical, 
budgetary, and public.
Certain developments in the problems or politics streams - 
including a focusing event, a natural disaster, economic crisis, 
change of administration or swing in national mood - are more 
likely than others to open a policy window and thereby create an 
environment favorable for entrepreneurs promoting ideas and 
solutions. Entrepreneurs are more likely to succeed if they 
possess a number of important strengths, qualities and skills 
such as the ability to speak for an identifiable group or public, 
expertise, political connections, etc. When the window opens, 
the probability of agenda change is enhanced when a skillful 
entrepreneur couples problem, solution and politics. In the 
absence of constraints - social, economic/budgetary, political - 
the item rises onto the governmental agenda, and perhaps, even the 
decision agenda.
To reiterate, these processes though apparently accidental 
and fortuitous, are not, as some might conclude. There is some 
semblance of order. In each stream there are processes at work 
which impose some order. Among these processes are, the devices 
used to raise consciousness that problems exist, the criteria
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used to judge whether proposals should be seriously considered or 
not and political norms and rules of the sort constitutions, 
elections and culture impose. Additionally, institutions impact 
the problems, policies and politics streams by means of 
constraints and incentives. Let's briefly look at how 
institutions were important in the case of tax agenda change in 
Britain and France.
New ideas like tax reform, may be attributable to 
individuals or groups, but need somehow to be disseminated and 
diffused in order to 'take off', catch on' and 'capture' the 
attention of people in and around government'. Recall Hall's 
(1986) observation, "...the crucial step here is the one which 
popularizes a new economic idea and translates it into policy."702 
In France, the new idea became popularized by groups and 
organizations, like the nouveaux economistes, universities and 
grandes ecoles, the Club de l'Horloge and Club 89, the RPR and 
UDF, the press, etc. In Britain, the cast of important 
institutional actors included universities, think tanks - i.e. 
the Bow Group, the CPS, the IEA, the IFS - the press, and the 
Conservative Party. Without the 'home' provided by such 
institutions, tax reform would very likely have remained just an 
interesting idea, rather than the issue - or even the 
international trend - that it became.
Rather than attempt a new analysis of the important 
institutional variables which structured the activities and
702 P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., p.275.
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behavior of the relevant tax policy making actors and 
institutions, and which affected the shape and direction of tax 
policies in Britain and France, we will focus on Peter Hall's 
variables, which I believe appropriately account for the course 
that economic policy - and for our purposes, tax policy - took 
from 1979.
I am not going to attempt a systematic analysis of Hall's 
(1986) five institutional variables - the organization of 
capital, labor and the state, the organization of the political 
system and the position of the nation within the international 
economy - with respect to their respective impacts on the policy 
processes and outputs examined here. But, with the exception of 
the organization of labor, which was not so important during this 
period in terms of its effect on tax policy making, I will 
briefly discuss those variables he has identified and consider 
how they impacted tax reform in Britain and France in the 1980s.
I believe Hall's account of the impact of institutional 
variables on economic policy continuities, and the policy changes 
which took place after the Socialist experiment failed and after 
the Conservatives came to power, is a sound one, if not entirely 
a sufficient one. His analysis can be applied to the case of tax 
policy, as it was with economic policy more generally. Our study 
provides strong evidence that, for instance, the organization of 
the state, the political system, capital and the positions of 
France and Britain in the international economy, had an immense 
impact on the processes identified here and the nature of the
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policies produced.
For example, the solution of tax reform, its availability
and appropriateness for France, was influenced by developments
taking place outside France. Not only did tax reform elsewhere
have important consequences for French policy makers, but also in
another important, though perhaps less direct respect, was
France's position in the international economy crucial. The
policies of 1981-82 revealed how pressures related to France's
external relations and economic position were aggravated. The
widening current account deficit, the weakness of the currency
and the rise in the budget deficit, testified to the degree to
which French policies were "out of step with the international
conjuncture” and the ”unsustainability” of such policies in the
face of external constraints. 703 Hall (1986) notes,
As the government ran up against economic constraints 
that derived from its insertion into world markets, it 
faced the difficult choice of adapting its strategy to 
the operation of market forces or of moving down a more 
radical path than anticipated.704
Socialist policy makers decided that France could no longer
OECD, Why Economic Policies Change Course, (Paris: OECD, 1988).
Several of the French intervewees explained how France's tax position 
was compromising its position in the international economy. To many, 
it was obvious that France needed to undertake important economic and 
financial (and tax) reforms, in order to improve its position. For 
example, when asked if there were any signs which may have prompted 
politicians to consider tax reform policies, one interviewee, Francois 
Xavier Stasse responded, "... la France a fait payer la crise...par les 
entreprises. Nous voyons tres clairement le partage ajoute a les 
entreprises; ca degradait tr£s nettement au benefices...les entreprises 
au cours de ce period voyent leur capacity de autofinancement, leur 
capacity d'investissement se reduiaient. Et la France petit k petit 
perd de la comp6titivit6... Nous avions ecout£, etudi£ les prises de 
positions des responsables economiques americains, anglais, 
allemands..." (Francois Xavier Stasse, interview in Paris, France, June 
2, 1992).
P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., p.225.
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afford to remain out of step with its major trading partners 
without jeopardizing France's position in the international 
economy, and the domestic economy - not to mention their own 
political positions. More a tacit vindication of Raymond Barre 
than the Projet Socialiste, the austerity package they 
subsequently devised and enacted began to remove the fiscal 
burden borne by French businesses and shifted it to the upper- 
and middle-classes. Similar strategies were being considered and 
pursued elsewhere, which facilitated somewhat the introduction of 
such 'un-Socialist' policies.
Initially, Britain's position in the international economy 
appeared to play a less important role in the processes which 
produced (tax) agenda change. During the Conservative period of 
opposition when tax reform was made an important item on the 
agenda, tax policy makers were not so much concerned by Britain's 
international trade and financial position. Although, it would 
be difficult to deny that the concerns of British industrialists 
and especially the City - with their exposure to international 
markets and their attractiveness to international investors - did 
not concern tax policy makers inside and outside the Conservative 
Party. 705 Later on, in the 1980s, when international tax reform 
was underway, tax policy making became more outward looking, in
705 The influence of City and business interests on the Conservative Party
has not only a domestic dimension, but an international one as well. 
For City and business influence in the Conservative Party and British 
government generally, see: C. Mellors, The British M. P., (Farnborough: 
Saxon House, 1978); N. Ellis, Parliamentary Lobbying, Putting the 
Business Case to Government, (Oxford: Heinemann Professional
Publishing, 1988); A. Roth, The Business Background of M.P.s, (London: 
Parliamentary Profile Services, 1972, 1967, 1965).
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the sense that taxes were seen as a way of enhancing Britain's 
competitive position vis-a-vis its major partners.
Even in the earlier period, when tax reform measures 
appeared on the Conservatives' agenda, the positive effect of 
neo-liberal tax policies on the country's international economic 
position and improving international confidence were not far from 
policy makers' minds. 706 The Conservative's tax plans as outlined 
in The Campaign Guide 1977 made frequent references to Britain's 
tax and economic position in relation to other low tax and 
economically successful countries in Europe and elsewhere. 
Frequent comparisons were drawn between the British tax system 
and those systems in other countries in order to highlight 
Britain's 'disadvantaged' position. Certainly implied, if not 
always explicitly stated, was the need to correct those 
disadvantages.
The pursuit of a "domestic" growth strategy was not enough. 
Tax policy would also need to be aimed at improving Britain's 
international competitiveness, although as already mentioned, 
this concern became much more pronounced in the later reforms 
under Lawson. Nevertheless, under Geoffrey Howe, the taxation of 
capital underwent some significant changes, providing evidence of 
the concern for Britain's financial and industrial positions in 
the international economy, a well as domestic economic growth and
Several of the British interviewees mentioned the brain-drain - the 
migration of high income earners to low tax countries - the squeezing 
of company profit margins and the efforts of high income earners to 
seek shelters for their income outside Britain. All these problems 
were relevant to Britain's position in the international economy.
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the creation of jobs.
The organization of capital, according to Hall (1986), 
refers to the relationship between financial and industrial 
capital. Britain and France maintain different capital 
structures. In Britain, businesses were largely given a free 
hand to make decisions and conduct affairs. The state interfered 
as little as possible. British firms came to rely on internally 
generated funds and equity issues for finance, rather than large 
scale and long-term assistance from banks. 707 The reverse was 
true in France, where industry remained small and fragmented and 
depended heavily on long term bank loans for finance. The state 
orchestrated consolidation of industry and nationalizations in 
the post-war period gave French banks, many of them in state 
hands, a more important role. Moreover, whereas, the City took 
on a substantial role in business affairs, in France financial 
markets remained largely undeveloped.708
With its reliance on the state banking sector for financial 
support and its traditionally close relationship with French 
government and politics, the organization of capital had 
tremendous consequences for government policy makers. Several 
developments affecting the organization of capital had 
consequences for tax policy change in France. In the early 
1980s, in light of the state's need to capitalize its vast 
expenditure program, budget deficits grew, and to choke off
707
708
P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., ch.3.
Ibid., pp.264-5.
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inflation and support the depreciating franc, interest rates 
rose. Sources of finance capital began to dry up. The 
government passed much of the burden for financing its social 
program onto the corporate sector. Taxes on corporations rose. 
Such measures adversely affected corporate profits which, as a 
result, fell. The rate of investment was on the decline. 709 For 
instance, the portion of investment financed from retained 
earnings fell from 78% in 1979 to 34% in 1982 .710 The cost of 
debt service for French firms as a percentage of value-added 
doubled between 1979 and 1984.711
Relations between capital and the state had ramifications 
for the direction of tax policy. In the early 1980s the French 
Socialist government was trying to ostensibly democratize state- 
society relations by promoting dialogue with 'other' 
representatives of capital besides the traditionally privileged 
CNPF.712 Actually, the government was trying to shore up its 
political base of support. These actions, which entailed 
strangling financial resources, increasing costs, introducing 
rigidities, withdrawing the state's recognition of the primary 
representative group as a privileged interlocutor and 
marginalizing it, had the combined effect of inciting significant 
reaction on the part of capital interests. The CNPF emerged as a
Recall the earlier quote by Francois Xavier Stasse.
P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., p.222.
Ibid.
See, S. Berger, in H. Machin and V. Wright, eds., op.cit.
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major institution of opposition to the government.713
While in Britain, the CBI and IOD resented the policies 
pursued by the early Thatcher government and threatened a "bare­
knuckle" fight, these business groups were not strong enough to 
force the government to bend to their will.714 But the 
organization, practices and norms of the main economic policy 
making body, the Treasury, plus the mediating effects of 
monetarist ideology and conviction politics, gave the 
Conservative government room to flout the arguments made by 
business representatives, if it wanted to.715
The Socialist government in France, saddled with a set of 
interlocking institutions which relied on the input and 
cooperation of business interests, soon learned that it could not 
afford to run rough-shod over the demands and pleas of the 
CNPF.716 Suzanne Berger (1985) writes,
...the Government discovered that it needed employers' 
organizations as a transmission belt to a world in 
which bureaucrats had limited access and few points of 
leverage. The professional unions represented in the 
CNPF have constructed a dense organizational network 
that covers all of France. Their legal, financial and 
research services have a reach into individual firms 
that no government offices parallel. The Government 
began to understand that the modernization of French
Ibid., p.230.
See: P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., p.105, 129; W. Grant, "Representing
Capital" in R. King, ed., Capital and Politics, (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1983) ; W. Grant and D. Marsh, The Confederation of British 
Industry, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1978).
See, P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., pp.65, 264-5.
The institutional framework in France which served as a conduit for 
business interests included, among other bodies, the modernization 
commissions of the Plan, the Economic and Social Council, and 
nationalized industries.
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industry and its adaptation to world markets would 
require associations to mediate between the State and 
private business...717
The government was compelled to heed the demands being made by 
the representatives of capital if economic recovery was ever 
going to materialize. Somehow, Mitterrand's government needed to 
persuade private businesses to invest, innovate and hire.718 
Moreover, as growing budget deficits and currency instability 
constrained state financing, it was necessary to free up finance 
capital in other ways. Lowering company charges (including 
taxes), allowing public companies to "sell-off" assets and 
encouraging the financial markets were some solutions under 
considerat ion.
Conceding to the demands made by the CNPF was the price for 
achieving the aims of the government, and relieving the 
government of unbearable responsibilities. A major demand made 
by French businesses was lower taxes on enterprises. In order to 
remain competitive and stimulate economic recovery, the 
government was convinced that it was imperative to reduce the 
charges borne by business and thereby enhance their financial 
flexibility. The influence of capital and its organization over 
economic, and especially taxation policy was thus manifest in 
France during the 1980s.
In Britain, the traditional loose and independent relations
717
718
S. Berger, in H. Machin and V. Wright, eds., op.cit., p.235. 
Ibid., p.236.
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between capital and the state and the division of interest and 
operations between the managers of financial and industrial 
capital (Hall, 1986) freed policy makers to some extent, from 
pressures exerted by these two sectors. Moreover, this situation 
was enhanced by the smaller scale on which British industry 
concentrated compared to its French counterpart, and its failure 
to mobilize in any effective, organized way to promote its 
interests. If anything, the international reputation and 
orientation of the City, and sterling's role as a world currency, 
obliged British policy makers to pay more heed to the interests 
of the financial community than to business. This situation was 
reinforced by the organization of the state with its 
internationalist perspective and the institutional presence 
within government of the Bank of England, which spoke for the 
interests of the financial community.719
Tax policy was subject to short-term political concerns, 
with little thought as to its long-term effect on business.720 
Where business was concerned, the attention focused on it was 
generally due to the eruption of crises and the need to preserve 
employment in threatened sectors. The extent of government 
intervention on behalf of capital can be observed in the plethora 
of tax reliefs commonly resorted to as a means of alleviating 
perceived problems, and which particularly favored the
719 P. Hall, 1986, p.251.
720 Cedric Sandford, speaking generally about British tax policy, felt much
of it was "ill-conceived" partly because there was "not enough
consultation or long term thinking." (Cedric Sandford, interview in 
Bath, England, June 6, 1991).
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manufacturing industries over service industries.
It wasn't until the advent of Prime Minister Thatcher that 
the state developed a long term approach to capital, but one 
still guided by a minimalist creed. This approach largely 
involved tax reform backed by supply-side principles. That is, 
creating a decision making environment uncluttered by tax devices 
which distorted investment decisions and choices about finance. 
Specifically, this involved eliminating all but a few 'essential' 
allowances and lowering corporation tax rates. However, while 
the evidence is lacking for the direct influence of capital on 
the tax reform agenda - particularly as the economic/tax 
preferences of the government were more or less congruent with 
the economic/tax preferences of business/City interests - the 
organization of capital in Britain certainly influenced the tax 
reform process by establishing the parameters in which tax policy 
makers devised and implemented the tax reforms of the 1980s.721
The organization of the state and the way it orders and 
channels the interactions and relations between actors also 
pressured a particular line of policy. This variable tends to 
lend itself more to policy continuity than change in the sense 
that the state's particular institutional structure remains
721 For further information on the role of business groups and the City in
British economic policy making, see e.g.: P. Hall, 1986, op.cit.; P. 
Middleton, "Economic Policy Formulation in the Treasury in the Post-war 
Period", National Institute Economic Review, no.127, February 1989; N. 
MacKinnon, "Playing to the Front Row", New Economy, Autumn 1993; D. 
Freud, "The Tories Open a Hornets' Nest", Financial Times, January 23, 
1983. City reaction is important and its influence was noted by Leonard 
Beighton, who said, when devising tax policy, "...you have to have one 
eye on the financial markets. . . it's very important to the real economy 
how the financial markets are reacting..." (Leonard Beighton, Lecture 
to the LSE Financial Markets Group, January 9, 1995).
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largely stable and so, will very likely constrain or deflect the 
exertions of political actors intent on effecting radical change. 
However, policy innovators and policy innovations may break 
through the constraints posed by the organization of the state, 
and actually exploit statal institutions to serve innovative 
ends. Here we can see that there is a close relation between the 
organizational variables of the state and the political system.
In Britain and France, the distinctive organization of these 
states affected the "incentives, balance of power, and flow of 
information facing individuals at different positions within 
it."722 This organization imparted a particular bias to the 
policy processes and outcomes.
The subjugation of the legislative branch of government by 
the Fifth Republic constitution, and the constitutional and 
practical pre-eminence of the executive, mean policy initiatives 
generally lay with the executive. The President, who heads the 
executive, and his ministers, are assisted by a personal team of 
advisers with access to ideas and actors inside the government, 
in the civil service, the cabinets, and outside government, in 
business and the broader policy community. The President, 
ministers, and advisers, are in a position to range widely across 
the policy agenda and consider items that muster technical as 
well as political feasibility. It is likely, therefore, that any 
important policy initiatives should issue from the executive 
branch of government, particularly the Elysee or in the case of
P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., p.61.
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tax ideas, the Ministry of Finance.
The customary avoidance by the bureaucracy - recognized as a 
major policy force - of issues that are controversial or overtly 
political in nature, leaves the initiative on an idea like tax 
reform with the political - as opposed to the administrative - 
executive. However, the extent of the administration's influence 
may be felt in its resistance to such ideas which may not meet 
administratively defined criteria of acceptability. In fact, the 
influence of the administration on the policy process was 
translated into support for the President's tax reform proposals 
- as long as they were technically viable. We have learned that 
the administration had come to be infiltrated by neo-liberal 
thinking and thinkers who were partial to neo-liberal tax reform 
ideas (J-F. Kesler, 1985; B. Theret, 1991).
As already discussed, neo-liberal ideas dominated teaching 
and thinking at the grandes ecoles by the mid-1980s and this had 
important policy consequences. 723 The new strategy adopted by the 
French government can therefore be related to the organization of 
the state: a President, and ministers and advisers, advocating 
tax reform imposed their policy preferences - developed 
internally and inspired by group demands and international 
developments - on a pliable bureaucracy and an acquiescent 
Parliament.
The British state bears much in common with its French
723 See: J-F. Kesler, 1985, op.cit.; B. Theret, op.cit.
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counterpart with respect to its institutional organization.724 
Tax policy making is centralized in the Treasury, with input 
possible from other sectors. However, it's the Chancellor who 
has the final say over tax matters. 725 Only the Prime Minister 
can overrule the Chancellor. Of course, the Prime Minister's 
decision-making authority does not merely rest in her ability to 
overrule. She is also a possible source of policy proposals.
The collective Cabinet and Parliament remain largely marginal to 
the tax agenda setting process. Cut off from the policy making 
process by the closed ranks among budgetary policy actors and the 
secrecy which shrouds the process, any input they may have is 
generally at the Chancellor's discretion. Constitutional devices 
and standard operating procedures, including among other things, 
a weak committee system, the three-line whip and the spectacle of 
Budget Day, also further limit participation in the tax policy 
making process on the part of the Parliament and cabinet. As in 
the case of France, it is with general facility that the 
political executive in Britain, sure of itself and its policies, 
structures and implements its tax agenda.
Hall (1986) maintains that the "civil service system and the 
politics-administration nexus" in Britain inclines policy making 
to be inertial rather than innovative. 726 To a large extent this
724 See e.g., N. Lawson, 1992, op.cit., p.272.
725 On the role of the Chancellor, see e.g.: N. Lawson, 1992, op.cit.,
pp.691-2,598,ch.47; H. Young and A. Sloman, But, Chancellor, (London: 
British Broadcasting Corporation, 1984); M. Thatcher, 1993, op.cit., 
p.673;
72S P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., p.62.
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is true. 727 However, if a party, privileged with an electoral 
mandate, enters government determined to implement its program, 
then the state's capacity to constrain innovative policies is 
much reduced. 728 Furthermore, if a strong Chancellor is appointed 
to head the Treasury, with a prolific mind and dogged 
determination, the civil service will bend to his will rather 
than the Chancellor bending to the will of the civil service.
While the organization of the state is generally considered 
to introduce rigidities with respect to the policy process and 
the ability of actors to enact innovative policies, this is not 
an absolute. Policy change is possible within the institutional 
confines of the state. Tax reform rose on governmental agendas 
in Britain and France because of the ability of policy innovators 
to exploit their positions within state structures and overcome 
the constraints imposed by those structures. Nevertheless, those 
actors had to work through and within the organizational 
structures to develop, promote and enact tax reform policies, 
thereby becoming subject to the rules, roles, procedures and 
physical structures in their given organizations. In the case of 
tax reform, therefore, agenda setting processes and policy 
outputs were impacted by the organization of the state.
727 See earlier discussion on elites and sub-cultures in Chapter 2. Also,
see e.g.: S. Steinmo, 1993, op.cit., pp.113,115,148; Lord Houghton, 
"Administration, Politics and Equity" in A.R. Prest et al., The State 
of Taxation, IEA Readings 16, (London: The Institute of Economic
Affairs, 1977), p.55; H. Young and A. Sloman, op.cit.; J. Barnett, 
Inside the Treasury, (London: Andre Deutsch, 1982). John Kay, for 
example, referred to the "clear unwillingness" and the "restraints" 
posed by civil servants when faced with politicians bent on introducing 
reforms (John Kay, interview in London, England, July 2, 1991).
728 See, H. Young and A. Sloman, op.cit., p.123.
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Finally, in the case of tax policy, the rules, norms and 
procedures set forth in the existing tax code had an important 
impact on the shape of tax ideas and tax policies in France and 
Britain. This notion draws on incremental and inertial theories 
of the policy process.729 In-force legislation, what Heclo (1974) 
calls the "policy inheritance", can be considered an 
institutional variable in that it represents and imparts 
established procedures, rules and norms which define relations 
between actors and institutions in the polity and create 
incentives and techniques which shape attitudes and behavior. To 
borrow Heclo's words, tax reformers were reacting against and 
working with a background of inherited techniques, forms, and 
presumptions collectively known as the tax code.730
Since France's tax system is heavier on consumption, rather 
than income, emphasizes indirect as opposed to direct taxation, 
(on the balance of taxation, see Appendix A, Figure 5A) and has 
come to be used by government to exercise control over and 
regulate economic decisions made by individuals and enterprises, 
policy makers are therefore constrained, and must bear in mind 
this aspect of the institutional setting when formulating policy. 
For example, while in Britain and the U.S. swinging cuts were 
made in personal income taxes, where direct taxation is heavier, 
French politicians and policy makers did not have the same scope
See e.g.: R. Rose and T. Karran, 1987, op.cit.; J. Witte, 1985,
op.cit.; H. Heclo, 1974, op.cit.).
730 See, H. Heclo, 1974, op.cit., p.47.
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to introduce such policies. In Britain and the United States 
taxes on income and profits represent 38.5% and 42.6% of total 
taxation respectively, whereas in France it represents only 17.8% 
(1983 figures). (For a comparison of the balance of taxation and 
the tax burden between France, the U.S., and the U.K., see 
Appendix A, Table 3A and Figure 5A).
In order to offset cuts in income taxation, the rates of 
value added tax were raised and its scope extended in Britain in 
the 1980s and early 1990s. This strategy had been foreshadowed 
by Geoffrey Howe, when Shadow Chancellor in a speech he made in 
Leicester on January 5, 1977. He said, "The whole balance of our 
tax system needs to be shifted. The British system depends more 
on direct and less on indirect taxes than other countries."731 In 
France, the high and increasingly uncompetitive VAT rates 
provided room for maneuver for tax policy makers in this area, 
and accordingly, VAT rates were reduced and streamlined 
throughout the second half of the 1980s.
By the same token the revenue yields of particular taxes, 
like the taxe professionnelle or the National Insurance Surcharge 
or the popularity of tax provisions like mortgage interest tax 
relief make it difficult for reformers to simply abolish such 
taxes outright. In all cases, in fact, these taxes were either 
left to be eroded by the effects of inflation and/or "reformed" 
incrementally. Evidently, therefore, the body of rules, laws and
Quoted in The Campaign Guide 1977, (London: Conservative and Unionist 
Central Office, 1977), p.73.
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regulations that govern a particular policy area also have 
important effects on the ideas and policies produced.
While the previous variables alternatively provide arguments 
for policy continuity and policy change, it's primarily in the 
political arena that the most influential stimuli can be found 
for policy change. Investigating the economic policy changes of 
the Thatcher and Mitterrand governments, Hall (1986) concludes 
that parties functioned as "agencies of innovation". 732 He 
maintains that a "coalition of social groups, forged by political 
elites around a new set of priorities, has been the agency for a 
major shift in policy. " 733 Indeed, both Thatcher and Mitterrand 
alienated or side-lined respectively, Conservative 'wets' and 
leftist Socialists and Communists, in the pursuit of their 
respective agendas; in Mitterrand's case, an agenda which was 
different from that which got him elected. Thatcher reached out 
to supply-siders and monetarists, and Mitterrand welcomed the 
inputs of classical economists and supply-siders, as the policy
agendas for each took on a decided neo-liberal shift compared to
what went before. The political system, therefore, with its 
constellation of political organizations and actors competing for 
electoral support and political power, is an important 
institutional variable explaining the processes discussed above.
The organization of the French and British political systems
732 P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., p.102.
733 P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., p.63; also see: P. Gourevitch, Politics in Hard
Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises, (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1986); T. Ferguson, "From Normalcy to New
Deal", International Organization, vol.38, no.l, Winter 1984.
is already quite familiar, and is not too distinct from the 
"organization of the state" variable. Still it is slightly 
separate. 734 We have already looked at the organization of the 
political system: largely dualist party systems aligned across a 
left-right spectrum, with deeply rooted doctrines, legislative 
elections every five years or so, and in France, presidential 
elections every seven years or so, a majority-based electoral 
system/ where the winner takes all (except in the 1986 general 
elections in France), the policy marginalization of Parliament 
achieved through disciplined parliamentary majorities, 
constitutional devices like toothless committees, the three-line 
whip in Britain and articles 38, 40-1, 44 and 49-3 (among others) 
in France, which give the government the upper hand and enables 
it to impose its will despite significant dissent. These 
"institutions" create incentives for parties to devise and offer 
programs which respond to perceived economic and societal demands 
or reflect strongly held views (ideology) and they concentrate 
policy making powers and resources in the executive. If tax 
agendas changed, then its largely to the role of the political 
systems that we must look.
The innovative role of political parties in France was 
evident in both Chirac's and Mitterrand's adoption and advocacy 
of neo-liberal tax reform. Because he needed to distinguish 
himself from his centrist and leftist opponents in order to 
ensure his survival as a credible presidential hopeful, and
734 P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., p.271.
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ultimately appear on the second ballot, Jacques Chirac virtually 
discarded his party's platform and opted for the neo-conservative 
and neo-liberal policies espoused by Reagan and Thatcher.
Apparently, when political ambitions and survival are at 
stake, traditional doctrine is easily discarded and new ideas 
taken up. While it was certainly electoral competition that 
persuaded Chirac to adopt the tax reform policies he did, this 
action had little to do with demands expressed at the grassroots 
level. It was more a risky political calculation based on the 
success of such policies elsewhere and their potential to 
attract, at least in the beginning, a core of support, and 
perhaps later, a broader electorate, provided a considerable 
effort was made to change the climate of opinion through 
education and persuasion. To borrow Hall's words, it was the 
combination of economic promise and political advantage that made 
neo-liberal tax reform such an attractive policy alternative for 
Chirac. 735 The same appeal was recognized in Mitterrand's case.
The decline in the Socialist party's electoral fortunes and 
popularity within a year of its election, highlighted by the 
evidently growing appeal of the center-right, obliged the 
Socialist government to reconsider its policies. The upcoming 
1986 parliamentary elections imposed a timetable that the 
government had to consider if it was going to do something to 
reverse its deteriorating position. The electoral timetable 
meant that the government had to change its policies with enough
Ibid., p.275.
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time for them not only to to be formulated, authorized, and 
implemented, but also for them to be appreciated by the voting 
public.
The glissement a la droite and the withdrawal of the
Communists from the government in 1984, opened the prospects of a
center-left alliance, something Mitterrand had been considering
since 1982. The change in the electoral laws to a system of
proportional representation augmented this prospect. The
political timetable, the need to win back support at the
opposition's expense, and the attempt to appear more centrist led
Mitterrand, the de facto head of the Socialist party, to poach in
neo-liberal territory and adopt policies that seemed to have
popular appeal, among which, tax reform. Certainly, concern
about the state of the French economy and the need to do
something about it also figured in the Socialist government's
search for new, viable and attractive alternatives. But, on the
whole, the shift in policy was driven largely by ideas expressed
and developed by political parties competing for votes and hoping
to forge new social coalitions that would broaden their bases of
support and propel them into office.
The importance of party on agenda change in Britain is
emphasized by Peter Hall (1986) who asserts that the,
...movement of the Conservative Party toward monetarism 
was ultimately the most significant factor in the 
collapse of the Keynesian consensus. In 1979 Thatcher 
was to form a Government and embark on a determined 
monetarist experiment.736
Ibid., p.98.
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In Britain, the political system was important in two ways: 1) 
the embrace and promotion of a new set of ideas by a political 
party; and 2) in terms of its impact on agenda change, by virtue 
of the fact that it provided the opportunity (elections) to enact 
an agenda which promised a distinct set of policies. 737 In 
contrast with France, however, the appearance of tax reform on 
the Conservative Party's agenda had little to do with the nature 
of electoral competition or responses to grass roots pressures. 
After all, neo-liberal tax reform had been on the Conservatives' 
agenda before Mrs. Thatcher assumed the leadership of the party. 
It was reinforced as a prominent agenda item by Mrs. Thatcher, 
Keith Joseph and Geoffrey Howe, not so much as a means to win 
votes away from Labour - although of course the promise of tax 
reform did have this effect - or as a party-driven search for 
new solutions - which to a large extent it was - but to satisfy 
and promote the ideological convictions of these Conservative 
leaders. Tax reform was necessary to rejuvenate the economy by 
providing greater choice and incentives and reducing the 
government's role in the economic and social life of the nation. 
Nevertheless, it was the party, led by a few ideologically driven 
individuals, hoping to forge a new social coalition, competing in 
an electoral arena for the privilege of power and the opportunity 
to implement its ideas, that underscored the processes of
P. Hall (1986, p.132) notes that the "Thatcher Government initiated a 
remarkable break with the pattern of past policies."
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alternative generation, policy advocacy and agenda change.738
We have examined a number of organizational variables - the 
organization of the state, capital, the political system and the 
positions of France and Britain in the international economy, as 
well as in-force legislation or the policy inheritance - and 
their effects on both the activities leading up to (tax) agenda 
change and the nature of the (tax reform) policies produced. In 
France and Britain there was no sudden alteration in the 
institutional setting which induced agenda change. Having said 
that, however, institutional change was indeed taking place in 
subtle ways. Gradually, a number of related and unrelated 
changes had been underway for some time - the decline of 
planning, the growing global economic interdependence and 
increasing exposure of 'domestic' industries to international 
markets and events, the decline of trade union influence and the 
rise in business influence, the concentration of decision making 
power in the executive and the decline of collective cabinet 
decision making, growing budget deficits and the drying up of 
state controlled finance capital, the rise of political and 
philosophical thinking groups promoting New Right ideas, to name 
a few. Furthermore, rigid boundaries did not exist between these
758 When asked, "Was tax reform driven by economic or political/ideological
motives?" a majority of the British interviewes responded, 
"Political/ideological." John Kay responded unequivocally that the 
whole process was "entirely politically driven." (John Kay, interview 
in London, England, July 2, 1991) . Hermione Parker asserted, "Politics 
has come first in tax reform." (Hermione Parker, interview in London, 
England, June 11, 1991) . Although, Cedric Sandford saw elements of both 
economics and politics. He said, "Tax reform was driven more by 
economic motives. These motives grew out of closely held political 
philosophy - a market orientation philosophy." (Cedric Sandford, 
interview in Bath, England, June 6, 1991).
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spheres. Each of the social spheres associated with these 
institutional variables interpenetrated others.739 Developments 
in one had implications for others. Shifts in the broader socio­
economic and political context created opportunities for 
strategic maneuvering by actors within existing institutions.
As we have seen, institutions are not immune to change, and 
their adaptation to shifting contextual conditions can impact 
political outcomes in a significant way. The diminishing ability 
of the state to successfully govern the economy in the late 1970s 
led to a growing divorce of power from responsibility in this 
sphere. 740 The increasing openness of the French and British 
economies and the international character of economic problems 
and policies rendered national economic strategies ever less 
effective. Institutions traditionally responsible for economic 
policy making and management were undermined and saw their 
influence decline, i.e. tri-partite bodies, Sectoral Working 
Parties, the National Economic Development Council, the French 
Planning Commissariat, the Modernization commissions, state 
controlled banks and public sector industries.
In the policy vacuum that ensued new actors and groups 
stepped in drawing attention to pressing problems and linking 
them with new ideas. Governments and political parties searched 
for new means of dealing with the problems at hand. Groups like 
the nouveaux economistes, the Club de l'Horloge, and political
739
740
P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., p.280.
Ibid., p.281.
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actors with ties to the UDF and the RPR, in France, and the IEA, 
the Bow Group, the IFS, the CPS and policy entrepreneurs 
associated with the Conservative Party in Britain introduced new 
ideas, many of which were developing abroad.
However, the development of these ideas in Britain and 
France, their rate and manner of diffusion, the activities 
undertaken by members of the policy community, policy 
entrepreneurs and decision makers in and around government, the 
nature and impact of perceived problems which the new ideas 
addressed, and the shape and definition of the policies which 
evolved from those ideas, are better understood in light of the 
institutional configuration which imprinted its image on the 
processes at work and consequently, the outcomes. Of greatest 
impact on the agenda setting process and policy outputs pertinent 
to neo-liberal tax reform were four elements of this 
institutional configuration: the organization of the state, the 
organization of capital, the policy inheritance, the organization 
of the political system and the position of each country in the 
international economy.
CHAPTER EIGHT
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CHAPTER EIGHT
- Conclusion -
Tax systems in a number of different countries underwent 
significant changes in the 1980s. The remarkable feature of 
these changes was the commonality - in policy processes and 
outputs - discernible from one country to another. Changes in 
the socio-economic and political contexts in the late 1970s/early 
1980s led to critical examinations of tax structures, France and 
Britain were not immune to such developments.
Common criticisms emphasized the complexity and inequity of 
the tax system as well as the system's punitive and distortionary 
character. Such problems, though not necessarily new, had become 
more pressing given the changed economic climate of the 1970s, 
characterized by stagflation and declining competitiveness. New 
ideas about the role of government and more specifically, the 
role of the tax system, moved from the margins of society into 
the mainstream. Political actors were persuaded by arguments 
that government should withdraw and give vent to the freer play 
of market forces. Neo-liberal tax reform figured prominently in 
such arguments.
Neo-liberal tax reform emerged on the agendas in France and 
Britain in the decade from 1979, as it did in many other 
countries. However, this policy was not simply a response to 
economic conditions. The changed economic picture was certainly 
an important impetus to the introduction of tax reform policies, 
but alone cannot account for the changed agendas in France and
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Britain. Moreover, while many tax ideas may originate with 
economists, they do not have the power to determine policy. They 
do not possess the legal authority to make binding policy 
decisions, as governments do.741 Government agencies and 
commissions study tax proposals to assess their possible 
administrative, legal, economic and revenue effects. Government 
ministers, legislators and civil servants, as well as political 
parties, consider the proposals in light of the reactions they 
will elicit from different sectors of society, and debate the 
proposals" merits and demerits. Any controversy which arises is 
settled politically. The policy choice made and the policy 
outcomes are decided politically. Rather than an economic or 
fiscal technique, tax reform must be considered a political 
strategy above all.
With tax reform, as with other policy areas, political 
variables will have a decisive impact. These variables are 
involved in often complex, ambiguous, unclear and messy ways.
But what are these political variables? How can we identify 
them? How can we come to anunderstanding of the parts they play? 
To do this we need the help of a model or framework which somehow 
makes sense of the policy process(es) and the variables that play 
a part therein. The suitable model or framework should correctly 
trace the evolution of tax reform from idea to government policy, 
showing how societal inputs of various kinds, decision making 
processes, political and bureaucratic cultures, actors, ideas and
741 J.E. Anderson, 1975, op.cit., p.43.
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institutions, have interacted within a given (domestic and 
international) institutional setting. Consideration of the 
institutional context in which these activities take place is 
essential because political preferences, attitudes and behavior 
cannot be understood outside it.
A number of theoretical constructs are available for the 
analysis of tax policy - culture, public choice, group, state 
centric, elite, learning and diffusion, institutional, garbage 
can and process streams and windows - and these have been 
examined above. Each of these theoretical approaches, in some 
respect, alert us to important political phenomena. Moreover, 
they help to clarify matters by reducing or simplifying the range 
of variables relevant to those phenomena. While some help in 
explaining the emergence of tax reform on the agendas in France 
and Britain in part, none are entirely suitable.
The cultural model is too broad-brushed and yet explains too 
little. It is fraught with many problems. A culturalist would 
try to explain tax policy developments in a polity in terms of 
the long-standing beliefs, values and attitudes of the tax policy 
makers. For example, in France anti-tax sentiment joined with an 
etatiste tradition and concern for social justice in France to 
produce contradictory trends in tax policy. In the case of 
Britain, from 1979, a culturalist would say, hierarchical and 
market cultures combined to produce low taxation. While examples 
can be found which appear to support the validity of cultural 
arguments, in the final analysis, however, even these cultural
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characteristics need explaining. Taking the above examples, were 
policy makers naturally ingrained with a low (or a high) tax 
bias, or did they learn to appreciate the values and ideas behind 
such policy positions? And, if they learned, how did they come 
to learn such values and ideas?
Following on from this line of questioning, the cultural 
model is problematic when confronted with the "which came first?" 
issue of institutions versus culture. Is someone born with an 
anti-/low/high tax bias? Or does one learn it? If the latter 
question applies, how is it learned? And who is it learned from? 
How are beliefs, values and attitudes reproduced if not by 
reference to institutional structures?742 More concretely, we 
learn these values through institutions. Institutions like the 
family, church, school, government, and the press, filter, 
transmit and inculcate values.
Finally, culture, for the purposes of this study remains 
problematic because it tells us next to nothing about the 
processes at work that brought tax reform onto the governmental 
agendas in France or Britain.
Public choice arguments focus primarily on behavioral 
motivation with their simplistic and occasionally erroneous 
assumptions, although, as we have sen, they do have some limited 
purchase. The riddling of the British and French tax codes with 
reliefs and exemptions, and Mitterrand's concession to reform the 
corporate tax system, testify to the rent seeking behavior of
742 P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., p.230.
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interest groups and the utility maximizing behavior of 
bureaucrats and politicians. Olson's (1982) encompassing groups 
argument also helps us to understand why - in the face of 
possible hostility or resistance - the RPR, UDF, Chirac and 
Mitterrand, and Mrs. Thatcher and the Conservative Party, adopted 
tax reform policies.
Nonetheless, public choice arguments related to the median 
voter, the political business cycle, and in some respects rent 
seeking, have been shown to be largely inaccurate as explanations 
for the emergence of neo-liberal tax reform. For example, the 
signals were not clear that assuming the mantel of neo-liberal 
tax reform would maximize utility, either in the case of Mrs. 
Thatcher in the mid- to late 1970s, or Chirac in 1981, or in the 
case of Mitterrand in September 1983. Factors other than, or 
additional to, mere economically inspired rationality had to be 
operating in the tax reform process.
Group theory has been a useful analytical framework for 
evaluating the emergence of neo-liberal tajc reform on the French 
government's agenda, and to a much lesser extent, the British 
government's. Pressure brought to bear by the CNPF and other 
business interests, political thinking groups like Club 89, the 
Club de l'Horloge and the nouveaux economistes, and later public 
interest groups like the Ligue des Contribuables, were critical 
to the adoption of tax reform by Mitterrand and his governments.
But group theory has its limitations, partly due to the 
passive role it attributes to government, and partly du e to its
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failure to adequately consider the role of institutions. 
Governmental officials are not merely referees in the struggle 
between competing groups. They are active, opinionated and 
possess resources that enable them to act decisively and 
sometimes independently. The French government, like its British 
counterpart, was not obliged to heed the pleas and demands of 
business - or any other - groups for tax cuts or special tax 
treatment, although as we saw, given the context, their arguments 
were certainly compelling. Nevertheless, to a degree, 
governmental officials controlled the activities and effects of 
these groups. And although, in both Britain and France, there 
are cases where the government 'caved in' to group demands, each 
ultimately retained control over the timing and nature of the 
policies considered and introduced.
Finally, group theory fails to account for the differentials 
in the relationships between different groups and the state, how 
groups shape and define their preferences and choose their 
strategies. This implies a neglect of the institutional setting 
in which groups operate.
State-centric theory is also an unlikely explanation of tax 
reform in France and Britain. The extent of state intervention 
in political, economic and social life and the clash of 
preferences at the highest levels, puts into question its unity 
and independence vis-a-vis societal groups. Furthermore, despite 
possessing ample institutional means to impose its will, the 
state has not only become virtually obsolete in terms of being
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capable of defining economic preferences and translating them 
into policy on its own terms, but it is also extremely reliant on 
societal actors, if not for their input, then for their 
cooperation in the implementation and evaluation of policy.
The evidence demonstrates the weaknesses of the state- 
centric model for the case of tax reform in France, the ultimate 
state-centric paragon. If it had not been for the direct 
pressure exerted by the CNPF (and perhaps external actors, i.e. 
the Germans), and the indirect pressure exerted by the 
increasingly popular center-right parties, as well as the 
economically and politically successful supply-side economic and 
tax programs introduced in Britain and the United States, 
socialist tax reform, rather than neo-liberal tax reform, would 
most likely have been the order of the day. In Britain, the 
emergence of tax reform on the specialized agenda of the 
Conservative Party in the 1970s had nothing to do with state- 
centrism and everything to do with the ideas, efforts and choices 
of actors outside the state, including the press, party research 
departments, think tanks, and policy experts.
Elite arguments which explain the tax policy process in 
terms of a small, cohesive and purposive policy elite, are also 
inappropriate. While elite structures and practices can be 
identified in France as well as Britain, the tax policy process 
in both countries is more pluralistic and dissentious than elite 
theorists make out. It encompasses a large number of actors and 
a wide range of interests. Moreover, the elite themselves, as we
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have seen, are characterized by internal disagreements, 
fragmentation and division, making a clear and unified position 
on taxation highly improbable.
Learning and diffusion are unwieldy tools in the analysis of 
public policy. They basically attempt to attribute policy change 
within a polity to the influence of 'agents of change' equipped 
with information and knowledge acquired from outside - as well as 
inside - a given system. Also learning and diffusion models 
attempt to explain how that which is learned is transmitted by 
these agents within society generally, and to domestic decision 
makers in particular, and in what ways these are influenced.
Moreover, at least with respect to the pre-enactment 
processses which concern us here, it was only in the case of 
France that learning and diffusion were applicable. Britain 
itself, was considered to have been at the forefront of the tax 
reform movement and so was not influenced in the development of 
its tax reform agenda by ideas and developments outside the 
country, except, arguably, later in the reforming process. If 
learning is applicable at all in the British case, it is in the 
sense that Mrs. Thatcher and other key economic policy makers 
took on board the experiences and policies of preceding British 
governments and political actors. These cases suggest that 
policy outputs reflected the impact of learning and diffusion to 
a certain extent. But admitting this, while helping us to 
understand the processes a little better, does not satisfy as an 
explanation. In addition, the inability to frame our discussion
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of the tax reform agenda setting processes in Britain and France 
in common terms, compels us to look elsewhere for an approach 
which links the processes at work in both countries.
Unfortunately, as a theoretical construct, learning and 
diffusion are too unconstructed. We are not helped to understand 
why something is learned, why it has a certain effect, or how 
what is learned is applied. Furthermore, why - as in some cases 
- does what is learned yield different responses and policy 
outcomes? Our examination showed that learning and diffusion 
approaches are characterized by a lack of rigor, coherence and 
consensus.
Institutionalists, like Peter Hall (1986), attempt to 
identify a range of political and economic variables interacting 
in the policy process by examining the structural constraints and 
incentives operating in a country's socio-economic organization. 
As Hall says, "...economic policy is the output not of 
individuals, but of organizations that aggregate the endeavor of 
many individuals in particular ways."743 The endeavors of 
individuals cannot be understood apart from their institutional 
environment. In other words, in order to appreciate how ideas 
are translated into policies, one must examine the institutional 
context in which ideas are generated and actors' preferences, 
goals and activities are shaped and defined.
Decision makers are faced by an environment consisting of a 
number of defining domestic and international variables. The
743 P. Hall, 1986, op.cit., p.233.
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organization of the state, the political system, capital, each 
country's position in the international economy, as well as the 
policy inheritance, had a defining impact on the emergence of tax 
reform on governmental agendas in France and Britain.
These organizational variables structure the environment in 
which decision makers develop preferences, make choices and 
pursue goals. The sort of factors which have a defining impact 
on policy processes and outputs include: the relationship between 
the executive, legislative and judicial bodies, the political 
arena and the nature of electoral competition, the strength and 
roles of finance and industry, the openness of the national 
markets and the positions of national producers and financial 
markets relative to international markets (Hall, 1986). With 
repsect to our two cases, an examination of the institutional 
settings in Britain and France gave us a clearer understanding of 
how neo-liberal tax reform emerged on the governmental agendas in 
those two countries. One cannot fully comprehend the diverse, 
and at times overlapping processes which pushed neo-liberal tax 
reform into agenda prominence in Britain and France without due 
consideration of, for example, electoral competition and 
majoritarian electoral systems in both countries; the 
hierarchical nature of British and French governments, which 
concentrates decision making in the executive and tax policy 
making in the French Ministry of Finance, and the British 
Treasury; the constitutions and political traditions in each 
country which equip the executive.with effective disciplinary
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devices to ensure its will can prevail; the relationship of 
business and labor with government; the importance of financial 
markets, the roles of sterling and the franc, and the competitive 
positions of the French and British economies relative to each 
and to other countries. Earlier detailed examinations of these 
institutional variables revealed their dynamic effects on the 
policy goals and politico-economic strategies of policy 
entrepreneurs and key decision makers. Without institutions, it 
is impossible to understand the interactions of ideas and actors 
that set the tax reform agendas in Britain and France.
The institutional framework, however, is weakened with 
respect to two factors: policy changes and the role played by 
ideology. However, in recent years, institutional analysis has 
moved away from its static sensibilities and successfully 
accomodated the notion of policy change, by accounting for the 
phenomenon of institutional change and the ineffectual responses 
of established institutions to events or crises which may prompt 
institutional adaptation or change. With regards to ideology, 
institutionalism is less comfortable, but still makes an attempt 
to link institutions and the role of ideas in politics. This 
link is effectivley supported by the argument that while one's 
ideological convictions may not be explained in terms of one's 
position or role in a given institutional setting, those 
convictions, to have effect, and to find force, need to be 
resonated and disseminated by and within institutions.
Again, our enterprise is concerned with identifying
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commonalities in the agenda setting processes in Britain and 
France which gave rise to neo-liberal tax reform.
Institutionalism is useful to some extent, but as a middle 
ranging theory, it is more appropriate with respect to 
identifying the most salient factors which explain policy 
differences, rather than policy similarities. Finally, the most 
serious drawback for this school of thought is its oversight of 
the activities and processes that operate and gave rise to agenda 
change and tax reform. In other words, institutionalism, 
explains the woods while neglecting the trees. Nevertheless, it 
has defined the parameters in which an examination of the agenda 
setting and policy formulation (pre-enactment) processes take 
place. We cannot ignore the impact of institutions on these 
processes without weakening our analysis.
Our final discussion focused on garbage can (Cohen, March 
and Olsen, 1972) and process streams and windows (Kingdon, 1984) 
models. These models revealed the existence of several process 
streams running through an organization. I relied on Kingdon's 
model which draws heavily on the earlier garbage can model.
Public policy change is understood as the fortuitous confluence 
of three streams: problems, policies and politics. Participants 
in each stream are engaged in various activities from 
interpreting indicators signalling the existence of a problem to 
persuading key actors that a particular solution is the 
appropriate one for addressing the problem(s) at hand.
Within our organization the three streams flow more or less
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independently of one another. They come together at critical 
times, usually when a policy window opens, and produce agenda 
change. A policy window opens usually because of some 
development in the problem or politics stream. Solutions are 
joined to problems, which are then both joined with politics. 
However, this is not a passive coupling. The appearance of the 
right entrepreneur at the right time is crucial to the coupling. 
Entrepreneurs advocate, educate, and wait for the right moment to 
push their proposals and problems into prominence. When the 
right moment appears, usually in the form of an open policy 
window, they attempt to link the three streams. If the link is 
made, then the likely outcome is agenda change.
In Britain, members of the Conservative Party - as well as 
some in the opposition parties - had identified problems with the 
British economy, and more specifically with the British system of 
taxation. They formulated policies with the help of many 
advisers who came from outside as well as inside government. 
Certain activists, like Margaret Thatcher, Keith Joseph, Geoffrey 
Howe, and later Nigel Lawson, sought to persuade the British 
public of the detrimental effects of Britain's tax system on 
enterprise, initiative and choice. They furthermore advocated 
their policies - lowering the top and basic rates, switching from 
direct to indirect taxation, cutting capital taxes and raising 
thresholds etc. - as those best able to solve the problems they 
had identified.
As politicians themselves, Howe and Lawson, supported by a
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large cast of other governmental and non-governmental officials 
and advisers, capitalized on favorable developments in the 
political stream, for example, rising public opinion against the 
onerous burden of taxation and the 1979 general election. When a 
window presented itself in the form of the 1979 election and the 
subsequent Conservative victory, Sir Geoffrey in particular, 
joined the three streams and brought tax reform onto the British 
government's agenda; although it soon became a lower priority on 
the agenda as other more pressing problems commanded the 
Chancellor's attention. As those pressing problems were fading, 
Nigel Lawson was made Chancellor. Given his entrepreneurial 
credentials and commitment, tax reform again emerged to assume a 
prominent place on the British government's agenda, where it 
remained through the end of the 1980s.
Neo-liberal tax reform appeared on the agenda in France in 
the early 1980s. On the advice of key political advisers, neo­
liberal tax reform was initially advocated from 1981 by Jacques 
Chirac. The intent was not to solve an identifiable problem 
(although a problem was ostensibly identified), but, rather, to 
seek electoral advantage by invoking an issue which apparently 
had contributed to the electoral successes of Ronald Reagan and 
Mrs. Thatcher. Neo-liberal tax reform, as it figured in Reagan's 
and Thatcher's programs, and as it was adopted by Chirac, was 
largely ignored by his main opponents in the 1981 presidential 
race, Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Francois Mitterrand. As we 
saw, however, the time wasn't ripe for Chirac's tax reform
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message.
As the 1980s progressed, the situation changed. The issue 
was catching on and soon both the RPR and the UDF had made tax 
reform a major (electoral) theme. Employers' organizations also 
tirelessly (and tiresomely) pressured the government of Francois 
Mitterrand to consider and implement tax reform measures, such as 
were being considered and implemented elsewhere. Moreover, the 
issue received much attention by the media. The climate appeared 
increasingly receptive to neo-liberal tax reform ideas and 
solutions.
Before long, neo-liberal tax reform made the move to the 
Socialist government's agenda. A couple of related problems were 
recognized: electoral decline and unpopularity, high tax burden 
and rates and their negative impacts on the economy. The 
problems stream was therefore opening a window for appropriate 
solutions. A solution was available in the policy community and 
recommended: neo-liberal tax reform and its component measures. 
Political developments also had the effect of opening a window 
and made the time right for policy change: a shifting national 
mood, the threat of electoral defeat in 1986 at the hands of the 
center-right, and the lobbying of influential business interests. 
Potential constraints - i.e., the budget, political and pressure 
group opposition - were soon minimized or perceived to be 
sufficiently minimal as to warrant the serious consideration, 
enactment and implementation of exploratory tax reforms.
Policy entrepreneurs played a critical role in linking these
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streams. They capitalized on propitious events and circumstances 
and used their influential positions to promote their ideas with 
the aim of changing the agenda. These policy entrepreneurs 
included both visible and hidden participants, among others, the 
Club de l'Horloge, Philippe Auberger, Alain Juppe, the Club 89, 
Jacques Chirac, Laurent Fabius, Pierre Beregovoy, the CNPF, the 
visiteurs du soir, perhaps Jacques Attali and Jean-Louis Bianco, 
and the President himself. The commitment to reform taxes made 
and maintained by President Mitterrand, as well as other key 
figures in the alternating Socialist and center-right governments 
and oppositions, and leading advocates outside government, 
throughout the 1980s, meant that the issue would not fade away. 
Considered acceptable in terms of their economic and political 
viability and potential to solve the given problems, these 
policies were coupled to events in the political and problems 
streams and thereby changed the tax policy agenda in France. Tax 
reform continued to remain an important agenda item for some 
years. During the 1980s several proposals were devised and made 
available in the policy stream and overcame a number of 
constraints and hurdles to reach legislative enactment.
These processes described above were not completely random. 
The structures of our organized anarchies help explain why new 
ideas like tax reform were developed, sought after and translated 
into policies. We cannot hope to understand the emergence of tax 
reform on the government's agenda without consideration of the 
institutional environment and the role of institutions,
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particularly the organization of the state, the organization of 
capital, the policy inheritance, the organization of the 
political system and the positions of Britain and France in the 
international economy. We cannot fully understand the ideas, 
interests and actions of participants in the tax reform process, 
or the process itself, apart from the institutional settings in 
which they operate. Institutions impose some structure, defining 
relations and influencing actors" interests, attitudes and 
behavior.
Despite this, an element of unpredictability and chance 
remains which makes the phenomena of agenda setting still rather 
vague and hit-or-miss. 744 Still, the processes described here are 
made less imprecise given an understanding of the process streams 
which run through the organization and the dynamics of the 
organizational setting.
The tax reform process is a complex one, comprised of many 
interweaving strands. 745 The research revealed no single factor 
explanation - i.e. economics, technological advance, group 
pressure, elite consensus, international influences - behind the 
promotion of tax reform onto agendas in Britain and France from 
1979. What the research did reveal was a complex of factors
744 J. Kingdon, 1984, op.cit., p.218.
745 Indeed, one of the interviewees, Adam Ridley, invoked the image of a 
multi-dimensional matrix, reminiscent of the "interwoven" strands 
mentioned by Robinson and Sandford (1983) . He said, "One of the things 
that you find if you analyze what has been happening in the policy­
making process, from about 1976-77 onwards - it was like any multi­
dimensional matrix in each of which you have a variety of different 
elements intersecting..." (Sir Adam Ridley, interview in London, 
England, May 30, 1991).
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which did not interact neatly in orderly and clearly identifiable 
steps or stages.
This examination of tax reform in France and Britain has 
aimed to combine empirical and theoretical material in order to 
arrive at a better understanding of a subject which has not been 
scrutinized sufficiently in terms of political, as opposed to 
economic or administrative, dynamics. The process of tax reform 
in France and Britain during the 1980s was a complex one, 
comprising several interweaving strands driven largely - though 
not exclusively - by politics.
Why did tax reform evolve from idea to government policy?
Why did tax reform rise on the governmental agendas in France and 
Britain? Why did some proposals succeed, while others did not?
In answering these questions, we looked at the interactions 
between actors, ideas and institutions and we explored the 
processes through which they affect agendas.
The approach favored here is one which combines Kingdon"s 
(1984) process streams and windows framework with Hall's (1986) 
institutional framework. As evidenced in the cases of Britain 
and France, this sort of eclectic framework of analysis is useful 
in helping us to understand the relationships among the different 
variables at work in the agenda setting phase of the tax reform 
process.
The Kingdon approach is most suitable as a framework for 
analyzing the complex of factors involved in the emergence of tax 
reform on the governmental agendas in France and Britain during
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the 1980s. It is largely successful in its attempts to identify 
and explain the often unpredictable and sometimes messy 
interactions of actors, ideas and institutions. While this model 
acknowledges the role of serendipity in the policy process, it 
also recognizes that the agenda setting processes depend on 
features of the organizational environment.
An institutional approach fuses nicely with Kingdon's (1984) 
process streams and windows approach. Together they synthesize a 
wide range of material in a compelling way, that help us to 
better understand the complex of factors that led to the 
emergence of tax reform on the governmental agendas in Britain 
and France. This approach, however, has ramifications that 
extend beyond this single policy area and indeed, the two-country 
analysis undertaken here. Building from the limited focus of 
this study, our somewhat eclectic process framework may have a 
number of advantages when applied to multiple issue areas and 
cross-country comparisons. The framework's potential for 
considering a broad range of concerns, activities and 
institutions systemically, comprehensively and empirically has 
important and interesting implications for comparative studies.
APPENDIX
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A ppendix A
Figure 1A
France: Tax Burden as % of GDP, 1973-1990
Figure 2A
Britain: Tax Burden as a % o f GDP 
1970-1989
3 6.9
3 6.5
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Source: OECD
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Figure 3A
France: Tax Receipts 
Consumption Taxes vs. Income Taxes
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■ Income taxes
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Source: T. Gandillot, Le Grande Cirque Fiscal (Hatier, 1988)
Figure 4A
France: Trends in Social Charges (cotisations sociales) 
as % of GDP
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Figure 5A
Balance of Taxation (1984)
France
direct
indirect
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T a b le  1A
Tax & Social Charges on Businesses 1980-89 
(as a % of GDP)
1980 1984 1985
France 16.6 17.9 14.3
Germany 10.8 10.9 9 .1
Great Britain 8 .0 11.0 8 .0
Japan 9.6 10.0 11.9
United States 7 .6 9 .0 7 .5
Source: OECD and Conseil des Impots (1987)
T a b le  2A
1978
Income Tax Rates and Thresholds 
Married with 2 Children
1981
Threshold rate of Threshold rate of
in sterling income tax in sterling income tax
Belgium 2,680 12.7 3,300 21.7
Denmark 2,700 14.4 2,445 14.6
France 4,735 7.2 5,400 7.2
W. Germany 2,725 18.0 3,010 18.0
Ireland 2,275 20.0 2,680 25.0
Italy 1,465 10.0 2,070 18.4
Luxembourg 5,750 18.45 5,625 12.3
Netherlands 3,395 19.2 3,040 16.3
Great Britain 1,736 25.0 2,146 30.0
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Source: Financial Times, February 3, 1982
Table 3A
The Burden of Taxation (1989) 
as a percentage of gdp
personal 
Income tax
corporate 
income tax
employee 
social charges
employer 
social charges
V A T St 
excise taxes i
F r a n c e 5.2% 2.4% 5.7% 11.9% 12.7%
I L K . 9.7% 4.5% 2.7% 3.5% 11.0%
I L L 10.7% 2.6% 3.5% 4.9% 4.4%
l figures for 1988 
Source: OECD
499
A ppendix B
Tax Reform in France, 1981-1989
Main measures:
1981
• all brackets to be indexed for inflation
• exceptional increase of 25% on income tax paid in 1981 over FF100,000
• special tax of 10% on certain general company expenses (i.e., 
entertainment, gifts, etc.)
• abolish loi Monory (relief for share purchases)
• creation of IGF (wealth tax) on incomes over FF3 million with rates 
from .5% to 1.5% (various deductions for plant, machinery and art)
• reductions in cotisations patronales due on salaries not exceeding 
FF3,480/month
1982
• exemption from social charges for certain troubled industries, i.e. 
textiles
• new favorable depreciation rules for companies
• Taxe d'Etat imposed on automatic apparati installed in public places
• special levy of 1% on civil servants' income for the benefit of the 
unemployed
• VAT lowered to 5.5% on certain food products
• standard rate of VAT raised from 17.6% to 18.6%
• VAT extended to veterinarians and non-daily publications
• higher taxes on oil industry
• taxe professionnelle reduced for businesses that create jobs, hire 
the unemployed or invest (FF5 billion loss to the Tresor)
1222.
• creation of new upper income tax rate of 65%
• surtax of 5% on 1982 incomes paid of more than FF20,000, and 8% for
more than FF30,000
• obligatory government loan of 10% of taxes paid equaling more than 
FF5,000 in 1982
• exceptional levy of 1% on all incomes for the benefit of social 
security
• increase in employers' unemployment contributions
• increase in employers cotisation assurance-vieillesse
• removal of the ceiling on the cotisation assurance-maladie due by 
employers, but imposed at a lower rate
• abolition of stamp duty on bills posted, receipts and residence 
certificates
• creation of a new parafiscal tax on certain petroleum products by the 
Caisse nationale de l'energie
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• increase in the taxe interieure de consommation sur les produits 
pStrolieres (TIPP)
1984
• tax deductions for professional expenses for specific industries
• deductions for mortgage interest, energy-saving home improvements, 
and life insurance premiums, changed to tax credits of 25%
• tax deductions of 10% for business expenses of high income earners 
(more than FF509,000/year) limited by non-indexation of FF50,9000 
limit
• inheritance tax rate raised from 20% to 30%, 35% and 40% for fortunes 
transferred over FF3.4 million; lightened for small inheritances by 
means of a rise in the threshold below which the tax does not apply
• increase in tax on automobile insurance policies from 9% to 15%
• VAT rate of 33% extended to rented cars. Video-cassette recorders and 
video-cassettes
• continuation of the temporary 1% contribution for the benefit of 
social security
1985
• eliminate the 1% contribution for the benefit of social security 
(promised for 1986)
• reduce the taxe professionnelle by FF10 billion
• reduce income taxes by 5% (FF10 billion)
• abolish 25% withholding tax on foreign purchases of domestic bonds
• repayment of 10% obligatory loan announced for 1986
• extra-budgetary increases in the price of supercarburant and the taxe 
de base tdlephonique
• upper rate of IGF (wealth tax) raised from 1.5% to 2% for fortunes 
more than FF20 million
The 1985 budget represents the government's attempt to fulfill
Mitterrand's promise to reduce the tax burden by 1% made on TF1 in
September 1983
1986
Socialist measures
• income tax reduced on average by 3%
• IS (corporate tax) for undistributed profits lowered from 50% to 45%
(cost: FF4-5 billion)
Chirac government measures
• reduction of 9 parafiscal taxes on various industries
• reduce top income tax rate from 65% to 58%
• reduce TP by 16%
• abolition of the IGF
• harmonization of exemptions for bond and share income
• increase in TIPP
• increase rate of cotisation vieillesse on employees
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• obligatory tax contribution of .4% of net household revenue in 1985 
and 1986 for the benefit of the Caisse nationale d'assurance- 
vieillesse
1987
• IS lowered to 42% on distributed and un-distributed profits
• reduction in income taxes of 3% on average
• taxe d'Etat abolished
• reductions in TIPP
• reductions in taxe sur les frais generaux over three years, then 
abolished in 1989
• tax deductions for interest paid on capital loans
• increase deductions for revenus fonders from 15% to 35% in certain 
cases
• certain exemptions granted for vignette auto (i.e. for families with 
5 children)
• avoir fiscal raised from 50% to 69.05%
• tax credit for research at rate of 30% for expenditures of more than 
FF3 million
• VAT extended to telecommunications
• VAT for record sales reduced from 33% to 18.6%
• VAT on car sales reduced from 33.3% to 28%
• medical care organizations relieved from VAT
• tax reliefs for agriculture, i.e. VAT reductions/exemptions
• increases in cotisations sociales
1988
• IS lowered from 42% to 39%
• tax holiday for new businesses of five years - third year at 75%, 
fourth year at 50%, fifth year at 25%
• no social charges or temporary exemptions for companies that take on 
apprentices, people on revenu minimal d'insertion
• indexation of taxe sur les salaires
• from January 1989 new companies exempted from taxe f o n d e r  and TP
• increases in cotisations sociales
• removal of the ceiling on cotisation d'allocations familiales for
employers
• VAT decreased to 5.5% for a number of goods and services
• VAT reduced rate lowered from 7% to 5.5%
• VAT reduced from 33.3% to 28% for many items; i.e. perfume, hi-fi,
tabacs, audio-visual
• VAT reduced from 18.6% to 5.5% on non-alcoholic drinks
• .4% levy on incomes subject to IRPP
• new wealth tax (ISF) with rates of .5%, .7%, .9% and 1.1% on fortunes
over FF4 million with exemptions for art, forests, plant and 
machinery, employee buyouts involving share transactions. Expected 
to hit about 125,000 taxpayers
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1989
• company tax decreased from 39% to 37% on un-distributed profits; 
remains at 42% for distributed profits
• eight year exemptions from IS for companies setting up in Corsica
• tax credit for companies making reductions in their work time (la 
duree hebdomadaire de travail) of at least three hours
• interest income from savings instruments of 10 years exempted from 
income tax
• decrease from 11% to 0% (up to FF100,000) and 6% (FF100,000 to
FF300,000) of company transfer duties (droits de mutations sur la
cession de fonds de commerce et conventions assimilees)
• reduced tax on bonds and other fixed revenue savings 
instruments(instruments de placement a revenu fixe) from 25% and 32% 
to 15%
• reduction in tax rate applied to other savings instruments from 45% 
to 35%
• abolition of 5.15% tax on life insurance contracts
• holders of personal equity plans who collect after ten years (capital 
plus interest) will be exempted from tax
• ISF changed with new rates (1.2% and 1.5%) and brackets
• VAT decreased: 1) on medications reimbursed by social security from
5.5% to 2.1%; 2) high rate of 28% reduced to 25% on cars, hi-fi, 
video-cassettes
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Tax Reform in Britain, 1979-1989
Main measures:
1979
• basic rate of personal income tax lowered from 33% to 30%
• top rate of personal income tax lowered from 83% to 60%
• personal allowances raised
• age allowances raised
• thresholds raised for investment income surcharge
• profit limits raised for corporation tax applied to small companies
• standard rate of VAT raised from 8% and 12.5% to a uniform 15%
• excise duties raised on tobacco, alcohol and petrol
1 9 8 . Q .
• lower personal income tax rate of 25% abolished
• tax thresholds and personal allowances raised
• thresholds raised for investment income surcharge
• employees'/employers' national insurance contributions raised
• relief for life assurance policies reduced from 17% to 15%
• thresholds raised for stamp duty
• exemptions for capital gains tax raised
• corporation tax for small companies lowered from 42% to 40% and 
profit limits increased
• excise duties raised on tobacco, alcohol and petrol
• exemptions for capital transfer tax increased
• prescription charges increased from 45p to El
• petroleum revenue tax increased from 60% to 70%
• increased taxation on company cars
• short term social security benefits including unemployment benefit
become liable to income tax from April 1982
• Green Paper, The Taxation of Husband and Wife (CMND 8093)
• Committee on Enforcement Powers of the Revenue Departments (Keith 
Committee) set up - report issued in 1983 (CMND 8822, 9210, 9440)
1981
• no rise in threshold and personal allowances
• employees' national insurance contributions raised
• windfall tax of 2.5% on non-interest bearing sterling deposits over 
ElO million
• new supplementary petroleum duty to be levied at 20% of total value 
of oil extracted in the Britain and from the continental shelf
• increased taxation on company cars
• excise duties raised on tobacco, alcohol and petrol
• taxation of various fringe benefits, i.e. free petrol, season rail 
tickets, credit cards provided at employer's expense
• business start-up scheme provides relief against taxation on 
investment in new businesses
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1982
• tax thresholds and personal allowances raised
• thresholds raised for investment income surcharge
• employees'/employers' national insurance contributions raised
• increase exemptions for transfers of property subject to stamp duty
• exemptions for capital gains tax raised; new system of indexation
• exemptions for capital transfer tax increased
• national insurance surcharge lowered from 3.5% to 2.5%
• petroleum revenue tax increased from 70% to 75%
• excise duties raised on tobacco, alcohol and petrol
• Green Paper on Corporation Tax (CMND 8456)
1983
• tax thresholds and personal allowances raised
• thresholds raised for investment income surcharge
• employees'/employers' national insurance contributions raised
• mortgage interest relief ceiling raised from £25,000 to £30,000
• exemptions for capital gains tax raised
• exemptions for capital transfer tax increased
• national insurance surcharge reduced gradually from 2.5% to 1.0%
• excise duties raised on tobacco, alcohol and petrol
• planned phased reductions in advanced petroleum revenue tax to 0% in 
1987
• taxation of various fringe benefits, i.e. company-sponsored 
scholarships, company-provided or no-rent/low-rent housing
• tax relief for investors in small businesses increased from £20,000 
to £40,000
1984
• tax thresholds and personal allowances raised
• investment income surcharge of 15% abolished (cost £350 million in 
full year)
• five-year phase-out of tax relief of 50% for foreign employee's 
working in Britain and tax relief abolished from April 1985 for 
British residents working abroad
• excise duties raised on tobacco, alcohol and petrol
• life assurance premium relief for all new contracts eliminated
• top rate of capital transfer tax reduced from 75% to 60% and 
exemptions increased
• stamp duty reduced to 1%
• rate of corporation tax reduced from 52% to 50% then to 45% in 1984- 
85 and 40% in 1985-86 and 35% in 1986-87; the rate for small 
companies is lowered from 38% to 30%
• exemptions for capital transfer tax increased
• capital allowances on plant, machinery and assets cut from 100% to 
75% with immediate effect, then to 50% from March 31, 1985, and 
abolished from March 31, 1986; annual allowances of 25% will then 
apply from the date expenditure incurred
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• stock relief abolished
• national insurance surcharge abolished
• increase in development land tax threshold from £50,000 to £75,000
• VAT payments on imports to be brought in line with customs duties
• VAT extended to construction alterations and take-away food
• increased taxation of company cars
1985
• tax thresholds and personal allowances raised
• graduated rate structure for national insurance contributions 
(NlCs)and cuts in employees'/employers' NICs for low-paid workers
• upper earning limit on employers' national insurance contributions 
abolished
• exemptions for capital gains tax raised
• capital transfer tax thresholds and rate bands raised
• development land tax abolished
• stamp duty of 1% on gifts repealed; deeds of family arrangement and 
transfer of property on the break-up of a marriage exempted from the 
1% duty
• VAT extended to advertisements in newspapers, journals and 
periodicals
• excise duties raised on tobacco, alcohol and petrol
1986
• tax thresholds and personal allowances raised
• basic rate of personal income tax cut from 30% to 29%
• exemptions for capital gains tax raised
• capital transfer tax on lifetime gifts between individuals abolished 
and CTT renamed "inheritance tax"
• stamp duty on share purchases cut from 1% to .5%; stamp duty extended 
to previously-exempt areas of trading, i.e. purchases of letters of 
allotment, quick buy-and-sell deals, dealings in loan stocks
• introduction of personal equity plans (PEPs); all dividends and 
capital gains accruing are exempt from tax as long as investment 
remains for one full calendar year
• small company tax rate cut to 29% (corporation tax for large firms to 
35%)
• excise duties raised on tobacco (cigarettes, not cigars and pipe 
tobacco) and petrol, but not on alcohol
• Green Paper, The Reform of Personal Taxation (CMND 9756)
• Green Paper, Paying for Local Government (CMND 9714)
1987
• tax thresholds and personal allowances raised
• basic rate of personal income tax cut from 29% to 27%
• exemptions for capital gains tax raised
• inheritance tax threshold raised from £71,000 to £90,000; number of 
rates reduced from seven to four: 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%
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• corporation tax: 1) small company tax rate cut to 27%; 2) for firms 
with profits between £100,00 and £500,000, the tax rates are set on a 
scale between 27% and 35%; 3) tax on companies' capital gains to be 
charged as income at normal corporation tax rates (35% or 27%); 4) 
advanced corporation tax may be set against capital gains tax
• tax-free lump sum of occupational pension schemes limited to £150,000
• no increases in excise duties on tobacco, alcohol and petrol;
differential of 5p introduced in favor of unleaded petrol
• switch to cash accounting allowed for VAT payments for small 
companies
1988
• tax thresholds and personal allowances raised
• rate structure of personal income tax reduced from 6 brackets to 2,
one at 25% and one at 40%
• increased taxation of company cars
• taxation of various fringe benefits, i.e. entertaining overseas 
business persons
• tax relief for non-charitable covenants and the costs of planting and 
running new plantations eliminated
• limit of £500,000 on the amount a company can raise through the 
Business Expansion Scheme
• reform of the taxation of husband and wife planned for 1990
• Capital gains tax: 1) amnesty for capital gains tax liabilities
incurred prior to April 1982; 2) separate capital gains tax rate of 
30% abolished with capital gains brought more into relationship with
income tax, subject to the taxpayer's highest marginal rate
• small company tax rate reduced to 25% (main rate of corporation tax 
at 35%)
• inheritance tax structure reduced from four rates to one, at 40%
• tax relief on mortgage interest on loans (after April 6, 1988) used
to purchase a home for a dependent relative or former or separated
spouse; mortgage interest relief to apply to residences rather than 
borrowers
• some excise duties raised, i.e. on beer, wine, cigarettes and petrol
1989
• tax thresholds and personal allowances raised
• introduction of the community charge (poll tax) in Scotland
• reform of NICs: 1) reduced number of rates with one at 2% (on the 
first £43) and one at 9% above that; 2) abolition of the earnings 
rule
• inflation-adjusted ceiling on the size of occupational pension funds 
qualifying for tax relief
• increased taxation on company cars
• VAT extended to commercial building and utilities (obliged by 
decision of the European Court)
• tax relief limits to pensions paid out on earnings of a maximum of 
£60,000 (applicable to pension schemes set up after March 1989)
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• tax relief for private medical insurance
• new rules on the taxation of capital transfers
• raise annual limits on amount that may be invested in a PEP and be 
exempt from tax
• restrictions on life assurance company practices, but abolition of 
the life assurance policy duty (from January 1990)
• excise duties not raised
Appendix C
List of Interviewees
In France:
Name
Philippe Auberger
Raymond Barre 
Jean-Pascal Beaufret
Pierre Bilger 
Patrick Careil
Jean Choussat 
Georges Egret
Philippe Lagayette
date & place 
of interview
Paris, Nov. 8, 1993
Paris, June 2, 1992 
Paris, May 14, 1992
Paris, April 28, 1992
Paris, May 25, 1992
Paris, May 12, 1992 
Paris, May 7, 1992
Paris, May 20, 1992
(former)position
representative for economic and financial affairs to the 
prime mininster's office, 1974-76; sous-directeur in the 
Ministry of the Economy and Finance; adviser on tax 
questions to Jacques Chirac and the RPR; author of 
L'Allergie Fiscale (1984) 
prime minister
charge de mission a la direction du Tr6sor; technical 
adviser to Laurent Fabius
charge de mission a la direction du Budget; technical 
adviser to Jean-Pierre Fourcade; sous-directeur a la 
direction du Budget; directeur du cabinet de Maurice Papon, 
minister for the Budget
charge de mission au Service de la Legislation Fiscale,- 
rapporteur, commission d'etude sur 1'institution eventuelle 
d'un prelevement sur les grosses fortunes; technical adviser 
to Jacques Delors and Laurent Fabius; chef du Service de la 
Legislation Fiscale; charge de mission aupres Pierre 
Beregovoy
chef de service a la direction du Budget; directeur du 
Budget
directeur du service fiscal du CNPF; member of the finance 
section of the Economic and Social Council; secretaire 
general du groupement francais de 1'Association Fiscale 
International
directeur du cabinet de Jacques Delors; 2eme sous- 
gouverneur, Banque de France
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In France:
Name
Yves Mansion 
Jean Meo 
Yvon Ollivier
Francois Xavier Stasse 
Michel Taly
In Britain:
John Biffen
Baron Arthur Cockfield
Peter Cropper 
Douglas French
List of Interviewees (cont'd)
date & place 
of interview
(former)position
Paris, June 2, 1992
Reuil Malmaison,
May 18, 1992 
Paris, May 14, 1992
Paris, June 2, 1992 
Paris, June 22, 1992
charg6 de mission, direction du Budget; technical adviser to 
P. B6r€govoy; adjoint directeur du cabinet de P. B£r6govoy 
author of Atout France (1980); secretaire-general adjoint et 
conseiller pour les affaires 6conomiques et sociales au RPR 
chef de bureau, Direction Generale des Impots; sous- 
directeur au Ministere du Budget; detache en qualite de 
directeur g€n£rale des impots
technical adviser on the economy/budget to President 
Mitterrand
chef du Service de la Legislation Fiscale
London, June 20, 1991 
London, June 11, 1991
London, June 10, 1991
London, July 3, 1991
Chief Secretary to the Treasury; Leader, House of Commons 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue; Minister of State, HM 
Treasury; adviser on tax policy to the Conservative Party 
and the Chancellor of the Exchequer
special adviser on taxation to the Conservative Party and to 
the Chief Secretary to the Treasury; special adviser to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer; Conservative Research 
Department
assistant to Sir Geoffrey Howe, Shdow Chancellor; special 
adviser to the Chancellor of the Exchequer; Chairman of the 
Bow Group
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List of Interviewees (cont'd)
In Britain:
Name
Martin Holmes
Sir John Hoskyns
John Kay 
Hermione Parker
Sir Adam Ridley
Ann Robinson 
Cedric Sandford
Sir Alfred Sherman
date & place (former)position
of interview
Oxford, June 17, 1991
London, June 11, 1991
London, July 2, 1991
London, June 11, 1991
London, May 30, 1991
London, June 18, 1991
Bath, June 6, 1991
London, May 21, 1991
academic and author of several books on the Thatcher 
governments
head of prime minister's policy unit; Director-General, 
Institute of Directors
Director of the Institute for Fiscal Studies
assistant to John Biffen; researcher, Institute of Economic
Affairs
economic adviser to the shadow cabinet and Assistant 
director, Conservative Research Department, 1974-79; 
special adviser to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1979-84 
co-author Tax Policy-making in the United Kingdom (1983) ; 
head of policy unit, Institute of Directors 
member of Meade Committee on the Reform of Direct Taxation; 
professor of political economy at Bath University; director 
of Bath University's Centre for Fiscal Studies; co-author 
of Tax Policy-making in the United Kingdom (1983) ; author of 
several books on taxation; tax expert
co-founder, Centre for Policy Studies and Director of 
Studies; adviser to Conservative Party and Mrs. Margaret 
Thatcher, Shadow leader
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